The development of the Soviet machine tool industry, 1917-1941 by Cooper, Julian M
THE DE.'YELOFNENT OF THE SGVU.! MACHINE TOOL ThDUSTuY 
1917 - t)n 
Julian M. Cooper 
Thesis submitted for ihe 
degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
in the Faculty of CommE-rce 
ancl Social Science , Universttv 
of B irMlnghal!l . 
Seotember 19'75 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
University of Birmingham Research Archive 
 
e-theses repository 
 
 
This unpublished thesis/dissertation is copyright of the author and/or third 
parties. The intellectual property rights of the author or third parties in respect 
of this work are as defined by The Copyright Designs and Patents Act 1988 or 
as modified by any successor legislation.   
 
Any use made of information contained in this thesis/dissertation must be in 
accordance with that legislation and must be properly acknowledged.  Further 
distribution or reproduction in any format is prohibited without the permission 
of the copyright holder.  
 
 
 
Synopsis 
The Deve".opment of the Soviet Machine Tool Industry, 1917-1941 
Julian M .Cooper 
The thesis is devoted to an examination of the creation and development 
of the Soviet machine tool industry in the inter-War years . It opens 
with a brief review of the low level of machine tool buildin~ before 
the October Revolution 1 an~ then considers the revival and changing 
priorities of the inoustry during the 1920s. After a review of the 
intensive development of the branch during the first three Five-year 
Plans, particular aspects are considered in detail . The overall strategy 
of the industry , involving decisions relating to production s pecialis-
ation and technology , is analysed, together with a study of the role 
of process and parts specialisation. A major problem facing the industry 
was that of the choice of machine tool technology; this question is 
examined 1n detail, and followed by a consideration of the influence 
of technical progress,and the creation of a research and development 
system in the branch . The limited role of foreign technical assistance 
and the much granter role of imports are discussed. Further chapters 
are devote~ to the problems of developing a skilled labour force and 
of buildin~ new enterprises . It is concluded that the nevelopment of 
the Soviet machine tool in~ustry was on the whole a successful 
achievement 1 offering some lessons for present-day developing countries . 
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INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is devoted to an examination of the for mation and development 
of the machine t ool industry in the Soviet Uni on in the int er -War years . It 
provides an historical review and also a study of a number of parti cular 
features of the organisati on and economics of the industry, including the 
specialisation of production, the choice of technology , problems of technical 
progress and the role of imports and foreign technical assistance . 
The machine tool is the basic production equipment of the engineering 
industry • The appearance and development of machine tool building was a crucial 
element of the Industrial Revolution in England in the late 18th and early 19th 
centuries: as Marx wrote in Capital , it was onl y the the construction of machines 
by machines which gave modern industry a fitting technic~l foundation and allowed 
it to'stand on its own feet ' . The great industrial s t rength of Britain in the 
nineteenth century,and later of Germany and the United States , was f ounded on 
the possession of a strong machine tool industry ,whicb produced the technical 
means required : or raising productivity throughout the economy . But the possession 
of a powerful machine tool industry gave two further advant ages of immense 
importance for securing economic and political strength on a world scale : first, 
it secured a high degree of technical independence from other countries ; second, 
it provided a vital source of equipment for bui lding up a modern, machine based 
defence capacity ~ and a related ability to quickly expand military production in 
the event of war. These considerations are vital to an understanding of the 
role of machine tools and machine tool building in Soviet industrialisation. The 
acquisition of a capacity to independently produce machine tools was not just 
~element of an economic development strategy, it was also a matter of crucial 
strategic importance for the Soviet Union attempting to build the foundations 
of a socialist society in the circumstances of capitalist encirclement. 
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It is a basic premise of the present work that the development of tioviet 
machine tool building cannot be understood in isolation from this fact of the 
international environment in which the Soviet Union found herself in the pre-War 
years . At least three industrially advanced capitalist countries possessed strong 
machine tool industries developed over a number of decades , each having certain 
characteristic features of organisation and type of product. For the Soviet 
Union these capitalist machine t ool industries were a source of s~pply of 
industrial equipment , and also models of possible industrial forms which could, 
or could not, be replicated by the domestic machine tool branch. The machines 
themselves were often regarded critically, but were purchased and used . Forms 
of industrial organisation were another matter , however, in so far as they bore 
the stamp of the capitalist social relations ~ithin which they developed . Thus 
we are concerned here with the Soviet perception of these f orms of organisation 
and the learnin~ process by which it was determined what f eatures were specific 
to machine tool building as an activity ,and ~rhat features were characteristic 
of the capitalist system as such. In a number of sections , therefore , a quite 
detailed analysis is provi ded of the contemporary pract ices of the machine tool 
industries of Germany , the United States and Britain , with particular attention 
to the basic tendencies of development . But the interaction of two different 
economic sy.tems bad other implications in the 1930s. Given that the Soviet Union 
was attempting to achieve the technical-economic level of the industrially advancej 
capitalist countries , it could not ignore the current course of development 
of these countries ; the state of health of their economies and t he rate and forms 
of technical progress . In the period we are concerned with the overriding fact 
was the economic crisis which convulsed the capitalist economies at the very time 
when Soviet industrialisation was at its most intense phase . An attempt is ~ade 
to analyse the interaction of the crisis and Soviet machine tool buildln~ • wtth 
emphasis on the question of technical progress . 
There has been no work in English specifically devoted to the early years of 
the Soviet machine tool indust ry . The onl y book to consider certain aspects of 
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study. Another quite useful work is the short book by M.S .Zhed' published 1n 19461, 
This is prim:u:1ly cievoted to a review of the economics of the machine tool a.nd 
tooling industry , but also has a short historical introduction containing s ome 
material on the pre-War period not obtainable elsewhere , Nention must also 
be made of the only history of the Russian and Soviet engineering industry as a 
whole~ This book by Rozenfel'd and ~limeako is a comprehensive and scholarly work 
containing useful sections on the machine tool building branch. 
With the exception of the last namec book all the works mentioned were published 
before 1960. Since then no new books have appeared , but 1n recent years there 
have been signs of a revival of interest in the history of the machine tool 
industry with t he appearance of a numb~r of doctoral theses and articles. Examples 
are Ku~.netsova' s study of sorne aspects of the industry durin.<; the ?irst Five-year 
Plan period) , Volkova's work on the Moscow Party organisation and the development 
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of the industry in the same period , Puchko's thesis on the Ukrainian machine 
tool 1ndustry5 , and Zinich' s articles on the machine tool in i ustry during the 
6 War years . This recent work makes much greater use of contemporary primary 
source material , including archive sources , and i s generally of a higher academic 
level than all previous studies . 
Other s~uroes used include factory histories , over a dozen of which have 
appeared since the War, including several of looal,republican publication . These 
histories of ~chine tool factories tend to be rather superficial , but quite 
substantial monographs h~ve been written on at least two leading enterprises , 
the imenl Sverdlova works 1n Le'lingrad7 and the Kha.r' kov drilling machine factory~ 
Some recently published memoirs have also orov1ded useful material on t he 
machinetool industry. 9 The primary sources employed in the thesis are contemporary 
newspapers and journaJs , above all Za Industrializatsiyu , the main 1n'•ustr1al 
paper of the period ( : rom 1937 , Mashinostroenie) , and the machine tool indus t1y 's 
v 
own journal, Stanki i Instrument , founded 1n the summer of 1930. A particularly 
valuable source is the verbatim report of the f irst All-Union Conference on 
t·:achine Tool Building of June 1933 .10 In general 1 t must be said that the 
material proved to be much richer than was thought likely at the outset of research 
For a number of reasons the thesis is devoted exclusively to the production 
and use of metal-cutting machine tools • It does not discuss metal-forming 
machine tools (l.e.presses , hammers, bending machines ,etc .,working metal by 
the exertion of pressure) or the cutting tools used by the machine tools. Hetal-
forming machines were built on a relatively small scale in the period in quest.ion 
and at different enterprises from cutting-type machines. Cutting tools are of 
course crucial to the operation of machL~e tools , but their production is a 
different activity with its own distinct features . In the case of Soviet in·•ustry 
the specialised production of cutting tools was organisationally closely related 
to the building of machine tools , but a very large proportion of tools were in 
fact made by engineering factories themselves and by other non-specialised 
producers . 11 Finally,it is evident that information on theproduction of metal-
forming machines and tooling is very sparse in comparison with that available 
on cutting machines . 
foletal- cutting machine tools (metallorezhushchie sta.nk1) shape metal by 
applying a moving cutting tool to a stationary workpiece, or a stationary tool 
to a moving workpiece. The cutting tool is generally made of very hard alloy 
metal or , 1n the case of grinding machines , of abrasive materials . For machines 
of the l a the group the workpiece if usually rotated between centres and cut by 
a stationary tool; in the case of turret lathes a number of tools are held in 
a rotating head , and semi-automatic and automatic lathes provide different degrees 
of automation of the processes of tool selection and the feed of the workpiece . 
For machines of the milling group the metal is cut by rotating milling cutters, 
while for drilling machines holes are cut by a rotating cutting tool. A number 
6 .Notably ,M .s .Zinich , "Iz istorii stankostroeniya 1 tyazhelgo mashinostroeniya v 
pervo1 period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny" ,Istoriya SSSR , 1971 .~o.6. 
? .Borisov ,G. and Vasil ' ev ,S . ,Stankostroitel'n~i imeni Sverd1ova ,L., 1962. 
8 .Khar ' kovskii Stankostroitel ' nyi ,Khar ' kov , 19 8. 
9.Notably ,Gudov ,I. ,Sud ' ba rabochego ,M. ,1970. t i n d 
h i po stankos roen yu, • • • 10.Stenog;ammy - pervogo vsesoyuznogo soveshc an ya . bra Moscow) . 
duplicated. (in the State Public Science and Technology Li ry' 
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of types have a reciprocating action , involving the backward and for~ard motion 
of the cutting tool over the workpiece , or of the workpiece under the tool . 
Thus planing machines are ~enerally large and have a fixed tool(s) and a 
workpiece attached to a reciprocatin~ bed, whereas shaping machines are smaller 
and have a reciprocatin~ tool. Slotting machines wnrk on a similar principle to 
shaping machines , but make slot-shaped cuts . Gears are cut on a range of 
dif ~erent types of gear- c utting Machines , often involving mll llng,shaping , planing 
and other basic process es • Grinding machines take a variety of forms depending 
on the nature of the workpiece and the type of work to be performed, the basic 
types being cylindrical, surface, i nternal , centreless , and tool grinding 
machines . Broaching machines have an elongated, toothed cutting tool which i s 
pushed or pulled over the surface to be cut . Honing machines finish or enlarge 
holes by an abrasive action . Within each basic type group there are very many 
vari ants and diff erent si~est the great diversity of products is one of the 
characteristic features of the machine tool in1ust ry . 
The thesis begins with a brief background review of the state of machine 
tool building in Russia bef ore t he October rlevolution . The developments of the 
1920s are then discussed , showing the continuity witb the past a nd the steps 
towards t~e formation of a special ised industry . Chapter Three provides an overview 
of developments between 1929 and 1941 • The following ten chapters examine 
in detail particular aspects of the machine tool industry ' s developm -nt in this 
period . Some factual issues are discussed in ~ppendices , notably the administrative 
arrangements of the industry , its factories, the different vari~nts of the Five-year 
Plans for machine tool building , and the structure of machine t ool installations 
during the perio1 1919-1934 . Some problems are also examined in detailed appendices: 
comparison of the Soviet and American machine tool stocks , military production 
and the demand for machine tools and the role of cont inuous flow production. A 
summary chronology is provided in ~ppendi~ Eight , and all the main statistical 
materials are gathered in a final Statistical Appendix. 
11 .Almost two-thirds of al l tools were produced outside the specialised industry 
in 1940 - Zhed' , op. c1t, p . 18 . 
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Chapter 1 
MACHINE TOCL ,t;UILDING IN RUSSIA BEFORE Tilt REVOLUTION 
The First Russian Machine Tool "Builders 
The beginn~s of machine production in Russia date from the time of Peter 
the Great and were closely linked with the production of armaments. The very 
first Russian machine tools were built by a talented engineer, A.K.Nartov, 
in the royal workshops . In 1712 Nartov built a copying lathe incorporating a 
mechanical slide rest, long before the English machine builder Kaudslay,wbo is 
1 
g~nerally credited with the invention of the modern machine tool. Nartov's 
work had very litt le influence on subsequent machine development , however, 
while Maudslay's provided one o: the crucial technical means associated with 
the Industrial Revolution . The early arms factories established in the eighte~nth 
century built many of their own machine tools , some of great originality, and 
the first prtvate enterprise machine tool building took place at the 'Berda' 
factory ,.founded in St .Petersburg 1n 1790. This factory was one of only two 
enterprises in Russia in the nineteenth century which trained workers in the arts 
of machine tool building s i t took from ten to fifteen years to fully train a 
2 
s killed craftsman. 
Before the Crimean War the Russian engineering industry was ext r emely weak 
and needs were met primarily from imports . After the War the Tsarist government 
t ook measures to promote ship-building, railway constr uction and military production. 
Tariffs on machinery were intr oduced in 1868 and· were particularly e.:f'fective 
in f ostering the domestic production of rail transport machinery. The 1890s 
were years of quite rapid development of machine building , output rising from 
3 
50 million rubles in 1887 to 209 million rubles in 1900 . The industrial crisis 
of 1900 to 1903 ended the decade of advance 1 many factories closed down, while 
a general process of product diversification intensified the already marked 
universalism o"'f production . It was not really unti l 1909 that the Ruesian 
1.Britk1n,A.S . and Vidonov,S.S., Yydayushchi1$Ya mashinostroit&l ' XVIII vekaa 
A ,K,Nartov ,M. ,1950,p.24 . 
2 .0cherkii 1stor 11 tekhniki v Ross11,M . ,197J ,p . JJO . SSSR M 1961 p 47 
J .Rozenfel'd ,S.A. and Klimenko,K.I.,Istori:Ya masbinostroeniya ' ., ' • • 
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engineering industry really resumed its expansion . Many f actories were enlarged 
and reequipped at this time giving rise to a large demand for industrial equ1p~ent. 
In the immediate pre- War period new , advanced-technology branches of machine 
building began to develop, notably the building of motor vehicles and aircraf t. 
In 1914 the ' Russo-Baltic' factory built 140 cars , incorporating a large share 
of imported parts and materials . The low level of vehicle production , a branch 
which exerted a powerful influence on machine tool building and production 
technolon 1n general before the First ~<orld War, deprived the Russian machine 
tool builders of a vital stimulus to development. The electrical engineering 
industry , which grew rapidly 1n the pre-War decade predominantly under the control 
of German capital , was marked by a high technical level, but many components were 
imported and technical skills were largely supplied by foreign specialists. A 
similar phenomenon wae typical of another branch which in the ~'lest exerted a 
major influence on machine tool design . Thie was sewing machine building , 
concentrated at one large f actory at Podol ' sk owned by the American Singer company . 
This high precision production probably had little influence on the Russian 
engineering industry , because Singer imported almost al l the equipment and many 
of the semi-fabricates and parts, whlle ~11 design work was undertaken in the USA. 1 
The technolog ically most advanced and best equipped Russi an owned engineering 
factory before the Revolution was probably the small Semenov works in St .Petereburg . 
This factory built automatic cigarette making machinery of independent design on 
a batch basis using American machine tools of the latest types. In 1910 it was 
reported th~t Semenov was planning to start the production of American 'Prentice' 
l athes , but it is not known whether this was achieved.2 Other branches of ~achine 
bui lding which exerted an influence on machine tool building in the West were 
almost non-existent in Russia r these included bicycle making, the ouilding of 
printing machinery and of typewriters. 
1 Rozenfel ' d and Klimenko op .cit p .107. This experience was not unique to ~uss1a . 
• ' - ' ith hines made by The large Sin(J'er works in Scotland was equipped largely w mac 
Singer themselves and did little to advance the Bri tish machine tool ~du~;~· 
See Saul,S.B .,Technologlcal change& the United States and Britain in ~ 
centu;y ,Lonrlon,1970,p.161 . f t b e the 
2.The tron age,16.6.1910,pp . 1462-1463 (After the Revolution this ac ory ecam 
imeni M.Gel ' tsa tobacco machinery works) 
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Machine Tools 1n Russian Industry before the First World War 
Throughout the entire period from tbe initi al establishment of t be Russian 
engineering industry to the beginning of the First 1'4orld ~/ar the overwhelming 
majority of raachine tools 1n use 1n industry were of foreign manufacture. A 
survey undertaken in 18?5 by the Russian Technical Society revealed that almost 
all machine tools were of foreign origin , mainly imported from Britain.1 The 
tot~ number of machines at this time was very smalls in 18?1 there were 165 
metal working f actories h~ving a.n average of twenty machine tools each, giving 
a total stock of over 3 , 000 units.2 In the mid-1880s the structure of the stock 
was approxtmately as follows 1 lathes 45 per cent of the t otal, drilling and 
boring machines 18 per cent , planing and shaping machines 20 per cent, milling 
machines 5 per cent and gear-cutting machines 3 per cent.3 The general l ack 
of specialisation of industry ~1scouraged the use of specialised types of 
machines then being developed tn the United St ates and Britain. 
In the l ast decade of the ntneteenth century the British machine tool builders , 
who h~d s upplied the bulk of machines imported into Russia up to that time , began 
t o be strongly challenged by Ger~n firms . while German machines were no better 
in design or qu~ity than those of Britain or America, the German suppliers had 
the advantage of cl oser links with the Tsarist government and considerable 
capital holdings in machine using branches of industry. Ther e were charges t hat 
Ger many sol d inferior quality machine tools to Russia at prices below those 
charged on her own domestic market , some of the machines t aking t~e form of 
special 'export goods ' •4 In the im~ediate pre- War period the American machine 
tool industry began to show increased i nterest in the Russian market and made 
some inroads into the German market share. 
The relative proportions of machine tools built in Russia and imported are 
shown in value terms in Table 1.II , whi ch clearly reveals the s ubstantial 
dependence on imports and t~e f act that this dependence did not decrease in the 
immediate pre-war period. The proportions in physical terms are not known , but 
1.Rozenfel'd and Klimenko ,op c1t, p .90 . 6 4J9 2 .Strumi l1n ,S .G.,Ocherk1 ekonomicheskoi istori1 Ross11,M.,19 O,pt. •iya SSSR M 
C S A O~:P.~~.!_P:~i~s~t~o~r~i~i~s~t~an~k~o=.s~r~o~e:!!n.!.::.oi_~..;;;...;:;;.;;;.;;..; • • ' 3.A1zenshtadt ,L.A.and hlkhachev, •• ,~c er po 
195? ,p.99 . 
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an approximation is provided be data from the 1932 Census of metal-working 
equipment. This provides the following information about the machines in the 
4 
civilian machine tool stock of the country in April 1932 which were installed 
before 1914. 
Table 1.1 
The pre-\.ar fllachine Tools 1n the Stock of April 1932 
Year of Total no. Foreign machines 
Origin 
_( ~·of 
of foreign machines 
installation* ;, 
foreilln machines) 
in stock No . o-~" total Germany USA Britain Other 
Before 1900 11,796 8,479 71.9 48.9 11.7 18.1 20 .3 
1901 - 1907 8,217 5,834 71.0 50.0 14 .. 3 10.1 25.6 
1908 - 1913 14,f305 11,195 75.6 46.0 25.5 9.0 27.6 
* or year built in a few cases where ye~ installed not known. 
Source: compiled from Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR ,M.,1935,p.72. 
Thi s information must be treated with caution because the rate of scrapping of 
machines of different countries of origin between 1913 and 1932 is not known. 
F urtherMore, the census does not cover enterprises engaged in military production , 
oz· those Russian engineering enterprises located beyond the boundaries of the 
USSR, in particular those located in Poland. Other sources refer to a much higher 
sh~re of German imports ,e.g. a contemporary source stated that the German 
proportion of machine tool imports in the ye~rs 1906-1910 averaged 76.5 per cent 
by weight and 78.4 per cent by value.5 It is possible that German machines were 
of lower quality than those of Britain and America and that a larger proportion 
were removed from the stock between 1913 and 1932. The total magnitude of the 
machine tool stock on the eve of the war is not known, but a survey in 1908 gave 
a total of 75,000 metal-cutting machine tools in the economy and 18 ,000 units 
6 of metal-forming equipment. 
Machine Tool Building in Russia bef ore the First World War 
Disregarding the early efforts of individual inventors and the government 
4.Plotnikoff,rLS.,"Tbe mechanical industry in Russla",The Russian Economist, 
Vol.1,No.4,July-Sept.,1921,p.1160. 
5.Rozenfel'd and Kltmenko,op c1t,p.106, citing a report of 1913 . 
6 .Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958godu, M., 1959,p.156. 
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military enterprises , coMaercial aachlne tool building in Russia effectively dates 
from 1S70 , when a number of do~estically produced machines were shown at the 
All-Russian ~:anu""acturlng Exhibition, including radial-dri lling and planing 
machines built by the Broaley factory 1.n filoscow and machines built by the 
Lessner and Nobel factories of St .Petersburg •1 New producers exhibiti.n,; 1n 18~2 
at a national industrial exhibition 1n Moscow included t he Putilov and Veikhel't 
factories and a number of newly established Itrms, including the Grachev works 
in Moscow and 'Gerlyakh and Pul'st' of Warsaw.2 The railway boom of the 1880s 
and 1890s , coupled with the introduction of a tariff on imported machinery 
provided some incentive for domestic machine tool building towards the end of the 
nineteenth century and the nwaber of f"actories involved increased. The machines 
were generally of a heavy and simple kind suitable for use 1n railway repair shops. 
Two ambitious attempts to establi~h specialised machine tool factories met with 
failure . The French owned Khar'kov locomotive works had a special machine t ool 
building shop from the m1d-1890s which built a wide range of machines, including 
light lathes , radial rlrllling 'llachines and special equipment for working armour 
plate. This enterprise proved unprofitable and it was closed down after i'ire 
destroyed the sbop in the early 1900s.J A similar story was repeated at the 
Chernomorsk factory in Nikolaev , a factory buil t at the end of the 1890s , with 
t._,e involvement of French capital, specifically for m.achi.ne tool building. The 
firm bull t mlll ing fl'lachines and turret lathes of French design , but despite 1.ts 
modern equipment and ll;overnment support sales were inadequate and after a fire 
in 1904 the works was closed down .4 A aajor factor in the failure of these 
atte~pts to establish specialised ~chine tool building in Russia was clearly 
the abrupt cCintr;a.ction of the market after 1900. At the 1896 Nizhny Novgorod 
Exhibition twenty one Russian machine tool builders were represented, the majority 
of exhibits being lathes .5 But during the years of the depression from 1900 to 1908 
the output of machine tool~ contracted and the number of factories involved fell 
1.A1zenshtadt and Chi khachev,op cit,p.120 . 
2.ibid . 0 82 
J.ib1d. ,p . 1481 Sots1al1sticheskaya rekonstruktsiya 1 nauka,1932,No.9-1 ,p. • 
4 . 1bid • 
.5 . Alzenshtad t and C h1khachev , op cit, p .129. 
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sharplyt output 1n 1908 was only half tb~t of 1900.1 
Durin~ the five years before the outbreak of tlar machine tool bulldin~ 
developed quite strongly . This expansion is shown in Table 1.11 • O~ut rose 
by 2.2 times between 1910 and 1913, whlle imports rose by over 2 .8 tiaes. Of 
the forty enteprises building machine tools 1n 1914 , fifteen were workshops 
of a semi-handicraft nature employing up to fifteen workers and bulldin~ machine 
tools ::ts part of a diverse range of Jlletal products . A second group of f1fteon 
rather larger factories having over a hundred wor~ers also built some machine 
tools alongside other products - many o: this group were located in Poland and 
Latvia. A third group was composed of a number of very large engineering works 
which built aAChine tools to meet their own demands , but occasionally for the 
market when conditions were f avourable. This group included the Put1lov works 
and a number of railway equipment factories. A final small group of four enterprises , 
(the 'Cerlyak.h and Pul ' st' factory 1n Warsaw, the Bromley .Brothers factory 1n 
Moscow , the 'Phoenix' works 1n St.Petersburg and the 'Fel ' zer' works in Riga) 
was the most important, but the first named was the only one which could be 
considered a specialised machine tool ftrm. Machine tools represented about a 
third of the output of t he other three enteprises 1n 1913 . 1 The 'Gerl yakh and 
Pul' st • factory specialised 1n machine tool building from 1908J equipped with 
modern American machine tools,it produced a range of types, some on a batch 
basis. Products built included m11lingmach1nes,wh1ch were sold to f irms making 
guns, ammunition and sewl.ng m.achioes, suggesting a high level of precision, This 
2 
factory had a basic capital of one million rubles 1n 1913 and employed 750 workers . 
The ' Bromley' factory was ""ounded 1n 18.57 and built machine tools from 1870, lll8.1nly 
for the railway repair s hops. In 1913 1,300 workers were employed and capital 
am~uoted to three million rubles. Output in that year included 92 machine tools 
of twelve different types, indicating a low level of special1sat1on.3 The 'Phoenix' 
works of St.Petersburg was founded by a Scot , James Muirhead, in t867 and began 
bullding machine tools to individual order 1n the 1890s. In 1897 it becar:;e a joint 
t.Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev,op cit,pp.145-147. 
2 . 1bid.,pp.148 and 1.54;The iron a.ge ,16.6 . 1910J . pp . 1461- 1462. 
3 AlZenshtadt and Chtkhachev,op oit,op.149- 150;0marovski1,A.G.,Soyetskoe 
·atroenie 1 ego rol' v industriailzatsii strany,M . ,1948 , pp .153-160. 
stanko-
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stock company and from this time the British machine tool firm ' Gr eenwood and 
Batley' began to acquire shares and lat er gained fin~ial control • The majority 
of the administrative personnel were British. Machine tools , generally of a 
heavy and simple t ype, were built primariQy to the order of the Navy and the 
rail way workshops , t~e models being copies of old foreign designs. On the eve 
of the War ?50 workers were employed, 1 Foreign i nfluence was also dominant 
at the Riga ' Fel'zer' works, where a large proportion of the technical personnel 
and workers were from Germany , This f actory,founded 1n 18?4, built machine tools 
from 1896, mainly of heavy types for railway workshops, alongside diesel engines , 
turbines , boilers and pumps. In 1913 this works employed 1,200 people .2 
The Influence of Govern~ent Policy on Russian Machine To0l Building 
The Tsarist government directly infl uenced the development of machine tool 
buil~ ing through two channels, namely tariff policy and the placing of orders. 
Although ostensibly protecti~e in intention , both these factors did little to 
foster t he domestic pro~uction of machine tools of a quality adequate to compete 
with imported products and on balance may have exerted a negative influence. 
During the 1860s and'70s machinery and equipment entered Russia duty free , but 
in 1882 a tariff of 90 kopecks per pud was introduced for machinery and of 
1 ruble 40 kopecks for locomotives.3 This measure di d help to establish the 
domestic production of rail equipment , and also created a demand for relatively 
simple, heavy machines for equipping the railway repair workshops . By the 1890s 
the tariff had been raised to 4r. 50k. per pud , and in 1910 the rate stood at 
4r.20k., but if additional necessary minor costs were added the effective rate was 
about 5 rubles per pud .4 But whereas normal European tariff practice attempted 
t o discriminate between types of machines , with differential rates according 
to weight and complexity , the Russian tariff took the form of a single standard 
rate per unit weight of machine. This policy had the inevitable outcome of 
~ 
protecting the buildingkheavy, simple machine tools, while lighter, more complex 
1.Borisov,G. and Vasil'ev,S.,Stankostroitel'nyi imeni Sve ·dlova ,L.,1962 ,pp.J - 6J . 
2.A1zenshtadt and Cbikhachev,op cit,pp.153-154; Sotsialisticheskaya rekonstruktsiya 
i nauka,1932 ,No .9- 10,p.82 . 
J,Ocherk1 istorii tekhnik1 v Rossi!, op cit ,p.JJ1. 
4,Rozenfel 'd and Klimenko,op cit ,p.106 . 
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Table !.II 
Russian Hachine Tool Building - Factories, Production and Imports 
1908 - 1913 
Production ('OOOpre-~ar r.} Imports ( ' OOOpre-\lar r..) Domestic prod.n .as 
Number of _w.1th1n~l5 ari~s Qft I Including Excluding per cent 
Year factories Russia USSR duty duty tetal salae 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) {6) 
1908 1,8~1.3 6?1 . 8 
1910 34 1,507.6 7?8.? 6,9.56 4,63? 1?.8(24.5) 
1911 35 2,3?4.4 1 ,4?2 .? 11,118 ? ,412 1?.6(24.) ) 
1912 42 2,~13.2 1,820.3 12,0.5? 8 ,038 18.9(25.9) 
1913 3 .34?.0 
2 
2,1~2.0 19,182 12,788 14.9(20.?) 
1.Pre1940 boundaries. 
2 . In physical terms 1,490 units (or 1,~00 1 within present-day boundaries) (Zhed'~.S ., 
~prosy ekonoi'A1Jd. st.ankoinstrUJilental ' noi promysblennosti, l<i ., 1946 ,P .6: N arodnoe 
khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958g.,M. ,1959 ,p.231) 
Sources a 
(1) Aizenshtadt and Ch1khachev , op c1t, pp.139 and 145. 
(2) Omarovsk11,op cit , p .46, 1910-13 data also g iven by Sistema 1 organ1zatslya, 
1926,,io .4,p.11. 
(J) o~arovek11 ,loc.c1t . 
(4) Calculated from Aralov ,S.I . and Shatkhan ,A.S .(eds. ) ,Promyshlennyi import-
ltogi i perspektivv, M.-L.,19JO , p.140. Thi s source estimates that cus toms 
duty and various commercial expenses were equivalent to half the value of 
machine tool imports. The source also stresses the approximate nature of 
the import data . 
(5) as (4) . 
(6) Tot al sales taken as producti on (2), plus i mports including duty (4) . 
Proportion of sales plus imports excl~ing duty shown 1n brackets, ( • • ). 
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machines could not be profitably built domestically and needs were met to a 
considerable extent by imports. The systematic bias against the domestic production 
of progressive t ypes is illustrated by the following table 1 
Table t . III 
The Duty on Imnorted Machine Tools 
Type of Price per Duty as a oercentage of the price of the machine 
mc.tool pud weitht Weight categories (Qud) Up to 100 100 - 600 600 or more 
Lathes Over 15r. 20 - -
I 
10 - 15r. - 32 -
10r .or less - 50 60 --
Planing I Over 11r . 27 - -machines 
lOr .or less - 37 71 
Drilling Over 11r. 27 - -
machines 10r.or less 50 60 -
Milling Over 15r. 20 21 -
machines 
30 1,5r .or less - -
- f--
Special Over 20r. 18 - -
machines 20r .or less 28 - -
Sourcet Aizenshtadt and Ch1khachev , op .cit,p .142; original source,Vestn1k 
inzhenerov, 1915,no.7 . 
-
Thus a light and complex (high price per unit weight) milling machine entered 
the country with a duty of 20 per cent of its price; but a heavy, simple l athe 
with a duty of 60 per cent . One writer estimated th~t a light (100 pud, or 
1,638kg. ) domestical ly produced lathe cost fifteen per cent more th~n the 
equivalent imported machine after payment of the duty, but a heavy lathe of 
300 pud (4, 912 kg.) could be produced at a price equal to that of an equivalent 
imported machine1• 
The acti on of the government ordering policy was similarly contradict ory. On 
the one hand , the placing of orders for machines required by the railway r epair 
t .Byulleten' konventsii sind1katov metallicheskoi promyshlennosti' 1925-26 ,No .10-12; 
p .155. 
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shops and military a~ 1nistrat1ons secured the Russian Machine tool builders with 
a market and was responsible for fostering the machine tool building activity of a 
nu.~ber of engineering factories in the 1880s and '90s. On the other hand, the 
s)'ltem of ordering did little to encour~e the bullding of machines of high quality 
or advanced design . The machines needed for the repair shops were generally of 
simple types of low accuracy; the orders were haphazard and , as a rule, the 
government adopted a pollqof awarding contracts to the lowest bidder thereby 
providing no incenttve for quality improvement.1 This policy, not surprisingly, 
d id not meet the interests of the machine users. During the period 1896 to 1905 
the railway repair shops were obl~ed to buy ttussian-bu1lt machines: their costs 
rose to the extent that they could not compete with the locomotive factories 
which carried out re~~1r using imported equipment. The rail workshops therefore 
2 pressed the government to permit them to import machine tools. The net result 
of the Tsarist governmenth policies for supporting machine tool building was 
probably negative. They protected the high-cost production of backll•ard machines, 
while increasing the country's dependence on foreign suppliers for all but the 
simplest and heaviest types. The extent of this dependence was to become acutely 
apparent in the early period of the War. 
Machine Tool .Building during the War, 1914-191?. 
The inadequacy of the eaglnePring industry was brutally revealed to the Russian 
!Overnment 1n the early months of the ~ar. The arms factories were unable to supply 
the required gune and a~ua1t1on, and the machine building industry was quite 
unable to supply the technical equipment essential for a modern wara motor vehicles, 
aircraft, electrical equipment and, above all, machine tools necessary to establish 
the domestic production of these products. The government was forced to take 
measures to expand the existing arms factories and to build new ones, while at the 
same time involving civilian private enterprise 1n military production. The 
hin uld t b Supplied by Britain and F ance because they necessary mac e tools co no e 
l.Sotslalieticheskaya rekonstruktsiya 1 nauk!,19J2 ,No. 9-10 ,p.81. 
2.A1zenshtadt and Chikhachev,op cit,p.143. 
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had the1r own urgent domestic demands to meet , while the main traditional source 
o ~ supply was cut of:. Thus Russia had little choice but to obtain machines where 
possible from the United States and Scandinavia, while at the same time the 
government tool measures to ~eatly expand domestic production. In 1915 the 
Council of the Congress of Representatives of Industry and Trade aknowledged 
that machine tool building was "one of the weakest elements of Russian machine 
building" . In August of the same year the Committee of Medium and Small-scale 
Industry revi.ewed the st<\te of equipment of 175 small and medium enterprises in 
Petrograd with a view to tooling them for machine tool production : eight of them 
were switched to large-serial production of one type of machine . 1 It is not 
clear how effective these government measures were in expanding production. It 
appears that the new market conditions led to a sharp rise in machine tool prices 
and made machine tool building a profitable activity for many engineering wor~s, 
some of which established large- scale production. 
The primary pre-war m~chine tool builders, with the exception of the' Bromley' 
works, contributed little to the War effort . rhe ' Gerlyakh and Pul ' st' factory 
was evacuated to Khar'kov but not restored.The 'Fel'zer' factory was evacuated from 
Riga to fiizhny-Novgorod in 1915 and virtually ceased machine tool building.2 The 
'Phoenix' works cut-back machine tool building and concentrated on munitions 
production. But the 'Bromley' works expanded during the War and made machine tool 
building its main speciality. Other enterprises building machine tools during the 
War years included the Tula arms factory, the Singer factory at Podol ' sk (making 
turret lathes), the Shtolle works 1n Moscow, the locomotiveand wagon works in 
Sormovo , Kolomna and Bryansk , and a number of technical schools, including the 
Bardygina works-school .in Egor' ev near Mosco~ The main products wer e simple lathes 
and drilling machth~s r equired for munitions production . 
There is some dispute as to the extent and technological level of this sudden 
upsurge of machine tool building in Russia during the ~irst World Jiar. The exact 
magnitude of the increase 1n output is uncertain, but it must have been quite 
substantial. The only available information is that the 1917 output exceeded the 
1 .Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev,op clt, p . 155 . • 
2 .1 bi d •• p . 157 • J 
J .I0Ia.,p.156 ; Rozenfel ' d and Klimenko,op cit ,pp.122-12 • 
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pre-it ar level 1 by 43 per cent . If 191J prices are being employed , this would 
indicate an output in 191? of about 5 million rubles. Given that engineering 
output as a whole in 1917 was about 70 per cent of the 1916 level2 ,mach1ne tool 
output at its peak 1n 1916 aay have been as great as 7 million rubles.J The 
engineer, Grinevetskii, in his well known work on the post-war prospects of Russian 
industry, admitted that machine tool bu.Uding was "one of the weak and backward 
sectors of Russian PIBChine building" before 1914, but claimed that during the War 
1t " grew extraordinarily , not only quantitatively, but also with respect to 
quality". Many factories , he added , "undertook production of a normalised or mass 
t~chnical schools , 
type: Tula , Shtoll~, the ' Zemgor' combines, Kra~torsk, Sormovo and the Hryaaek 
factories built extremely intricate and complex machute tools and made better 
products than the majority of ::>candinavian and other wartime exporters" •4 Soviet 
writers consider this an exaggerated view of the wartime achievements. The products 
of these new oroducers were , th~y claic, predominantly simple, operational machines 
for military production, designed ~or a very limited range of work in the hands 
of low-skilled operators. It was this simpltcity which permitted the rapid 
organisation of their serial pro~uctlon, but 1n terMs of the design of machine tools 
and their quality the level of machine tool building was not enhanced? The 
historians of the Russian and Soviet engineering industry , Rozenfel'd and Klimenko, 
do aknowledge that there were some qualitative improvements , but put more stress 
on the org~1sational aspectsa wartime production of machine tools was "a good 
6 school of large-serial proos.ution" • However , all Soviet writers are agrer-d 
that the long-term effect of this experience of machine tool building was ~1n1ma1. 
~ost o~ the wartime pro1ucers dropped machine tool production a£ter the War and 
the workers and spe~Lalists who bad acquired some of the skills of the trade 
were scattered during the Revolution and the Civil War. 
During the War a considerable quantity of American machine tools was imported 
by Russia . The quantity in physical terms is not known , but in the fiscal year 
1915-1916 (1st July 1915 to 1st July 1916) the USA exported 10.3 million dollars 
worth of metal-working machinery to Russia, compared with 1.3 m1llion dollars worth 
1.Sotsialistichesk.aya ratsionalizatsiya v bor ' be s poteryaml ,M.,19JO ,p. t50. 
2.Rozenfel 'd and Klimenko ,op cit,p.126 . 
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in 1913- 14, and 2.1 in 1914-15. In .~ay 1916 Russian imports from the USA 
represented ) .6 million dollars - the highest ever month's i mports of machine 
tools by a.ny country up to that ti.me . 7 
13 
The expansion of domestic production, coupled with substantial imports, led 
to a large increase in tbe ~ize of the •~c~e tool stock of the economy during 
the War years . By 1917 the stock aprears to have been approxinlately 120,000 un1te,8 
compared with 75,000 in 1908. Other evidence is provided by the 1932 censua , of 
the tSt , OOO oach1nes 1n the stock (civilian only) of April 1932, 57 , 000 were 
1nst3lled prior to 1918, and almost 19,000 of these, or 35 ~r cent , were installed 
during the War years .9 The quality of this addition to the stock i s another 
question • While many high quality machines were almost certainly imported , 
notably from the USA , those domestical ly produced , or imported purely for meeting 
the short-term dei!Wlds of military production, could not b:we been of great value 
to the economy in peacetime . Even Grinevetskii , usual ly enthusiastic about the 
wartime achievements, ad111ts that theEqu1pmeat installed was "too much subordinated 
to the ephemeral 
writers today .11 
10 tasks of wartime" 1 and this view was supported by Soviet 
Machine Tool Buildin~ in Russi a on the Eve of the October hevol ution 
In the United St .. tes and a number of West European cour1tries machine tool 
buildin~ was a well-developed, specialised industry by 1917. Skill s and exper1~nce 
had been accumul.gted gradually over many years , and the structure of the industry 
and its products had been formed under the influence of a series of new branches 
of eng~ering , notably the making of railway equipment, sewing machines, bicycles , 
and , above all, motor vehicles. By the outbreak of war such complex machines 
as automatic and semi-automati c lathes , gear-cutting machines and production 
grinding f!lachines were being used in many branches of engineering ~d new machine 
tools were being ·Iesigned to take full advantage of the possibilities offered by 
3 Present day Sovi et sources ~ive an output in 1917 of only 200 units (e.g.Strana 
"sovetov za 50 let. ,"' .,1967 ,p .8J) There is no indication of the origin or scope 
of thi s figure and ,in view r:Lth~ known ore-War output , 1t is probably cl 
substantial underestimate. 1 l922 42 4 .Gr 1nevetsk1i, V.I. ,Pos1evoennye oerspektivy russ'l<oi promyshle4~ost ,N • ' 1 P • • 
5.Aizenshtadt andChikhachev ,op cit ,p.156; Omarovskii ,op cit,p . · 
6 .Rozenfel'd and Kl~enko,oo cit ,p .123 . 
? .American macb1n1st ,Vol.~5 ,191g , pp .J37-JJ8 ; 554 · 
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high- speed tools. Tbe situation in Russia was very different. ~hile several 
en~ineering factories bad been building machine tools for a number of years , by 
1917 the~e was only one specialised machine tool building r~ctory and no 
identifiable aachine tool 'industry• , 1n the sense of a gxoup of more or ]P.ss 
specialised enterprises under~ing machine tool building on a regular basis. 
At a nQ~ber of thefactories which did build machine tools foreign technical 
specialists played an important role and the machines built were ~enerally of 
foreign design , ~achine tool supply in general was characterised by a very high 
degree of dependence on foreign producers 1 a dependence which government tariff 
an-i ordering policy only served to reinforce. Recognition on thepart of the 
government and Russian industrialists of the necessity of establishing a viable 
doMestic l'!l~chtne tool industry c-~une only under the acute pressu.re of war. 'But 
the hastily or~anised production during the three years of war ,wh1le revealing 
':he potenthl of .tussian industry to quickly ~ss1m11Jite machine tool building o! 
a fairly rudimentary nature , was not sufficient to overcome the consequences 
of the neglect which machine toool building had suffered 1n the preceding decades. 
It would be w.rong,however, to dismiss Machine tool building in pre-Revolutionary 
Russia as having been so insignificant. as to Mve hadno influence on subsequent 
development . This view was often put forward during the Stalin period and is 
exemplified in the following comment by A.Zernov , a leading machine tool engineer, 
writing in 19J2; "one rnay say that Soviet machine tool building received flO legacy 
of any value :rom 1'sarlsm. Pre-Re;rol utiona.ry machine to·' l building created neither 
cadres o~ technicians and workers, nor production skills , nor a cult~e of Machine 
to 'Jl building , and Soviet industry had to start from scratch" •12 The incorrectness 
of this position will be shown 1n the !"allowing chapter . 
In the last days before the October Revolution , under the Provisional Government 
an ambitious scheme was launched by a group of prominent Russian industr1al1atsa 
the creation of a corporation 1n Petrograd for the production of metal and wood 
working ~~~acbinery , and small tools. It was announced in May 1917 that the new firm 
B.Za Industr1al1zatsiyu (he~eafter,Zaind . ),29.10 .J2 . A more recen~ ~o~~e gives an 
estimate of 100,000 to 120, 000 units - Pedosov,A.D.,Partlya Bol s ev ov 
tekhnicheskcgoprogress ,M.,1969,p.282. 
9.Sotsial1sticheskoe stroltel'stvo SSSd,~ •• 1935,p.72 . 
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headed by A.E.PutUov and backed by the Russo-Asiatic and Siberian Banks , had speni 
S!Wen and a bal.! allllon dollars on i;Cqu1r1ng two engineering factories and was 
intending to buy a whole chain of enterpri~es, which were to be equipped with 
13 
A~erican r.1achine tools. Five years earlier such a project could have transformed 
machine tool buU.dln! 1n Russia and had a s1!n1f1cant impact on the War effort ; 
by May 1917 1t was too late . 
10.Gr1nevetak11 ,op c1t,p . 47 . 
11.Rozen!el ' d and Kliaenko,op cit,p. 1251 l·laevskH , I .v . ,Ekononik~ russko1 pro•ysh-
lennoeti v usloviyakh pervoi a1rovo1 voiny, M ., 1957 , P~- . 120-121. 
12 .~s1al1sticheekaya rekonstruktsiya 1 nauka , 19)2 ,No .9-10 , p.88 . This is just 
a particular case of a more general phenomenon of the pP.riod - a widespread 
tendency to downvrade the industri al level of th~ country before 1917. As the 
historian V.Lel'chuk observed 1n a recent work;"If one were to believe the 
overwhelming majority of authors, writin! from the end of the 19J0s to the .. 
mld-1950s , the industrialisation of the USSR developed almost ~rom scratch • 
{Zak,L .M.,Lel ' chuk ,V.S .,Pogudin ,V.I ., Stroltel ' stvo sotsializma v SSSR-
iet~riograficheskii ocherk ,M. ,1971 , p .89) 
1J.The iron ate , 5. 5. 1917 , p .876. 
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Chapt er 2 
CONTINUITY MiD CHANG£ - SOVE.T !"I.ACHTI E '!'COL buiLDING '[)t;t{lN(, 1't'.E. 1920s 
T~e First Years of Soviet Power ,1917- 1925. 
The immediate consequences of the October Revolution were not favourable 
to the developMent of the engineering industry from the point of view of 
production , but this was not the primary concern of the new Soviet government . 
Nationalisatlon of the largest engineering enterprises was the first aim and 
this began in December 1917 .In June 1918 nationalisation was extended to cover 
a ll large-scale metal working , metallurgical and mining enterprises ,creating the 
necessary precondition for pl1r~ed development of these sectors . The first 
steps in the direction of the for11ation of a. new centralised administration for 
industry wer e taken , with the establishment in December 1917 of the Supreme 
L.ouncll of the National Economy (VSNKh) and the creati on within it of the 
Department of Metal in 1918.rlenamed Glavmetall (Glavnoe upravlenie metallicheskoi 
promyshlennosti) in 1921 , thi6 department was to serve as a single centre for 
controlling t he enginP.ering and metallurgical industries. 
Production of many categories of machinery fell sharply 1n 1918 and this 
decl ine intensified greatly with the onset of the war against foreign intervention 
an~ the CivU War,~iachine building suff ered severely durin,- this period of 
f i ghting from 1918 to 1920s production fell to an insignificant level ,workers 
lef t the factories , and plant and equipment , already neglected and worn after 
four years of wartime use ,experienced further neglect and lll treat,lent through 
use 1n unskilled hands.The putput of the metal working industry fell to only 
7.5per cent of the 1913 level in 1920.1 All branches of machine building were 
aff ected ,witb the excepti on of sectors having direct military importance .Th1e 
was the period of war Communism characterised by extreme centralisation of 
the administr~tion of industry .The Department of ~etal of VSNXh , at this time t1920j 
headed by E .M. Al'perovich , controll ed 230 large enterprises having 270,000 
2 
workers , but only 176 of these factories were actually in service . 
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Machine tool building practically ceased during this ~eriod of disruption. 
There was little if any da~d for new m~chlne tool equip~ent 1 the neP-ds of 
priority sectors could be m~t by transferring machines from inactive factories. 
The new regime also inherited a stock of machine tools imported during 1917, 
but not installed .Struallln esti~ted that there must have been about 200 
million rubles worth of industrial machinery accumulated at the ports and 
factories at the time of the rlevolution .3 Resources were lacking for the 
replacement of Lhe considerable quantity of worn machinery in the economy . 
Furthermore, the production base for machine tool building itself had been 
reduced with the loss of Poland and the ~altic countries , which accounted for 
4 about J5per cent of the total pre-War machine tool output . The ' Gerlya.kb and 
Pul'st ' and ' Fel 'zer' factories had both be6n evacuated , but the former 
was never restored , its equip ent bein~ distributed to other enterprises . 
The 'Fel'zer' works was rebuilt at N1zhn11-Nov~orod and resumed machine tool 
buildin2 alon~side its main activity of diesel engine building.This :actory, 
later renamed 'Dvigatel' Revo~tsii ', specialised in machine tool building 
for railway wor'<shops and made eleven such machines in 1920 . 5 The 'Bromley' 
factory in :Otoscow was nationalised tn r~~overober 1918 and subordinated to VSiuth 
under the name of the State Machine building Factory No.2 .The workers had to 
.flPht off attempt·s to 'conserve' the enterprise because of the lack of fuel and 
6 
metal .They were suces c;ful , and machine tool building was resumed during the 
Civil War period ,when special machines were built for t he munitions industL~ . 
In 1922 the factory was renamed ' Krasny1 Proletar11'. With the exception of 
th~ Tula Arms factory , all the tbe engineering factories which had taken up 
m3chine tool building be~ore and during the War now dropped this activity . 
The 'Phoenix' works, one of the largest pre-War .Russian suppliers , was put into 
'conservation' until 1925.It was nationalised in July 1919 and renamed the 
Petrograd Machine Tool Factory imeni Sver dlova 1n November 1922, althouqh at 
that time it was inactive.? Thus the machine tool building which had sprung up 
t.Rozenfel'd & Kl1~enko , p168 . 
2 . lbid , p174 . 
J .Struzilin,S.G.,Izbrannve proizvedeniya,Vol1,M. , 196J ,p351· 
4 .0marovskii , p49 . 
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so rapidly during the three years preceding the Revolution, fadedaway with 
equal r apidity in t he ttu::ee years a:fter it . 
Despite the recognition by Lenin and other leaders that 1 t was 
18 
essential to create a new material and technical basis for tbe socialist society, 
founded on large- scale machine production, the pri.m.ary task of the years 
immediately nfter the Civil War was the restoration of industry on the technical 
basis inherited fro• Taarist Russia~herefore , the machine building industry and 
in particular those branches creating means o~ production, di d not play a 
leading role during the first years of the New .I!..Conomic Policy .Government 
priorities were rather measures directed towards maintaining and strengthening 
the support of the peasantry, which in practical terms meant more emphasis on 
light industry and agriculture then on heavy 1.ndustry and machine building.These 
factors conditioned the restoration of the eogine~ring industry and account for 
its relatively slow progress a industry as a whole attained 75per cent of its 
prewar output by 1924/25 , whereas machine building produced only 58per cent of 
8 its 1912 output 1n the same year. In these circumstaneesthere was little 
pas 1b1lity of a large- scale renewal of industrial plant and equ1pment,desp1te 
its worn condition. A large proportion of the capacity of the enp-ine~"ri.ng 
industry was in fRet deliberately rem~ved fro~ service at this timet of the 
118 engine ring factories of Union st:ltus under Glavmetall in 1923/24, only 
77 were in oper ation, the remainder being in a state of conservation to be 
9 gradually brought into service as demand for l'lachinery revived. In t ese 
circumstances it is not surprising that little if any official attention was 
10 
p~id to ~ach1ne tool building during the first stage of NEP . 
5.Aizenshtadt & Chlkhachev,p160 . 
6 .Slavnye tradttsii,M .,1957,pp18-19 . 
7 .Borisov & Vasil 'ev,pP94-100. 
8aozenfel'd & Klimenko ,p181. 
9.Makeenko ,M.M.,OchP.rk razvitiya mashinostroeniya v 1921 -1228gg,K1shinev,1962 ,p17 . 
10 .0marovskU ,p49 ,citing an archive source ,clalms that there was a Party and 
~overnment decree 1n 1923 calling for the organisation of machine too~ building · 
No other evidence for the ~xistence of thts decree has been traced an it ls 
possible that the source has mis-dated a later measure . 
I 
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The revival of the engineering industry too~ place from 1922 , but the 
growth of its co~~onent branches was uneven as the following table showsa 
'Hachine build Product ton as a Pro ortion of Pre-War 
Table 2 .1 
Branch 1922/23 1923/24 1924/25 1925/26 1926/27 
.,. 
General ~tc .Bdg . 2? 3? 4? 83 125 
I 
Agricul t.ura.l 33 52 105 132 I 183 Mc .Bdg. 
Ship building 12 24 25 4? I ?1 
*Active enterprises only. + industrial and transport n:achnin.e buildbg. 
Source a Rozenfel'd & Kl1menko ,~p182 , 188 . 
The extent of the physical wear of equipment ~lso varied between branches and 
between the different machine building trusts , while the level of capital 
utilisation showed similar variations 
Table 2.II 
Value , •ear and Utilisation of Assets of the ~our Leading Machine Suilding 
Trusts 1st October 1925. I 
Value of Value with I Depreciation/ Utilisation assets account of of assets* 
Trust m.r . deprec1at1on(m .r . ) (per cent) (per cent) -
GC~:Zy 166 .0 96 .7 42 44.2 
Lenmashtrest 115 . 0 80 . ) 31 56 .8 
YUMT 109.0 61.4 4J 59 .6 
Gosshveimashina 25.6 18.9 26 ?0 .0 
- f..- - · --- -- - - - -
Total 415 .6 257 .2 JS 
* as a proportion of technical l y ~os~ible capacity. 
GC1iy - Gosudarstvennoe ob ' edinenie mashinostroitel ' nykh zavodov , ISNK:, S~::>.~ • 
ru·rr - Yuzhnyi mash1nostro1tel ' ny1 trest ,SNK UkSSR . 
Gosshveimashina - Cos~1arstvenny1 trest po proizvodstvu 1 prodazhe shveinnykh 
mashin \ chastei k ni:!l , '/5\iKh SSSR . 
Sourcet lndustrializatsiya SSSR ,1926-1928,M. , 1969,p1?6 . 
Even though there was up to 40-60-er cent spare capaci ty in the engineering 
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industry at the beginning of 1925/26 1 calls for ne~ construction and expansion 
became more insi~tent .One factor promoting these dernandswas that the rate of 
incrr=..ase of production vas so great that it threatened to leave the industry 
without reserves of capacity if no act ion were taken ,e.g .Lenmashtrest alone 
increased its output in 1924/25 over the previous year by 77pe-r cent 1 and 
utilisation of capacity at the enterprises of the Trust which were then in 
service (eight out of twelve) rosP from 48per cent in the first qu•.rter of 
1924/25 to ?7 per oent in the last gusrter.1 A very active role in drawing the 
att:>ntion of the Party and govern.,.ent to the need to devote more attention to 
the d~velopment of the engineering industry was played by F .E.Dzerzhinsk11,ln 
his capacity as chairman of the managtn~ board of Glavmetall .In a report 
on the state and perspectives of the me t al industry presented at thePlenum of 
the Party Central Committee 1n Janu.llry 1925, Dzerzhlnskii argued that the task 
of renewing the equipment of the engineering industry was one which had to 
be tackled without delay, and the Plenum resolved that urgent attention should 
be rievoted to the question of developing the production of tractors 1 motor 
vehicles,r~il transport equipment and snips .2 This Plenum was a turning point 
for the development of the Soviet engineering industry and its conclusions were 
reinforced at the 14th Party Conference of April 1925 , which called for the 
elaboration o~ a three year plan for the construction of factories for the 
metal industry and aknowled£ed that euch construction was a first priority task. 3 
But de~pite those positive Jneasures , thE! problem of developing dome.c:tic machine 
tool building does not appear to have been raised at the Plenum or the 
Conference . 
1.Khromov ,S .S. 
1
il' 3 .uzerzhinskii vo glave metallopromys ennos ' • • ' 
Chernov,A .S. ,hetallopromyshlennost ' SSSR,~. , 192),p18 . 
2 .6 21 
the 'Krasnyi Proletarii' factory built 202 machine tools5 and 1n JWle 1925 the 
im.Sverdlova works resumed operation as a specialised machine tool factory -
6 
the firs~ 1n the Soviet Union . But the products of these factories and the 
production methods employed were were r elatively primitive , the designs dated 
fro:n the prewar years a."ld the machines were built on an i ndividual basis using 
a considerable amount of hand work. Concern over the widening gap between the 
industrially 
level of technology 1n Russian industry and in the/advanced capitalist 
countries led to the cre~tion in early 1924 of a new organisation, specifically 
charged with introducing modern methods into Soviet industry , 1n particular the 
engineering industry. This was ' Orgameta.l.l' (akts1onernoe obshchestvo po 
ratsionalizataiyu proizvodetva ~ tyazhelo1 promyshlennosti ' , founded on the 
personal initiative of E .M.~l ' perovich , the former head of t he Department of 
l'1~tal of \'SNKh , following a period spent studying the engineering industry ot 
Germany .One of the tasks of this new organisation was the introduction into 
Soviet industry of the latest Western machine tools and tooling , but during 
the years 1925 to 1929 its main a~tivity was projecting new achtne ouilding 
enterprises base 1 on modern ·production technology. 7 
On 20th August 1925 the boari of Clavmetall recommended the construction 
of fourteen new factories for general and agricultural engineertng .These included 
a tractor works at Stali.Mrad , a wagon factory in Nizhnyi TagU , a heavy 
machine building works in Sverdlovsk and eight factoriPS for the oroduction of 
8 agricul tur~l machinery , incl ud.1ng one in .hostov-on- Don . In December , a further 
heavy machine building works was added to the list - in Kra.m.atorsk; and on 17th 
December 1925 these plans were approved by Casplan .9 ~eanwhile,in November , 
VSNKh aprrovt>d the creation of a special institute fDr the planning of new 
engineering and metallurgical factories ,Giproroez , which began work in February 
1G26.Thus, by the end of 1925 policy was undergolne a change, from on e of 
the restoration of industry on its existing technical basis to a new policy 
of the reconstruction of industry on the basis of new technology. This 
trans~tion marked the beginnin~ o~ socialist 1n~ustr1alis~tion • a cours~ 
ado-pted at the 14th Party Congress 1n December 1925 , which took the 
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historic dec i sion to,"carry out econo ic construction with the intention of 
transfor· 1ing the US;:iR from a country importing machines and equipment into a 
cou.11try producing machines and equi p .ent, in order that by this means the US::iR, 
in a situation of capitalist encirclement , cannot be turned into an economic 
appendage of the capitalist world economy , but rather exist as an independent 
econ .... .,ic unit bel.n~ built in a socialist way .... ;o 
The Engineering Industry durinF the Reconstruction Period,1926-1929. 
Before considering the development of machine tool building after 1926, 
it is necessary to briefly cons ider the context in which it was situated and 
the nature of the demand for machine tools which industry presented, in 
particular the engineering and metal working branches .The most striking feature 
of this period was the continuity with the pre-Revolution pattern of development 
and stucture of the engineering industry 1 a continuity which was to be 
challenged in th course of the period as demands for a radical break with the 
past became increasingly insistent and exerted an ever stronger influence on 
pol1cy .The Soviet engineering injustry at this time was characterised by the 
predominance of indiYidual and small and medium batch production carried out 
in relatively unspec1.alised enterprises Wlder the administrative control of 
of a number o:f Trusts , the larRest Jf which ( GOMZy ,Lenmashtrest ,Nosmashtrest) , 
were of a highly unspecialised nature .Atthe beginning of the period, production 
2 .Khromov ,op c1t,p184. :KPSS v reZ?]Jutsiyakh 1 resbeniyakh s"ezdov,konferentsli, 
plenumov Tst,Vol2,M ., 1970,p150. 
) .KPSS v rezo)Utsiyakh 1 resheniy~~h •• , op cit,p206. 
4.Lebyachenko ,p5 . 
5 .1bie , pB . 
6 .Borisov & Vasil ' ev ,pplOJ - 105. 
7 . 10 let Orgametall , 1924-1934 ,~ ., 19J5 , pp9-10 ;Stanki i Instrument,1968,No?,p44. 
8.Khromov , p245 . 
9 . ibi .;o , p247 . 
10~S v rezo}utsiyakh i resheniyaKh •• , op cit,195J,Pt.2,p.75 . 
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technology and the products built were basically those of the pre-War years , 
and the acute shortage of skilled technical specialists , e specially those 
having a go~ knowledge of thelatest western practice , made it difficult to 
change this situation. During the period 1926 -1929 capital investment in 
the engineering industry was devoted primarily to the reconstruction and 
expansion of exist~ er terprises,rather than the construction of new, and this 
practi~e tended to act aga inst the a~option of new production technology and 
organisation .The stucture of capital expenditure in general machine building 
was as follows & 
Table 2.III 
Caoital Hxoenditure in General Machine Building ,1925/26 - 1927/28 
(Fer cent of total) 
Category of capital 
expenditure 1925/26 1926/27 1927/28* 
Expansion and reconstruction 47.9 54.8 60.0 
New factories l) .) 10.1 17.6 
Capital repair 23.7 17.6 13.0 
Housing for new factor ies 5 . 1 17.5 9.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
*from date of source must be provisional or planned expendl ture 
Sourcea Industrializatsi 
of August 1928 
An~sis of t he stock of machine tools ~nstalled during the years 1918 to 
1928 provides substantial support for t he view that there was no decisive 
break with pre-Revolutionary practice during the restoration and reconstruction 
periods~Firstly, the branch str ucture of machine install ations was very similar 
to the branch structure inherited from Tsarism .Be~ore 1928,the largest number 
of installations was in t he locomotive and w gon building branch ; the branch 
with the largest machine tool stock before the Revolution . Ot~er branches in 
which a relatively l arge numberof machine tools was i nstalled were agricultural 
l.From the machine tool Census of 1932- see App~ndix J for details . 
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~achtne building, electric power eqaipnent building and the ~oduction of 
industrial nower equipment , all branches quite strongly developed before the 
Revolution and characterised by a predor~inance of individual and small batc:h 
pro1uction organisation . The degreP of specialisation and automation of machine 
tools installed between 1918 and 1927 was ~lmost identical to that of machines 
installed before 191? , as was the structureof labour skills associated with 
the machines installed . SigaificaJt. changes in these indicat or s did not take 
place until 1929 , when machine tools began to be installed on a l~rge scale in 
new branches characterised by large-batch and mass production technology . 
During the Reconstruction period there were t wo main forces which acted 
counter to the traditlonal ,inherited structure and pract ice ; firstly , the 
development of new branches of production and , secondly , the campaign for 
the r a tionalisation of oroduction . The most significant new branches to be 
developed at this time were vehicle building and tractor production , two closely 
r elated activities which 1n the West bad played a leading role 1n creating 
progressive production technology • The building of trucks was conceutrated at 
the Moscow AMO factory , which built Fiat -type 1t ton vehicles on a sma' l scale • 
only 698 tmits were bull t 1n 1928. 1 ·rractor building was mor\- highly develope 
than truck building before 1929 .During the Restoration period a number of factories 
built tractors an a small s cale , in~luding t he Ahar ' kov l oGomotive works , the 
tractor- building shop of which was partly equip~ with ~achine tools f rom the 
former machine tool factory , ' Ger lyakh and Pul' s t •.2 Fr om 1926/27 tractor building 
was concentr ated at the ' Krasny! Putilovets ' factory in ~eningrad, where modern 
progressive prorluction technclogy was adopted ~or t he ~uildin. of the' Fordson ' 
20 h.p. model •• >.uch use was made of speciEa.l. fixtures and tool ing and elements 
of mechanised now- line assembly were introduced. But the relatively limi'ted 
inf luence of these develop~ents on the demand for machine tools is shown by the 
fact that of the t ot al st ock of machine tools installed in the automobile industry 
1n April 1932 , onl y J86 machines ,or 7 .9 per cent of the total , were installed 
1 .Hateenko, op cit , p188. 
2 • .1ll1d., p1?5 . 
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between 1918 and the end of 1928; and for the tractor industry , only 163 machines, 
or 4,3 per cent of a total of 4,890 units .1 Further .ore , the machine tools 
insta11 ed 1n these branches were ?~nost entirely imports. 
Th~ abolition of the universalism of the engineering industry 1nner1ted from 
Tsar1sm was not an easy process .The unspecialised nature of pra:luct1on was 
reinforced by the difficult economic condt.tions of the early years of Soviet 
power,when factories lacked sufficient regular orders to concentrate on a narrow 
range of products .The path adopted for overcoming this form of technical and 
economic backwardness was 'retionalisation' .The r ationalisation movement ln 
the Soviet Union owed much to the experience of the industrially advanced 
c~pitalist countries , in particular, Germany, where the theory and practice of 
rationalisation ,attained its highest level of develop:nent . In the United States 
the stress was placed on 'simplification' and the elimination of duplication in 
product ranges of firms and of diversity having no technical or economic 
justification. At the same time ,the American development of flow production 
methods associated with Henry Ford,and of scientific management,exerted a 
consid~rable influencc:on European fi7Tms of rationalisation. In Germany , the 
rationalisation movP.ment was more comprehensive and passed through two main 
stages : .firstly , an initial post-War st~e of 'ne~ative' rationalisation, 
representin ~ a process of ~aking the best use of an over- expanded production 
base by closing down uneconomic enter~1ses , the scrapping of old buildings 
and equip~ent and the concentration of nroduction of products at factories 
J!l&st sui ted to the aaking of each particular product ~nd , s econdly ,when the 
initial spare capacity had been absorbed , rationalisation became a positive 
2 
activity of introducing scientifically substantiated techniques and new technology . 
In the Soviet Union, the r a tionalisation camnaisn followed closely that of 
~ermany , passing through the same stages& the conservation policy and the closing 
down of small, poorly equipped enternrises was the Joviet equivalent of the 
! .Calculated fro"l , Oborudovanie metalloobraoatyvayushchei promyshlennosti,H · • 
19J5,vyp .2,pp130-131. 
2 .Brady,R .A. ,The rationalisation ~ovement 1n German 1ndustry,California,1933,p xii . 
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first stage of German rationa!.sc::.tion . By 192? emphasis began to change in the 
direction indicated by the German ovement . A Party Centr al Committee decree 
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of 24th .iarch,1927, 'On the question of t he Rationalisation of Production' ,stated 
that ,''The improve~tent of technology and tne organts:"Ltion of production must 
take three ~in directions a 1) the creation of new enterprises on the basis 
of the latest achievements 1n the re~lm of science and technology , ti) tbe 
fundamental reequipping of existing enterprises by way of the introduction of 
the best technical e~u1pment and better organisat ion of labour , and iii) the 
aim of 
provision of a number of practical measures with the/Maximum utilisation of 
existing equipment and the reorganisation of ;roeuction" •1 These practical 
measures , vigorously propagated by the workers of t he Peopl~s Commissariat of 
Workers' and Peasants' Inspection (NK RKI), focused on the specialisation of 
enterprises, the r eduction of product variety , the introduction of standardisation 
and , on the basis of the increased scale of production of homogeneous 
items achieved by these means, tbe development where possible of the technology 
of large- batch and ma:;s production . These measures wer e es sentially organisational 
in nature and did not necessarily involve capital invest ment on any scale 1 
rationalisation was th\ls an appre~~priate method of raising the technological 
level of industry at a time when the 'regime of economy ' was regarded as the 
pri'"lary means of financing industrialisation , But the introduvtion of progressive 
organisational and technolo~ical principles was ~o easy matter ,The inherited 
organisational structure and production methods proved very difficult to alter 
and VSNK1 , bein~ responsiblP ror current production , showed rather less 
enthusiasm for chknge t han d id NKRKI , wh1ch had no direct responsioiltty for 
plan fulfilment. 
Some of the proble~s of modernising the engineer ing industry stemmed from 
the administrative s tructure of the industry during the r econstruction period . 
B~sponsibiltty for general ~lannin~ of the metal industry , both the metallurgical 
.:md engineering sectors , was veste with Gla:v:uetall of VSNKij USdR , whlch was 
also charged with exerc1.si.ng general l ead·.rship inaecordance with dttectives 
issued by the Presidium of VSNKh.After the death of Dzerzhinsky in 1926 ,Glav.netall 
l .KPSS v re olyutsiyakh 1 r esheniyakh ,op cit,19?0 ,Vol J , p .456 . 
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was beaded by V .I .Mezhlauk , previously its deputy cha1rman .In August 1928 
Glavmetall was disbanded and machine building was placel under the control of 
a new organisation ,Glavmashinstro1 , the chairman of which became A.F.Tolokonteev , 
formerly ·the head of Voenprom, the body responstble f'or t~€' activity of the 
1 four defence industry trusts . Whlle these administrations wer e responsible 
for overall policy for the engineering industry , direct control was exercised by 
a number of trusts , each of which united a series of en~erprises .The trusts 
were responsible for the economic activity of ti-Jeir subordinate enterprises, 
and for technical policy and rat1onal1sation .The trusts were very varied 
organisations; some wer e specialised by activlty ,eg . the Leningrad ship- buildfg 
trust and Aviatrest , the latter unitu1g the factories of the aircraft industry, 
but the largest trusts were composed of widely differtng enterpr1ses,e .g.tbP 
the ten f actories of which in 1927/28 
~eningrad machine buildi ng trust (Lenmashtrest) , '/.included the vast 
'Krasnyl Put1lovets' works , the 'Russkii Dizel ' • factory , the im .K .Mar~sa textile 
machinery factory and the 1m .Sverdlova machin ~ tool factory . 2 This diversity 
hindered the realisation of specialisation of production and a consistent 
t~chnical policy, as it frequently meant that factories of the same activity 
were located under a number of different t r usts. The situation was further 
complicated by the fact that sales and supply were handled by separate organisations ~ 
the most important of which were Mashinosindikat ,Metallokonventsiya and 
Sel'mashkonventsiya. J Finally , the import of machinery was h~ndled by a 
spec' alised organisation, ' Hetalloimport ' , created i.t the end of 1926 . A feature 
of most of these organtsattons was that many of the leadin~ cadres were not Party 
nembers and wholehearted supporter s of the Soviet regime , but engineers,technictans 
and administr ators of the old order - bourgeois special~s , attracted to work for 
the economic r estoration of Russia ln the peculiar conditions of the New ~conomic 
Policy . 
l .Torg.Prom.Gaz. , t6- 8- 28 . 
2 .Rozenfel'd & Chikhachev ,p20J . A det~lled account of the trusts and their 
member factories is given by Makeenko ,op cit,ppJ2-~3 . 
J.Rozenfel ' d & Chikhachev ,p204. 
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A Poli~y for the Rationalisation of Machine Tool Building 
Until the spring of 1926 there was no specialised body 1nthe Soviet Union 
responsible for machine tool building .This was remedied by a decree of 
C lavmetall on ~!arch 4th, 1926 , which call ed for the cr eation of a Section 
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of ~achine To~l Building attached to the Convention of SJOldicates of the 1•ietal 
Industry .This Section was given the tasks of ,• wor king out and examining 
questions concerning needs for machine tools , examination and clarification 
of questions concerning the state of machine tool building in the US3R , questions 
of rationalisation of production , problems of standardisation of machine tools , 
and the specialisation of factories by type of machine tool , the allocation of 
orders and ronsideration of economic questions related to machine tool building" •1 
The head of thE: Sact.ion was an engineer , M .~· .Orent likher .In AprU 1926 a 
wimllar section was organised with responsibility for the production of small 
tools and ~easuring instruments . But while the new Section had a wide-ranging 
brief,its powers were limited in so far as the syndicates did not have direct 
r sponsib111ty for the activity of the machine tool building factories. 2 
In May 1926 the f irst meeting on machine tool building was organised by 
Glavmetall, at which Orentlikher present ed a report on the development and 
rationalisation of machine tool production. It was aknowledged that machine 
tool building represented one of the weakest links of t he engineering iodustry ,but 
also that the demands of reconstruction and of freeing Soviet industry from 
foreign dependence made the do~estic production of machine tools a matter of 
considerable importance.At t hat time only four factories were building machine 
tools. 'Krasnyi Proletarii• , im.Sverdlova , ' DYi!atel ' Revolutsii ' and the Kramatorsk 
works , the latter making metal-fo~ing equipment .All four had been involved in 
tnis activ ~ty before the Revolution .An additional factory was to be built in 
Sverdlovsk , for the production of metal- forr.J.ng equipment and metallurgical 
equipment for the Urals iron and steel industry - the f uture Uralmashzavod. 
Meanwhile, there was a very considerable discrepancy between the demand for 
1 .Byu1let~ konvents11. sindikatov metallicheskoi promyshlennost1 , 1925/26,No10- 12 , 
'050 • , hin ind ikat' later known as VMTS. 2 . In June 1926 the Convention was replaced by Mas os ' 
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machine tools and the ability of the do~estie industry to fulfil it : 1t was 
es t imated that in 1925/26 only 9 .6 per cent of all ne•'ds would be met~ The 
producin~ factories were secured ord~rs for tt to 2 vears , a s•tuation which 
Orentllkber considered highly favourable for the development of rationalisation, 
and which made it poss ible for the Convention to divert its efforts from 
trade to the reorganisation of production . The main lines of ra tionalisation 
of machine tool building had already been determined by the American and German 
industr i es , Orentlikher believed , and all that remained was to adopt similar 
pol1c1esin the Soviet industry . Firstly , the nu~ber of types and sizes of machine 
tools had to be 11-itedJ the desires of customers alone could not determine 
the product range , but account had to be taken of the inter~s of the producers 
of the machines . Secondly , factories had to be specialised so as to reduce the 
number of types and sizes built by each . Orentl1kher refered to the fact that 1n 
the USA many factories pro uced only one type of machine tool, and in the recent 
past the German i ndustry had begun to take the same path ;"Here'', he ad.ded ,"the 
situation of demand is such that we could restrict the numoer of types 
2 and sizes of machine tools to an extraordinary dea-ee " , retaining ,however , the 
production of the necessary basic types. Clearly , 1n the Soviet Union ,with such 
a small production base the possibilities of factory specialisation were very 
limited.The Section had drawn up a draft plan of spec~alisation which provided 
for the making of 17 different types 1n 40 sizes J of the basic types, three 
factories were to build l athes , two were to build planing machi nes , vertica] 
and radial drilling machines wer e to be bull t by one fact ory only and m11 1 in 
rnac~ines by two factories.The maxtmum number of sizes to be built at one f actory 
was twenty-five and t he minimum , eight .3 At the time of t he meeting the ' Krasnyi 
Proletarii ' works was in fa,ct bu~lding a total of eleven G. liferent types of 
machine too14 , although its output 1n 1925/26 was only 297 units . 5 The basic 
principles of this drai t plan were accepted by th~ ~eetlng . 
1.0rentl1kher ,M,, "Eiatsionalizatsiya stankostroeniya" ,Sistema 1 organizatsiya,1926 • 
No4, p11 . (This article ap::ears to be Orentlikher ' s report to the 1-iay rr.eetinc- ) 
2 . UW) . 
3. ibid . 
4 .Torg . From .Gaz. , 11- 5-26 . 
• Leb achenko J)8 . 
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A third path of rationalisation outlined by Orentlikher was the limitation 
of the nWAber of ~izes of machine tools of e·.ch type , the tipizatsiya of machines. 
Such reduction of sizes would facilitate the introduction of parts and components 
common to the different machines of a given type and such unification would 
permit the building of special machines on the basis of standard universal models. 
Orentlikher linked tioiZatsiya with the process of r~ising the technical level 
of the machine tools built by Soviet factories ,vith the aim of securing more 
accurate machining so as to eliminate much of the hand fitting then characteristic 
of all branches of engineering . 'l'he final basic path of rationalisation was 
considered to be the normalisation of parts and materials, normalisation being 
defined as the adoption of lo~ic~ly establtshed numbers , forms , and magnitudes 
of 
of parts entering tnto machine tools and/the materials employed .Such normalisation 
was then being carried out by so~e factories individually, but ef orts were not 
being coordinated. These four directions of rationalisation work would , it was 
believed, give the possibility of raising the size of batches of given types 
and sizes of machine tools built, with consequent cost savings . This s~t of 
f~~damental principles of rationalisation was to be central to policy in the 
machine tool industry during the fifteen years from this first me<:ttng in tolay 
1926 to the War , 
In discussing the problem of raisin~ the tec~1cal level of Soviet machines, 
Orentlikher noted the possibility of entering into technical cooperation with 
fore~ firms , and also mentioned that individual factories were engaged in 
discussions on cooperation. "However", he added, " one should not forget that one 
c~ot simply transplant the production of a machine tool from a ~erman 
to a Russian factory . Such an approach to the problem is impracticable , dead 
and schematic.In order to realise the buildin~ of a new type of machine tool one 
has to split it up into its separate parts and,with the aid of scientific and 
mathematical analysis, study the methods of making them at all st~es • '' 1 Again , 
this approach to the problem of co~ying foreign machines was to be rPstated on 
many occasions in subsequent years . The meeting of May 1926 thus played an 
important role in clarifying policy for the development of machine tool building . 
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.Plans and Priorities 
One of the central concerns of thg Section of Machhe Tool BuUding and 
Glavaetall durtng the years 1926 to 1929 was1he elaooration of plans for the 
future development of rnac~ine tool building • this work being carried out withtn 
the wider context of the drawing up o" a Five-year Plan for the develop·nent of 
the economy as a whole . Those r esponsible for planning ~c~1ne tool building 
faced a number of extremely difficult proble~s , some of which stemmed from the 
very nature of the activity . The Party leadership accepted in general terrns the 
need to develop the production of instr~ments of production and recognition of 
this fact was embodied in the resol utions of the Fifteenth Party ~onfereoce 
in the ll.Uturnn of 1926 : " Having 1n view the necessity of the organisation in 
our country of the production of instruments of production . with the aim of 
eliminating dependence on capitalist countries 1n a sector which is decisive for 
industrialisation . Conference places before the state and economic organs the task 
of the all-round development of machine build tng". 2 But aknowled~e:nent of' the 
leat=~ ing role of the machine building industry 1n general terms was one thing 1 
r ecognition of the crucial i~portance of the machine tool sector in particular 
was another. There were a nu ber of good reasons why such reco~ition was not 
re<J.dily forthcom'ing . " irstly. the machine tool sector was a very small component 
of the engineering industry : before the Revolution , 1n t912 , it had accounted 
for only 0.8 per cent of total engineering output , in 1925/26 1.0 per cent~ and 
4 
even a t the end of the First Five-year plan period , in 1932 , only 2 per cent . 
?or comparison , locomoti ve and wagon building accounted for 15.4 per cent of 
total output 1n 1925/26 and textile machine bu1lding . 5.7 per cent •5 Secondly , 
machinetools were very mundane and unr omantic products compar~d with tractors , 
turbines or tanks, and it proved very dif:ficult to rnobllise public opinion in 
support of machine t ool building . A Pravda editorial at t he end of 1931 observed 
1.0rentlikher , Sistema i organizatsiya,op c1t ,p12. 
2.KPSS v resolvutslyakh i reshenivakh •. , o~ c1t,~ol2 , p3?5 . 
3.lhromov , op cit .pJ24 , 
4 .Stanki 1 Instrument , 194? ,No11 ,p) . 
5 .Khro~ov , loc .cit . 
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that, " We devote little attention to this matter (machine to ~l building), 
The entire country .knows about the new powerful turbines and blooming mills. 
Proletarian public opinion must turn its attention to the same degree to the 
pro"olem of creating Soviet ":lachine tools" .1 
But the reasons for the relative neglect of machine tool building during 
the 1920s went deeper. Before the Revolution , machine tool building had not 
been a profitable activity except during the abnormal conditions of war,or when 
companies built relatively primi~e machines to thP order of the r ailway repair 
shops or the military authorities. Russian machines were generally employed for 
repair work or other auxiliary functions, basic production processes were 
su~plied with imported equipment.Luring the Restoration and Reconstruction periods 
the same p;ttern applied,as the Soviet products were technica ly inferior to 
their German ,Britisb and American e~uival nts and relatively more expensive, 
because of the bacKWard pr~uction technology and organisation employed. 
Furthermore, although a high proportion of demand was satisfied by imports, the 
absolute magnitude of these imports must have seemed rather insignificant to 
planners and managers alike. In 1925/26 imports of matal cutting machine tools 
reprosented a mere 4.1 per cent of total imports of mach~ery and equipment and 
0.8 per cent of all imports.By 1927/28 machine tool imports had risen sharply, 
but still represented less than 9 per cent of machinery and equipment imports 
2 and 2.1 per cent of all imports, For these r asons there does appear to have 
high 
been a widespreaJ view in the 1920s that machine tool buildin~ was not a/priority 
for Soviet industry , but a sector which could be tackled a~a later date when 
conditions were ~ore favourable. It was this position which was to be powerfully 
challenged in the years immediately preceding the First Five-year Plan . 
Plans for the development of machine tool building required as a basis some 
estimation of the economy's needs during the plan period in terms of the quantity 
of machines demanded and the structure of these machines with respect to types 
and sizes.During the 1920s information about the existing stock of machine tools 
!.Pravda,l?-12-Jl. 60 :l6'7i.Jt 
2.Calculated from Vneshnyaya torgovlya SSSR za 1918-1940gg, M.,19 ,pp. o . 
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was quite inadequate for making an accurate ass~ment of the specific requirements 
of each branch . No census of the machine tool stock was taken between 1908 and 
1932, so that even the magnitude of the stock and its structure were only known 
aD roximately and , prior to 1929, there was no attempt to compile a balance of 
machinery for the economy , revealing needs and sources of supply for the pl~ 
period. The inadequacy of the data meant that estimates of the stock and fu:.ture 
needs tended to be presented 1n highly aggregated value terms , providing 
considerable scope :f)r error . Final y, the r lanners were faced with the problem 
of uncertainty over the general path and rate of economic development which 
characterised this period of Soviet history. ~very decision to accelerate the 
construction of new factories in any branch of the engineering industry, or t o 
increase the capacity of new or existing enterprises,led to a corresponding 
increase in the demand for machine tools, necessitating f requent revisions in 
the plans for the branch. 
The first attempt to clarify the development of machine tool building over 
~ five year period was ~ade in 1926 ~y the Section of Machine Tool Building 
at, or shortly after, the May meeting . Needs for machine tools were estimat~d 
by a very crude procedure : the stock of machines in the meta l industries in 
October 1924 was estim.;, ted to be valued in current prices at 198. 5 mil l ion rubles , 
and the machines were considered to be on average fifty per cent worn. A ten 
year life for the machines was assumed, giving an annual replacement demand of 
20 ~.r . a year. In addition , machine tools to the value of 4-5 m.r. would be 
required annually for the expansion of existing factories and the construction 
of new, giving 24-25 m.r. a year, while the needs of other users would be met 
by an additional 20 per cent of this sum, giving a total an 1u.a.l demand of about 
30 million rubles~ This total and the stock estimate included both metal cutting 
and metal forming machines . Thus no increase in the level of demand over the 
five years, 1925/26 to 1930IJ1 ,was foreseen, but rather the reverse, b~cause 
ne~ds in the final year were set at 28.8 m.r • • This demand was to be satisfied 
by making full use of the capacity of the three main enterprises,'Krasnyi Proletarii' 
t.Orentlikher, Byu1J.eten' konventsii , • • ,op cit , p1_56 . 
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im.Sverdlova and 'Dvigatel' Bevo~sit', giving 12 m.r . output in 1930/)1, but 
further expansion of these factories was ruled out because of their 'obsolescence'. 
A further 5.6 m.r . worth of metal forming equipment would be produced by the 
-ramatorsk 10orks in the Ukraine, while the remainder would be supplied by two 
new factories, each having 2,000 workers and giving an output of 5.6 m.r. a year. 
One of these new factories was to be built ln Sverdlovsk and was to supply 
met~l forming and metallur~ical equipment (later to be known as Uralmashzavod), 
the other was to buUd metal cuttin~ machines and be located in the South to 
supply machines to the railway workshops. 1 
A second meeting on machine tool building was organised by Glavmetall at 
the beginning of March 1927. Once ae;ain, Orentlikher presented the main report 
on the developaent of the branch, but the meeting was opened by the chairman of 
Glavmetal.l, V .I.Kezhlauk. B~fore the Wer, Mezhlauk claimed, "machine tool 
building in essence did not exist" , but, " 1n order to build machines it is 
neccessary , above all, to aaster machine tool building , and therefore the 
development of machine tool buildin~ at Soviet factories is one of the most 
important tasks of the metal industry". 2 .1eanwh1le, imports of machinery were 
greater than before the War • However, inital plans for 1927/28 then provided 
~or a reduction of machine tool imports compared with th( level of 1926/27: 
an intention which •· ezhlauk considered incorrect, because, " In order to free 
ourselves from dependence in the future and establish our own production, we 
should , on the contrary, import significantly 111ore equip• ,ent for the first 
two or three years'! This principle was to be restated on a number of occdsions 
1n the following three ~ears and became central to the industrialisation 
strategy , but the problem of timing remained: during which ' two or three years' 
were machine tool imports to rise? The immediate task before the machine tool 
builders , 1n Mezhlauk • s view , was to sharply reduce the extraordinarily high 
cost of Soviet machines by means of the specialisation of factories , the transition 
to batch and mass production and the tiuizatsiya of machine tools . In order to 
1 ,ibid ' 
2 .Torg.Prom .Gaz.,J - J - 2?. 
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secure such a cost reduction and to raise the tec~ical level of the machines 
built , tt was essential ,Mezhlauk believed , to forbid the organisation of machine 
tool building at enterprises which had no previous experience of this activity 
1n recent tines there had been a tendency ror many fact ories to build machine 
tools to Reet their own needs . In eff ect, this was a call for the restriction 
of machine tool building to those factories which had undertaken it before the 
Revolution a a plea for continuity which belied ezhlauk ' s earlier claim that 
machine tool building bad been non- existent at that time . 
In his report to the meeting , Orentl1kher restated his views on the need 
for rationalisation and also stressed the ia~rtanoe of creating a force of 
Soviet design personnel , but his main concern was the plan for the five-year 
period, 192?/28 -1931/32 . The plan as se2n in !'1arch 192? represented a slightly 
a~ended version of that discussed 1n the previous year .Nceds for the five years 
a~a 1n totaled 150 m. r. , but n ~ a rising trend of demand was foreseen, from 
2~ m.r. in 192?/28 to 36 m.r . in 1931/32 .1 For metal cut ing machines ,needs 
were rorecast to rise from almost 18m.r . in 192?/28 to 27 m.r . in t he terminal 
year , compared with a planned production or 6 . 8 m.r. and 19.2 m.r . respectively . 
In the ~inal year 71 .1 per ceat of demand would be satisfied from domestic 
production . Total output 1n the final year would be 28.2 m.r., copposed of 11 . 5 
m.r . from the tnree main f actories , s.6 m.r . from Kramatorsk, 4.9 m.r . from 
a number of local factories and 6 .2 m.r . from two new factories. The two new 
comoined 
factories were still to be built in Sverdlovsk and the South , but theirj capaclty 
1n 1931/32 was to be 6 .2 m.r. , compared withtre11 . 2 m.r . in 1930/31 outlined 
in the previous year . Fulfilment of these aims would require capital expenditure 
totalling 36 .6 ., . r . , including 11 .2 m.r . for reconstructing the three main 
factories and a further 15.5 m. r . for bu1ld1n~ the two new works .But this 
capital investment was to decline over the five year period - 9.7 m.r. in 192?./28, 
9.8 m.r . in 1928/29 , 8 .1 m.r. 1n 1929/30, 5.8 m.r 1n 1930/Jl , and 3 .2 m. r . in 
the final yeax .2 This ' d1m1n1shin~ curve ' of invest~ent outlays r eflected the 
1. ibid.; and , Orentlikher ,I~ . ,''Sostoyanie i perspektivy stankostroeniya" .~1, 
1927 ,no6 , pp74-?? . ?or details of the plan and other variants , see pp.44~-457below 
2 .Torg .Prom .Gaz . ,J-3- 27 . 
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thinking embodied in the VSNKh OSVOK draft of the Five-Year Plan of 1926, but 
1 
not that of VSNKh in the spring of 1927,when its second draft was under preparation . 
Unfortunately , details of the invest~ent plans for the maOhine tool industry 
later 1n 1927 and in 1928 are not known ,so that it is not possible to say 
whether this ' diminishing curve' of investment was later corrected. The whole 
plan for ~achine tool building reflected a very modest and short-term conception 
of reconstruction of the eoonomy: the rate of growth of de·!tand for machine tools 
was to fall over the five years , fro~12 .8 per c ~nt in 1928/29 compared with 
1927/28, to an 8 .9 per cent increase in 1931/JZ compared with 1930/)1.2 , while 
the short- run increase in imports which 11ezhlauk had refered to amounted to a 
mere half million rubles (~rom 11.2 m.r. metal cutting machine tool imports 
(excluding custo~s duty) in 1927/28, to a maximum of 11 .72 m.r. in 1929/)cy.J This 
parttcul~ variant of the Five-Year Plan for machine tool building was still 
basically in force in May 1928,when Glavmetall presented a report on the 
development of heavy engineering . 4 to the Presiiium of Gosplan. 
The rather complacent apnro~ch to the problet of developing the domestic 
~achine tool industry during 1926 and 1927 may well have been conditioned by the 
unusually favourable situation with re~ard to machine tool imports • In April 
1.926 a m"'jor trade agree~ent was signed under which the German government 
agreed to guarantee sixty per cent of payments for goods supnlie1 to the uSSR to 
a total s~ of )00 million marks. Over h~f this credit was used for purchasing 
machinery and equipment , including a considerable number of machine tools. This 
credit led to a sudden , very marked increase in machine tool imports, from 
6.) million rubles in 1925/26 to 19.4m.r. in 1926/27 and 20.0 m.r. in 1927'28 .
5 
The placing of orders under this agreement ende~ in the autumn of 1927 J the 
agreement was not renewed , and ':laChine tool bmorts fell in 1929 . The ease wl th 
which machine tools coul1 be imported at this time must have had some influence 
on priorities within VSNKh and industry at l arge • 
1 . see Carr ,E .H.; Davies ,R .w., Foundations of a planned economy , 
2 . see p.448 ,calculated from ' lariant II' • 
) . see p.448 (imports calculated - needs minus production) . 
4 .Torg .Prom .Gaz .,11-5-28. 
5 . Vnesbnyay~ torgovlya SSSR za 1918-1~10P cit ,p269 . 
Vol1 ,1974 ,pb.edn. , 
pp.902-91J 
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In the autuan of 1927 the first successes of rationalisation were reported. 
A review of the achievements o~ the first decade of Soviet power presented a 
very favourable vLew. Production methods had 'significantly improved' since 
before t~e War. with increasin~ use of g uges and templates to give interchaogeab)e 
parts~ The 'Krasnyi Pr.oletari1. ' factory pioneered the use of jigs and fixtures 
1n Soviet machine tool building and created a bureau of fixtures in 
1925, consisting of one man . which quickly grew as the factory introduced the 
production of diesel engines on a bate I'! basis . 2 Batch pro ~uction of diesel 
engines was achieved 1n 1929,w1th technical assistance from the German firm of 
'Ot:to Deutz' and this experience was later applied to machine tool buUding.J 
Before the Revolution the leading figure in the machine shop had been the 
rnark-out 111811 , who marked out the work for rnaoh1n1n'5 .find determined the accuracy 
of the parts. But progress was slow; British engineers visiting the factory 
4 
in 1931 commented on the "notable absence of jigs, involving ~uch marking out". 
In January 1Q27,the im.Sverdlova factory proudly announced th· tit had achieved 
interchangeable parts production in the building of a ' new ' lathe ( in fact 
based on a pre-War design)~ The 'Krasnyi Proletarli' fa~tory also carried out 
pioneering work on machine tool standardisation . Masmashtrest, to which t he 
factory was subordinated , organised a standardisation bureau on the site of 
the enterprise 1 1n view of its experience in this field before the Revolut1on .
6 
By the autumn of 192? work was being carried out on the establish~ent of a 
systematic nomenclature o: r.achine tools and the determination of stendard sizes , 
while the problem of drawing up acceptance conditions for machine tools was also 
receiving attention,? Successes were also clo1med in develoJing batch productiont 
individual types were ~e~ built in batches of from fifty to one hundred in 
1926/27 .
8 
l.Torg ,Prom.Caz •• ? -10- 2? . 
2 .0strovskii ,Z, I . ,Ot Bromleya k ' Kr asnomu ProlPtariyu' ,M.,19J? , p6 . 
J ,Slavnye t r ad1tsi1 , on c1t, ~t86aLebyachenko,p8. 
4.~ach1nery ,Vol J8,16-7-Jt,p502. 
5 .Tor~ .Prom .Gaz .,22-t-27 . 
6 .Cmarovskii,op cit , p1~? . 
?.Tor~ .Prom .Gaz .,?-10-27. ell 
B.IhlQj see a1 so Orentl1kher ,M. ,"Stankostroeniya", Vestnik Inzhenerov , 1927 .No12,prJ • 
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From the sum~er of 1927 industrialisation policy began to be increasingly 
influenced by military considerations.The Combined Plenum of the Central Committee 
and the Central Control Committee , in August 1927, issued a decree on the 
economic directives for 1927/28, which placed gr at emphasis on the threatening 
international situation following the raid &n the Arcos office in London and the 
subsequent breach of relations with Britain .This was followed in October by 
a Combined Plenum on the directives for the Five-year Plan, which again stressed 
the possibility of capitalist military intervention and the need to prepare 
for it. Links with capitalist countries had to be directed towards strengthening 
the economic independence of the So~iet Union and the acceleration of industrialisati 
This theme was taken up again at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December 1927, 
notably by Voroshilov.2 In February of the following year, Mezhlauk , speaking 
at the Eigth AJl-Union Congress of Metal Workers, declared," What tasks stand 
before the metal industry in 1927/28 and in the coming years? The basic task 
is the securing for the country of an adeouate military capacity.with respect 
to the economy, the Soviet Union must become independent from foreign capital'! 
There had been great successes ,but," • • many machines and machine tools are copies 
of obsolete designs; output s-:ttisfies only an insignificant proportion of 
needs and must be developed. The view exists that to undertake machine tool 
building is unprofitable and irrational . This is not true. i•1achine tool building 
must be undertaken & without it there can be no independence f rom foreign capital11 •J 
At a nrevious congress of metal workers in October of the previous year, Mezhlauk 
had found it necessary to explain why this unprofitable production had to be 
undertaken&"When we take tho path of uroducing means of production, we always 
bear in mind that this is unprofitable production, but one which we have to 
have .Machine tool building is 1n this category . Although this most i mportant of 
branches is not very profitable in termsof its contribution to industrial 
accUlllulation, the establishment of maahine tool building is important, because 
he who masters machine tool building masters the 
1 .KPSS v ~?o}.utsiyakh i reshen 'yakh • • , op cit , Vol 
2. see Carr ,E • .d • ;Davie• ,R .11 • , op cit, pp454-460. 
) .Torg.Fro"' Gaz. ,19- 2- 28 . 
4.Tor~.Pro, .6az.,11-10-2?. 
11 4 
entire metal industry • • • 
2 , pp507 - 512 . 
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2.24 39 
these attempts to convince the sceptics and win the mete~ workers'Union to 
the cause of accelerating the development of Soviet machine tool building do not 
appear to have had any immediate impact. 
It was not until the autumn of 1928 that the question of machine tool 
building began to receive serious att~ntion , but in the preceding months 
more general problems of technical policy for the enginePring industr y were 
publicly aired and conservative attitudes vigorously challenged. One central 
issue,which was debated in the summer of 1928,was that of the type of machine 
building factories to be built in the Soviet Union. Strong views had been 
expressed earlier; an editorial in the industrial newspaper Torgovo-Promyshlennaya 
Gazeta , for example , in May 1927, pointed out that the objective factors 
promoting universalism of enterprises no longer existed and that the aim 
should be to specialise f actories on a limited range of products allowing 
1 large-batch and mass production and the use of specialised machinery. This 
policy was vigorously advocated by NK RKI,which consistently coupled demands 
for better use of existing capacity with calls for the application of large-batch 
and continuous-flow methods . At this time the merits of the Ford system of 
continuous- flow organisation were being enthusiastically championedz'Fordizma' was 
the only 
/path for the Soviet engineering industry. In May 1928 Mezhlauk calledfor the 
specialisation of factories,and the provision of centralised preparatory 
actories ( foundries and forges) .He also reiter ted a call he had made in the 
previous month for the reorganis~tion of Glavmetall1 to provide a more specialised 
administration for the machine building industry.2 This apoears to have been 
the starting point of a long controversy on the specialisation of enginaering 
enterprises in which representatives of all interested bodies participated -
VSNKh, Glavmetall, Orgametall, NK RKI, and representatives of the trusts and 
factor1es.3 Most participants were agreed that the new factories then under 
construction or being projecte~ were not examples of progressive specialised 
production, being marked by a tendency to revert to the universalism so long 
characteristic of Russian machine building .The Rostov agricultural machL1ery 
1.Tor~.Prom .Gaz.,12- 5-27. 
2 .To~.Prom.Gaz.,8-5-28; and 15- 4-28. 
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works came under especially strong attack on these grounds. The main targets 
of criticism were Glavllletall and Gipromez, both of which seemed to be particularly 
4 disposed towards the construction of large, • closed combines' • The general 
conclusion appears to have been that new factories should be specialised on 
specific products , that there ahould be centralised preparatory works , and active 
cooperation between enterprises . Such organisation would al l ow the adoption 
of large- batch and mass pro1uction technology with the use of more specialised 
machinery than the general- purpose equipment then preioa1nat1ng 1n the 
engineering industry . This conclusion was backed by the outcofle of a 
simultaneous debate on the choice of textile machinery for Soviet industry, in 
which the advocates of smaller scale, Jess mechanised production were defeated.5 
The call for speclalisation and the adoption of large-batch production was 
made even more strongly by Kuibyshev at the end of ~~ust 1928 at the Thira 
Plenum of the Party wentral Control Commission . ~ rationalised enlerprise was 
de ~ined as one which undertook the mass production ,on a continuouos-flow basis , 
of products standardisen by quality and size . But Kuibyshev concedea that results 
to date had not oeen 1mpressive6 J a view forcefully expressed by ~1 . Kaganovich 
in his report to the Plenum on behalf of NK RKI . Kaganovich ' s speech amounted 
to a condemnation of Glavmeta11 fer its alleged inactivity in carrying out 
rationalisation • Turning to the future , Kaganovich asserted that the basic 
line of rationalisation durin~ the coming Five-year Plan period had to be 
attention to," • old , existing enterprises , which for some time will play 
a dominant role in "ur econotty", but ,at the same time ,rationalisation had to be 
based on new methods of production, otherwise there was 1 " a danger that the 
Five-year Plan wi)] hold back the r.'tte of ~owth of our industry" . 7 This 
position of the NK RKI was to have considerable impact on the future developnent 
of the machine tool industry . 
).This controversy is discussed below 1 Ch. 5 . 
4, TorQ' .Prol!l .Gaz. 1 15-6- 28. 
5.Tonr .Prom .Gaz. , 16-8-28. 
6 .Torg .Prom .Gaz . ,29-8-28. 
?.Tor~ .Prom.Gaz ,, )0-8-28 . 
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The Break with the Past - Machine Tool Bu1ld1n~ in 1928/29. 
In the economic year 192?/2S, Soviet factories built metal cutting m.a.chir,e 
tools to the value of 6 . 4 million rubles, compared with 3 .J million rubles 
output 1n 1913 from the factories of the old Russian empire . In terms of the 
number of units built , output reached 2 , 000 ruachln~ tools , 450 of which were 
built by the 'Krasnyi Proletarii ' factory . 1 In 1912 domestic production had 
account.ed f'or 19 per cent of total sales: 1:n 192?/28 the proportion was exactly 
the same . 2 About a dozen factories were building machine tools on a more or less 
regular basis; thPy were all subordinated to different trusts and all built 
a range of other ite,s of machinery . There was thus no unified machine tool 
industry at the time when the First Five-year Plan was taking its final form . 
In May 1928 , i n a report to the Presidium of Gosplan on the future of the 
heavy engine t'r ing industry , Glavrnetall had presented final year targets for 
tbe Five-year Plan of machine tool r.uilding identi cal to those outlined in tne 
previous year . J It is not known whether the new vers\.ons of the Five-year Plan 
drawn up by VSNKJ!a in April and August 19284led to any changes in the intentions 
with regard to :nachine tool building , but by the end of October l t was clear 
that plans had been revised . At t.he end of the month , the permanent planning 
conference of VSNKh adopted a new varia~t of the control figures ~or the Five-
year Plan providing for increase~ cepital investment • Two-thirds or the additional 
investment ~as to be directed to the engineering industry under Glavmashinstroi, 
including 140 m.r . for general .,~chine building , a category which included 
machine tool building. It was now proposed to build four small machine tool 
factories in the year 1930- Jl and ,possibly ,a further factory in 19J1-J2 .5 In 
November a conference of workers of machine tool building r~ctories was held 
1n ~loscow to discuss the future develop.,ent of the branch. Unfortunately , no 
details of this conference have been traced , apart fro~ t .e fact that great 
e~phasis was placed on the need to caref ully ch~Fe the new desL~s to be built 
at each factorv .6 
1.Sots1~11st1cheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR ,M.,19J6 , p . 1)6;Lebyachenko,Qp cit,o .8 . 
2.see 'table 2 .IV ,p.42 . 
J .Tor£ .Pro.m .Gaz . ,11-5-2~ . 
4.see Carr,iLH . ~Davies ,R . ~ .,on c1t,pp925- 9)J . 
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Production and Importsof Metal Cutting hachine Tools 
1924/25 - 1928/29 
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Table 2 .IV 
I Production Imports I OOOr . ) I Domestic Production 
(I OOOr . ) 
Including Excluding as a proportion of 
Year dut) dut} total sales (%) 
(1) (2 (3 (4) 
1924/25 (1 , 040) 6 , 037 4,312 14.7 /19 .4/ 
1925/26 1 ,950 8 , <360 6 ,329 18.0 /23 .6/ 
1926/27 ),900 27 ,200 19 ,428 12. 5 /16.7/ 
1927/28 6,4oo 28,060 20,045 18.6 /24.2/ 
1928/29 10,400 (25 .095) (17 ,925) 29 .3 /J6.7/ 
( •. ) Estimate 
Sources 
(1)1924/25 - Estimated.Total output of metal cutting and metal forming machine 
tools in 1924/25 was t.Jm .r . (Aizenshtadt & Chikhachev ,p16J) .ThP proportion 
of cutting machines tn the total output o~ 1925/26 (2 , 5m.r.,1bid) was 78 
per cent, and this is assumed to apply to 1924/25. 
1925/26 ,26/27,27/28 - Aralov & Shatkban , p141 (Prioes of corresponding year) 
t928/29- Zaind. , 19-10- J2 (marketed output 1n 1926/27 prices) 
(2)Calculated from Vneshnyaya torgovlya ~S&R za 1918-1940gg.,r . • ,1 960 ,pp204-301 . 
Data o .. source are tr;msl , ted into prices of' corresponding ye rs by a 
coefficient of ) . 4851 (1bid,p9) to give column (3) .According to Aralov & 
S~tkhan , p140 , customs duty and various necessary commerci~l expenses vere 
eq}valent to 40per cent of the value of machine tool imports at this time. 
Therefore ,col . (2) equals col . (3) , plus 40per cent.Data pr~sented are very 
similar to those given in Aralov & Shakhtan , p141 . 
192SV29 - source gives Oct .-Dec .1928 and 1929 imports ;1928/29 est.therefore 
obtained from Oct .-Dec.1928 total ,plus three-quarters of 1929 total . 
(3)See(2) . 
(4)Total sales taken as production (!),plus imports including duty (2). 
Proportion of sales with imports excluding duty shown in brackets ,/ •• /. 
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By the end of December 1929,VSNKh bad completed the elaboration of its 
Five-year Plan for the engineering industry. Total marketed output or the industry 
was to increase by ) .6 times over the five years and costs were to be cut by 
no less than 38 per cent . 7 neportin~ on this plan to the PresidiUJII of VSNKh 1 
Glavmasb1nstro1 called for wide-ranging rationalisation of production processes 
and the deepening of specialisation • All basic types of machine building were 
to make the transition to batch and mass product on , with the adoption of the 
Drlnciples of continuous- flow organisation . The principles of specialisation of 
production were to be extended to the buildin~ of rr~chine tools s each enterprise 
was to have a f i xed, comparatively narroe, specification .In order to attain 
this end , besides the four main factories t including the Kr amatorsk works) , 
fifteen small factories were to develop machine tool building on the basis of 
strict specialisation by typ~ of product . Furthermore , the preparatory stagli)s 
8 
o!' prodllction were to be concentraterl at separat e 1 specialised :factories . This 
Five-year Plan ~or thP. en~ine~i~g industry was reported to a Gosplan conference 
on machine buildin~ at the beginninF of January 1929 by A . A .Hilyukov, the head 
of the production section of Glavmashinstroi . ~s in October, the Plan provided 
for the const ruction of five new factories , each ~lth a capacity of 4-5 million 
9 rubles output. The planners of ~.>osplan had never previously aknowledged the 
existence of machine tool buil ding in :my of their Control Figures 1 it was 
for t.heJ.I\ merely a component of a broader cate,-ory , general machine oui dirtg 1 
10 
wh1cb in turn received very little attention . 
On 25th January 1929 1 the Presidium of VS~h aknowledged the necas :ity of 
creating an All-Onion Tr ust of Medium t'tachine 'Iool Building and 1 with this a im 1 
proposed the transfer to the control of 'SNKh of the ' Krasnyi Proletarii ' 
factory of Aosmashtrest and the ' Dvigatel ' Revo~ts11 ' factory of N1zhnii-Novgorod. 
These two enterprises were to be combined with the 1m.Sveri lova facto=y of 
Leningrad . 11 This important decision indicated a mountinfl' concern for machine 
5.Torg .Prom .C..az. , 27- 10- 28. 
6 .Kas 1 yanenko ,'f . r. ,Zavoevan ie ekonornicheskoi nezavisimosti SSSR 
19721P95. 
7 .Tor:r .Prom .Saz . ,28-12- 29 . 
B.llil.. 
9.Ek ,Zhizn ' ,4-1- 29 . 
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tool building on the nart of VSRKk ,althougn the ne~ trust was not in fact created 
until Octoter . Further evidence of concern was provided by a decision of the 
VSNKh Prestdiwn. to draw up a bal3Jlce of equipm~t for the econoroy, in order to 
obtain an accurate account of the needs for new machinery and the scale of imports 
and domestic production . 12 
Early in April 1929, the leading members of Clavma.shinsttoi di~cussed the future 
o~ machine tool building and the creation of the new trust.The main report was 
presented by V.F .Oborin . He revealed that onlv 24 types and slzes of machine tools 
were then being buill. in Soviet factories and ,accordlng to the Ftve-year Plan,the 
total was to be raised to f1fty.But, he stressed ,''It will be poss ible to develop 
our production with the maximum rapidity only with a re1uction of the product 
range" •13 At that time , he continued, production was concentrated at four main 
factories (including the making of forming ~c~ines at Kramatorsk) , two ' numbered' 
factories (1 .e.mil1tary works;in this case,the Tula and Izhevsk arms factories) , 
and six small local factories . 'This compared with 350 ·Lachine tool building 
enterprises 1n Germany . Turning to the future • Obor1n expressed the opinion that 
successful development and , ln particular , solution of the problem of designing 
new machines , required the conclusion of techn1c~l as~1stance ~reements with 
forei.gn firms.At this meet1ng ,representatives of Moscow SNK..h , ~1osmashtrest and 
Lenmashtrest attacked the proposed new specialised trust on the grounds t rAt it 
was "an untimely reorganisation"; an understandable response to the threatened 
loss of one of their members . The chairman of Clnvm&shinstroi, A.F.Tolokontsev • 
i n turn charged with t~sts with devoting very little attention to machL~e tool 
building ,and the meeting decided to precede with the new organisat1on,whi~h was 
t.o initially include thre~" factories and start operation on 1st October . It was 
also ie~ided that three months would be given before the location of new machine 
t ool factories was --inalised . 
10.Th1s even applied t o th 1929/30 Control Figures ,published in 1930 , see 
Kontrol 'nye tsifry narodnogo khozya1stva SSSR na 1929/30 god,M., 19JO ,p84. 
ll.Ton . ~rom .ua~ . ,26-1-29 . 
12 . ?orll .Prom .Gaz . , 27-1-29. 
13 .Ton- .ProJ!I .Gaz . ,14-4- 29 . 
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Events now gathered -ace as the Five-year ?lan neared its final apt roval by 
the Si>:teenth Farty Con.ferere ~t the end of April~ 6n 23rd April, Sovnarkom 
ap1-roved the' optimal' variant of the Plan , but in doing so it called on Gosplan 
and VSNKh to further examine the question of stepping UJl the intended rate of 
development of 111achine tool building •1 The decree of the Fifth Plenum of iSl~Kh 
on the Flan , published the following day , for the f irst time put machine tool 
buiJ..;ing in first place in its section on the engineering industry . It stated 
tl-tat :" In the development of machine bu1ldinll it is necessary to devote= opecial 
attention to machine tool buUdlnrr , striving for si8n1 ~icantly increased 
production cocpa.red with that projected 1n the cont:::·ol figures of the five-year 
plan of industry .In order to achieve this tt is necessary to take organisational 
~easures ~or separating machine tool building into a special organlsation,and 
to review the title list of capital work to secure a more rapid develop!l.ent of the 
production of machine tools'! 2 On the same day ,Kuibyshev reported on the Five-year 
Plan at the Sixteenth Confe.a:en-ceand noted that over the five yeaJ.'S only forty 
per cent of the demand for mac~ine tools would be satisfied by domestic production . 
This point was taken up by a speaker in the d1scuss1on,Kadatski1 , from Leningrad , 
who observed that," During recent yr•ars we hav~ spoken a great de~l about 
aachine tool building, but it must be admitted that durir~ these years we have 
in fact done hardly anything in the f ield of complex and precision machine tool 
bulldin.R;'; and went on to criticise the inadequacy of the prov isions of the Plan 
4 for the develop tent of the industry. The resolutions of the Co~ IIB.de no 
specific reference to machine tool -oullding . On 29t h April the Con~ce a r proved 
the optimal plan , the three volu esof whtch were publishe~ by the end of May . 5 
The Flan itself ,as aoproved by the Sixteenth Coriere'X>?gave no indication of 
either needs for machine tools,or the intended scale of production . It did , 
however 1 stress the vi tal importance of machine tool building 1 "The developrent 
and success of macnine building is impossible without the preliminary organisation 
of a corresponding volume of production of metal and wood- working machine tools. 
1. Tore- .Prom .Caz . , 8-5-29 . 
2 .Tor~ .Prom.Caz . ,24-4-29. 
3.Shestnadtsataya kon.ferentsiya IKP(b) ,sten ~otchet ,M . ,1962 ,:¢4. 
4.1lUQ.,pt56 . 
S.The plan wa s approved by the Fifth Onion Congress of Soviets on 28th M~ . 
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Scono~ic and technical progress of any machine building is directly dependent 
on ·the corresponding equipBent - machine tools and tooling. Renee , the leading 
role of ,.,achlne tool building · and t()Oling is · evldent~1 While avoiding 
specific targets , the 'Plan did set out broad policy guidelines. Sovtet machine 
tool building had to be raised to a level adequate to meet the demand for the 
most widely used machines, but the building of special machine tools could 
be postponed to th~ following five-year plan period,except for very limited 
production with the aim of gaining experience.2 On the question of the scale 
of machine tool building factories and their specialisation, the Plan favoured 
a cautious approach a"The experience of German and American factories shows that 
the amalga~tion of enterprises is not a fact predetermining the best results 
in ~~achine tool building . In view of the diversity of types and shes ,one needs 
to show great caution in carrying out spec1al1sation'!3 The three main factories 
were to be strengthened and specialised on the production of the most common 
types and sizes , a number of existing smal)er factories were to be reconstructed 
and specialised , and two or three new factories were to be built .A sum of 
25 1111llion rubles was al 1 oc'2t.ed ~or the construction of new f :sotories over the 
4 five-year ~eriod . Accordin~ to the title list of construction projects included 
in the plan , one new factory was to be built in Moscow at a cost of 15 m. r . , work 
beginnlns in 1929/ 30 and ending in the final year of the Plan 1 a. second was 
to be built in Khar'kcv at a cost of 10 m.r., for construction during the years 
19)0/)1 to 19)2/331 and a possible third factory was to be built in the Urals 
at a cost of 10.5 m.r.5 This was the ' optimal ' Five-year Plan of machine tool 
building, but it was out of date:~y the time it left the printers a new plan 
had been drawn up , substantially revising all previous ,programmes 10r t he 
development of Soviet machine tool building. 
In response to the decree of Sovnarkom , Glavmashinstroi met early in Ji ay 
and discussed measures for accelerating the developnent of machine tool building . 
It is knOiltl that this me-ting resolved to begin the construction of two new 
factories in 1929/JO , for which 7 m.r . was allocated , and to carry out r~constructior 
6 
work at existing enterprises to the extent of 5m .r • • But it was probably at this 
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meeting that revisions were made to the Plan for machine tool needs and output 
over the five years.7 Previously, VSNKh had established that machine tool needs 
over the five years would total 152 m.r.JnOw a final year target of 84 m.r. was 
fixed , implying a total over five vears of about 300 m.r. ~ It was foreseen that 
62 per cent of the final year demand would be satisfied from domestic production , 
i.e ., output in 1932/33 would be 53 m.r., 22 . 5 m.r. of which would be given 
by the three main factories .During the five years , five new factories would be 
built .9 This new plan thus represented a considerable change of intentions 
compared with the variant in force only twelve months earlier.Two factors were 
prob~bly responsibJ e for VSKKh ' s change of view . Firstly , it appears that 
the findings of the com~ission which had been compiling a balanc~ of machinery 
and equipment were now available. At the Fifth ConRTess of Soviets later in i•,ay, 
Kuibyshev refered to this balance and claimed that machine tool needs over the 
five years would be 425 m.r . , 175 m.r. ( or 41 per cent) of which had to be 
built by Soviet producers.These totals evidently re~ere1 to both aetal cutting 
and forming machines~ 0 Secondly, machine tool building was tJeing subjected to 
a 11ajor investigation by NK RKI, the first results of which were published on 
19th Nay . 
The State of Machine Tool Building in the Soring of 1929 a the NK RKI Survey. 
Before considering the findings of the NK RKT survey , it is necessary to 
briefly lo~k at the enterprises engaged in machine tool building at the 
begin ing of 1929z these enterprises were to form the core of the industry during 
the First Five-year Plan period . The leading factory , 1 Krasnyi Proletarii ' 
has already been mentioned , but this was by no means a specialised machine tool 
factory . In 1926/27 45 per cent of its output took the form of machine tools; 
m 1927/28 , 65 .6 per cent . 11 The main secondary activity was the bunding of 
diesel engines, and according to a plan of reconstruction of the factory adveted 
1.FyatUetn1i plan na:;:odno-khozyaistvennogo stroi tel 1 stva SSSrt ,Jr1 edn • ,h • , 1930' 
Vo1.2 ,pt .1 , p1.56 . 
2. ib1d ,p157. 
) .)JUg. ,p159 . 
4.1bid. ,"ol .1 ,p46. 
5.~,Vol .3 , Append1xs Ob"ekty novogo stroitel ' stva gosudarstvenno1 promyshlennosti 
na pyatiletie , pp10 , 21 . 27. 
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w October 1927 , this activity was to be retained and expanded over the five 
years, with technical assistance from the German &:Deut~· f1rm .12 The product 
ra..nge in 1927/28 included lathes , shaping 1 planing, drilling ,slotting and 
threading machines . From about 1929 the main product beca~e the ' TN ' lat.he , a 
sl~htly modified dest gn of 1915-16 . The only fully specialised factory was 
the im .Sverdlova works of Leningrad . This factory took a number of years to 
restore producti on after i t s per iod of conservation. There was an acute shortage 
of skilled wor!<ers , engi neer s and designers; equipment was old and worn 1 and the 
level of wor k organisation was very low . In 1928/29 output reached JOO units , 
including sha.ping machines , lathes , Cincinnati-type tool sharpening ~achines 
and a few ' Fortuna' - type cylindrical e:rinding rnachines . The latl1es and shaping 
machines were of old ' t'hoenix ' designs , but in t~23 the factory began to intr"'Cuce 
a new lathe , the 'TV • , based on a design of the German firl!l , • Braun • , This 
aodel , characterised by a quite excessive degree of universalism ( 33 different 
feed rates) , was to be the basic product l hr.oughout the First Five- year Plan 
period. 1J The t hird nain fact ory , 'Dvigatel ' RPV04otsi1' , built diesel engines 
as its main product , machine tools accoWtting :for 35 per cent of its output in 
' 14 1927/28. This factory specialised in heavy machine tool building , its prooucts 
being used by the locomotive and wagon building i:1dustry . Together , these three 
~actories 1u1lt 693 units in 1927'28 and 1 , 075 in 1928/29 . 15 
From about 1025 the number of nachine tool building factories began to 
~radually incre~se .:~ the Ukraine , the Odessa 1men1 Lenina facto~y began to 
6 .Tor~ .Prom .Caz ,, 12-5-29 . 
? .Ek.Zhizn' ,19- 5- 29 re er~ to recent c1anges in the Plan ;SotsiP-listlcheskaya 
r~tstonali~~tsiva I bor 'be s uoteryami ,M. 1 19JO,p17J refer s to a Plan revision 
in ,•,ay 1929 . 
3 .Sotsial1sticheskaya r~tsionalizatsiya .oP cit ,pl?J :Tor~ .From .Gaz ., tl- 5-29 gives 84m, 
9 .Ek .Zhizn • , 19- 5-29 . 
lC.'ls" ezd Sovetov, ( sten .otchet) ,!1 . , 1929 ,Byulleten ' 9 , p8 . 
11.Aizensht adt & Ch1Y~achev , p172. 
12 .~ . , pt68. 
1J .Borisov & 'asil ' ev , op cit, pp105- 106 ; 15 let bor ' by za sovetskoe mashinostroenie, 
L • -M • , 1932 , p46 . 
14 .~K.Zh1zn ' ,19- 5-29 . 
15., Kra:snyi .E-r ol et ar i i' buUt 450 uni.ts in 192?/28 and f>07 in 1928/29;im.Sver dlova , 
157 and 299 respectively , and ' Dvi gatel ' Revolyutsii' 86 and 169 - lebyachenko , 
op c 1t ,pp . S-13 ; 20 ;Ek .~hizn ' ,19 .4.29 \for ' D.R.' ,1927/28 only) . 
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build machine tor.ls in 1925. Founded in 1862 as the • Bellino-.• ender:lkh • company , 
this works was engaged 1n snip repair work and t"le making of ship components 
before the Revolution . It was in conservation from 192G to 1924 , when it was 
reopened as a general engineering works under Odessa Metallotrest. Originally 1 
machine tools were built to individual order 1 giving rise to a prelife ation of 
types ouilt, but fr~ro 1927/28 measur s were taken to reduce the ~oduct range so 
that in 1928/29 only lathes ,drilling 1 planing and threading machines were 
1 
produced . In 1927/28 machine tools accounted for 65 per cent of total output~ 
At this time the d€signs were old and the factDry was ill- equipped and 1n need of 
reconstruction . 
In 1927 machine tool building was started at the Samara (later ,KuibyshevJ 
factory , 'Imeni Soyuza Ts. K . r•'iashinostroen iya' • This works bee an life as a amall 
repair shop in 1874, beco~ing a general engineering factory in 1395, when it 
built locomobiles , boilers and other industrial equipment . In 1911 it ceased 
operation and its equipment was removed . During the Civil War the shell of the 
works was taken over by a machinery repair shop evacuated from the fromt and tbis 
developed into a repair shop for local industry . In 1927 the fir t orders for 
achine to~ls were accepted , although there was no ~JTevlous exrerlence of this 
activity . Yery simple lathes and drilling aehines were built ,alongside a 
3 
range of other engineering products : machine tools accounted for )7 . 5 per cent 
of total output in 1927/28~ While the'Tsl i•Jashinostroeniya ' works had no 
previous experience of machine tool buildL~g , this was not the case with the 
'Samotochka ' factory of Moscow, which began building machir.e tools in 1926 . This 
was formerly the ' Yu .ShtollP ' factory, founded in 1398 , whlcn built machine tools 
from 1910, supplying lathes and some turret lathes to military departments. This 
md1cates quite a high technical culture and explains why ,after the ~evolution , 
activity vas resumed under Mospoligraph , repairing printing machinery.It was 
then transfered to Ho¥-edprom and began n:aehine tool building , from the st.:u.t 
'Samotochl~a · built shaping machines ~nd this was to re~Ain the speciality of tne 
1 •• !.1z<H1shtedt & Chikhachev ,pp18v- 131 ;Lebyacbenko ,ppZ0- 21 . 
2 .tk .Zhi~m' , · ~-5-20 . . 
) .Lebyachenko ,pn27- 28 t 
4.Ek .Zhizn • ,19- 5- 29 , 
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~actory for several ye1'1rs. In 192?/28 .nachine tools represented 24.l pe:r· cent 
1 
of output ; t"le main product of the faet0ry continued to be mac"'inery for 
t he paper and printing industry. hachine tool building was c.lso undertaken on 
a small scale by the 'Komsomolets' factory and technical scho~l in Egor 'ev 
(·oscow oblast '). This factory-school was founded in 1909 by the'B~dygin' 
firm for traininR: technicians. t uring the War it buUt some -nachine tools for 
military production anc this activity was resumed in 1925, when 32 shaping 
machines were built f or the market . I1achine tool building was regared as a means 
of improving the financ1~1 position of the school .In 192? a new lathe was 
intDoduced,distinguished Qy its single pulley and gearbox drive a~ time when 
the more pr imitive stepped pulley drive was typical of all Soviet-produced 
machines. A certain degre of universalism was retained as a deliberate policy 
in the interests of providing a range of work ~or teaching purposes. 2 1'he 
final civilian factory of any importance building machine tools on a regular 
basis at this time was the 'Kom11unar ' works of Lubny in th~ Ukraine . This factory , 
previously e~gaged inrepair work , began to build simple lathes f'rorn 1926J and 
lathe building was to remain the main activity until the W~ 
Two important mac ine tool building factories were locaten in the nilitary 
sector under the gun and machine gun trust, ' RUZh ', created in 1926 . During the 
second ~f of the 1920s the Tula arms factory , which had a very. long history 
of uchine tool building experience , produced a simple milling machine , model 
''l'C- 1 ', with hand-feed . 4 This was the only milling !T'achine to be built on a 
regular basis in the Soviet Union before the First Five- year Plan period. The 
Izhevsk gun ~aking ~nd steel works of the Udmurt Autonomous Republic began 
machine tool building in about 1928 , making a simple lathe of the German ,'Loewe' • 
type, which became known as t "le 'RUZh ' lathe .5 In 1927/28 machi "le tools accounted 
6 for only 10per cent of the total output of this factory . 
1.Ek.Zhizn' ,19-5-29 . 
2.Lebyachenko , p~2B-J1. 
) .I.bid, t>p37 ,40. 
4.11U.d,pp36-3? . 
5JlUd,p36;Izvestiya,21-?- 30 . 
6 .Ek .Zhizn ' ,19-5-29 . 
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The findings of the NK RKI survey were first presented in Bkonomicheskaya 
Zhizn 1 on 19 th ~'1ay !.929 by M .Kaganovich , and the NK RKI inspectors, L .Lipovetsk11 
and G.Rafalovskii.This was the first association of Mikhail M.oiseevich Kaganovich 
with the machine tool industry,and fron this time o~ he was to be one of its 
most active promoters. Introducing the report , Kaganovich stressed the vital 
importance of machine tool building for Soviet industriallsation;"ltachine tool 
buiJding is at the ryresent time that leading link , gr~sping which,we may pull 
the whole cha"\n ,and in deeds not words catch up and surpass the advanced, 
1 technically developer} ,capitalist countries'! The matn target of criticism 
was the fragmentation of machine tool building; its lack of a real coordinating 
centre and its low level of specialisation . The Section of 1'1achine Tool Building 
of VMTS performed some wf the functions of a trust and was beginning to introduce 
some elements of concentration and specilisation of production of machine tools 
but , it was claimed , Glavmetall gave it insufficient support. In 1927/28 
domestic production met only 19per cent of needs • Ten factories built machine 
tools, but these factories were subordinated to no less than eight different 
trusts and organisations . There was no real plan for facto~y specialisation . All 
but one of the factories buibt a range of other Pngineering products alongside 
machine tools , while the basic types of machine tools were built at several 
fac~ories. Thus , eight enterprises built l athes J five building one and the same 
size ( 150mm bn.ight of centres) with outputs of 28 ,44,60 , 70 and 214 units each. 
rhis duplication gave rise to small batch sizes and hi~h costs . The average 
cost of a machin"' tool was about twice as great as befvre the tlar , and 
consider~ble higher than for equivalent foreign machines . There was also much 
variation in costs between factor ies , costs tending to be higher at the large 
enterprises where overheads formed a gre&ter proportion of total costs , because 
of :poor organisation of production. Thus , a shaping machine uil t by the 1 Krasnyl 
Proletarli 1 factory cost almost fifty -er cent more than a similar machine built 
at the small 1 Samotochka ' works. " 
l.:!!C.Zhizn ' ,19-5-29. The following account of the NK RKI findings is based on 
this source , and the more det~iled account in Sotsialisticheskaya ratsionalizatsiya 
v bor 1 be s poteryami ,M.,1930 ,ppt46- 178. 
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A second ~jor problem revealed by the survey , related to the question of 
the lack of central control, was the low level of the design and quality of the 
machine tools built .There was an acute shortage of skill ed design personnel, but 
design work was neverthe'less undertaken by each factory with no general 
leadership or coordination . Designs were generally chosen by the factories 
thelllSQp).res. Foreign designs were inadequately studied ,and foreign firms were 
not involved on a consultative basis . There was very little standardisation even 
betwe~n the models of each individual factory • A tendency towards the building 
of models of excessive un1versal~ty and complexity was also crltlclsed . Sovie t 
machines were also extremely heavy compared with e~utvalent foreign models. With 
regzxd to quality, it was aimitted that the level ~as higher than pre-War , but 
nevertheless considerably lower than for the best foreign machine tools , haterlals 
were of erratic quality, there being no standards . Castings were frequently of 
uns~tisfactory quality and hardness.Heat treatment of lead-screws and spindles 
was lac~ing at most factories , with the resul t that parts deformed very easily . 
Thus , while the best 3oviet machines satisfied the accuracy standards established 
by the German authority,Schlesinger, the deformation of parts led to a rapid 
loss of precision . At the tim~ of the survey there •as no organisation responsl le 
for the comparative testing of Soviet and foreisn macbtnes and factories lacked 
proper testing facilities. But some tPchnical acceptance condi&tions were 
applied by VMTS to ensure a reasonable standard of act:uracy . The external finish 
of Soviet machines was generally poor . 
A third group of problems revealed by the survey related to the work of 
the factories . At the three main enterprises , eighty per cent of the equipment 
of tbe lllachining shops was installed before the 'W'ar ; it was botn physically worn 
and obsolescent,permittin~ cutting spe~ds of only 20- 30 per cent of modern levels . 
~he ~reduction cycle was considered to b~ over twice as long as it should have 
been: the average length of the cycle for a11 models built in 1927/28 was 1).4 
~onths. Equipment and productton are were very poorly utilised. According to 
the VSNKh Ytve-year Plan , 'Krzsnyi .r·roletarii ' was to produce 1,100 rubles of 
output per square metre of area of .Thachining and assembly shops per year;whereas 
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in t~27/2S the actual output per squ~re metre had been 397 rubles , compared 
~uh only 155 rubles at 'Dv1gatel ' RPvo~tsli • and U6 rubles at the iln .::>verdlova 
factory . Fillally , VSNKh was cr iticised f'or not orsanlsing any fore..i.gn technical 
assistance for the branch pespite its acute problPp . 
~1ter exposing thts 1ormidable catalogue of derects , NK BKI proceeded to 
outline a sel'ies of practical measurf's for raising the level o!' Soviet machine 
tool ouilding . The solution ,as presented by Kaganovich, was fundamental 
r~tionalisation and reconstruction of the exlsting factories , with the realisation , 
in t 1e fir t instance , of a narrow specialisation of each enterprise . Tt~s 
path w~s likened to th~t proposed by .F:rofesoor 3c le~tnger for tbe German wachln~ 
1 tool industry • But Ger.'lEirl rationalisation was based on Amer lean practice , Thus 
l\'"ganovich stated that , "In our development. of machine tocl building we rnust 
thP 
emub.te/Ameri.can industry , both in relation to the structure of tyoes built and 
Hs rate of develoPment'! This s ·ecialisatlon was to be achieved tn stages .Firstly , 
within one y ar, the :factories had to be freed from all non-"".achine tool production; 
secondly , during the five years of the Plan factories should specialise 1n 
the production of particular types of ~chine tool , with the aim of one type per 
fqctory , ~xcept ror lathes whlcb were to be built at two factori s . ~uch 
specialisationwas not foreseen in the VS~Kh five-year Plan for the branch. 
According to Hh. RKI , the VSNKh plan envisaged that J , JOO lathes would be built 
in the final year by eight, differemt factories . In order to free space for basic 
pro'uction , the making of ~11 nuts , bolts , and other small standard itens was to 
be trans~ered to a specialised engineer ing factory1 thls was to be done by 
Au.$ust 19)0 . Specialisati on of factories , the full utilisation of space and 
equip~ent , and the undertaking of r econst ruction work would give a substantial 
mcrease 1n the output obtainable from existing factories and give the possibility 
of fulfilling the First F i v<:!- year Plan in a manner v ery different from th;~.t 
envisaged. by VSNKh . 
There was no "roporly e l aborated Five- year Plan for machine tool building • 
clair~~ed the NK RKI , and no clear view of mach· ne tool nee O.s . Taking the actual 
l .It is not known whet her Schlesinger hi msel f participat ed in any way in the NK RKI 
s~ey .Re i s known t o have s urveyed the AMO vehicl9 factory in 1928 t J .P.G.J0-8-28 . 
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consuaption during the two years 1926 to 1928 , 65 .1 m.r ., as a basis , and 
assu0ing an increase of needs o~ 20-21 per cent a year over five years ,NK RKI 
estimated that total needs would be 300 m.r . , with a de~and of 86 m.r . in the 
final year , 19:32/33· The recent new variant of the VSNKh Plan ap~roxiotated to 
this , with a demand in the final ye~r of 84 m.r •• But , whereas VSNKh foresaw an 
ouput satisfying 62 _per cent of needs in 1932/3J , or 53 m.r ., 'NKHKI believed that 
70 per cent fulfilment could be achieved , i . e . 60 m. r •• Furthermore , whereas V~Kh 
envisaged that the three mai n fect ories would give a combined output in the final 
year of 22 .5 ~ .r . and foresaw the construction of five new factocies , NK P~I 
wase convinced that an output of 47 m.r . could be obtainej from the thre~ main 
factories and additional 10 m.r . from other existing enterprises. The ouilding 
cf new factories was necessary , but not on the scale,nor with the urgency , 
claimed by VSNKh . Thus , NK RKI advocated an intensive p3th of development, as 
opposed to the extensive path aiopted by V~!Kh . 
The crux of the argument presented by Kaganovich end the NK RKI was that 
macMine to0l building had to be considered as a separate industry , and not 
as an activity scattered between a diverse range of organisations . Unified 
lea1ershtp was essential in order to pursue a coherent technical and rationalisation 
Polictes. The creation of a speci~lised machin~ tool butlrting trust was thus an 
essPntial precondition of future prqgress . While welcoming VS~h's proposal 
for such a trust , Kaganovich was cr itical of the fact that it was to embrace only 
three enterprises , In the view of :4K RKI it had to include six factories - the 
three nain ones , plus 'Samotochka ', Im .Lenina and im .!sK Mashinostroeniya . Tbe 
trust would exercise general leadership of work con; ected with plann*ng and 
projecting new factori es . t•1achine t0ol sales would be handled through a syndicate · 
The board of NK RKI discussed the findings of the survey on 24 th May and 
during thf following two months the report was considered join tly with interested 
~rties , including the enterprises .The p:roposals out) 1ned above were incorporated 
~ a decree of NK RKI of )1st July 1930, which was accepted by VSNKh as a ba~is 
for the rationalisation of machine tool ou:lding.
1 
l.Sotsi 11stlcheskayA ratsionalizat-siya • • , o '1 cit ,p174 . 
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T~e Creation of 'Stankotrest'. 
OhB immediate consequence of the publication of the :rl<.. RKI survey findings 
appears to have been that Glavmashinstroi turned to STO for a speedy resolution 
of the question of creatin~ the specialised 1 trust . A report on the problem 
had been prepared for STO at the beginnin~ of ~ay • This had indicated the 
necessity of the trust for stren~htening technical leadership and deepening 
the specialisation of fartories, but also for facilitating the creation of a 
2 strong central design bureau. Government aprroval was granted on 29 th May 
and the statute of the new trust,'Stankotrest' - the State Trust of .iedium 
~:achine Tool Building , was approved by \SNKh on 21 st June . It was to embrace 
three factories only , despite the demands of NK RKI , possibly because 
Glavashinstroi did not want to delay its creation bv having to overcome the 
resistance of other trusts • The new trust had an initial capital of 18.9 million 
rubles and was to operate as an independent economic unit on the basis of 
'commercial accounting ' .3 'Stankotrest ' was to begin operation on 1st October 1929. 
At the end of S~ptember a further new organisation was created, this was 
'Stankostroi' , which was to supervise the work of nro ·ecting and building new 
achine tool factories . This organisation was not subordinated to ' Stankotr~st ' , 
however, but to 'Orgametall', presumably because of the latter's role in projecting 
4 the new enterprises . 
The first Chairman of 'Stankotrest ' was Evgenil Markovich Al 'perovich , 
the founder and fDrmer chairman of 'Orgametall ' • I t is claimed by one modern 
source that Al'perovich , together with his colleagues in ' Orgametall', was 
largely responsible for the creation of the new trust1 Al'perovich was born Qn 
16th June 1888 in Gornel ' skaya oblast ' , Byelorussia~ !.ike many 11achine tool 
engineers of the period, he was educated at the ~loscow Technical Uni "ersi ty under 
an early Russian snecialist of metal cutting technology ,A.P.Gavrilenko . 
Al 'perovich joined the RSDRP(b) in 1914 and in the ~ollowin~ year was exiled for 
r~volutionary act1v1ty .After the February Revolution he became a member of the 
~oscow obl<>st ' bureau of the Party CP.ntral Committee and was responsible for 
Party work with engineers • A member of the Moscow Military-Revolutionary Committee 
1.Ek.Zhizn ' ,25- 5-29 . 
2.Torg.From.Gaz ., 11- 5-29. 
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1.n October 191'7, he subsequently became Cha1rm:m of J.1oscow oblast' Sovnarkom 
As noted above, from 1918 to 1920 he headed the Department of Metal , later 
Glavmetall, of ~SN~h. While head of 'Orgametal1 ' during the years 1924 to 1929, 
Al'perovich was also a member of the Moscow RKI and the author of a book on 
survey methods . '7 It is therefore possible that he was involved in the NK ffia 
survey of machine tool building, although no d lrect ev 1dence for this has been 
~racec. In tbe late 'twenties 'Crgametall' took an increasing interest in 
machine tool building matters, drawing heavily on th:.. experi nc"" of the German 
i.niustry ,whicb Al'perovich and his colleagues propagated in a number of oooks .8 
visited 
In the autumn of 1927 , Al ' pe~ov1ch/the United States and studied a nu~ber of 
machine tool factories~ During his period as h~ae of 'Orgametall ' ,Al'perovlch 
gathered around him a tea.m of engineers, aany of whom entered 'Stankotrest' J 
prominent members of this group included G.M.Golovin, C.M.Gorokhov , A.A.Zernov 
and E.E.Levin , the latter becoming the first head ¢If the lllachine tool industry 
research 1nstitute ,ENIMS. Thus 'Stankotrest ' began its nct1vlty having an 
experienced and knowledgeable leadership with particularly strong llnks with 
the German engine,ring and nachine tool building industries. Al ' perovich was 
to remain chairman of tbe board of ' Crgametall ' on a part-ti~e basis throughout 
1930 , but a:t the end of November the PresidiW!I of tbe TsKK and NJ\ RKI sharply 
criticised the wor~ of the organisation and inadequacies of its leadership , and 
reco~mended that Al ' perov1ch be replaced by someone who had ~ore time to devote 
to the rationalisation work for which 'Orgametal l ' was intended.10 Shortly 
before this the Party organisation of 'Orgametall ' had been removed for alleged 
rligntist activit1es ,11a fact which must have reflected badly on Al'perovich . 
) .Sobrante za~onov i raspor1azhen11 ,1929,Pt2,NoJO ,pp696- 670. 
4.IndustrLalizcts1ya i st~nkostroenie- byulleten ' { 'Stan~otr~st ' ) ,19JO ,No.2-J, p69 . 
5.Stanki i instrurr.ent , 196~,No? , p44 . 
6 .]ol 'shaya sovetskaya ~ntsiklope-liya ,M . , 1926,\ ol.2 , p)10 . urther biographical 
d~'>ta.Hs are from this source and Stanki i instruaent ,1968, No7 , p44 ( article on 
:. ... Al' perovich , 1888- 1938) • 
7 .Al ' perovich ,E .M .,OsnovnyP. polozheniya 'DO metodiKe o·osledovanii, . ., 1927 • . ..,.. 
8,i.otably,Novosti stankos·roeniya v Gemanii,J1 . , 1927; and , Al'perovich,E.l' ·~ec~0 •$•.ti • 
Obraztsovyi zavod ,M.,1929. ' Orgametall's foreign contacts are considered • • 
9 .'!or~ .Prom ,Gaz , ,31 - 12- 27 ;and ,1 7- 3- 28 . 
lO.Za .Ind . ,30-11- JO . 
11.Za Ind . , :1- 10- 30 . 
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Soviet writers are almost unanimous intheir assessment of Soviet machine tool 
building in the period prior to 1930 1 its development began relatively late, 
the lack of a single administrative centre held back the branch, the level of 
specialisation was too~ low , production met.bods we12 primitive, designs were 
1 backward , and official attention to machine tool building was inadequate. There 
is much justi~e in these criticisms, but Soviet writers tend to play down the 
real obstacles to the ~owth of the branch during the period, in particular the 
uncertainty of policy with regard to industr ialisation and the late recognition 
of the vital role of the machine tool sector • After the trial of the so-called 
'In1ustrial Party ' in the autumn of 1930 , Sov~et writers claimed th~t the slow 
development of the branch was a consequence of ' wrecking' activity on the part 
of officials responsible for the engineering industry.2 As the above account has 
attempted to show , there ~Pre quite sufficient real reasons for the backwardness 
of machine tool building without invoking the deliberate sabotage of a few 
malevolent administrators . The leadership of VSNKh does appear to have been 
slow to recognise the inportancebf th~ branch and undecisive in taking practical 
I 
measures . The Chairman of VSN~h , ~ . V .Kuibyshev , very r arely made any mention of 
11achine tool building in his nublic speeches and ,despite Mezhlauk's 
occasional advocacy of it, Gl~vmetall seems to have devoted very little attention 
to the branch . With th~ formation of Glavmashinstroi and a new leader of the 
engineering i ndustry ,A.F.Tolokontsev, who may have had a greater appreciation of 
the strategic role of the machine tool industry through his work in the defence 
industry , the situation began to change. But the real pressure for change came 
from outside the VSNKh leadership, from NK RKI and 'Orgametall '. Within VSNhh 
and the trusts there does ap~ to ~ave been , not ' wrecking ' , but scepticism 
and an unwillingness to break with the methods and priorities of the past. By 
October 1929 the forces for change had to a gre~t extent triumpheu over those 
promoting cont inuity J the victory w~s far rom complete, but th~ creation of 
' Stanktrest' can be regarded as the effective birth of the Soviet machi ne t ool 
industry . 
l.see,eg. ,Aizenshtadt &: Chi.,..hachev ,pp164-t67;Lebyachenko,p5;Pivovarov , I , ''Sovetsloe 
Stankostroenie" ,Problemy ekonorriki, 19)5,No4,p190. 
2 .~ee1 P~g .,Lebyachenko ,P6 ; Za Ind. ,?-2- 31; and 27- 1-32 . ;Borisov & Vasil'ev , op cit , 
\19c2; 107 . 
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Cha pt er 3 
FROM I STANKCYl'REST' TO THE PEOPlE Is CONlrliSSARIAT OF tw'!.ACfiTN~ TOOL BUILDThG 
A General Review of 1929 to 1941 
This chapter is devoted to a general review of the years 1929 to 1941 as an 
introduction to more detailed consideration of particular features of the industry 
in subsequent chapters. Facts relating to the administrative arrangements of 
the industry , its factories , construction plans and their fulfilment , output plans 
and their fulfilment , the growth of the product range , the different variants 
of the five-year plans and the development of the machine tool stock are presented 
in appendices and so will not be looked at in detail here. 
The creation of 'Stankotrest ' in October 1929 opened a new stage in the develop· 
ment of machine tool buildin~ in the USSR . For the first time a single administrati• 
centre existed with control over enter.pr1ses , although at first their number was 
s~all . But the birth of the machine tool industry as an independent branch took 
place at an extremely difficult time when there was considerable ~1certainty 
about the rate and pat tern of development of the engine"'ring industry as a whole . 
The Five- year Plan underwent revisions almost immediately from the time of its 
official adoption ; targets for the building of tractors and agricultural machinery 
were raised in connection with the collectivisation c~mpaign , but of greater 
significance was the international situation and neasures taken in the sumner 
of 1929 to step up the rate of develop~ent of branches connected with defence 
nro~uction . 1 In the autumn a number of major new construction projects were 
2 
added to the ori~lnal plan , includin~ a ~roup of aircraft industry factories. 
T~ese events had major implications for the machine tool industry if import 
dependence were not to increase above the level planned , and during the autumn 
of 1929 there were calls for a revision of plans for the branch . Gurevich , in 
Particular ,raised the aJarm at the ~owin~ import dependence for MachL~e tools 
and demanded vigorous action to expand the industry and modernise and widen its 
Product range~ 
1.leninskii plan sotsialisticheskoi industri~lizatsii 1 ego osushchestvlenie ,M •, 
1969 , p.113 . 
2.Vedusbcha a rol ' raboche~o klass v rekonstruktsii 
p, 7. 
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In the autumn o-4" 1929 the final Plan year output target was in fact revised 
and intentions with regard to t~e building o~ new factories changed quite 
radically. Now ten new factories were to be built over the five years , instead 
of five foreseen in the previous variant of ~1ay . Three new enterprises were to 
be built during 1929/JO the original two foreseen in the Plan , plus a new 
factory o: millin~ machines in Nizhnl· Novgorod (Gor'kit). These were to be quite 
large enterprises : an announcement at the end of the year claimed that they had 
no equals in the world , except for Britain. The Khar'kov factory was to produce 
1 , ~00 drilling machines a year, the ~ oscow factory 1,200 turret lathes and semi-
automatics and the Gor'kii factory 1 , 300 miJJing machlnes .4 The original Plan 
document had expressed caution with regard to the scale of machine tool factories; 
now nine months later this had been disregarded. 
In 1929 machine tool imports were still somewhat below the high level of 1927/28 
but it was evident that as plan targets were pushed up imports would grow rapidly 
and their role increase . \'lhile sone regarded this prospect with alarm and insisted 
on an acceleration of the development of the domestic industry, others accepted 
t~e situation as an inevitable short term phenomenon, as a component of an overall 
~rowth strategy . One of the clearest statements of this view was by Tolokontsev 
of Glavmashstroi at the Second Session of the Central iixecutive ComMittee (TsiK) 
in December 1929r 
"If time had permitted we would have begun to build machine tool factories, 
factories of presses, conveyers , etc . , but now we cannot allow ourselves 
this luxury ... ~en we have freed resources in just two years time we will be 
able to seriously undertake the production o~ implements of production, 
Le . to build factories able to equip metallurgical anrl machine building 
factories, the chemical, coal and oil industries , etc . At present we produce 
only a comparatively small quantity of certain types of machine ti . If we had 
wanted to solve the problerrs of machine building by our own technical forces 
alone we would have fallen behind , and not caught up Burope and America . 
' ith widescale use of foreign technology the problem of organising machine 
building is for us fully realisable" . 5 
3.T:>rg.-orom.gaz . ,27 .11.29 . 
4.t;k.zhizn' .,22 .12 .29 . 6 
5.2 sessiya Tsil\. Soyuza SSR,stenograficheskie otchet ,Byulleten ' No . 11 ,N.,1~29,p . 2 • 
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Thus the foundations of the engineering industry were to be laid on the basis 
of foreign technolog;y; intensive development of the m.'lchine tool industry was 'b:> 
wait until resources were available. This approach , as became clear in the 
following year , was not acceptable to the machine tool industry itself . 
On 6th January 1930 VSNKh issued a decree calling for a review of the Five-year 
Plan for machine building , and Tolokontsev , refering to this , called for study 
of American technolo~y and organisation , and also , contrary to his previous 
str>tement , stressed the need to give particular attention to machine tool building~ 
Shortly before this G .Fe~orov had appealed for urgent action to develop the 
industry in view of the ' famine ' of machine tools he saw developing; this famine, 
he adied ,was promotin the undesirable phenomena criticised in the N~KI report 
of the previous year - low quality products, a low level of specialisation of 
rnac~ine tool building factories 2 and also a tendency for prices to rise . VSNKh 
di~ in fact take action to accelerate the development of the branch . A decree , 
'On the state of machine to~l building and measures for its further development', 
of 11th January outlined a programme of action , refering to machine tool building 
as ," one of the most important factors in the industrialisation of the Union and 
liberation from foreign dependence" . The building of the three new factories was 
to be accelerated in order to secure their commissioning by the end of 1930/31, 
a further five new factories were to be projected in 1929/30, a commission on 
machine tool building was to be sent to the USA and Germany in order to obtain 
technology from machine tool firms su'pplying equipnent to the USSR , and a group 
was to be sent ~broad to study forei~n production methods .Furthermore , the possibili1 
o~ forei~n t~CQ~ical assistance was to be investig~ted , foreign specialists to be 
enga~ed and three more factories transfered to 'Stankotrest (im.Lenina,'Samotochka ' 
aad im .TsK r•tashinost-roeniya) .3 This decree indicated a much more positive 
com~1ttment to developing the industry than at any time in the past and suggests 
that the rate of growth of machine tool needs and imports was giving rise to 
serious concern . 
~·lai~ .,? . 1.30 .; 8 . 1.30. 
•1 b!i. '3 . 1 . 30 . 
3.lli,19J4 ,No .10, p .5. 
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This VSNKh decree was follot>ied by two more significant measures . First the 
output plans of the industry were revised upwards . The new final year taz:get was 
to be 1,50 million rubles ln import prices (in 1 f;2("i 27 prices not Know,) , and the 
extent of satisfaction of needs from doMPstic production was to rise from 24 per 
cent in 1929/JO to 40 . 5 per cent 1n 1931/32 , and presumably a much higher level 
in t'le final vea:r g\ven planned needs of 144 million rubles . 1 Second , the project 
capacities oF the three new factorles , then being projected at tne Berlin office 
of Orgametall , were substantiall y incrP.ased . The Gor ' k11 milling machine works 
was now to produce .3 , 400 units a yet:ir and t l1e Moscow factory 2 , 400 units . 2 The 
projects were approved tn Nay and constr uction work on all three enterp!:"lses 
began in the suBmer of 19)0 , The new factorl€s ~ere to be integrated machining-
assembly ~~its , without foundry cap~city: castings were to be supplied by specialised 
centralised foundries , 
Despite the evidence of a more definite commitment to development machine 
tool building on the part of Blavmashstroi and VSNKh , t~ere was still much 
dissatisfaction with ' the situation . One of the roost vigorous pleas for more 
action wAs an editort .., l of Izvestiya of 10th Hay 1 clearly bearing the hallrrtarks 
of NK RKI influence . Successes and grandiose plans ~ere, it claimed 1 diverting 
the attention of practical workers from the need for a prorerly thought out 
plan for. the sequential develooment of dif~erent br~1ches of industry and of 
branches within the engineering industry . A moat xapid developMent of machine 
tool build in~ , ''in al, countries the leading branch of machine building" , was , it 
stressed , an elementary condition of further successful development of all 
1ndustTy and liberation from import deoendence. The editorial went on to note 
that the lack of a previous tradition of .machine tonl buildir~ created excellent 
preconditions for organising the industry on a quite different basis tha~ in otner 
countries , giving the oos~ibiJity of undertakiqgtbe mass production of a narrow 
product ran£e . Finally , it not.ed the necessity of preparing the production of 
AmPrican- type , specialised 
l .See -~ppendix 2 . 
2 .Izvestiya , 19. 5 . )0 . 
3·.!bid ., 10 . 5. )0 . 
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machines require~ by the auto- tractor industry . 
On several oceaslons in the veeks precedin~ the S1xteen1.b Party Congress 
Al ' perovtch expressed concerr. nt the state of the lniustry , atte~pttng to arouse 
publ1c opinion 1n favour of further .action . The slo~ progress of construction 
work on tbe new factories was a particular sourc~ of concern at this tlme .1 At 
the Congress J\.aganovich launched a vigorous attacJ.: on the VS!.Kh leadership for 
its allegei! neglect of machine mch1ne tool 'bu1ld1ng , employing the materlals 
of t.hP t:"K RKI survey of the previous yea~ as evi.dcnce for hls c G" . He cr1tlc1se!l 
what he regarded as the quite inadequate lPVel of rat1onall.sat1on actlvity tn 
the branch , the .POOr litillsatlon of capacity • backward models of low quality , 
and thP cautiousness of pl'lns for the industry r plans trhich hnd , he claimed , 
undergone four. r.evts'l.ons dur.lntr the year . '!'here una a lack or clarity on the 
part of ~canonic ortr.anlsations , he said , on the queotion of machi ne tool needs 
and this Jed to a lnnk of decisive act too 1.n developing the 1.1\dustry . 'l'hc blnme 
fo-r these shortcomings ~as clearly plAced ,.lth VS!iKh and the former leadcrohip 
of Glavmashstro12 • In reply KulbyAhev ~nohledged that ~ore had to be done to 
develop the industry 1n order to relieve the mnchine tool ' famine ' .3 The cm1gress 
called for t,he forced developn:an t. of the eng lneo.c1ng industry , in partlculn.r 
heavy machine buildlne and the production of Mchine to~ls and t.ool1ng , for a 
rev tew of 1 ts .Plans , and for :f:urt..her r.nt1onn:l1satlon directed towaxdfl 't.he 
specln11sa!.ion of factories by product , the .nan:owing of product ranges and tne 
4 
organ 1sat1on of mass production , Shortly after the Congress t".agnnovlch set out 
t,l.s views en the develoornent of machine tool bulldine in the press , citing exanrlet 
of American practice which he coosldered worthy of emulatiotl • He called for 
~eater speciali 52.tion of machine to,...l buildin£ factories , a re uction .of the prodl 
range , the organisation of flo;r production , and the provision of t:tatning for 
skilled workers requl:rerl by the branch , Any expenses incurred ill acquiring forei{l) 
technic&! ;.ssl.stance .for developing the 1noustry woulc:' ; he belleve!i , be quic»Y 
recoupt'>-ii . Above all , t .. a'Janovlch stressed that machl.ne tool building was a 
qualitative problem s the production of n large quantity of backward machines 
would , he s~ressed , threaten the growth of labou~ productlv1ty through~ut industry 
1 .See , e .g .Zaind ., 2,5 .6 ,JO , 
2.Xvr s"ezd"VK:P(b),Sten ., otchet .,~t .-L ., 19JO , pp . 519-.522 •. A purge of the Glavoaahs1 
leadershi p was announced in •~y 1930 - Izvest1ye , 19. 5-JO. 
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Despite the endorsement of the policy of strengthening t~e ~Achine tool 
industry by the Sixteenth Partv ConRress , Al' perovich continued to express concerr 
e.t the lack of attention to the branch during Auv.ust and early September. It is 
clPar that the forecast of nachir.e tool demand by the end of theplan period had 
been ra"ically revised , proba-oly in J ul.y . Kaganovlch refered to needs ill 1932/33 
of 250 l!lllllon rubles (as opr-osed to 144 million rubloo sef'!n earlier in the year) 
while Al ' perov1ch noted that 42,000 units Hould be required 1n that year~ Output 
plans may also have been changed 1 Kaganovtch 1!\dlcat.ed n final year target 
I 
of 150 nUl ion rubles . Al ' perovich was part!Jcule.rly worried about the .industry's 
investment plans . In 1929/30 14. j mill~on rubles had been re~u1rcd for the new 
factories alone , but only 7 ,. 5 had been allocated; while for 1930/Jl he est1oated 
Utat 105 l!ltilion rubles would be needed 1n order to fulf11 the plan , but VSNKh 
bad made clear its intention to only allocate 42 million rubles. 7 The br-unch 
wan now comnit·ted ·to further construction projectsa a factory or gear-cutting 
Mchlnes was to be built , and al.so a central , specialised foundry with a capacity 
of JO ,OOO tonnes a year to be located 1n i"ioacow . 8 Al' perov1ch stressed the 
necessity of putt1n~ the construction of' machine tool factories into th~ first 
priority category fnr aunply purposes . The rnn1n tusk of tho pe1:1od ahead was seen 
ns the introduction of new modern nesigns , replacing the old , pre-lcvolution modele 
then in production at all factories . To this end , Al' perov1ch called for the 
creation of a "factory of new designs" as a base for buUd1ng prototypes of the 
new Mch1nes. 9 
On 9th September the Presidiun of VSNKh discussed the Dach1ne tool industry 
and the problems of its develop~ent . In an article published on the day of this 
ceetlng 1n Izvcstiva ( a consistent supporter of the industry 1n 1930) Al ' perov1ch 
attacked the philosophy of those ~ho , like Tolokontsev Ul the previous December, 
believed that machine tool building could wait. Imports were growing rapidly, he 
wrote , but the problem was not just that tens of mtllions of rubles foreigrl 
J .Fravda , 12 .7 . JO . 
4.D1rektl'!l,_KPSS 1 sovetskogo pravitel'stva po khozya1stvennym voorosal!l,l'i ,,19.57, 
Vol .2,pp.t94-198 . 
.5.~ . ,24 . 7 . JO . 
6 ,.~·1 Izvestiya ,9 . 8 .30. 
? .Izvest1va ,5 . 8 . JO. 
S.lbid .: Izvest1va . 9 . 8 .10 . 
64 
excnange was beine- spent: 
"'!'here are khozyaistvennikl who Ill2.intain that we still have plenty of time 
for machine tools , that we can calmly import them from e.broad for another 
two years . Posing the question in this way would have some sense if one 
were speaking about a temporary increase in the demand for machine tools 
given the existence of our own technical base in the decisive sectors of 
machine tool building. But the fundamental question consists in the fact 
that we build individual , low quality , very simple Machine tools, but do 
not as vet tutve our own proper machine tool building ind ustry as the princi!_l:ll 
base for reconstruction of industrv as a whole . It is precisely this which 
is the crux of our foreign r'lependence in the realm of machine bti1ld1ng . In 
nost advanced countries modern machine tool bulldin~S is characterised by 
the fact thRt machine tool and to~llng factories do not just sup~ly individual 
machines to customers , but give them tooled- up technolopical processes for 
this or that component. This is why we so often have to go abroad for the 
elaboration of projects of' new production . This is why the creation of our 
own machine tool bu1lcHn,l't base is the central ooint of the oroblem of ~ 
dependence on capitalist countries . This is why this question is fa:r frt)Jn 
being exhausted by the question of the import of an extra few thousand 
machine tools" 1 
l\l'p9rovich went on to observe that the intended cutback of investment could 
p11t back the solution of the industry' s problems by yet another year, and raised 
l !l~> possibility that the new factories would have to be put into conservation 
l.l.'ltil resources were available . Events were soon to show that this was no i dle 
threat: ~ork on thE" new KhF~r ' kov factory stoppe1 an(i was not resuned for t wo 
vears . 
At the VSNKh Presidium Al' perovich stressetJ t'lat t.hemain task of the coming 
ygar was the transition to new modern designs , and stated that foreign technical 
assistance was neces~ary if real progress was to be made . Suntning up the d iscuss ion. 
Unshlikht"leclared that : "The situation with re~ard to machine tool building is 
2 l!!anifestly unhappy , and with tooling - catastrophic" . l'.,oll owing this me ting a 
d~creel!as issued by the 'Sr'Kh Presidium , The main task of 1930/31 was to be the 
~~,d~ental renewal of designs built , with a transition to new models in the 
fono.,ing year .A special research and design bsse was to be created within Soy.uz-
~ ·~ · original emphasis , 
·~ .• 9.9.30. 
2·~. ,12.9.30. 
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stankoinstrUJilent , incl udin~ a central desirr..n off1.ce and a factory of new desigtls . 
The industry ~-:as to see< 'foreign technica 1 as ~tsta.nce and , finally, the indus try 
was to adopt a policy of strictly speclalisin£ the "laChine tool factories . 2 This 
decree set the policy for the lndu.:;try for the next two yea:::s and mar~ed a turn 
tn its development . 
In 1930 imports of machine tools reached 9,000 units worth 41 . 5 million 
rubles compared with 5 , 000 units to a value of 16 . J million rubles tn 1929~ 'l'he 
trend of development was very steeply rising . Just after the end of the'Promparty' 
trial in December 1930 a noup of representatives of the industry , including 
the head of ' Stankostro1.' ( t"te industry ' s construction organisation) ,Erlikh , 
forcefully drew attention to this situation in the pages of Pravda . Forecast 
nee:ls ln 1932/13 ;;ere 42 , 000 units worth 270 .9 million rubles ; output in the 
flnalyear was to be 152 .1 mill i on rubles , covering ;6 per cent of demand , COI'Jparr 
with an originally planned 17 per cent 1n 1930/31 . But. , they wrote, ~nitial claims 
for 19)1 t otalled 55 , 000 units . The rapld develop11ent o:f the industry t.:as therefol 
esse:1tial they urged , both for economic and also strategic reasons . Problel!'.s 
of the industry were explained , they asaerted , by the wrecking activities of 
those responsible for planning the branch in thepast , notably C.harnovskil , one 
of' the defendMts at the t:-1al ;and also by the fact that leading economic organs 
(R~1ng , evidently , VSNKh) manifestly underestimated the importance of machine 
tool building . Investment allocations had been reduced to the point that one 
factory had been put into cor.servat\.on and another , the Hoscow turret: lathe works , 
was now also threatened . A fundamental change of approach was essentilll , they 
4 
concluded ,if I:eal progress in developing the industry was to be made . 
Despite the existence of serious probler.s and a definite ambivalence on the 
puo. of econonic and industrial leaders on the question of the priority of the 
m.-anch ,substantlal changes took place 1n 1930 , which effectively represented 
tM year of foundation of t.he modern Soviet machine tool industry . The ambivalencE 
ste "'ed froM a numoer of .factors , notably the ease with wnlch machine. tools could 
Lrhts ne10 organis~tlon replaced Stankotrest in June - see Appendix 1 · 
~·~Ind • ,17 .9 , )0 ;Izvest.1ya, 20 .9 ~30 . 
J .Se!: Table SA .XVI {Sta tistic~J appendi .x) • 
•!:rav~l) .12 . )0 , 
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stankoL'lstrument 1 tncludin~t a central desian off\.ce and a factory of new designs. 
The industry ::as to seek foreign technical assistance and 
1 
f1.nal ly 
1 
the industry 
was ·o adopt a policy of strictly specialising the -.achine tool factories. 2 This 
decree set the policy for the industry for the next two years P~d marked a turn 
ln its development . 
In 1Q30 imports of m;~chine tools reacher-1 9,000 units worth 41.5 rnillion 
rubles compared with 5, 000 units to a value of 16.3 oillion rubles 1n 1929~ The 
trend of development was very steeoly rising . Just after the end of the'Promparty' 
trial in December 1930 a group of representatives of the industry , including 
the head of ' Sta.nkostro1. ' (the industry ' s construction organisation) ,Erlikh, 
forcefully drew attention to this situation in the pages of Pravda . Forecast 
nee~s 1n 1932/JJ were 42 ,000 units worth 270 .9 million rubles; output in the 
f1nalyear was to be 152 . 1 million rubl es 1 covering 56 per cent of demand 1 comparee 
with an originally planned 1? per cent in 1930/31 . But , they Hrote,!nitial claims 
for 1931 totalled 55)000 units . The raptd development of the industry was therefor1 
essential they urged , both for economic and also strategic reasons . Problems 
of the 1..ndustry Here explained , i.hey as::-erted , by the wrecking activii.ies of 
those responsible for planninp; the branch in t-hepast , notably Charnovskii , one 
o" the defendants at the tr1~1 Jand also by the .fact that leadtng economic organs 
(m~aning , evidently , VSNKh) m~~ifestly underestimated the importance of machine 
tool building . Investment allocations had been reC'1uce~ 1 to the point that one 
factory had been put into conservation ar.d another , the Hoscow turret lathe works 1 
was now also threatened . A fundamental ch~nge of appro~ch was essential , t.hey 
4 concluded, lf real progress in developing tho industry was to be made . 
Despite the existence of serious proble~s and a definite ambivalence on the 
Part of econonic and indusb·ial leaders on the questlcn of the priority of the 
branch,substantial changes took place in 1930 , which effectively represented 
the year of foundation of the 111odern Soviet machine tool industry . The ambivalence 
st~ed fr.om a number of factors , notably the ease with which oachine tools could 
l.This ne1: organisation replac&' 3-tc"l.tlkotrest in June - see AppendiX 1 . 
2.Zaind .,1? .9 . 30 ;Izvest1ya,20 . 9 . JO . 
3 .See Table SA .XVI (Statistical appendix) . 
4 .Pra.vda~13 . 12 . )0 . 
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, tnoorted in the crisis conditions of the capita] ist world , but also an a~parentl .. 
11'1delY held view that machine tool building was such a difficult matter that it 
"-ould take years to o.rgantse properly. Al' perovi.ch and others tirelessly strived to 
arouse public opinion to the importance of machine tool building , but with limited 
success . As a Pravda editorial w;:ts to point. out a year later, all the country 
kr.e.t about the neh" turbines and blooming mills , but 1nachtne tools were a different 
catter& 'proletarian public opinion' it concluded , had to be turned to the 
1 problem of creating machine tools . 
A111bltious targets were set for 1931 . Output was to total 22 ,000 units compared 
vltb about 8 ,000 built 1n 1929/30 , while the specialised component of the 
indust-ry w1s to build 10 ,926 uoit,s , over. t-wice the achievement of the previous 
2 
yeu. The year op~ned wHh an All- Union conference on the problem of renewing 
•!}! designs butlt, t he rnain task of the year . Particular stress was p.lced on 
st.rengthenL'1g the des i.gn forces of the industry , both at the level of the factories, 
&P.-l also by creating a Central Desien Office~ The latter :was in fact created 1n 
lloveJaber 19)1. In ~arch the VSNKh Presidium approved the organisation of a research 
institute for t.he industry ; this machine tool and toollllg institute NI!STI) was 
to start work from June 1931 . While work on new designs got underway 1 including 
work on a ae;.; standard lathe of the latest German design at the ' Krasnyl Proletar11 ' 
factory {the 'DIP') , the factories of the branch reduced their product ranges 
Ud sharply raisedthe level of seriality of their production 1 putting into practice 
t!le der.and of the VSNKh decree of September 1930 . The a option of this policy 
Gf ·tr1ct specialisation , and its results , is considered in detaU in Chapter 4 . 
During 19)1 a nunber of specialists connected -with the industry ,or otherwise , 
'-... ilJi "'\ 
•ilt t' 1 1n J •OI"Ward radical n.ro'Oosals breaking ll~1th the practicesof machine too L 
c·i>itaHst countries . These proposals related to the or~isation of production • 
!ts Si)ec1allsat1on 
1 
scale and technology, and also to machine tool design · '1any 
or~ 
-~proposals , although of interest and at times of bold originality , were 
~1npraot1cable in the conditions of thf> Soviet economy of 1931 and 1932 . This 
l.Pt-avd 1 2 ~. 7.12.31. 
) ·:~e Table SA I 
e:)U 1Q" ' • __ , .34 ,Ho .10,p .6 . 
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radical ,' leftist' (as it came to be characterised ,cecause its ideas .ran ahead 
of the possibility of their Practical realisation) tendency developed after the 
'fromp2xty' triaJ and lasted until about thP sum"er of 1932; as will be shown , it 
had little practical influence on the machine tool industry . 
The specialisation policy of 1.931 , coupled "11th the general expansion of the 
industry , lf!d to a rapid upsurge of production • Taking 1931 as equivalent to 
th~'> 1910/Jt economic year of the Five- yearPlans , even t.hemost ambitious plan 
variant was overfulfilled , both in terms of output in rubles,and in terms of total 
machine tool supply - output plus imports - in units . This latter result was 
obtained in part because imports .rose to an exceptionally high level , 14,000 
units worth over 85 m1.111on rublen , This level was not to be reached again in the 
pre- ar years . But the import situation was by now deteriorating . In December 
Al'perovich observed that the crisis was beginning to 11~r.1t the ability of foreign 
firms to finance production of roach1nes built to Soviet orders and "substantial 
1 difficulties" were being experienced 1n placing new orders. This , he stressed, 
nocessitated even more intensive devPlooment of the Soviet tndustry . Some idea 
of the envisaged path of the branch was given in another contribution by Al'perovict 
in November 1931. In ~rgu1ng for v.reater attention to dPslgn work, he noted that 
in addition to the three new factories ( two of whtch entered their starting up 
period at the end of the Y"""ar) t.welve more new enterprises would be built, and 
at these and existing factories a total of three htmdred types and sizes would 
be od 
. 2 pr UCe<": . 
The primary problem of 1932 was the assimilation of modern machine tools at 
the old and new factories, This transition to a new technical level , involving the 
mastery of complex production technology , took place in difficult conditions in 
so far as all the factories had experienced a very rapid growth of theiY labour 
forces , which har' been supplemented predominantly by young , Mskilled workers 
of :rural or~in . The new models were planned for large- serial production using 
quite eJaborate fixtures and special tooling . The problems of assimilation and 
Llli ,1931 ,No .11- 12 ,p . 2 . 
2 .~ •• 7 .11 . )1 . 
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their consequences for the path of development of the industry arA discussed 
1n detail elsewhere . One result was soon apparent - the rate of growth of output 
slolled dramatically ; 1.n fact output in the specialised industry fell and did 
not. exceed the 1931 level again Ulltil 1935. The overall outnut level was maintained 
by oxoand1ng production at enterprises of the defence industry , which played 
a major role l.n developing the prori uction of high quality machines , and other 
branches of machine building. The nwnber of these so-called 'planned ' factories 
(because the machine tool ob"edinen1e had certain planning responsibilities in 
relation to them) rapidly increased at this t1:ne . How~ver , while falling 1n unit 
terms , cutout ln value terms rose sharoly because the new prortucts had a much 
lligher cost and price than those they replaced . 
The ye:u- 1932 opened with a. major campaign for reducing the level of machineL'y 
imports anti this was t,o be a preoccupation throughout the following eighteen 
nonths . l'lachine tool imports did fall somewhat , declining to 12,000 units. But 
r~uclng import dependence was not simply a matter of quantity 1 it was above 
all a question of widening the product range ln order to remove a whole range 
of types from the import list . This was a major concern of 1932 . In the years 
precedin~ the Five-year Plan new machine installations had been directed predominan· 
ly to branches of small to medlW!l serial production and 1 as shown elsewhere 1 the 
structure of installations did not differ substant.ially from that prevailing 1n 
t.he ore-Revolution years . But during the First Flve-ye~ Plan a substantial shift 
to large-serial and mass production took place , associated above all with the 
auto-tractor industry , which was supplied with machines almost entirely of foreign 
Production . At the beginning of 1932 the Soviet machine tool industry built 
n~ne of the specialised , high- productivity types of machiae tools requir'?d by 
£lass production branches . Types not built included automatics and semi-autos , 
a.lnost all types of grinding w.achine , gear- cutting machines, many types of milling 
r:.achl.nes, broaching machines and radial drilling machines . Demands that the Soviet 
1n:iustry should begin the production of these types x·ose steadily in 1931 and the 
!'iret half of 19J2 and culminated in ar. ~K'l'P Order of 1st June 1932 which cal.Jed 
for the developn:ent of production of a range of progressive types , including 
) . 12 
special aachines renuired by the auto-tractor industry , and also heavy machines 
1 required by the raU transport branch aJ'\~ heavy engineering. But the intention 
to build a wider pro~uct range including more specialised types had Important 
iaplicat ions for the level of speaiallsation of the machine tool ractories and 
the production methods employed . ThP next twelve months ~ere a pP-riod of strugrle 
for the acceptance of a modifted strategy of development putting greater emphasis 
on the individual and small serial pro~'~uct:.ion of high-productivity models . This 
question is discussed in detail in Jhapt"lr Four 
From the beginning of 1932 attention turned t.o the Second Five-year Plan .. 1'he 
required rate of growth of machine tool outnut was linked closely to that of 
machine building as a whole and initial plans for the latter wece extremely 
ambitious . The directives for drawing up the Plan approved by the oeventeenth 
Pttrty Confe:r·ence at the bef'inning of February granted the machine building industry 
lhe lead \ng role 1n tha completion of the technical reconstruction of the economy 
2 
and called for an in~rease of output of 3-Jt times compared with 1932. The 
subsequent instructtons for compiling the Plan called fo~ complete freedom 
from foreign dependence by the end of tbe period , and called for special attention 
to be devoted to lagging branches of industry, 1n the f.'irst place machine tool 
building , which was to radically change its product range.J Initial plan variants 
for the Machine tool 1.ndustry , drawn up before the problems of assimilating new 
models and factories had really been encountered and analysed . were optimistic 
tn the extreme . The process o~ ariving at a final Second Five-year Plan was 1n 
fact the reverse of that for the First : final year targets tended to dlninish 
rat~er than i.Jicrease as subjectivism prevalent in econotr.ic affairs in 1931 end 
the first half of 1932 was gradually overcome . Th~ first plan variant t'or the 
machine tool industry indicated an eight-fold increase in output in value terms 
COI'lpa.J:ed with 1012 and a final yea:r target of 80 , 000 units , compared with a planne 
22,000 tn 1932 .4 rba share of lathes in total output was to ~ecllne to a mere 
20 per cent , co:t~pared with an actual share in 1932 of almost 40 per cent ,while 
1.£U , 1932 ,No .7 , p . 2 . 
2.ms v reolyuts~yakh 1 resheniyakh s"ezdov, konferents11 i 'Qlenumov TsK ,Pt . ) , l>l ., 
19§fi ,p .151 . 
) .Osnovnye ukazanlya k sostavleniyu vtorogo pyatile~nogo plana narodnoso khozyalstv 
SSSR I 1933- 1937 ,Jt! . ,April 1932 , pp21- 24 . 
J .13 70 
turret lathes , semi-autos and autolllB.tlcs 1o~ere to represent 16 per cent o:f total 
output (2 .8 per cent in 1932) and grinding machines 18 per cent (2 .6 per cent) . 5 
The machine tool stock was to increase from 200 , 000 units in 1932 to 600 , 000 in 
19)7 . A nu~ber of speakers at the Seventeenth Conference argued for more vtgorous 
development of the industry , notably Strel ' tsov of NK RKI , who stressed the 
great significance of the branch for the defence of the country .6 
The June Ni<TF order prov lded for a 1937 output of 70- 80 , 600 l.lllits worth 750 
mHlton rubles , but at the First Conference of Designers, which discussed the 
implications of this new measure in m1d- July, a target of 72 , 000 units was ind1catec 
- the process of cutting lt back had begun~ This process was at .first gradual; 
in the autumn of 19J2 Zernov , a Stankoob"edi.nente worker , indicated that about 
69 ,000 units would be produced in 1937, including 58 , 000 built by the specialised 
d 8 tn ustry·. The conference of designers was a significant event in the development 
of the industry because Al ' perovich presented a crittque of some central aspects 
of the policy and practice of the previous period, 1n part·icular the striving 
for ve1·y large scale production of an extremely narrow product range . A basic 
lesson of past experience , Al ' perovich declared , was that allo~w1ce had to be 
m3de for techn i cal progress a there were certain laws of machine tool building whtch 
could not be ignored . 
It was precisely the demands of technical progress and the problems of making 
a leap to a new technical level which that had been tnsufficien t1y taken in to 
account. tn the First Five- year Flan and the initial variants of the Second . The 
general pr.o'bleo of technical progress is discussed at length in Chapter 8 
where i.t is argued that at the t.ime of the First FivP.- year Plan an oversimplified 
conception of technical development was prevalent and that attitudes were influencec 
by the crisis of the capitalist economies , at its deepest during the Plan period . 
There were major achievements in assimilating new tec~~ology during 1932, notably 
the building of the ' DIP ' lathe ~ ' Uognat ' i oer8'l'nat') which came to symbolise 
t.he transition to a modern lPvel of machine tool building. '!'his model came 1n for 
criticism on the grounds that tt was excessively complex and universal, and this 
led to the holding of a ' trial' of the machine , an event which helped to arouse 
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public 1nterest in the industry an1 its probleos . Both the new factories , the 
Gor ' k11 ~illl.ng machine works and the ·.oscow 1J!1,0rdzhonikldze turret lathe and 
sent-automatics factory , built their first batches of new mRchines in 1932, but 
ex~-rienced considerable problens stemming , above all , from the lack of skills 
of a,l kinds . The problems experienced at this tlrle appear to have reinforced 
the scepticism clearly present in soMe quarters on the ~uestion of the desirability 
of at tempting to rapidly develop the Soviet machine tool industry . These attitudes 
were v1gourously chalJenged by R.Anders 1 a leaning specialist on forelgn machine 
building and Soviet imports of machinery , towards the end of 1932. He pointed out 
that machine tools were then accounting for 42 per cent of all lnports of industria: 
machinery - a quite intolerable level . "There are still people ", he wrote, 
''who have learnt nothing from the rich experience of the !3trUR:gle for Soviet 
machines of the most complex ty-pes. These people strive to convince us t.hat the 
production of machine tools is an ultra-complex matter , that it demands designer~ 
enttineers and workers of the very , verv highest skills , and that our machine tool 
building can be developed only at relatively slow rates . It is necessary to 
put a stop to t.h1s chatter in a most decisive way" . 9 Once again , ns on many 
other occasions 1 this contribution ende1 with an appeal for the mobilisation 
of public opinion in sup;ort of the industry . 
It is not easy to measure the degree of fulfilment of the First Five-year Plan 
of machine tool building because it is not clear which Plan ~as actually regarded 
as definitive , an~ the change to the calendar year and the fact that it foraally 
ended in 1932 add further conplications . Nevertheless it is clear that the 
branch was Cjuite successful . The Plan as adopted in .April 1929 was certainly 
overfulfilled by quite a large margin, and the revised Plans of 1929 were also 
overfulfilled 1n value terms ( although there is clearly a proble~ of prices which 
cannot be resol ved) . PerfoL:mance in relation to the variants of 1930 was also 
good until the end of 1931 , but fell short by a Jarge margin if 1933 is t~ken 
as equivalent to the terminal year o~ the Plan. This shortfall arose largely because 
4,See -~npendb 2 , p .4.54 • An output of 80 ,000 units was not i.n fact attained 
lUltil 1953 . 
:5.Sll,1932.-No . 2 1 p .2 . Actual 1932 see Table SA .VI I. 
6.lVi i konferentsiya VKP(b) ,sten .otchet , p . 195 . 
7 .su ,1932 ,No.7 , p. 2 . o 83 
S.sotsialisticheskaya rekonstruktsiya i nauka , 19)2,No .9-1 , p . • 
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the transition to new models led to a slowdown in the rate of growth which had 
no been fOTeseen by the planners. By the end of the Five- year Plan period import 
dependence 1n quantitative ter~s bad fallen below its highest point in 1931. In 
t9J2 domestic production accounted for 60 per cent of supply in unit terms, but 
45 per cent in value terms , comparPd with 24 per cent in the previous year.1 
However , the share of total imports accounte:i for by machine tools rose, providln.a-
a measure of the relative backwardness of the branch . In 1932 metal-cutting 
machine tools represented 21 per cent of total machinery and equipment imports , 
and 12 per cent of total tmports , cor.pared t-~ith 14. J per cent and 7. 7 per cent 
respectively in 1931 , and 6 . 1 per cent and 1.9 per cent 1n 1929.2 'l'he combtnation 
of exceptionally high imports in 1931 and the slowdown tn growth of output of 
the domestic industry meant that total supply ln unit terms peaked in 1 S31; if 
the simplest types of machines ar~ excluded, this level of GUpply was not to be 
attained again until 1936 .3 But while substantial progres~ was undoubtably made 
in quantitative terms 1 formidable tasks remained if the qualitative aspect is 
taken into account. The output of' the industry as a whole tn 1932 consisted of 
15eneral - purpose types of machines , frP.qllently of simple and obsolete desig-ns , and 
of poor quality , The new rnooels introduced in 1931 and 1932 had been pronuced 
~small quantitiP.s - 25 'DIP' lathes, 36 turret lathes of ' ,arner and Swasey ' 
design , 28 'Cinc1nna ti 1 milling 1achines of modern design bull t by the Cor ' kii 
4 
!'actory, 60 30mm drilling machines of 'Cincl.nnati-.Bickf'ord ' design ,etc .. Output 
of a nW~ber of basic older models actually rose to compensate for losses incurred 
~hile assimilating ne~ models . The product range was extrenely narrow . The main 
enter~Lses of the specialised industry built a total of 24 models in 1932, ~he 
6a!!1e nunber as in 192A/29 , and of these 13 were of modern design introduced during 
the ?~an period. a these new models accounted for 16 per cent of the total output 
of "St.ankoobn edtnen 1e" in 1032 . 5 Overcoming this bottleneck of the na:n::ow product 
range lJas to be the primary task of the Second Five- year Plan . 
9.!!1nd. ,29.10. 32, 
l.See Appenr"' 1x 2 , p ,4.)2 • 
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The Second Five- vear Plan 
The massive transforw.a.tion of inrlustry and agriculture achieved in the 
brief perioi 1929 to 1932 , while creating a foundation for independent economic 
develop~ent , the creation of a powerful , modern defence capabllity , and a 
fundamental chrmge in social relations, led in the short. run to a number of 
serlous problems which requirert a major reassessment of the prospects for the 
next five-year period , The collectiv lsation of agriculture gave rise to acute 
problems of supply of both food and industrial materials , and also led to a vast 
migration of population from country to town ,~hich caused serious labour turnover 
and discipline dislocations , The lar~e-scale industrial construction of the 
period ~ubstantially augmented the capital stock , but the new capacity had only 
been partially asamilated by the beginning of 1933 . The skills associated with 
modern industrial production were all in short supply, and disproportions in the 
rate of development of related branches - notably the .metallurv.ical and engineering 
industries- placeA further constraints on production . It has been estimated that 
the Soviet engineering industry had a potential capacity of 9 , 000 million rubles 
output in 1932 , but tn fact it was able to give only 6 , 600 million rubles . 1 It 
was in these circumstances that the Party decided to change the planned rate of 
output of industry for the coming five- year period 1 the combined plenUJll of tht 
C~ntral Commit ee and t.he Central Control Commission early in January 19J3 
r~uce~ the envisaged annual average rate of growth of industry for 1933- 1937 
to 1)-14 per cent , and the assimilation of new technology was posed ~s a central 
task or the Plan period~ This compares with the average annual rate of 19 . 2 per 
cent claimed for the First Five- year Plan . Shortly after the Plenun Hitler 
becane ChanceJlor 1n uermany : the lnternat.ional environment for the USSR , already 
tense in the Far East , further deteriorated and intensified pressure for the 
r:.in1~n1sat1on of economic and technical dependence on the capitalist world . 
i ·!storha Komnunisticheskava nartii Sovetskogo Sovuza,Vo1.4,book2,ti ., 1971,p . 240 . 
·!Q:SS v :rezolyutsiyakh i rqshenlyakh .. , oo c1t ,Vol.5,M., 1971 ,pp .74-75 . 
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The broader economic events described above had immediate repercussions for 
the r.~chine tool building industry ; its Five-year Fla~ was sharply cutback • The 
final year target was halved cor.1pared w.ith the vnriant of .January 1932 , and now 
stood at 40,000 units , including 26 , 000 for the specialised industry . 1 In 
February 1933 a ne"N target was put forward for machine ·tool bullding within NK'l'P -
output was to reach 32 ,150 units • 2 .4 times tha~ planned for 19JJ ,2 Eut by 
tay an even lower aim had be set , possibly as a reaction to the rteterlo~atlng 
1nternat1onl>l situation . The Stankoob" edinenie factories ~;er·e now to produce 
only 15 ,000 units in 1937 , compared with an output of 7 ,)11 units in 19)2 .3 This 
"'as to be the lowest plan variant ' in t.he autllNl a process of upward re\'ision 
bf!~an again . 
Pressure on the mac~ine tool industry was ~ghtened in February 1933 , when 
on the ~4th NKTP issued an order forblding the import of certain types of machinery. 
Introducing the order ,Ordzhonikidze confidently asserted that Soviet machine 
buildlllg had at·t.ained such a level that it was now capable of pr.oject1.ng and 
4 producing any ~achine . Plans for. the machine tool industry in 1933 were revised 
to include ne~ r.todels not originally foreseen . 5 At the end of April or early hay 
Al'perovich reviewed the new situation , which he characteriswJ as a ' turning point~ 
He stressed that elimination of dependence on the capitalist countries was 
ncrlf an acute and ur~ent question , and that an expansion of the product range 
of t!'le ruachine iocl industry was a basic condition for securing independence and 
the country• s defence , Tbe industry had to adopt a new path , he stressed , invol vir 
a rapid expansion of the oroduct range , an increase in the number of types and 
s1zes butlt by each factory , the transition in many cases from large serial to 
individual and soall serial production , an increase in the number of non- !"..achine 
tool bullding factories engaged in machine tocl building , a strenghtEri.r.g of t.he 
desi~ forces of tbe branch , and the creation of a sound research and experimental 
base for the industry . Higher skills liould be required for the realisation oi' 
1 • .§£.,19)J ,t o . ! ,p .L See also Appendix 2 ,p .454 . 
2 . ib1d 19~3 t~ 2 1 ---.• • .., ' "o • , p • • 
3 .~. ,t~o .4 , p . 1 . 4.zar:r.n .,26 .2.JJ . 
S.ibid . 1 -:a 3., 
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this program~e , he pointed out , but the previous three years experience had , he 
ool!eved , provided a good foundation for i'urther raising skill levels .
1 
In mid-.'ay one of Al 1 perovich' s demands was realised when NKTP issued an 
order providi ng for the creation of an experiMental , research institute for the 
industry on the basi s of the already ex1s1ting NIISTI . The new organisation ,ENTI1S , 
started work 1n the summer of 1933. On 16th June 1KTP issued a further order , 
'On the development of machine tool building ', giving official endorsement to 
Al'perovich ' s call for a change of course , and setting out a programme for the 
introduction of a further two hundred types and sizes 1n addition to the forty 
th~'>n in prochtction . The new t ypes were to include gr.tnding ann gear- cutting mach.L'le 
and automatics artd semi- autos , the production of which was to start by the end 
2 of the ye:rr o 'I' his order was foD owed by an All- Union Conference of representative~: 
of the specialised and o planned 1 irtd us try devoted to the problem of organising 
the prodtlctlon of the new models . The 1 planned ' factories , central control over 
willch was strengthened by the order , were to play a large role in fulfilling the 
new program'lle , tn particular the military enterprises , whlch in the following 
four- five years b ull t the first Soviet examples of a number of progt·essive types 
including automatics (1934) , centreless grinding r.tachines (19.34) , surface grinding 
nack.tnes {1935) , internal grtnding machines ( 1935) , and thread-grinding machines 
\19)?) o J The new models to be bull t during the Second Five- year Plan were to 
b"' based on existing f'or~ign designs ,' translated into Soviet language' by 
conversion into metric and the adoption of Soviet standards where applicable . 
4 
The Aodels selected ~ere generally those of the l~ading forei~n firms ; there 
noes not ap-ear to nave been any direct foreign ass\.stance 1n assimilating these 
cop!es o~ foreign designs . 5 
Policy discussion , the vigour of which had been a feature o~ the previous 
period , temporarily dimln 1.shed after the apt eara.nce of the HKTI' order ann eff orts 
were concentxated on developing t.h~ producti on of new , modern designs • 'l'otal 
ouLput. of the industry , and of the specialised component , increased by only a 
S2:all amount in 1933, while imports decJ :tn ed to below the 1930 level representing , 
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however , over a ~uarter of all machinery nnd eo uipment imports . The successful 
devP.lopaent of a wide range of branches of machine building gave rise to a reductio• 
1n t.he share of total imports accoun·ted for by machinery nnd B'}Uipment , but the 
relatively slow progress of machine too] butld~tS Lended to increase its share of 
raachine~ imports and also , later in the period , its share of total Soviet 
1 t 6 4mpor s. 
At the end of Decem~r 1933 t~e theses of ~olotov and ~uibyshev on the Second 
Five-year Plan were published ; they provided f or a machl.ne tool output. of ~.0, 000 
~its in 1937 from NKTP P~terprises , i . e . the same total that Al ' perovlch had 
pnt forward in January of the same year . 7 This total wes higher than had been 
envisaged 1n the variants of February and , presumably , May , and must have reflected 
a ~ene~al upwar~ revision which tbe planned industrial output had undergone. I o~ 
Gosplan was callin~ foL an averap,e annual rate of growth of 18.9 per cent . 
Before the Plan was appr oved by t he Seventeenth Party Congress NKTP issued an 
order outlining lts ve1·s1on of the Plan f or the machine tool industry • This 
is difiicull:. to compare directly with the Gosplan target of hO, OOO because the 
order did not give an indication of llKTP' s contribution , but. lt can be deduced 
that tntentions ~ere more ambitious . The specialised industry , CUSIP(as it was 
now known following the analgamati on of t.he machine tool and tooling industries 
~de.r a sirn;le glavk in August 193:3) , was to buUd J0 ,800 units in 1937 , 1ncluding 
7,000 units from new enterpr ises not yet in action or built 1 factories of the 
1\efence industry were to bulld 10, 750 units 1 and other 'planned ' enterprises 
10,6.50 units , givinv. a.n overall output of 52 1 200 un 1 ts . Sof!le of the ' planned 
1 
factories were under local industry adl'l1nistrat1ons ; t.he NKTP contribution was 
Pl:'Obably about 45 1 000 nnits . 
8 A number of new factories we1·e to be built 
ho for grindln.v. nachines , and others for autonat~cs ,gear-cutting mach1nes lheavy 
nachine tools and a shop of precision machitte tools . 
Thel:e was evidently disagree!'lent on the question of the appropriate scale of 
tachlne lo~l production during th~ 19'34- 19:37 peri od . The Congress approved the 
1.g: ,19J) .I,o ,4 ,pp . 1- 2 . 
~·l!!!ustrw ~zatsiva SSSR , 1933-1937 ,M. , 1971 , pp. 248- 251 . 
4 
·Sea Table 5h .XIV. 
·See Table SA,!.V. 
5.See Oa.pter 9. 
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40 ,000 target , but at the same ti~e revised the planned annual average rate of 
growth of industrial output , lowering it to 16 . 5 per cent . The originally 
planned levels of output of iron ~~d steel were also lowered , implying a reduced 
1 demand for machine tools . At the Congress Ordzhonikidze spoke vigorously 
in favour of developing machine tool building and calJ ed for the equipping of 
thP automobile factories with Soviet machines . He also noted that in 1937 industry 
h~d to pro~uce 40- 50 , 000 machine tools . 2 h.Kaganovich in his contribution noted 
that the Machine tool industry had made considerable progress , but was still 
a bottleneck of the economy , and also pointed out that the volume of capital 
~vestment required by the branch was insi~nificant , amounting to a mere 0 .47 
per cent of all industrial investment . He called for an increase in the investment 
allocated to the industry during the Second Plan period from a planned 240 million 
rubles to 350 million rubles3, and claimed that NKTP would itself find the 
resources to achieve this. Kaganovich concluned by admitting that he personally 
disagreed with Gosplan on the question of the output planned for the branch . 1-l.e 
believed that the 1937 output had to be pushed up to 50-55,000 units , to be 
achieved by involving more factories in machine tool building . But Kaganovich 
was not alone in bold in~ this view . Writing in the Gosplan journal ,Plan , at a bout 
the tine of the Congress , I .Pivovarov calculated that total machine tool needs 
over the 4'1ve years would be 204 , 000 units , but the Plan provided fo:r: the building 
of only 129 ,400 units . Pi vovarov therefore call ed for the maximum utilisation of 
the ~xisting stock and 
4 
an increase of output L, the final year to 50 ,000 units. 
The ~econd Five-year Plan set a target of an additional 200 types and sizes 
to be assimilated , and provided for substantial cha.'lges in the stucture of output. 
~llling ~achlnes were to represent 10 per cent of output in 1937 ().9 per cent 
in 1932) ,grinding machines 13 per cent (2 .6 per cent) , gear- cutting nachines 2 per 
cent (nil) , turret l=>thes 10 per cent (2 . 8 per cent) and automatics and semi-autos 
6·6 per cent (n11) . 5 A number of new factories were to be built and start work 
~ ·~in.l, ,30 .12 .33 ;7 .2 . 34 . 
•!!II s" ezd VKP( b) , sten . otchet ,H. , 1934 , P . 171 • 
l •!.H~. ,p,472 . The r'lraft olan in fact aliocated 250m .r . , raised later to 300 .See P . t;.o~t 
·~,1931..,. o .1 , pp.32- 3J . 
5.~~ vtorogo pyatiJ etnggo plana razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva SSSH , 1933- 37, 
M.,1934,p ,484 .; Actual 1932 from Table SA .VII . 
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~efore 1937 , incl ud !.ng the Khar ' kov enll inF machine wori.s and the ' Stankokonstrukts~ 
experimental and special mach1n~ tool factory attached to ENIJr!S , both of which 
started work 1n 1934. Other new factories to be butl t were a grind 1.ng machine works 
at l<har ' kov on th~J~~te a s the drilling !'lachine factory , a second gr1.nd ing 
machine factory at Voronezh, a gear- cutting nachine factory at Cor ' ~11 , an 
automatics fact ory in ~1ev , a heavy machine tool works in ~verdlovsk and 
a factory for precision machine tools •1 If :realised this construction programme 
wouln have amounted to e l"lajor expansion of the industry ' s capacity , 
During 19J4 t he machine tool industry strugYled to master the ·ouildlng of 
a range of modPrn types hitherto not built ln the USSR , The plan for new types 
and sizes was fulf il l ed with great difficulty and the Glavk 1 s leadership carne 1.n 
for much crit ic i sm in t he ~ress for its choice of designs and general perforrnance, 
The rroblens of this peri od connected with innovation and the choice of technology 
are discussed ln detail in later chaptPrs . Despite t hese problems real progress 
was made in 19J4 , The product range of the specialised 1ndustry widened to 70 
types and si~es coaoared ~ith 26 in 1932 , whUe the ' planned ' factories built. a 
further 60 types and sizes . 2 New types built for the first time included single 
spindle automatics and semi- autos (the former first pr.oduced by the Penza im .Frunze 
cllltary factory) , modern radial drllllng nachlnes ,a ' Cinclnnatl' type centr.eless 
li':rindlng rr.achine (the Tula ar!'ls factory) , plano- milling machines and an American 
typ"' gear- sh::_ping r.tach'\.ne .J The 1 Stankokonstruktslya' factory bull t the first 
Soviet high- product1v1ty , un1t- constructioo type machine , although smaller , simpler 
~it-construction mo1els had been built earlier by the machine tool factor.y 
of t"le Central Inst 1t ute of Labour . 4 Total output of the branch exceeded 21 , 000 
units (over 25 ,000 if simple machines are included) , while imports fell to 
'bf>lOR the level of 1929 and represente-i only 1.5 per cent of t.otal supply in unit 
terns .5 Thus , by the end of 19J4- the industry was in a generally healthier state · 
but there w:ts little opportunity to consolidate the achievements ; pressure 
was ~ fact stepped up ~urther by a ne~ NKTP order of JOth uecember , ~hlch 
l.See ::hapter 12. 
~ .See Table SA .XI. 
J ,See Table SA . XIV • 
• See Appendix 7 . 
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presented a p~ogramme for P.quipptng the ZIS and GAZ automobile factories and the 
Chely~binsk tractor factory with Soviet machines. These works were to undergo 
~xpanston and the machines they required were predominr~tly of a specialised , 
6 
high-productivity type. It is possi"ole th~tt 1:.h1.s meas\u·e in fact applied as 
much to the aircraft industry as the auto-tractor branch1 at the Seventh Congres~ of 
Soviets early in 1935 both Kag~~ovich and Ordzhonikidze refered to the :act that 
the r.achine tool industr.y h~d to supply 10,000 Machines to the auto-aviation 
industries in 1935 and 1936~ 
The year 1935 was one in which the question of technical progress arose as 
an urgent concern • The industry and the t,h.'TP leadership beca.J!Ie aware that 
technlcal development of machine tool building was proceeding at a rapid pace 
despite the economic crisis, which earlier had been regarded as a fm:ce severely 
curtaillne technical advance . Precipitate action was 1nlt1.at~d to replace a 
nuMber of fllodels introduced during the previous four years , lnclud11lg the 'DIP' 
lathe, causing diff'iculties for a number of factories . This question is examined 
in Che.p er Ei!ht • In ~~arch 1935 the Third Conference of Designers was held 
with the aim of d1scuss1n~ the problems associated ~ith the Lecember NKTP order 
and a further new order which required the machine tonl industry to supply machines 
to thP rail tr'tnsport industry. This conference Marked an important step in t he 
direction of establishing a modern nachine tonl industry canabla of building 
a wide range of complex, high-productivity equipment required by the leading 
br.anches of the engineering industry . It also marked a new stage 1n the industry's 
comdtment to developing unit- construction machine tool building as a flleans of 
introducing elements of standardisation and flexibility into the building of 
narro~tly specialised production equipment . This work was undertaken at the 
'St.ankokonstruktsiya ' under the leadership of the talented young designer , 
Dlkushtn . These new demands focused attention on the role of the designer as a 
central figure in the struggle for technical progress and it was probably the 
e~perlence of the branch which played an important part in NKTP' s decision ln 
;u.ly ~o issue an order designed to secure a higher status for the designer in 
P:odutt.!on . 8 
5.Seeo Table SA .XVIII. 
6·~1' shevtk , 1935,No .6,ppt)-14. 
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In the sunmer of 1935 the question of quality came to the forefront for the 
first ti.Jne , The inferior quality of Soviet machine tools had been a feature of 
the previous period , but it was only when the industry began to supply the 
leading auto-tractor and aviation branches on a regular basis that it became a 
serious issue . In 1933 Al'perovich had compla1ned that machine users did not 
inform the makers of faults ; a system of inspectors was organised so that 
machines could be examined in action at user. factories. 1 The reklamatsiya 
system was developed under which the factory building a faulty machine was obliged 
to rectify faults stel!lllling from bad workmanship. The most notorious offender 1.n 
1934 was the im .Ordzhonikidze factory - over 45 per cent of its output was 
subject to recall for rectification 12 Vigorous action was taken in the following 
year, however , reducing the orooortion to 10 per cent, and only 1.2 per cent in 
19}6.3 The question of quality was raised sharply in April 1935 by an anonymous 
contribution by ' a leading machine t ool- builder' in the pages of Za Industr1alizatsiy 
He noted that machines installed at the mass-flow production auto-tractor factories 
had to be especially reliable because if one was out of action it upset a whole 
production line. Furthermore , he considered that the loading of machines in Soviet 
vehicle factories was on average higher than in othe.r countries , including the 
USA, because three shift , and even continuous , work was not infrequent. Therefore, 
he concluded, the quality demands were exceptionally high; machines had to be 
reliable and had to retain their high level of accuracy for a long period. But, 
he observed, the uality of Soviet machines was then at "an intolerably low level". 
One of the worst "'lroblems was low quality gears and splined shafts, which very 
quic!Uy wore out , and this difficulty was met even at the leading enterprises 
U~e 'Kras:tyi Proletarii'. He concluded with a plea for a fundamental review of 
quality inspection procedures at machine tool factories 1 at the time , he claimed, 
:.reJ jw;t had the role of ensuring that the very worst prorlucts were not pas~ed 
on to customers and standards were not raised because plan fulfilment would be 
? ·Z...S"ezd sovetov , sten . otchet ,M. , 1935 ,Byulleten • No ."', n . )1. 
?·zZa!n<i., ,18. 7 ·35 • 
l • a.l~ • '2. 9 • 33 • 
2•m,19J7,no.4,p . 19 . At the first exhibition of Soviet machine tools held early 
~ 19)4 one user of a '1)6'( arner and Swasey) turret lathe built by the factory 
'Wrote in the complaints boolu"Clutches do not work;automatic stops do not work; 
8P~dle brake does not work;pump does not work; spir.dle does not stop; driving 
cont.next page •• 
u. 
adversely affected. 
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!n Hay and June frequent reports appeared in the press conderr.n io.g the poor 
qll!lllty of the Soviet built nachlne tools then bein supplied to the vehicle 
factories . These complaints related to both specialised factories and the defence 
industry nachine t.ool builders . 5 The l'la to causes of the low quality were poor 
quality materials , an inadequate level of pr~iuction technology ,poor work 
organisation , inadequate skr ls and end of month ' stormtng ' which occured at roost 
factor1es .6 Ill mid - July 1935 a party- technical conference was organised by 
the Glavk , with parti cipation .bY representatives of leading machine using branches . 
anc reports by Ordzhontkidze and !-i . J-.aganovich . The problem of quality was the 
central issue discussed , but there was alsc crttic1sm of ENJliS and t~e u1dustry's 
technical policy , or rather what many apparently considered to be the lack of 
such a policy. The meeting called for a e-eneral tmprovemP.nt of work . A 1·eport 
or the proceedings observed that the ' planned' factories , prL~arily m1lltary 
enterprises , tended to be much more disciplined than those of GUSIP; they gave 
nach1nes of better quality a."ld :were better at fu1f1111ng plans 1n terms of quantity. 
At about ihis time the industry was given yet another very difficult task - i.t 
w~s to wholJy equlp a large new bearlngs plant in Saratov and an extension to 
the r irst State Bearings factory in ·.oscow. S 
li11935 the specialised industry built over 10, 000 machine tools , exceeding 
the 19)1 level , while together with the ' planned' factories almost 25 ,000 units 
were produced . By the end of the year almost fifty enterprises wer~ building 
nach1ne tools compared w1 th twenty- eight in 1933 , and of the total fourteen belonged 
o the specialised industry , compare::! with n1.rte 1n 19.3) .9 The product range 
rose to 165 types and sizes , and new models buU t for the first time included 
eurface and internal grtndlng machines . Imports fell to their lowest level since 
1925/26, amounting to only 13 .7 mill i on 1·ubl es (3 , )74 units) . The year also saw 
keys left out ; e.djustment taper bearing dlstor:ted ; poor. fitting , ,poor scraping ; 
P~ finish ; turrets do not line up ; locating bushings soft and loose in their 
seats , carriage feeds with lever neutral ; turret. anti spindle out of line 0 . 4me~: 
3 
nolsy head" . The machinist ,Vo1 .73, 6 .6 . J4 , p . 402 . 
4 
.§g,19J? ,No .4,p.19. 
S ·~I!tl . ,27 .4 .)5 . 
6•_alnd. ,15.5.)5; 5. 7 ,J5 . 
7 
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the start of a campaign for. cost and price reduction in the ina ustry , and for. 
profitable operation in order to eliminate the subsidies which the industry 
;.oas then receiving . The Stakhanov 1 te Hove men t was quickly taken up 1n the br~nch 
and a rise of labour nroductivity of 17 oer cent was recorded for the year . 
In 19"6 tension in the economy mounted. L'l the course of 1935 the deter1orat.tn1 
international situ3t1on prompted a revision of plans in order to secure a faster 
1 
development of the defence industry . SoMe of the key targets of the 1936 plan 
were raised above the level originally foreseen in the Five-year Plan , iriclUding 
2 
iron and steel, and the buildtnGt of tractors, trucks and rail equipment . InFebruary 
1936 llKTP issued an order callinp; for the conversion of the Kh.ar'kov and Stalingrad 
tractor factories from wheeled to crawler model~ , and this 'ltas to pose a major 
task before the machL'le tool industry because not only were many general - purpose 
and spec1aliserl machines to be suuplied , bnt ENII~S and ' Stankokonstruktslya' were 
to secure the su_pp1 y of 60 unit- construction m~chines of 42 different types ar:d 
sizes 1 including multi-spindle and multi-station !llachines. ork on t~e latter 
began in May 1936 ann they were to be completed by the end of the fll:st quarter 
4 
of tbP fo11owing year. The mach1'1e tool industry was also striv info! to r ulfll 
the large order for the vehicle factories,and it is probable that def!l.ands for 
machines for military users l>Tere also at a hi~h level at this time . To add to the 
pressure on in~ust ..... y 1n genera] and machine tool building in particular 1 mounting 
concern began to be publicly expressed over the danger that Soviet industry was 
falling behind its CApitalist equivalents . These lolarnings rose in lntensity 
follo;oing the Soviet of t:KTP 1n Jt.U: .. e 19J6, at which Ordzhon1kidze anrl others 
stnssed the importance of maintaining a high rate of technical progress. 1'hese 
pressures created an increasingly difficult climate o.f work for the machine +ool 
industry and criticism of 1 ts performance ste<1d1ly mounted in the course of the 
year . 
Tee~~ical ~opress was a ~ajor preoccuoation of the machine tool industry 
1n 19)6, The Fou"rth Con+"'erence of Designers in April was devoted to the problem 
e.*-"lllM· .t5.r? .J5. 
9 ,'i)ee Table A1 .I, p .447 , i ·illorha KOillJilWiisticheskaya oartit Sovetskoau Soyuz.a ,M. , 1971 , Vol . 4, book 2,p . J50 . 
·~cond Five Jear Flan fo~ thA development of the natlonaJ economy of the 
3 ~,Loni!on ,n .d ., p .lli ( 1n E.ngli~h) , · 'JcovskolZ'o t.raktornogo zaYoda 1m.O:rdzbon1kidze, Vo1.1,Khar ' kov 1 60 o 
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of securing regular modernisation of deslgns nnd the conference resoltions provid ed 
for tbe t!evelopmt?nt of e:xper.imental work at -che factory level as one means of 
achieving this a1n .5 In the autuwn attenlion turned to developing the specialised 
production of machine tool components ~~d assemblies as a ~eans of raising quality, 
reducing consts and ~acilitat.ing the introduction of new models . The development 
of spec tal i.sed parts production had 'frequently been d iscussed ln the past , but 
the commitment to its practical implementation had been low . Now in 19J6 and 
the ft:rst half of 1937 some measures were taken t.hts qnflstion is exaMined 
in Chapter Six . 
The tasks posed before the machin~ tool industry in 1935 and 1936 proved too 
formidable r it was unable to supply on time all the high-productivity machines 
required for the expansion of the vehicle factories , the reequipping o f the 
tractor works and other major projects, In the autumn of 19J5 Al'perovlch and 
other leading figures of the industry travelled to the United States ~o place 
ord-er:s for machine tools required by high priority projects . Imports in 1936 
rose sharply to 8.157 units worth 40 . J million rubles . This ~as still below 
the level of 1929 , but an unwelcome reversal of a steady downward trend . The share 
of total imports accounted for by machine 't.ools rose to its hi~hest level yet, 
13 per cent , while over one third of all ro~chinary and equipment imports took 
t~e form of machine tools .6 Americ~n machines repreemted one thtrd of the total 
imports , while the volume was also influenced by purchases on credit agreed 
wlth Germany in the orevious year . The output of the specialised industry rose 
I 
to 1),288 units , and of the ' planned a.'l.d specialised enterprises together t.o 
32,408 units , a thirty per cent rise on the previous yea:r . The rise of production 
t:~ f the specialised industry was partly the result of more enterprises entering 
~ne Glavk . In 1935 t.he imeni Sedlna "arks of K.ra.snodar was transf'ered , while two 
nelt factories began work - a gear- cutting machine factory in Saratov (only the 
experil'!ental shop was put into action)'!7~ factory of small unit-construction machin 
~r. Sverdlovsk . The latter does not appear t.o have actually bu.il t uni t-coostructlon 
nachines , rather , ord.inary bench type lathes and mill ing nachines , and was located 
Ora the site of what should heve been a heavy machine tool factory , a project 
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s~ed and t~en froZP~ . In 1936 three more factories entered the Glavk - a new 
entP~prise for the building of automatics in ~lev , the i~eni Ktrova works of 
Tb111si , formerly an oil industry engineerinP: factory , and the • Stankonormal '' 
works of Moscow , a former repair factory of Rem~ashtrest, the machinery renovation 
organisation . The latter enterprise -was organised for the production of standard 
faste~s and other items for the machine tool industry , tn addition to the 
bu1ldir.g of grinding machines . Thus by the end of 19J6 there were seventeen 
specialised factories , about ten machine tool building enterprises of the defence 
industry , and about thirty other factories , usually bu1ld1n~ Machine tools 
alongside other products . 7 L'l fiecember 19:36 the defence industry branches left 
NKTP to form a separate Commissariat , and it is probable that this measure 
weakened GUSIP ' s influence on its machinP tool building activities. It 1s notable 
that from about 1936 the specialised industry strived to organise the production 
of a number of types , not.a.bly grinding Machines , forMerly the preserve of the 
defence sector . 
On a nur.tber of occasions in 19:36 there was blunt criticism tn the press of 
the work of the Machine tool industry , notably the institute END'tS . In hay one 
of the Institute' s staff , a young specialist on machine tool automation,G .Shaumyan, 
called for the removal of bureaucratic 11'\redtments to creative research and design 
10ork , an:i accused the ENIJ<.S leadership of hindering the development of machine 
8 
tool technolOEY · ~ut in September a new note of bitterness was struck . One 
A.Uspensk1i reported on an open Party meeting tn the Institute at ~hich very sharp 
cr\tlcism had bePn expressed of certRin aspects of its activity . Uspenskii reported 
that only 50 of the 530 workers could be considered creative , the rest he termed 
'ballast ' and ' excess people ' , t\horn the Ins titute would be better off -w ithout? 
Uspe.nsk11' s conclusior. that ENIMS lacked 'Bol' shev'ik spirit ' did not auger well 
for its leadexship ,9 This contribution set the tone for the following unhappy 
months. 
4.IDJ,19J7 ,No .21 ,p ,8 . 
5.!g, 19J6,No .6,pp .1-3 . 
6. See Tabl~s SA .XVI and SVII. 
~·~ee ':able A1.I, p .447 . 
9•--2,1~ . ,17 ·5 .J6 , ·ta!Bi. ,29 ·9 .J6 . 
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The plans for the industry in 1937 , the final year of the five-year Plan 
period , were ambitious. The GUSIP factor ies were to build 20 ,000 units , factories 
within NKTP 30 , 000 ( compared with 40 , 000 foreseen by the Five- year Plan) , but 
the s pecialised plus'planned' factories were to build over 41 ,000 units. This 
latter figure was effectively equivalent to the Five-year Plan target , because 
in the course of the P~an period the target for NKTP alone ceased to have much 
significance , especially in 1937 itself with the splitting off of the defence 
industry. In assessing the fuJ.filment of the Five- year Flan the s,pecialised plus 
'planned ' industry output was always taken . The GUSIP enterprises were to 
introduce 164 new types and sizes (including unit- construction machines) , and a 
further 64 types an~ sizes of old models were to be r emoved from production . 
In January 1937 the performance of the Glavk was exceptionally bad , attracting 
Much critical attent ion to its activity t the programme was fulfilled to only 
57 per cent, including a mere 10 per cent at the Gor'kil factory and 35 per cent 
at ' Krasnyi Proletarii ' •1 
The situation in the indust ry , as for the econonty anc\ society as a whole , 
rapidly deteriorated following the February 23rd-Marcb 6th Plenum of the Party 
Central Commi ttee , and also the death of Ordzhonikidze on 18th February . On the 
6th March it was reporteci that one of the deputy heads of the Glavk had been 
removed from his post - P .M.Stepanov , who for a number of years h~d been 
he~d of the tooling section of the industry . At the same time the dil:ector of 
the 'Xrasnyi Proletari 1' f actory , Zhbakov, was removed from his post .
2 
This 
began a process of removinll the industry ' s leaders , t-:hich was to continue for 
sev~ months . The death of Ordzhoniki dze was clearly felt deeply by Al'perovich, 
who seems to have enjoyed very close relations with him . At the First All-Union 
Conference of Production Engineers of machine tool building Al'perovich described 
how he had worked ' hand in hand • w1 t h Ordozhon1ki dze over many years and cited 
eY4mples of his understanding of the specific r.roblems of the machine tool industry. 
Abovean Al ' perovich stressed Crdzhonikidze ' s unwavering concern for raising the 
technical level of industry , and his appreciation that immediate results were 
nC~t alv~vs obtainable , "He knew", Al ' perovich said, "that we are trying to solve 
~·~~.,6.2 . 37. 
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complex tasks , that we are wor~ing honestly , and that if today we are unable to 
:io something , then tomorrow we will succeed'' . After a cursory conu'lent on the 
t I kin f 
1 
need to elimina e wrec g activity , Al perovich sarcastically refered to 
'young enginePrs 1 who , ' knowing nothing ' , rejected established methods and 
experience and tried to enforce their own , new, original ways of doing things . 
ThiA , Al ' pgrovich concluded , was a sign of cultural backwardness . 1 There could 
have been no noubt at t~e time that this was Al ' perovich's answer to the critics 
of the industry , and f ar from declining the volume of criticism greatly increased 
In mid-April the chief Pngineer of the Glavk was removed , and on the same 
day an editor ial of Zaindustrializatsiyu , apparently for the first time , ref~ed 
to ' wrecking ' in the machine tool industry. 2 Early 1n 1lay Al 1 perovich in his 
last major article outlined the path of devel opment of the industry 1n the 'rhird 
Five-year Plan . He admitt ed that there wer.e disproportions in the 14~1ch ; heavy 
machine tool building was only just beginning , whlle the position with regard to 
small prec~sion machine tools was aknowledged as very bad, no base for thei£ 
production have yet been organised by the Glavk . These were both serious weaknesses 
in view of the importance of heavy and precision machines for rnill tary production. 
Al'perovich believe1 that it would be necessary to have a product range of 1 , 000 
types and s 1!es in 1942 , compared with the 350 which would be in production by the 
end of 1937 . The technical level of ...,roducts would be ra1sen substanially with 
development of electr1fication , hydraul1cs , higher cutting speeds and automation . 
An output of 70 , 000 units would be needed in 1942 , and to achieve this he called 
for the construction of about ten me<'~ium sized enterprises , having from 700 to 
1000 wor kers .Further more , specialised p:1rts production would have to be extensively 
developen ,J This contr ibution provoked a barrage of criticism , usually directed 
a~ particular aspect s , rather t.han Al' perovich ' s general conception of future 
dPve1opments , Kr ivchanskii , apparently an engL"leer of the rail transport machine 
buU~ing industry, criticised the Glavk ' s neglect of heavy machine tools , its 
investment policy which led to the scattering of resources over many projects , 
~ ·~ I 193? ,N 0 • 8 t.PP .1- 3 • 
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the fact that the industry's experimental base had been turned into a 'sick child' , 
lack of consultation with users when deciding t~e rang~ of machines to be ouilt , 
and finally what he saw as the lack of technical policy for the industry . 
Al' perovich, Krivchanskii claimed , had a favourite phrase:" There's no need to 
chatter about tech."lical policy . It is cJ ear ; we are going or. the right path" •1 
Another crttic ,Dorogov , criticised investment plam of the branch and called for 
t~ee to five large factories rather than ten, and also called for a more vigorous 
2 approach to specialisation by parts . There was also detailed criticism of the 
industry's past neglect of heavy and precision nachine tool building~ 
At thP. enn of ~ay Al'perovich was personally criticised in an e1ltorial of 
Za L"ldustrializatsiyu for making what was described as an~ unprtncipled speech 
on restrictions of the supposed rights of a glavk nachal' nik " • 
4 
He was clearly 
fighting back against the critics , but it was a losing battle. The Glavk was 
now coming under fierce attack for its poor performance in fulfi1ling the top 
priority order for machine tool s needed for the conversion of the tractor factories 
thec:ut.veyors of which stopped at the end of ~tay . In ~~arch it had been reported 
that of 1,225 machines to be supplied , only 268 had actually been received, while 
by April 'Stankokonstruktsiyal;l7'8unt one unit-construction s pecial machine of 
29 planned for the first quarter . 5 At about this time members of the Glavk apparatu 
were purged6• An editorial of the industrial newspaper at the beginning of June , 
after cataloguing t he fail ings of the indl::lBtry , observed that ," In this branch 
'worked• enemies of the people - Japanese-German Trotskyist and Right spies and 
saboteurs. Countless bottlenecks have been created in machine tool building by t he 
h;:nds of the wreckers"~ BND$ came under a t tack again at the end of June following 
a meeting of its activists at which Al' perovich and Levin, its director, spoke. By 
this time 'Stankokonstru.ktsiya' had built twelve of the machines re~uired by the 
tractor factories ,8 and on )rd July by order of NKTP Levin was removed from his 
post as head of the Institute and direct.or of • Stankokoilstruktsiya' , being held 
P9rsonal1y responsible for the failure to meet the needs of the tractor industry •9 
Al'perovtch was now made personally responsible for this order , but at the end 
'f July it was reported that the Stal1ngrad factory was urtable to resume work because 
Vital Bachines had not yet been supplied~ 0The exact da.te of Al ' perovich.' s removal 
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has not been found , but it must have been in early Attgust. 
In about six months almost all the directors of the specialised machine tool 
industry ' s factories were renoved , many having been associated with the bra1ch from 
its foundation 1n the First Five-year Plan , while many leading officials of 
t.he Glavk also lost their posts. As a result , many young specialists and workers 
rose to leading positions , some , likA A. I .Efremov of the im .Ordzhonikidze factory , 
f:J.e 
makin~ extremely rapid progress fromLshop floor to the director's office , · 
Al ' perovich , who made such a great contribution to the formation and development 
of the Soviet mac!U.ne t ool industry, is reported to have died in 19)8, 1at the 
a~e of fifty . He was undoubtably a very competent leader of the bra1ch ,with a 
very clear view of the path of its development and the priorities o~ each stage . 
~rom 1930 he edited the industry ' s journal ,' Stanki 1 Instrument, and the frequency 
of his editorial contributions suggests that this was no formally held post. From 
1929 to 1937 he wrote countless articles on the machine tool industry and its 
problems , att empting always to raise the level of public understanding of its 
special features and difficulties . The whirlwind of the Ezhovshchina caused a 
tragic , heavy loss of talent ann experience in the still immature machine tool 
industry at a time when it could least afford it . 
The shortcomings of the branch ,ascribed in 19)7 and 1Q)R to the'wrecking ' 
activity of 'Trotskyist-Bukharinite bandits and saboteurS , were many ;and there 
is no doubt that by 19)7 a number of serious problems had accumulated because 
the ~dustry ' s leadership had been unable to consolidate its gains,under constant 
pressure of ever more pressing and difficult tasks. These problems included a 
relative weakness of heavy and precision nachine tool bulldin6 ~the latter stemmif4 
it appears ,froJT\ the fact that t he Glavk believed that it could be left to the 
defence ~dustry producers , in so far as this sector presented the largest demand 
for precision equipment) , the slow progress in ass imilating basic general-purpose 
~chtnes for la:rge- serial production at the le~ding factories , the poor state 
l.~Ind . ,10 .5 .)7 . 
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of castings supply , the low level of development of specialised parts production 
and cooperation , and the poor state of construction work in the industry , which 
by the end of 1937 had a large number of uncompleted projects . 2 
The work of the industry in 1937 was poor , with a large shortfall in plan 
fulfilment .GUSIP built less than 16 , 000 units against a plan of about 20 , 000 , 
while the combined specialised and 'planned' industry built 36,120 units , almost 
5, 000 units below the pl anned level~ Imports were less than half the high 1936 
total, I nstead of the planned 164 new types and sizes , 114 were built , or 78 
if unit- construction models are excluded .4 
Formally , the Second Five-year Plan was quite substantially underfulfilled 1 
factories under NKTP built about 26 , 000 units in 1937 against a plan of 40 ,000 , 
while total output over five years was about three quarters of the planned level . 
However , it is more ~eaningful to consider the total specialised plus 'planned' 
output ; here performance was better - 90 per cent in the final year and a 3 per 
5 
cent overfulfilment over five years. Total output in 1937 , includine simple machines 
amounted to 48,473 units . It is a l so difficult to assess the degree of fulfilment 
of the 200 new types and sizes target • Formally , it was undoubtably overfulfilled . 
The specialised industr y built 270 new types and sizes over the five years , and 
6 the ' planned ' factories a further 83 , making a total of 353 . But this total includes 
special unit- construction machines (probably about 50) , and many of the new types 
and sizes cannot have been fully assimi lated into production . Complaints about 
the ' formal assimilation• were frequent 1 many models appeared in prototype form 
and entered production much later or , L'1 some cases , not at all. Regardless of 
this problem , real progress was undoubtably made . The product range of the 
specialised industry at the end of the Plan period (excluding unit- construction and 
other special models) was about 150 types and sizes , compared with 26 at the end 
of .. he First Five-year Plan , while a further 60 types and sizes were being produced 
at the ' pl anned ' factories .? A measure of the significant progress of the industry 
Llli,1968 ,No .7 ,p44 . This source provides a brief biography of Al' perovich on the 
occasion o+' the e ightieth anniversary of his birth · 
2•5ee lli ,1937 ,t o .19, pp . 1- 2;Planovoe khozyaistvo , 1937 ,No .? ,pp.4t- 46 . 
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is provided by data on 'tne chan£inf.i structur of output .In 1937 Sovl=t industry 
built 894 automatics (ncne 1n 1932) ;1 ,839 grinding r:.achines (254); J97 gear-cuttin 
machines (none);J , 24J m111imr .-;:.achines (1,0?1) : 44 broaching machines (none) ,; and 
962 special machines (none) · 
1 
Lathes accounted for 31.4 per cent of all machine 
tools built in 1937 against 39 . 3 per cent 1n 1932 , vertical qr1lllng machines 
25.3 per cent (J? .?) : turret la ·~es and automatics 5.5 per cent (2 .8) ; and 
all types of grl"ldtng machines 8 .0 per cent (2 .6)~ However , despite this progress 
the structure of output was still qulta bAckward compared ~o~lth the structure of 
1netal1at1ons dl11."1ng the First F'ive- year Plan when imporLs hnd been at a high 
leveL J..s is argued later , there "'·as some relative deterioration 1n the quality 
of additions to the stock in marty branches during the Second Five-year Flan pe:rlod 
concern about the danger of faD inr behind again had real foundation . 
Probably the most unsuccessful aspect of Plan fulfilment was that related 
to the building of new factories . The two new grindinv. machine works were not 
even started and capacity was created instead by converting existing enterprises 
to grinding ma.chlne building , while the heavy oa.chine tool bull ding works in 
Sverdlovsk,whlch was to have worked on a cooperation bnsls with the neighbouring 
Uralnt«shzavod heavy engineering factory, was st.arted and ihon conserved. It ls 
clear that investment resources were diverted frorn civilian to m111tary projec·ts 
t.o the detrioent not only of machine tool building, but also the lron and steel 
industry : a fact ~h1ch was to cause serious problems during the Third Five-year 
Plan period . 3 
The Third Five-year Plan 
Defence considerations do:'linated the Third Five-year Plan . The threatening 
international situation required the Soviet Party and government to intensify 
the process of economic preparation for the possibility of War,already s~ted 
1n the previous five-year period . Rates of growth were lowered and stress placed 
on relocation of lndust:r.y and qualitative changes made neceoaary by the det:Ulllds 
- military production . The output of machine ouilding and metal working was to 
~ • .Jee Table SA .VII. 
2.Sce Table SA . VIII. 
).See Istoriya Kommun1st1cheskaya oart11 •. , op cit , Vo1 .4 , book 2 , p .J90;.Khromov ,P.A. , 
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rise by 2 .25 times, compared with a reported fulfilment of the previous Plan of 
a 2.9 times increase between 1932 and 1937 .1 In form .tion about Plan variants 
for machine tool building is not as plen t.lful as :for the first tNo five-year plans, 
but it does ap r.ear that there was less disagree~t , the same final year target 
was first presented in early 1937 and retained 1n the actual Plan . Total output 
was to rise to 70,000 units in 1942 , cor!lpared with 36,120 units 1n 1937, an 
increase of 94 per cent, compared wtth the 105 per cent achieved between 1932 
and 1937. The aim for the specialised industry ts not known . With the creation 
of the Commissariat of Heavy Nachine Build:!-ng in FebruaJry 1939 , this was taken 
as the planning unit; it was to build 43,000 units 1n 1942, compared with 19,330 
w 1937, The machine t0ol stock of the country was to rise from 380 ,000 units 
at the beginning of 1938 to about 600,000 in 1942 . The product range was to 
wcrease to 800 types and sizes, while the structure of output was to change 
to prov.tle a higher share of some progressive t ypes, notably automatics and semi-
auots , the share of which ~as to rise to 6 .5 per cent corapared with 2.5 in19:37 (the 
target apparently refered to NKTyazhMash, but t.hi.s was not specified). 2 A number 
of new factories were to be built , primarily to the east of the country. 
Information about the work of the industry in 1938 is sparse. Despite the 
complete renewal of the personnel in leading posts and the general disruption 
of the 'time,quantitativ'! ful!"ilment of the annual plan was quite good . Total 
output of the • .Planned ' and specialised industry was equivalent to the 1937 plan 
target , reaching 40,170 units . Imports reached quite a high level - 6,978 units, 
anc! their share in total il'lports arnd ln .imports of machinery and e1uipment reached 
tts highest point to date - t4 per cent and 40 . 5 per cent respectively. 3 In 1938 
a major effort to develop heavy machine tool building appears to have started . 
Construction wor~ began at the Sverdlovsk heavy machine tool "'"orks and at the 
Mramatorsk heavy machine tool factory , while capacity for heavy machine tool 
b~lding was created at the Gor ' kii milling machine works and other enterprises . 
In the threP. dlng the War the building of heavv machines develooed at years prece, - ~ · 
·~sny1 Froletarij ' , im ,Sverdlova,Gor'kii , the Khar'kov facto~y,the Saratov gear-
~!!etii pyatilelnii plan razvitiya narodnogo khozyaistva Soyuza SSR,19J8-42~5 ·• 
H.,1939 ,pp.10 and 19 . 
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cutting macbtne factory ,' Stankokonstruktsiya ', the in .Sed1na llorks in Krasnodar , 
and the Minsk tm. Voroshllova factory .4 In 1940 212 heavy, large and unique machines 
~ere buil t , of 23 different types and sizes . 5 Thus one of the bot tlenecKs or 
th"' Second Plan per t od was t·:J some extent overcor!le . 
At the Ei ghteenth Party Congrem in ~jarch 1939 a number of speaker s , including 
~:olotov and Halyshev (the Narkom of heavy machine building) ,placed great emphasis 
on the im,p:>rtance of raising the share of specialised , high- productivity machines 
i n total output , in particular alltOMi.ics and sellli-autos . 6 With t.he outbr enk of 
the Second World War this emphasis became even more Mrked .• On the day after the 
outbreak of war a major SNK decree outlined the tasks of the industry in the 
new s ituati on and a nW!Iber of measures for lrnprovlng 1.ts performance . This decree , 
while aknowled;lng the industry ' s achievemo~ts , was highly critical of a nuober 
or shortcomings , notably the slow rate of assl.mtlating new , modern types , especially 
h!F.h~productivity models , and stated that th1s was hindering the introduction 
of advanced production technology into machine building and the defence industry . 
hachine tool r esearch and design work lias considered inadequate , and designers 
were accused of falling to adequately study the requ1renents of advanced technology 
in the defence sector . The specialised industry Glavk was critic i sed for being 
divorced from the nork of the ' planned ' producers , as also were the other 
CO!lll!llssarlats concemed . The decree outlined a revl·sed program e for the industry , 
plac 1n~greater emphasis than before on the building of autol!lat1cs , semi- autos, 
grinding machines and other progressive types , 1n particular those requirerl by the 
defence industry . A l arge con s t ruction programme was outlined , with the intention 
or raising the cap!tcity of the industcy to 75 , 000 units a year by 1942. Soce 
adninistrative changes were also made . The machine tool Glavk was spllt into two 
CO!!lponents , Glavstankoprom , and Glavtyazhst.ankoprom , the latter 1ncludL'1g all 
factories building heavier type machines . Furthermore, the Institute,ENIMS, and 
' Stankokonstrukts1ya ' were tr.ansfered directly to NarKor:tryazhMaah. Finally ,a 
system of bonuses was announced , for stimulating work connected with designing 
and build i nP" nell 1 prosa-essi ve mo3els, in particular those for military production .
7 
3.See Tables SA .XVI and XVI! · 
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Conditions of work in the nachine tool industry , as for industry as a ~~ole, 
became progressively more dlf1icult in the imme1iate pre-War period. The output 
plan for 1939 was not fulfilled; in fact total output fell below the level of 19)8. 
:ieasons for this include an increasingly acute shortage of metal , lack of electricity 
(wtlich for a long period put factories in Jo.har' kov and Cor' kH out of action), and 
the fact that enterprises were forced to tmdertake an increasing number of orders 
of a directly military nature.
8 
The need to supply machine tools in a short 
p~r1od. of t1me , often of a special and complex nature for military product101\, 
led to further imports , In 1939 the number of machines imported was less than 
in the previous year , but their average weight and value rosa very sharply . 
~~~thermore , the role or machine tool imporls reached its highest level 1n Soviet 
history : no less than 18.4 per cent of all imports took the forrn of m~tal cutting 
Machine tools , and over 47 per cent of alJ machinery and equipment imports, indicating 
the hl~h priority ~ranted to strengthening the machine tool stock.9 Plans for 
increasing the range of types and sizes built were very poorly fuli'llled. In 1939 
only 78 new types and sizes were in fact introduced, against a plan target of 
155 . In the following year performance was slightly better , but still inade~uatea 
94 new t ypes and sizes were built , against a plan target of 148.10 
In the aut~~n of 1939 four machine tool building enterprises in Byelorussia 
were transfered to tbe specialised inr!ustry 1 th~se factories had been building 
machine tools on a fairly speci~lised basis since the early 'thirties. In building 
new cap~city during the Third Five- year Plan priority was generally granted to 
projects to the east of the country , generally in the Urals and Siberia . But 
at the same time the ~over.nment was anxious to raise output by all l!'.eans as quickly 
as possible and t~is could often best be realised by developing eXisting enterprises 
regardless of their location . Time was probaoly an important consideration .1n 
developing heavy machine tool building at rxarnatorsk in the Ukraine i as with the 
Sverdlovsk heavy machine tool works there was an already operailonnl heavy 
e~~certng enterprise of large capacity and experience near by , giving the 
6.xvru s" ezd VKF( b) . sten .otchet ,1'1 ., 1939 ,pp.294-295 ;386-38? ;65J • 
7.Qlrektivy KPSS 1 sovetskogo pravitel ' stva. po khozyaistvennym voprosam ,M.,1957, 
a ~ol :2 •I>P·!i01v6f. z ie ekonomicheskoi nezavisimosti SSSk , 191?-1940jts: , ,M., 
' 1972:~r9a~ ·The ·qu:;~~~~ of military oroduction and the 111achine tool tndustry 
is considered 1n detail in Appendix 5. 
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possiblllty of quickly organising production cooperation . The primary deteriltinauts 
of location in the 'thirties were tbe availability of skilled labour and proximity 
to machine using centres~ Heavy nachtn~> tool building tendtd to be loc~ted near 
metallurgical industry centres and bases of heavy engineering - Sverdlovek , 
Chelvabinak and f\.ramatorsk . The role of' the central lndustr.ial region as a 
supplier of mach 1ne tools steadily rose throughout the period from 1932 , rising 
from JO per cent to 37 per cent in 1937 and 46 . 5 per cent in 1'940 1.n terms of the 
numbe~funits built . The contribution of the Urals declined in .relative terms 
over the same yeers , from 14 .9 per cent , to 8 .6 per cent 1n 1937 and 4 .5 per cent 
in 1940. In 1940 Western Siberia accounted for only 2.3 per cent of total output. 
The RSFSR accounted for two- thirds of total output in 1940 , the Ukratnlan rl'!pUbllc 
one fifth and Byelorussia one tenth .2 However , eeveral enLerpr1ses were under 
construction in the Urals andSiberla in the 1~mediate pre-'11ex period and the potenti~ 
output from these regio~s was probably considerably larger than the actual output 
1n 1940 s~gests . About fifty percent of 1940 output stemmed from regions actually 
occupied during the War . 
Construction plans in 1940 ha~ to be cutback 'because of the shortag~ of metal 
and thP growing war danger3 . Efforts were made to accelerate the process of raising 
the t'chnical level of the machine tool stock . A modernisation and modification 
campaign start ed , and new procedur"'s were introduced for speeding up the process 
of introouciilg new models . The large reserves still present were revealed oy a 
census of the machine tool stock 1n. l.overnber 1940 . This census ap~ears to h;1ve 
covered the entire stoc~ , whereas previous data always seens to have refered to 
the civilian sector only~ A tot3l stock of 710, 00 units was revealed ; but about 
'•t. at ent.e· ... prises and construction sites awaiting installation , ~ , ooo machines were • 
and 2 further 70 , 000 units were not actually working on the day of the census . 
~easons for thetr i dleness incluied ponr organisation , and lack of materials . 
5 electricity and workers . 
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Attention to the machine tool industry heightened 1n the ~utumn of 1940. In 
September-October an All-Union meetln~ on the industry was held, in which 
participated Party leaders, Nalyshev (then deputy chairman of SNK USSR) and 
Efremov, the Narkom o~ heavy machine building . One of the mair. aims of the meeting 
was to devise policies putting an end to machine tool imports~ Performance was 
poor at this time 1 fuli"ilnent of the programme f or NKTynzh!~ash enterprises in 
the first nine months of 1940 reached only 73 ptu· cent , 2 At the beginning of 
~ovember 1940 a commission was created under the chairmanship of naJ..yshev to 
prepare a new decree providing f or an upturn in the development. of the industry. 
The result was a decree of the Party Central Committee and Sovnarkom USSR dated 
8th December . This deere~ has not been published and can only be pieced together 
from a number of secondary sources , but it is evtden~ that it presented a programme 
for a major t ransformation of the machine tool industry . It stressed the first 
priority importance of providing metal working equipment for the aviation , tank 
3 
and artillery industries , and indicated the necess i ty o~ using foreign experience . 
This r~ises the possibility that foreign technical assistance may have been 
envisaged from Germany? The decree provided for the transfer of a fut~ther 
ten enterprises of other administrations to the sneciallsed mach11le tool industry , 
including three labour communes of NKVD . An amtitious construction programme 
was outlined : twenty- five new factories were to be built • plus a further six 
for allied production . 5 I1easures were also ta~en to enhance the role of the 
desi~ner in developing new machines , with the introduction of new bonuses and 
a provi sion that machines could be named after designers . 
6 
It is not known how 
auch of this decree was actually put into practice before the outbreak of ar . 
A tot~l of 58 ,473 machine tools was built in 1940 ; 42 , 500 if simple types 
4 
are excluded • This latter total was 80 per cent of the level it should have been 
for fulf i lment of the Five- year Plan . Imports rose somewhat in unit terms over 19)€ 
but there is reason to doubt the usually published figure given the intense activity 
for developing military oroduction and , 1.n ~"act , a recent source noes suggest 
in 1940 - 9 , 2?4 units .
7 The _t:rogramme for ral:sing a l'luch higher level of inports 
L'Kas ' yenenko , oo cit , p . 198. 
2.1 bid . 
3 . 1.bid. ,p . 199 . h i t 20 
4,zhed ' , on cit , un . 15- 16JA1zenshtadt and Chikhac ev ,op c •P ·2 • 
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the share of automatics and semi- autos roet with some success . In 1940 J,~Jf units 
of these types were built • representing 3 . 5 per cent of total output. (including 
simple machines) , compared with 894 units and 1.8 per cent 1n 1937. The share 
of ordinary lathes 1.n total output fell to its lowest 1 evel yet - only 19 .7 per 
cent J the share of grinding machines of all types reached 11 per cent , compared 
with 8 per cent in 1937 . The biggest increase ~as in the production of special 
machi~e t ools , presumabl y for mil i tary pro3uction purposes ; their output rose 
from 962 uni+s to 6 ,688 units tn 1940, when they represented over 11 per cent 
8 of the total . Thus a quite significant qualitative change took place during t.he 
three years ,1938 to 1940 . By the end of 1940 the specialised machine tool industr 
was building )20 types and sizes , over twice the number in 19J7, while in the 
9 
country as a whol e about 500 types and sizes were being built . This was quite a 
conatderable achievement and testified to the ~rowing maturity of the industry's 
design and engineering forces. 
There is little 1nformatton about the work of the machine tool industry in the 
final months before the .ar. A report of work ln the first quarter refered to the 
successful fulf'ilment of plans by Glavstankoprom • 1ncl ud:\.ng the fact that 1t 
had fully fulfilled the plan ~or assimilating new models -
10 a rare achievement ! 
On 5th June a People's Commissariat of t1a.ch1ne Tool Building was created , 
signifying; the high priority granted to the branch at t.hat tiro~. Also in "unc the 
govP.~'"e'lt gave a ~1rective for an increase of output in the year 1941 , and it 
was decided that the production of oachL~e tools at the enterprises of the 
arnaments ' com~issariat ,hiKVooruzhenie , should be restorea .11 It 1s not kno~n 
'-'hen the enterprises of this commissariat ceased ":luildlng machine tools , but it 
~as probably 1n 1940, because the September 1939 decree foresa~ a major role for 
lhem ,suggesttng that they were in action in that year . The ~ithdrawal of these 
enterprises may account for s ome of the shortfall of output in 1940.
12 
In the 
f~st half of 1941 a total 0~ 28 ,100 machine tools were built .The volume of imports 
is not knowr . • 
5 .Zhed ' , op c1t , p . 16 . 
6.Kas ' yanenko ,loc . cit , ,omarovsk11 , oo cit ,p.86 • 
7 .See rat1 e SA .XVI . 
8,See Tables SA .VII and VII . 
9 ·See Table SA .XI. o4 
10 .I nnllet+ ... 4 ., ,. ,...,~ .. -' · •"' c:<:c:Q 1Qq~-1QlJ.1tr.:r •• M • • 197'3. P·2 • 
J .40 97 
.By the outbreak of ;.;oar the Sov i.et Union possessed a modern nach1ne tool 
tn1ustry able to build almost any type of machine and meet almost all the needs 
of the economy. During the Third Five-year Plan years 1938-1940 domestic productlc 
accounte' -for about 94 IJer cent of total supply 1n ur'li"t terl!ls, compared with 
86 per cent during the Second Plan and 56 per cent during the First Plan period. 
But there were definite weaknesses: the product range ~as barely sufficient , the 
technolo~ical level of many models w~s below the latest standards of ~oreign 
machine tool buUding , quality and reB.abllity were not up to foreign levels,the 
capacity of the industry for original design tho1~hL was still 11n1ted , etc •• 
Before considering some particular aspects of tbe development of the industry 
in IT.ore detail , it is interesting to compare the position reached by 1940 with 
the situation in the two main machine tool building countries, the USA and Cormany. 
Table J .I 
.·.achine Tool Output and Stock in the USSR ,USA and Germany 1937-1940 
USSR 
1940 
Output of metal-cutting 
machine tools (units) 58 ,4?3 
Stock of metal- cutting 
Mchine tools in the 
economy ( ' 000 units) 710 
-
Per cent of stock under 
ten years old 71 
l.excJuding occupied territory . 
2 . industry only , not whole economy . 
) .under eight years old . 
Sourcet 
1937 
55 , 000 
n.a. 
USA German11 
1940 19:38 1940 
110 , 000 119,800 1J9,500 
1 , 0002 9582 n .a. 
28 J43 
UOlSR - Out~ut, Table SA .I ; stock and age - Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1962g., 
M • I 19~ J I p • 55 • 
USA - Output ,.., ~oner , Jf .D . ,The United St~tes Machine Tool Indust 1 00 to 1 
N,I.T. ,19A6 , pp . Jt2-J~ stock and age - OmarovskU , op cit , p . 8 . 
Germany - Output, The ~ffects o~ Strate~tc Bombin~ on the German .~ Econony, 
The Uni+.ed States st:atea-ic bonbing survey,1945, p.224 (aDJUSted to remove 
meta) --forming machines); stock and age - ibid.,p.229 (alsocuijusted). 
Thus t~e industrialisation drive gave the Soviet economy a remarkably yo~~g machine 
tool stock , but its size was still quite substantially Sl'laller than in Germany 
11 .Kas'yanenko , on clt,p.200. ~ 
12,And also some of thP recorded decline in output to the east Ol the country: e.g., 
output the Udmurt ASSR (orobably entirely the Izhevsk factory of ~KV) declined 
from 2 ,212 units ~ 19)? to 1,441 in 19~0 (Narodnoe khozyaistvo Uamurtskoi ASSR , 
Izhevsl< , 195? , p .22 . ) • 
1 ,See Table SA .XVIII . 
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and the Unitecl St.ates . Output. in 1940 exceeded t.he US output of ..1.937 (50 , 000 in 
1929 and 34 , 000 1n 19J8) in quantity terns , but 1n quality there was probably a 
substantial difference. Its potent1~1 output was nuch lo~er however - the USA 
.,-as able to increase its production from :51 . 500 units in 1939 to 110 ,000 L'l 1940 . 
!he Soviet output was much lm;e.r than that of Germany , and by 1940 the latter had 
the possibil i ty of using quite subst;:..ntial capacity in occupied countries . Thus 
Soviet industry "'as at a distinct d:tsadvantage from the point of view of rtach1ne 
tool supply at the time Germany attacked . 
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Chapter 4 
THE STRATEGY OF DEVELOPf.iENT OF THE SOV IE"'!' MACKD "' TOOL IN DUST .ttY 
Given the decision to develop a strong machine tool building capacity the 
leaders of the industry were faced with the proble• of what path to follow . 
It was generally ainowledged that the scattered , universal production of 
Tsarist Russia,based on primitive technology, had to be superseded , but it was 
not easy t o devi se an alternative strategy appropriate to Soviet conditions . 
Should the branch follow an existing model and adopt the organisation and methods 
of a machine tool inrlustry of an industrially advanced capitaltst co~1tr.y? If 
so , which country -Germany or the United States? Or , should all capitalist models 
be rejected and a new strategy devised specifica ly tailored to the circumstances 
and possibilities of the socialist ,planned economy? This last alternative was 
attractive , but for its successful adoption a go~ understanding was required 
of what features of the machine tool building of other countries were specifically 
capitalist , and what features were peculiar to the activity of machine tool 
building itself. The proble"' of strategy involved a nu:nber of central issues 
relating to the organisation of production , notably the scale of factories, their 
degree of specialisation by product , the extent of process and parts specialisation 
the technology of production , the size of the product range , and the role of 
standardisation . Solutions to all these problems had to be devised in a very 
brief period of time ; whereas in other countries organisational forms and methods 
had evolved over decades . l<'urthermore , they had to be devised at a time when 
technical and managerial skills were in extremely short supply . This chapter 
is devoted to an examination of the evolat1on of the strategy of development 
of the Soviet machine to nl industry in the pre-War years,with particular emphasis 
onthe bfluence of foreign , capitalist practice and the extent to which an 
original industrial structure appropriate to Soviet conditions was created. 
Before considering the Soviet industry it is necessary to briefly review 
some of the ma.in .features of the organisation and methods of the machiJle tool 
industries of three leading inrlustrial colUltries - Germa.'l.y ,the USA and Britain -
4.2 100 
in order to more precisely determine the extent of their influence on Soviet 
theory and practice . 
The German Machine Tool Industry 
In considering the German industry distinction must be made between its 
traditional f eatures and the ne~ approaches which gained strength in the 1920s. 
The pre-Firs t world war German engineering industry as a whole and the machine 
tool industry in particular were characterised by a predominance of unspecial1sed, 
individual and small serial production with a heavy reliance on skilled labour. 
Large-serial and mass production were the exception and little use was nade of 
specialised and special purpose equip:nent , After the ;,ar the industry possessed 
very considerable excess capacity and the drive for profitability in these 
circumstances led to the vigorous promotion of techniques of ratlonallsatton . 
The rationalisation movement was energetically pursued in the maonine tool 
industry with active assista~ce from the German aachiae tool builders association 
(Verein Deutscher Werkzeuguaschinfabriken). 
The main directions of rationalisation 1n the machine tool industry were 
1 f ' rs-. 
as follows . Li he association of firms engaged in similar lines of production 1n 
order to reduce competition and make the fullest use of available capacity . Some 
of t.hese associations were directed towards the pooling of salea efforts, out. 
others involved far-reaching production cooperation . Tbe most notable case of the 
latter was the formation of Verein Deutscher Drehbankfabriken (V .D.F . ) , an 
associattoa of four leading lathe building firms (Boehringer , Braun , Heidenreich 
2 
und Harbeck , and Wohlenberg) in order to build a range of standard centre-la.tbes . 
A !eature of the German machine tool industry of the early 'twenties was the 
considerable diversity of the p~oduct range with uch duplication and consequent 
short product ion runs . Many factories made a number of types of machine havtag 
t .The general features of the German rationalisation mevement are described in 
detail 1n Brady ,R.,The rattonallsation movement in German 1ndustry ,Univ .of 
Cal1forn1a,19JJ . A comprehensive account of rationalisation 1n the machl?e tool 
industryis provided by Wegeleben ,F . ,Dle Ratioaalisierung i~ Deutsohen erKZeu.-
aascb1nenbau,Berl1n , t924 . 
2.See below ,p. toz . 
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little or no technical homogeneity . The second Min direction of rationalisation wa 
therefore the specialisation of factories by specific types of machines • This 
factory specialisation by product was frequently linked with the ' tipificatlon ' 
(tip1sierung) of the machines built,l .e.the reduction of the range of sizes 
built of any given type, thereby permitting a h1g1er degree of serlality of 
production . This latter aim was also pursued by the standardisation (normallsierung 
of parts and assemblies of machines o~ a given type , and sometimes , at a higher 
level, of parts and assembJ ies COI!l on to machines of different types . t:ith the 
possibility of raising the level of seriality of production offered by these 
rationalisation techniques machine tool firms bettan to introduce new systeme 
of limits and tolerances allowing interchangeable parts production , Finally , 
the larger batch sizes gave the possibi lity of introduclng elements of continuous 
flow production for some machining processes but. ,more frequently, for assembly 
orocesses. The introduction of flow organisation involved intra-factory 
reorganisation with the relocation of machine tools from the traditionnl group 
arrangement (groups of stmilar types of macr1nes) to arrange~ent according to the 
flo.., of work f'or particular machine tool assemblies . This generally involv~ 
the creation of specialised bays for the machining of such main elements as 
beds, headstocks , tailstocks , etc . A notable fe~ture of all these for111s of 
rationalisation , which owed much to progressive American practice, was that they 
were predominantly of an organisational nature ,requiring little if any additional 
capital investment . 
By 1928 the German machine tool industry was still characterised by a 
production base consisting of a large nll!Dber of small factories (865 factories 
with an averaFe of 75 workers each1) with considerable duplication of effort,e .g . 
th~rewere 90- 100 pro~ucers of lathes alone- 'sufficient for enormous overproduction 
But by this time the new tendency was clear to foreign observers . Thus a British 
visitor to the 192'3 Leipzig Fair noted that for German firms ," .• the trend is 
cirected towards the oroo uction of only one class or kind of machine tool and 
l .The iron age , 19 . 4 .1928 , p . 1097 · 
2 .1bi d . -
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within that class of only one model or size of l!l'iChine tool" •1 The specialisation 
of the Ge~An machine tool industry was also stressed by a Soviet specialist , 
Lazarev , writing in 1929f' Clear specialisation is character i~tic of the vast 
Majority of German machine tool building factortes , If one leaves out of account 
the small number of relatively large factories employing 1 ,000 to 2, 000 workers 
(e ,g .Loewe ,Reinecker,Werner) •• • then the ma j ority of machine tool factories with 
from 100 to JOO worker s arenarrowly specialised , all owing them to compete on 
2 both German and forei gn markets" • ll{oreover . Lazarev noted that specialisation was 
expressed not only in t he limitation of the product range , but also in a 
narrowing of' the range of productive oper ati ons Ulldertaken ;" For the present day 
organisat ion of German machi ne t ool r.actories the l3ck of foundries (often 
forges as t:ell) is becoming all the more t ypical . . • as a result. the machine tool 
factories ~re being t rrul.sformed into purely mechanical enterpr ises (machining 
and the assembl y of products)" ,3 
The most comprehensive case of rational isation ln German practice of the 
'twenties and early ' thirti es was that of the VIF combine . Thi s firm t.ook 
rationalisation further , ooth in relation to product design and organisation , 
than an¥ other German machine tool builder , and this experience can be regarded 
as the most advanced European practtce of the period . Moreover , it had no 
paralle l in the United States at this time. The VDF standard lathe was designed 
as a unified range of machines incorporating many standardised components anc 
assemblies common the machines of different sizes . For the first time in practice 
t~e mac~ines wer e bui lt wi th a standardised r ange of feeds and speeds according 
t o the theor etical principles wlaborated by Professor Schlesin~er . As the editors 
of the British journal ,'Machinery ', observed 1n 1929, the VDF lathe represented 
" , .the most 1Jnportant att empt at rationalisation which has yet been made 1n the 
nachine tool ind.ustry". 4 Each of the four member firms of the VIF combine built two 
or three sizes of the range and this high degree of specialisation permitted the 
· •• ~ac~ir.ery , 13 . 12 , 1928 , p .351 · 
2.,konomicheskoe obozrenei, 1929 ,No .6 , p .47 . 
3 . 1bid . 
4.Aiehinery, 12 .9 .1929 ,p .756 ; see pp.771-773 for a descr iption of the lathe . 
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use o~ quantity production methods hitherto considered inaupropriat e to machine 
tool building . Thus the Boehringer works built only two sizes with a programme 
of 75 units a month (900 a year) . Considerable use Ras made of special jigs and 
fixtures and flow line organisation of machining shops was adopted wherever 
possible . Speci al bays were organised for t'"te assembly of such units as headstocks , 
tailstocks and saddl es . Detailed work cards were prepared for each separate 
operation and interchangeable parts eliminated the hand fitting hitherto typical 
of the indust ry . It was claimed that this system of production gave considerable 
space savings without the need for additional capital investment , and could give 
a 1 saving in wage costs of up to thirty per cent . 
The lathe built by VDF was ~universal machine designed for use in toolrooms , 
repair shops and a wi de range of individual and small- medium serial engineerir~ 
production . Throughout the 1920s the German industry concentrated on the building 
of such general- purpose machines suited to the conditions of German engineering 
production , and it was only towards the end of the decade as rationalisation 
deepened giving rise to an increasing adoption of quantity production methods that 
the industry began to buil d more specialised models . This tendency was noted at 
the 1929 Leipaig Fair . 2 
The American Machine Tool Industry 
The main machine tool building countries of western Europe were concerned 
almost exclusively with the production of general- purpose machines finding 
wide application on both domestic and export markets . Special purpose machines 
were also buil t , but these tended to be o£ the heavier types required for such 
branches as rail tfansport machinery and ship building . The very marked product 
differentiation character isti c of the industry hindered the adoption of quaatity 
production methods . The rat i onalisation movement t"lerefore focused on the reduction 
of this diversity in order to secure cost savings derived from a greater seriality 
of oroduction poss i ble because of the nature of the gener al- purpose product • The 
position of the Amer ican machine tool industry was rather different. 'The strentrth 
l .See Sch(itz ,fl ., ' The m~S§ production of lathes ', Engineering, 14.8 . 1931 ,pp. 185-188; 
and ~tacbinery , 29 . 10. 19;J1 , pp . 1J7- 1J8. 
2.Macbinerv ,12. 12 . 29 , p .J80 . 
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of the industry was not in the building of general- purpose equipment (although it 
shoUld be stressed that good machines of thts type were built, mainly for the 
domestic market) but in supplying specialised production equipment suited to 
the demands of quantity production branches, above all the mass- production motor 
1nnustry. The specialised nature of this equip~ent , frequently built to meet the 
specific demands of customers , necessarily gave rise to great product differentiati 
and the predominance of individual and small- serial production , relying heavily on 
highly skilled labour . 
American machine tool factories of the 1920s ~ere generally small 1n scale. 
In 1929 the average number of workers per factory was 169 , but many of the best 
known firms building speci alised machines had from 300 to 800 workers (e.g.~ullard , 
Cone ,Fellows ,Cleveland,and Kearney and Tracker) . These factories tended to be 
specialised for the buildin~ of a particular type of machine tool , but often built 
many models and sizes of t~is type. There were a few larger factories of 2,000 
workers or more (e .g.Browne and Sharpe ,Pratt and Whitney,~lncinnati Millin~ ) 
but they tended to have a lower level of specialisation . Although American firms 
tended to specialise by type of machine , a Soviet specialist, after visiting 
American machine tool factories in 1927 , observed that while as 1n Yermaqythere 
<as a striving for specialisation there was a greater differentiation of the 
product range.1 But the American industry had a higher level of specialisation 
of a different kind - in the production of components and assemblies common to 
2 machine tools of many types , e.g.pumps, fastners , electrical ~~d hydraulic units,etc •• 
Tbis highly developed system of sub-contracting gave scale economies which 
camteracted the raised costs of low-quantity producti on of the machines themselves. 
This sub-contr acting also extended to the supply of castings and forgings: in 
the 1920s most American machine tool firms did not possess their own foundries .3 
The nature of the industry' s products (specialised production equipment) 
pnn~ed the development of very close relations between the machine tool firms 
and their customers, especially 1n the motor industry . In fact the customers tended 
to dominate the machine firms , the monopol y power of the large motor industry 
corporations being an important factor 1n this suoordination . A characterisation 
1.Al ' perovicb , TorgTprom.gaz , J1 . 12 . 192?· 
2.Thi s was also noted by Al ' pero~ich,ioid. 
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of the American machine tool industry in the early 1960s applies equally to the 
situation of the inter-~ar years a 
"The machine tool industry has traditionally been dominated by its customers . 
This has expressed itself 1n a number of ways. The industry has based 
itself on customer service , tailoring products to customer demands on 
what has been almost a custom basis, rather than making products to a 
price and merchandising them . This has tended to nake the industry a 
giant job shop , with low production runs , high costs, low profits and 
high prices in comparison to tne mass production machine tool industries 
of other countries . lhe industry has relied for direction in development 
work on what the customer wants. In recent ye'lrs this has been particularly 
4 true of the industry's relations to the automobile industry". 
The favourable market conditions of the 1920s did promote some measures 
directed towards the rationalisation of machine tool production in the American 
industry , especially for firms building machines of a general-purpose nature, 
A pioneer 1n this respect was the Jones and Lamson company , which in the 
early 'twenties rationalised its product range (turret lathes) and reorganised 
shop equipment from the traditional group arrangement to a layout by product 
securing elements of flow organ1sation,5 A British observer at the end of 1929 
noted that American machine tool builders were increasingly adopting the line 
system of layout with a tendency to departmentalise shops by product rather than 
process .6 Thus the line of rationalisation pursued by the German industry was 
also being followed in the USA , but in the latter case it does not apnear to 
have been carried as far . By the end of the decade the American industry was 
beginning to shcwinterest 1n a new form of rationalisation bet~er suited to the 
demands of low- quantity production of specialised machine tools . This was the 
unit- construction principle, elements of which were incorporated in new Cincinnati 
mf[ing m~c~ines introduced in 1929.7 The merit of this principle lay in t~e fact 
t1at it introduced elements of quantity production into what had hitherto been 
almost exclusively individual and small batch production . 
) .See Chapter Five . 
4 .Patterns and oblems of technical innovation in American indust , ',.'ashington , 
19 J ,p . 111. A.D.Little report to the ~ational Science Foundation • 
5.Transact1ons, ASME ,Vol .46 ,1925 , pp .696- 712 . K,Orentlikher presented an edited 
version of this article 1n Stank! i instr~~ent,19JO,No.1-2,pp.22-28 . 
6 .~lacb i rery, 12.12.1929, p . 338 • 
? .ibid.' pp. 336-339. 
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The British Machine Tool Industry 
There is no evidence that British machine tool building tur.d any direct 
influence on Soviet practice except , perhaps , by negative exaQple . The British 
machine tool industry had a structure somewhat simllar to that of the eerman 
industry , concentrating on general- purpose machines frequently of a low technical 
level b~cause of the exist ence of large ,protected colonial market) but with 
a lower level of specialisation and less progressive production organisation and 
methods. The real strength of the British industry was in the building of heavy 
machine tools of the types required for makinP. r~i1 equipment, shtps and other 
heavy engineering products . The British industry did have the largest machine tool 
factory in Europe (Alfred Herbert) employing up to three thousand workers , but 
this ~actory had a quite broad profile , building lathes , semi-autos ,and ~illing 
~c"tines . Apart from a few other relatively large factories employing over 600 
workers (e.g .Ward ,Lang ,Churcbill ) ~ost enterprises employed under five hundred .1 
Many factories lacked a clear profile , building a very wide range of products • 
a Soviet observer after a detailed study of thirty- four firms (including all 
the leading pro1ucers) concluded that , "Only 1n exceptional cases does narrow 
2 specialisation by tvpe of machine tool take place" . This same well-informed 
observer also noted that the British machine tool industry differed from those 
of America and Germany by thQ wor se state of its equipment and the backwardness 
of its production organisation : "Individual , kustar approaches to machining 
parts and the assernblv of macbL"le tools continue to be the rule ln the British 
•~chine tool 1ndustryo.3 Oborin also noted that despite the poor equipment 
and methods some s mall firms were ::tble to produce machines of high quality because 
of t he presence of very highly skilled workers • There were so~e exceptions to 
tbe general rule , however,e .g . the Herbert company produced on a large-serial 
basis with a large number of fixtures , but the Parkinson company of Shipley was 
alone in 1932 in having all its e~uipment arranged in specialised bays making 
4 
specific parts with machines located according to the flow of work . 
t .Burn,D. (ed . ) .The str ucture of British industr y;a sym_pos_it.tm ,Camoridge, 1958, \ol.1 , 
p,)?4r Sii , 19)1 ,No . 11- 12 , p . 1 .; Oborin ,V.,Vestnik metallooromyshleonosti , 19)2,No . 101 
pp .~- 58 . 
2.0bor1n ,op c1t ,p . )6. 
J .~., p . 57. 
4. tbid . on, SB-62 , 
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During the First '.-.orld \war government pressure for greatly increased machine toe 
output had led to the adoption of rationalisation measures of a kind similar to 
those typical of the German industry, including reduction of product ranges , 
specialisation of factories by type. ''The trend towards specialisation,standardisat-
ion and rationalisation was not C~f course reversed but after the early 1920s it 
had lost much of the impetus derived from the War and r ationalisation certainly 
never occured to the same extent as 1n Germany" •1 In another respect the British 
in~ustry ~s less specialised than those of Germany and America: relatively more 
factories possesse1 their own foundries . or the thirty three factories visited 
by Oborin in 1932, thirteen had their own foundry capacity, a1 though some of these 
received castings from other firms as well . Some of the largest factories 
{e .g.Herbert ,Lang,Asquith,Archdale and Butler) had their own foundries, but most 
were too small to have their own capacity and were supplied by jobbing foundri~s . 2 
The Strategy of Bevelopment of the Soviet Machine Tool Industry 
In considering the broad strategy of development of the machine tool industry 
three phases can be identified , distinguished by fairly distinct policies and 
practices. Although it is not easy to precisely delimit these phases chronologicall) 
convenient boundaries are provided by major official neasures directed towards 
securing a change J,?fu.therto accepted path of development • Thus, Phase One can be 
seen as the period froJil the beginning of the restoration of machine tool building , 
say 1925/26, to the meeting of the VSNKh presidium in Septmeher 1930; Phase Two , 
from September 1930 to June 1933 (the NKTP order No .5)7 of June 16th); ~nd Phase 
T~ree the period from June 1933 to 1941. The provisional nature of this periodisatic 
will become apparent in the discussion which follows; there were no abrupt changes 
of course. 
Phase One , 1925/26 to September 19)0. 
a)Policy 
The machine tool section of the metal industry syndicate , headed by M.Orentllkhe 
1.Aldcroft,D .H.,Bus1ness history review ,1966 ,No.3 ,p .291 . 
2.Burn ,op cit , p .379;0borin , op cit ,pP . 57- 62. 
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put forward a coherent strategy for the develop~ent of the industry from the time 
of its formation 1n 1926 . The aims of policy ca.n readily be identified& first , 
to restore machine tool bui.lding at a nUBber of enterprises (generally having 
previous experience) and increase output to meet growing ne~s at a tille ..-hen 
imports accounted for. a very subs~ant1al share of total salesa second , to raise 
the technical level of the machines built, third , to greatly reduce the cost 
of doroest1call' produced machine tools . The external influence is easily 
identifted as that of the German rationalisatton movement , and this inf'luence 
was fr'!nkly nknowledged by Orentlikher. himself . Outlining policy for the branch 
1n 1926 he stated that rationalisation had t.o be the focus of nll activity , and 
that'; the paths of rationalisation of machine tool building have already been 
laid down by Aroerican and German tool buUiers" • 1 Despite the reference to American 
practice( the rationalisation mover::ent 1.n erMny tlad its origins 1n eff orts to 
1 Allericanise 1 Gerr.um industry , but· lat.er developed its own features) t.he con·tent of 
the policy put forward ..-as an exact parallel of that then being pursued by the 
German machine tool indus try . 2 
The main elements of poli cy at this time were ,first, the specialisation of 
factories on the building of a limited number of types and sizes of machine toolsr 
second, 1n order to promote this specialisation tho nu111ber of sizes ofmachilles 
built wns to be rationally reduced ( 'tipizatsiya 1 ) 1 thtr~. the standardisation 
of parts and assemblies was to be developed, and four th, the seriality of 
production was to be raised , largely as a conse~uence of the first three measures, 
allowing the adoption of more progres ' ive proAuct1on ·technology ~~d organisation, 
with conse~uent cost savings . At this tice efforts were centred on the building 
of relatively simple universal type machine tools 1 ore specialised models were 
obtained from abroad . This rationalisation policy was expounded on several 
occasions between 1926 and 1929 by Orentllkher , but from the beginnir~ of 1929 
policy discussion tntensifierl and broadened in terms of particlpants .Sefore 
1.S1etema 1 organ iza ts1ya , 1926 ,No .4, P . 11 · 
2.Note , theSoviet vocabulary of rationalisation was drawn directly from the Cerman a 
rats1o 1izats1va/rats1cnalisierung ; spets1al1zats1ya/spe~ialisierung ;tlpizats1ya/ 
t1p1si~~~g J no~mFLli~atsiya/ nornal1s1erung. The Sov let tern 'f'~chnoe proi;vodstvo 1 
vas introduced 1n 1926 as a direct equivalent of the Ce.r1:12n Fllessarbeit 1n 
a deliberate (and eventu"'lly successful) attea.Pt to supplant the vague term 
'f9rd1zma' then 1n general use to describe flow production (see ,!lli. , 1926 ,No.1 - 2, 
p.b) . 
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considering the policy discussion which preceded the transition to the next phase, 
it is useful to briefly recall so.rne of the main features of' the practice of the 
indus try prior to 1929 . 
b)Practice 
The development of machine tool building prior to the form tion of Stnnkotrest 
bas already been considered 1n Chapter "'wo , As ~o;as revealed by the NK RKI suvey 
in the sprin~ of 1929, pr.actit e diverged substantial ly from policy , above all 
because there was no single organisational centre for the branch . Factories were 
subordinated to a number of different t r usts;they produced a wide range of ~ypes 
and sizes (although the very small production base meant that the total product 
range was extremely limited) and their products were of a low technical level , 
frequent ly representing ins~ificantly modernised , pre-Revolution models . 
Production technology was prinitive ,although some elenents of serial production 
with use of j1v.s and fixtures were being introduced at the leading factories. 
Furthermore, progress in standardisation wns very slight . As noted, the lack of 
a speci2lised trust was an important f~ctor , but this itself w&s partly a reflectton 
of the fact that the strategic role of machine tool building was not yet fully 
appreciated .at a time when tndustrialisa.t1on plans were still in the process of 
clarification. Other factors were present. During the nineteen henties t ere 
were few specl~lists with a ~owled~e o£ modern machine tool building .Ao exception 
was t.he stPff o+' Orgametall , but at this t :il!!e they had no direct links with 
machine tool building. Finally , the demands posed by the engineering industry 
were not as strict at this time as they were soon to becoMea such leading branches 
with respect to production technology as the automobile,tractor and aircraft 
1nd us tries were then in their in£ancy • 
c)The Transition to Phase Two 
The .policy of the Five-year Plan as app.ooved 1n t~ay 1929 c?_n best be seen 
by looking at not only the plan document • but also the related VSNKh -work on 
the basic lines of technical reconstruction during the plan period. Specialisation 
of factories provided the key element of policy for the machine tool lnaustry, 
but thPre were very clear reservations on the question of scale: 
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"Realisation of specialisation in this branch requires great circumspection 
in view of the diversity of types, the la~ge number of models and the vast 
assortment. ~pecialisation is carried out here not by the emlargement of 
producti on units , but by fixing a definite , comparatively narrow specification 
for types and sizes at each enterprise and in preventing production in very 
small series with its attendant dif' f iculty in obtaining acctmacy and 
quality 1n assembly . With a diversity of types the enlargement of enterprises 
does not improve assembly ••• Therefore, parallel with the stren~ening of 
basic factories (im.Sverdlova ,' Vxasnyi Proletarii' and ' Dvigatel' Revolyutsii '), 
development at the remaining fifteen small factories is foreseen ,with the 
provision of strict specialisation by type ••• The experience of German and 
American factories shows that in machine tool building the enlargement of 
the enterprise is not a factor predetermining the best results'! 1 
At the sarr.e time the Pl an indicated that during, the five years attention was 
to be focused on the building of the most commonly used types (khodovye),i . e . 
general-purpose machines2 . Thus the Five-year Plan presented a cautious view of 
the development of the industry and the specialisation of production , and did 
not provide for any real break with past practice . 
A turning point in the struggl~ for a more radical policy for the development 
of the industry was the publication of the NK RKI survey in Jltay 1929. This sharply 
critical review of the state of machine tool building outl i.ned a nwnber of 
mP.asures for its improvement , Kaganovich , reviewing the survey ' s f indings, called 
for a fundamental rationalisation and reconstruction of existing f actories and 
the putting i nto practice in the first instance of narrow specialisation," • • the 
very same tnsk which Professor Schlesinger puts before the German machine tool 
factories; moreov~r , he sees this as the sole ~eans of achieving the success of 
the present-day ,North American industry ••• In . our develonment of machine tool 
building we must emulate the American industry , both in relation to the structure 
o+' tyoes bull t and 1 ts rate of devel opmen t';3 As ., ill be shown . these demands were 
to some extent contradictory . As practical measures NK RKI proposed the creation 
of ;> spec i!'!lised trust , the freeing of ractories from non-machine tool production 
2n~ the specialising of each enteprise on the production of a single type of 
l ,Csnovnye linii tekhnicbeskoi rekonstruktsii pro~yshle~nosti SSSR ,M.,1929,Vol .2, 
p.120 . 
The actual Pl"n was ~ore cautious - the trree main factories were to specialise 
on the • most commonl v met types and sizes' , ~ndno reference was made to t"le 
'strict specialisation'of the small factories (PyatUetnii plan •. ,op c1t ,Vo1.2 , o .151 
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nachine , the concentration of production of standard items (fastners ,controls,etc . ) 
at specialise~ enterprises , and the development of production of such types 
as turret lathes , automatics and semi- autos . 
As plan targets for machine building as a whole were steadily increased in 
trP course of 1929, deman~s for a more radical policy for machine tool building 
intE-nsified and found some reflection in the VSNKh decree of January 11th 1930 . 
This called for intensification of work on new factories and led to a revision 
of their project capaciti es . 'With this rev.ision the three new works, conceived 
as integrated machining-as~embly factories , but supplied with castings from 
specialised foundries, were given a scale quite substantially greater than that 
typical in capitalist countries . The ·capacity of the milling machine works was 
raised from 1,300 units a year to 3 ,400rof the turret lathe factory from 
1,200 units to 2 , 400 . The former was projected for the building of horisontal, 
vertical and universal mill in-2' machines of ~our basic size groups ;the l atter for 
an annual output of 2, 100 turret lathes of two basic sizes and 300 semi-automatic 
4 
lathes . Thus the caution expressed in the VSNKh Plan guidelines of a year bef ore 
wit~ regard to scale was swept aside . 
The three new factories were projected in Berlin , as related in Chapter 9 
This natural ly raises the question of direct German influence on the strategy 
of the industry at this time . There is no evidence of German advice on the broad 
issues of strategy , but this cannot be ruled out , especially if one takes into 
account the close links between Orgametal l, Al'perovich ' s organisation before 
hP joined Stankotrest , and German industry .It is knQwn that Schlesinger was a 
consultant on a number of projects and in view of his direct links with the 
erman machine tool indust ry it is quite probable that he expressed his views on 
be desirable course for the Soviet industry . Unfortunately his position on this 
question in 1930 is not known, but later in the decade he did set out his views 
t d d fo machine tools" , he ...... ote ,"•he in the Soviet press. "In relation o mass eman r .. ._ "" 
US~ is in an unusually favourable situation - there is no country in the world 
2 ,1-ya tlletn 11 pl<}n. , • op cett, pp • 1.56-157; 
) .~k. z~1iZ'1 4 , 19. 5 ,1,929 ; original emphasis • 
4,\ estnik meta11opr4'1myshlennosti , 1931 ,No .8 , p .64. 
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vhsre it is possible and necessary to put forward a demand for making several 
hundred thousand machine tools a year of the !'!lOst diverse kinds • • • But there is 
a serious preble" with regard to the skilled workers necessary for such a 
colossal development of production . As th,:o creation of a ekilled labour 
force entails great d.U"ficulties and the task cannot be solved in a short 
period , 1t is necessary to put production on a oass basis 1n order to increase 
it rapidly . In switching from the production of one hundred lathes a month 
·to four hundred the working time is reduced by half. Consequently , with mass 
production , compared with the previous system of work , one needs only half 
the number of workers to make four hundred machinea " . 1 
In order to raise productivity it was essential , he stressed, to elim~te all 
hand fitting ,ie . to secure fully interchangeable parts . Thus Schlesinger clearly 
had in mind the widescale use of jigs and f ixtures in order to secure accurate 
vork with relatively Wlskilled labour. Schlesinger was tl-jerefore proposing a 
strategy for the Soviet industry whic~ represented an extreme version of the 
rationalisation policy pursued by the German machine tool 1n the 1920s. His startinE 
point was a conYlctlon that it would take a long ti~e to train skilled Soviet 
"'Chine tool builders. Only mass production technology would per11it this obstacle 
to be overcome and , fortunately for the Soviet ind~stry , the demand was sa great that 
such technology could be employed . Altho~h not spelt out ,Schlesinger' s policy 
also entailed very J arge , specialised factorl.eo . 
Early in May 1930 many leading specialists of Clavmashinstroi responsible for 
policy and practice in the engineering industry, including machine tool building , 
during the preceding period were purged. 2 Shortly before this was announced 
an editorial of Izvestiya presente4 a vigorous plea for a new policy in machine 
tool build L'lg J the arll':uments strongly resembled those of ~aganov 1ch and N"t<. RKI. 
~Ster stress1nll': the vital role o~ the machine tool industry for securing maximua 
inliependence from capitalist countries , the defence of the Soviet Union and the 
further development of industry as a whole, the ed1torinl ca) }ed for the reconstruct-
loa of Pxisting f.acto.ries and the construction of about ten ne'W , specialised 
enterpr ises . The branch had to be developed from scratch because virtually no 
aachine tool building of note had been inherited from Tsariem.Buta 
t.ZaTnd. , 29 .6 ·1936. 
2.Izvest1ya,19.5.19JO . 
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"The lack of any tra 1tion 1n this 'field creates .favourable condttions for 
at once putting this matter on a completely different footing than is the 
case tn 1estern European countries and America. It is not necessary for us 
to create a vast number of small , tsolaten factories competing between 
themsleves on the wor~ market on analogy wtth Europe&\ countries and America. 
Basing ourselv_£s on the satisfaction of our own needs , we have th,. conditions 
for organising the ma.ss pronuction of machines of a sinczle tvoe • .1.his is 
completely unrealisable for capitalist countries" •1 
Machine to0l building , the editorial admitted, was one of the most skill-intensive 
branches of eng1.m:jert.ng . Several hundred young skilled workers would have to be 
trained at foreign factories 1n order to provide the designers and setters for 
the new enterprises, foreign specialists would have to be engaged and several 
thousand skUled workers would have to be rapidly trained i.n special FZU schools . 
The three new factories , it stressed, had to be in operation b.Y Ocotber of 1931 
and alongsirle the bu1ld1ng of standard machines for existing mnchine building 
factories they had to prep{lXe for the production of modern special machines suitable 
for use 1n the mass production motor industry . Thus the &rgwr.ent resembled the 
later position of Schlesingers the perceived scale of demand for machine tools , 
coupled with the absence of an already formed organisational structure, was seen 
as a sufficient condition for the adoption of very highly specialised mass 
producti on . ~t the same time it was aknowledged that machine tool building required 
high skills . The manner in whi ch the building of specialised machines was to be 
reconciled with ~ass production of general-purpose codels was not s pecified; the 
problem was not even recognised . 
In July 1930 Kaganovich again spelt out his ideas on the strategy of 
development of the industry , refering as before to the A~erican practice of 
machine tool building . The American industry , h~ wrote , was characterised by the 
~xistence of small enterprises producing on average one hundred Wlits ~ yea:r, 
with a maximum of up to three thousand units . Factories served a wide range of 
customers and had a 1 o\of level o'f spec i a lisa tlon , but ·• despite" this the Anerican 
nach1ne tool industry played a.."l exceptional role 1n el:lulppl.ng the mass production 
automobile industry s.nd an c:.ctive agent of technical progress . Kaganovich placed 
particular emphasis on the fact th<>t American machine tool builders supflied fully 
1.7~tvestiya , t0 . ) . 1930 • (ori~1.nal emphasis)· 
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tooled- up equiom~nt for specific operations . This was a product of the close 
relations which existed between nachlne builders and users ~~d this close 
col laboration w~s also observed 1n the high level of organisation of technical , 
design and research facilities in American macbine tool factories. Thus,Kaganovich 
concluded , "American machine tool factories are • factories of new technical ideas' 
for all branches of machine building and metal working" •1 The lesson for the 
Soviet industry , he concluded , was th3t machinetool bui lding was to a ~reat 
extent a qualitative problem. Practical policy conclusions were s1m11ar,but more 
far reaching than i.n the previous May. "In organising production it. is necessary, 
~ith significantly greater boldness than in America and Germany, to specialise 
our production, limiting as far as possible the number of types and sizes of 
machine tools • • . • Without fail it is necesGary to introduce flow production , 
organising it not only at the new enterprises but also reorganising the existing 
ones by this method" . Finally, .itaganov1ch noted the great iJilportance of training 
skilled personnel in view of the high skill demands of the branch . 
So far we have primarily the policy proposals of NK ftKI . L'l August 1930 
the position of Al' ~erovich was clarified tn a major article , significantly 
entitled ' to obtain a fundamental change in machine tool building '~ The industry, 
be aknowledged, was failing to me t demands both 1n teras of quantity and quality . 
The main task was to rart1c-ally renew the design of machines bull t . During 19)0-31 
preparations were to be made so that al! factor~es wotQd be building new models 
in the following year . The three main enterprises and a nwaber of smaller factories 
would be reconstructed by the end of 1930-Jt , and at these factories the range 
of machines built would be reduced to the maximW!l possible extent, providing 
a bigb degree of specialisation of ~roductlon. A month later Al ' perovich 
also took up the theme oft~n stresse1 by Kaganovich , that r.achine tool building 
'ias not simply a matter of producing machines, but also providing customers wi~h 
J . 
fully tooled-up technological processes . 
It see~s clear that by early September 19JO the policy of the specialised 
1.Zaind . ,24 .? . 1930. 
2 .~. '5 .8 . 1930. 
3•Izvestiya , 9 . 9 ·19)0. 
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machine tool industry had moved a long way in the direction outlined by Kaganovich 
and NK RKI and this fact received official recognition at a session of the VSNKh 
Presidium early in the month devoted to the problems of the industry. At the 
session Al ' perovich refered to the large product ranges of the branch's factories 
and the very backward design built. In 1930-31 output would double , but largely 
as a result of producing these old models .1 VSNKh a1opted a decree on the basis 
of Al'perovicb's report, calling for a full transition to new models in 19)1- )2 , 
and as a condition for the realisation of this programne it declared that, 
"Soyuzstankoinstrument must take a firm course for the specialisation of machine 
tool factories" . 2 It was this decree which effectively marked the transition in 
practice to a policy of strict specialisatton of factories on the basis of a 
reduced pro1uct range , signalling the end of the first phase of development of 
the industry . 
Phase Two , September 1930 to June 1933 
a)folicy 
Some of the elements of policy during Phase Two have already been exantined 
in the above account of the discus~ion leading to its adoption. The intention was 
to switch from old to new designsi the nomenclature of machines built was to be 
restricted and factories were to specialise on the building of a small number of 
types and sizes. As a consequence , the seriality of production would rise and 
this would permit the adoption of new pro~uction technology. The nature of this 
technology was not spelt out at the time, but it is clear that the widescale use 
~ 
of jigs , fixtures and special tooling was foreseen , securing i~rcbangeable 
parts production. Furthermore , it is clear that the leadership of the industry 
saw t~e use of such methods as providing an answer to the acute shortage of skilled 
workers; machine to r.l building was to be deskilled. In February 1931 at a VSNKh 
Presidium meeting Al ' perovich stressed the role of operational differentiation, 
typical of large-s~rial and mass oroduction , in reducing skill requirements, 
giving the possibility of training workers in weeks or maths as oprosed to the 
years formerly neces~ary to train skilled workers .3 Although he did not refer 
1.Za!nd.,12.9.1930. 
2.ibid .,17 . 9 . 1930 . 
J . ibid .,13.2 . 1931 . 
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directly to machine tool building in this connection , the argument clearly 
accorded with the policy of the branch . 1 
116 
With the adoption of the policy of strict specialisation of enterprises 
discussion did not cease: ~ 1931 demands wero heard for an even more vigorous 
application of the princiole . Some of these contributions will now be considered 
as they throw light on the conditions in which the actual development of the 
industry took place at this time, and ~lso serve to elucidate both the logic 
and contradictions of this phase . 
M.Sorokin of Stankoimport was adamant that the organisation andmethods of 
capitalist machine to1l building provided no model for the SoviPt 1ndustrya 
"To adopt the foreign experience of the German ,American and British machine 
tool industry with respect to organisational-production matters would be to 
take as a basis obsolete forms pertaining to the conditions of an earlier 
stage of the capitalist system , and not to use modern technical achievements 
and the favourable factors of the socialist system • ... z 
Under capitalism, Sorakin wrote, the adoption of progressive principles of 
specialisation and cooperation in machine tool building was hindered by the 
anarchy of production , competition between firms , the multitude of types and sizes 
and the small scale of factories . Furthermore , the majority of machine tool 
buflding enterprises had appeared long before the automobile industry and as a 
result had a backward, complex structure formed over a very long period . There 
was no reason , in his view , why such an irrational pat t ern had to be copied in 
the Soviet Union . In the conaitions of the socialist planned economy wasteful 
excess product diversity could be avoided , he believed,by concentrating on the 
production of single types of basic mac~ines - one type of universal milling 
'W.Cbine , one type of radial drill ,etc . "We can reduce the com only used types 
of machine tools to a minimum and produce each of these types· in a quantity 
sufficient to apply in the main the methods of mass production ".J Furthermore , 
the planned economy gave the possibility of standardising parts and assemblies 
comron to diffe rent t ypes . Adoption of this principle , he declared, could lead 
l .See Chapter 11 • 
2 .Zaind ., 16 .2 . 1931. 
) . ibid . 
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to a ' literal revolution' in t~e practice of machine tool production and radically 
reduce costs . But while calling for far-reachingspecialisation of production, 
Sorokin also demanded a transition from the production of predominantly general-
purpose m~chines to speci~lised equipment of a high- productivity nature suited 
to the demands of mass and large- serial production. Inhis view , general-pl~pose 
machines would be needed in relatively small quantity compared with these more 
specialised types. Soro~in did discuss the possibility of creating more specialised 
11achines by simplifying the basic universal models and by the adoption of the 
unit- construction principle but , nevertheless, he did not clarify the problem 
of reconciling increased specialisation of the products with greatly increased 
specialisation of production and the adoption of mass proouctton methods. 
One solution to this problem was put forward by N.Go1osman (position unknown) 
in June 1931; he assumed that the demand for some of the high-productivity types 
would be so great that it would be possible to organise their mass production . 
This , he believed , would apply to the more commonly used types of automatics and 
semi- autos . Golosman , like Sorokin , favoured American types of machine tools as 
opposed to European , but believed th t he had rather underestimated the role of 
simple, standard universal type machines in Soviet industry. There was no doubt 
ln Golosman ' s mind that mass production methods had to be adopted ~or building the 
majority of types even though smaJl or medium serial production was employed 
abroad. "There is no sense whatsoever: he \ooTOte ," in our breaking up the Soviet 
machine tool industry into hundred of small factories. It is necessary to 
concentrate the production o£ the type of machine tools we need at powerful machine 
tool building giants on the basis of specialisation and c,operation" •1 The only 
p::tth for the Soviet industry was , he believed, the building of "tens of powerful 
machine tool buildin9; giants" • 
The policy of mass producing machine tools continued to be advocated early 
in 1932 • Sokolov , a leading spec1~11st of the industry, ~Tote that 1 
"It is necessary for us to develop the large-serial production of machine 
tools of such design as will make possible the achievement of maximum 
productivity , high precision and automaticity in machining parts , coupled 
1.Zaind., 19.6 . 1931 . 
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with simplicity of setting up and control. Wit"l mass production such a 
Machine tool , being simple from the design point of view, will be cheap . 
This is why Sovietmachine tool building, securing continuity of production 
flow, will differ profoundly from the patterns of development of machine 
tool building of capitalist countries" •1 
But from the sum~er of 1932 statements of this ktno became more infrequent . 
So far we have not considered the views of Al'perovich during the Phase 
Two years. While he evi ently suonorted the general strategy , in particular 
during late 1930 and 1931, it is also clear that his understanding of the tasks 
o~ the industry and the course of its future development was rather di'ff ere·•t 
from that of Sorokin or Golosman. On a number of occasions in 1931 he stressed 
th~t the most important task before the industry was the assimilation of the 
production of new models of modern design . uri tic ising Sorokin for putting 
one-sided emphasis on the building of specialised , high-productivity types, 
Al 'perovich stressed that account had to be taken of the specific demands of the 
Soviet economy in the short run , one of the most 1mpatant of which was t~at 
a very large quantity of general- purpose nachines was required . However , he also 
aknowledged that more specialised types required by the auto-tractor industry 
would have to built and noteo th~t the new turret lathe factory was to build 
semi-automatics , while the new Gor ' kii • giant• would produce "an enormous 
nomenclature" of st::utdard and special mi 1l ing machines~ Such a prospect was not 
really in accord with the policy of very narrow specialisation , but this problem 
was not at this time admitted. 
By November 1931 Al ' perovich appeared to have accepted a number of the 
propositions advanced by Sorokin and others , notably their analysis of capitalist 
machine to~l building ann the implications of this for the Soviet industry. 
Al ' perovich sharply contrasted capitalist and socialist machine tool building , 
m?..kiag no distinction between Americ n and .l!:uropean practice . Capitalist machine 
tool buildi ng , he wrote, was carried out at relatively small enterprises; large 
firms like Cincinnati ,Bro;;ne and Sharpe , Iteinecker ,Loewe and Herbert were 
exceptional. Even such prominent :firms as Fellows ,Raboma ,Lang and Churchill had 
l .Sokolov ,A.,Sovetskoe st~kostroenie,M .,1932 , p.28 . 
2.Zalnd ,, 14.4.1931. 
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only 300 to 800 workers in good economic conditions . Furthermor e , the largest 
firms produced and ' extraordinarily diverse nomenclature of machine tools'. The 
conditions of capitalist production promoted an excessive product variation and 
a tendency towaTds a high degree of universality of machines built. Furthermore , 
standardisation was weakly developed and , Al'perovich claimed tcontrary to his 
opinion four years before) , the production of standard parts at specialised 
~actories as widely practised in the motor industry was unknown to the machine 
tool buildln~ industries of Europe and America . ~hat were the lessons for the 
Soviet industry? First , "The exceptionally l arge delllalld for certain types of 
m~chlne tools gives us the possibility of creating new factory-giants for 
individual types with the organisation of l::trge-ser :eJ. production" •1 Second , while 
the Soviet economy needed universal machines, an ever increasing share of the 
equipment required by industry would be of a more specialised nature . Third,the 
planned economy gave the possibility of far- reaching standardisation of parts 
and the organisation of the production of standard items, and castings and forgings, 
at special factories . Looking to the future ,Al ' perovich envisaged the building 
of a further twelve new factories ; at these and the exislting enterprises over 
three hundred types and sizes would be built, including specialised types suited 
to the demands of large- serial and mass production . This contribution of Al'perovic 
was basically in line with the policy of Phase Two with the proviso that this 
was the first oc~asion on which such a large f uture tipazh had been foreseen . 
Clparly , given such an exp3ns1on of the product range , the bu11din2 of new 
enterprises was essential if the principle of narrow specialisation was not to 
be eroded . 
In 1932 the transition to a revised strategy began ; old positions were reassessed 
partly 1n response to the practic~JL experience of the industry since 1929 
.. l.i he Trr'l1"1:Gltion to Phase Three 
The year 1932 was to be the year of transition to new models and the commissionin1 
of the two new enterprises . In January 1932 Al ' perovich gave the first real 
indication tbat all was not wel l with the fulfilment of the new models programme. 
l.S11 , 1931 ,No . 11- 12, p .J. 
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"As a rule under pressure to fulfil the quantitative output layed down by tbe 
oro~amme for old models", he complained, " factories very badly lag in relation 
to design work , but still more in relation to the technological preparation of 
machine tools of new design" •1 This b~ckwardness was serious in view of the 
fact that 1932 was to be a year of prepar~tion for the force1 development of 
machine tool building durin~ the Second Five-year Plan: initial indic~tions were 
that machine tool output would have to increase eight-fold during the next five 
years in order to meet the demands posed Q1 the engineering industry . In February 
Al'perovich presented the tasks of the coming perio1 in more concrete terms. The 
primary a im was that of securimg technical independence; this required a fundamental 
change in the tipazh of produced machines . By the end of the five year period the 
share of lathes in totel output would have to be re1uced to only 20 er cent , 
while the proportion of grinding machines would be 18 per cent , and of turret 
lathes, automatics and semi-autos 16 per cent . 2 In the near future at least 
150 types and sizes would have to be assimilated , 
The slow pace of assimilation of new models caused mounting concern in the 
spring of' 19.32 . A meeting of the collegium of NKTP in early April singled out 
the introduction of new models as first priority for the branch and Ordzhonikidze 
spoke in favour of putting quality before quantity - the industry was not to 
fear a possible reduction of output while assimilating the new models.3 The main 
reason for the slow progress was the delay in making jigs , .fixtures and special 
tools required for the building of the new machines , This was admitted by 
Al 'perovich in a major article in April , notable because it was the first occasion 
on which the question of the technological preparation of production was raised 
as a major issue . Al'perovich contrasted conditions abroad and in the Soviet 
industry: 
"In our conditions the role of special tooling and fixtures for the production 
high-grade machine tools acquires particular importance , In capitalist 
countries there are cases of the production of high-class machines at small 
~actories where al l production is based primarily on highly skilled workers. 
This has an especi~lly large place in British ~chine tool buildin~ factories 
and to a lesser extent in Germany and even in t~e United States . We have to 
1.Sii,1932 ,No . 1 , p .1, 
2 , 1 bid • , 1932 ,No • 2 , p . 2 • 
3 .Zaind .• h .4.1912 . 
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take account of the basic fact that all our factories , not just the new , but 
also the existing ones , have an extremely low level of labour skills. The 
average wage rate coef-ficient for the ob" edtnenie as a whole on 1st January 
1932 was 1.46 - lfl? and the average grade of workers was about three . Even 
1n the toolrooms there are hardly any workers of grades seven and eight. 
Under these conditions one can~ot expect to obtain accurate dimensions 
determining the quality of machine tools on the oasis of highly skilled 
boring and planing machine operators and assembly workers . The output of 
machines corresponding to modern demands may be secu~ed only by previously 
made templates , jigs and gauges" . 1 
Thus it was considered that the acute scarcity of skilled labour made necessary 
t he adoption of capital intensive production methods relying on jigs and fixtures 
as the only means of securing the requisite quality of work in building machine 
t ools of modern design. The full implications of this resort to elaborate 
tooling do not appear to bave been appr eciated at this time. 
On 1st June 1932 the NKTP order No.407 was issued~ This amounted to a call 
for a change of course 1n the development of the industry in so far as it required 
Stankoob" ed1nenie to begin the production of specialised machines: required by 
•he auto- tractor industry . Tne building of grinding machines,automatlcs, semi-autos 
and gear- cutting machines was to have first priority , while heavy machine tool 
building was also to be developed . Plans for indi¥1dual enterprises were to be 
revised with a view to increasing the share of new models.More factories were to 
(o>\Jfr,.(f•C'' 
be involved in machine tool building and new enterprisesLfor the building of 
~rinding machines, gear-cutting machines and heavy machine tools .3 
The implications of the order were discussed at the First Conference of Jolachine 
T~ol Oesi~ners in July at which Al'~erovich delivered a major report on technical 
policy . This report has particular significance because it appears to have been 
t he first public occasion on which Al ' perovich criticised exces~es in the practical 
realisation of the specialisation policy of Phase Two . Experience showed , he began, 
that it took 1t to 2 years to produce pew models from the timeof preparation of 
working drawings . During the '->econd Five-year Plan the industry would have to 
as~inilate over a hundred new types and sizes; hence there was a considerable 
volume of design and preparatory work to be undertaken. Furthermore, the structure 
l .SU, 1932 ,No .4 , p . 2 . 
2.For the background to this order see Chapter 7 , p . 250 . 
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of types built would fundamental]y change. Turnin~ to the problem of factory 
specialisation Al' perovich outlined the ne-w e1 tuation t 
"Of course, 1t is easier to find a common language at a conference of designers 
because among design workers one is unlikely to come across many such lovers 
of specialisation who would strive to carry it to absurdity,with a factory 
stamping out one and the same machine tool for years on end. This 
contradicts both the professional interPsts and the pride of the designer •• 
The real solution lies somewhere between the interests of the des~ner 
and the interests of the pro~uctionman, who 1s tncllned to show more 
conservatism with regard to retaining the stability of machine designs and 
the possibility of ha\ting less types and sizes at his :factory. We have 
worked out the specialisation of machine tool factories for our pyatlletka 
••• A perspective plan that we will have 'n' number of factories and that we 
will give ~ limited numner of types to each factory ls one thing, but the 
realisation of specialisation during the Five-year Plan is another matter • 
•• Ve are unable to build all the factories at once , but we cannot wait for 
some of the ~achine tools intended to be built at th~se new f actories •• 
If we have no special factory of , say , tool and cutt er grinders or other 
machine tools , this does not ~oan that we shall not force some factories 
to mAke these m~chines £or fear of breaching the principle of specialisatton, 
Here we must show considerable flexibility. In ~any cases it will in practice 
be absolutely necessary , using the eXisting production base , to prep.u-e 
t he production of those machines which we will strive to supply at future 
factories •• together with a clear plan of specialisation of factories 
during the Five-year Plan , we will have to have a much more diverse 
aomenclature of production of machine tools at our existing base than 
individual factories will want!' •
1 
This statement amounted to a major revision of the policy of Phase Two ; f urther 
evidence that this was the case was provided when Al'perovich again turned to 
the question of the preparation of production . On the basis of practical experience 
he modified his previous position, admittin~ that different types of aachine 
required different degrees of tooling: "If a machine 1s so well established 
and thE> country needs it 1n such lar!7"e quantities that we can say without a.ny 
risk that it c~n be made without fundamental changes in a quantity of 5-6 ,000 units 
as is the case with the ' DIP' ",then this justified a high degree of preparation , 
but the situation f/as quite different if a machine was to be bull t in hundreds 
and was liable to undergo design cbanges.Al ' perovich admitted that mistakes had 
).SH , 1932,No . 7 , p .2 . 
1.1b1d., 19.3J ,No . 1 ,p .2 . 
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been made ,e .g . the 1 Komsomolets ' factory was making elaborate technological 
preparations appropriate to an ~utput of several thousan1 units for the building 
of its combined machine tool even though it would be obsolete by the time it was 
in full production in one and a half to two years time . Thus.Al'perovich continued• 
"what follows from this? From this it follows that machine tool building 
has its own laws . These are machines which as a rule do not have a chance 
of a long existence without fundamental changes . Therefore , as a rule , 
technological preparation for machine tools cannot be based on the making 
of a large number of units of machines without any design changes; true , 
with some exceptions" • 1 
New machines ,he concluded , had to be marle much more quickly with the use only of 
the most important and si~ple ~ixtures , as was the practice of European and 
APlerican machirte tool building . On this occ1=1sion nr· rererence was made to the 
question of labour skills . 
The conference of designers can be seen as an attempt to mobilise the new 
and relatively inexperienced design forces in support of a new policy ~or the 
tndustry ; a transition from the lar~e-serial production of general-purpose 
machines at factories specialised on the building of a very narrow r~~ge of types 
and sizes,to the production of a much broader product range covering specialised 
high-productivity types to be built in smaller quantities and necessitating, at 
least in the short run , some despecialisation of enterprises . As P~ ' perovich made 
clear,such a new policy was contrary to the interests of those concerned with 
production - they had a vested interest in the maintenance of the policy of 
Phase Two . 
Despite the NKTP order and the confere~ce of designers in July there appears 
to ~ve been no real change in practice in 19)2. All the factories were at this 
time grappling with the problems of assimilating new machines of a much higher 
technical level than any built previousl; . Provisional outlines of the next Five-
year Plan stilJ. provided for a very substantial increase of output by 19)7 
to 70 - 80,000 units, or over four times the 19J2 level . But from the beginning 
of 193J the pace of development quickened . Following the Janaary combined Party 
flenum output targets for the industry were progressively reduced and at the 
1.1bid . 
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sa;ne time the press ure fo:!' import substitution intensified . Meanwhil e , although 
~actories were still experiencing problems in assimilating new types, performance 
was beginning to improve and at a numb~r of factories the cost of new machines 
was starting to fall. 1 
In May 1933 a ~elayed issue of Stanki i Instrument carried a major editori al 
by Al 'perovich, significantly entitled, ' A turning point' , apparently wr~en 
following a conference of managers ·of Stankoob"edinenle factori es . This conference , 
claimed Al ' per ovich , had shown that the overwhelming majority of managers and 
technical leaders continued to hold outdated views on the tasks of their factories 
and had not translated the directives of the January Plenum "into the language 
of machine tool building" . The l atest outlines of the Second Five- year Plan shofte~ 
a sharp reduction in the ob"edinenie ' s target - it now stood a only 15 , 000 units . 
~or 1937 . The new situation was reviewed a 
" •• the question of removing from import a whole series of modern machine 
tools previously not made in the Soviet Union is becoming all the more 
~cute. The question of independence from cqpitalist countries in machine 
tool building has recently become much more acut~ and urgent . But the 
machine tool equipmP.nt of the country, its defence capacity and independence 
are in the f i rst place determi ned by embracing a ~uch broader nomenclature 
of machine tools, both by types and sizes , th~n has been the case to date . 
A number of r ecently revealed most acute needs of a whole range of branches 
within heavy industry (and oLtside it) and also the revealed needs of the 
defence of the country, demand an i~ediate and most rapid expansion of the 
produced nomenclature of machine tools".
2 
Al ' perovich then preceded to condemn the "backward views'' of managers , • including 
the "intolerable" attitude that, "one can make one and the same machine in unlimited 
quantity and for an unlimited ni..Ullber of years". The factories , he stressed , had 
not become "laboratories of technical thought" ; they did not take account of the 
needs of users and they showed "extraordinary conservatism" in relation to 
des~n chan~es . He aknowledged that an important factor deterrninlng such 
behaviour was the condition of the market , whic~ led customers to taken any 
product regardless of its quality or price. Now some factories were seeing the 
first s1gns of difficulty 1n selling their machines and in Al' perovich ' s view 
i .Zalnd . ,6 .4. 1933 . 
2 .sn~ 1933 .No .4 ,p .1. 
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this was to be regarded as an "absolutely positive phenomenon" , forcin~ factories 
to take more account of the demands of customers. 
From his analysis of the new situation Al'perovich ~rew certain conclusions 
for the development of the branch . First, the range of machines built had to be 
rapidly expanded and this required an acceleration of the pace of preparing 
and assimilating new models. Second, it would be necessary to expand the range 
of machines built by each enterprise and switch in many cases from the principle 
of narrow specialisation and large-serial production to the principle of producing 
1n small and medium series. Th1rd , it was essential to invoJve more machine 
building enterprises in machine tool building, given t he existence of a single 
guiding centre for technical and design leadership. This new path,he aknowledged, 
had a number of implicatioas for production or!anisation and methodsa 
"The transition 1n many cases from large-serial production to small serial 
and in certain cases even to individual production will force many factories 
to refrain from the previous scale of technological prepar~tton ; from that 
colossal number of special fixtures and tools which were resorted to with 
the orientation to making one and the same machine in unlimited quantity . 
If previously minds were set at ease by the possibility of replacing the 
needed skilled workers by complex special f ixtures , then with the complication 
of the product range and transition to small-serial production the problem 
of the skills of workers and middle- range technical personnel acquires 
particular acuteness. In relation to the really scarce skil ls we will have 
to seriously retrain both ~orkers and technicians" . 1 
Sut there was an additional method of tackling the problem of widening the product 
range which also had t o be adooted t maximum standardisation o~ parts and assemblies, 
securing the possibility o~ raising the seriality of production of individual 
assemblies common to dl~ferent models . Finally, Al ' perovich expressed confidence 
th1 t the industry would be able to successfully mePt t he new chall enge,because 
during the three years of existence of the specialised industry the main gain 
had been the acquisition of the skills necessary for both designing and making 
codern , complex machine tools. 
It is clear that from June 1932 Al'perovicb , apparently with the support of 
concerned NKTP leaders , was engaged in a struggle to convince the leading workers 
of the machine tool enterprises of the necessity of of a change of course . The 
1 b 
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order of June 1932 was a first step, but it was couched in general terms and the 
full implications of the demand for a broader product range had not been grasped 
at that stage . Al'perovich ' s article of May 1933 posed the new situation and its 
implications for the path of development of the industry much more sharply and 
concretely . The next stage 1n theprocess of changing course occuz:red in June 1933 : 
on the 16th NKTP issued a new order (No557) , signed by Ordzhonikidze , which 
f ~rmally laid down poli cy for t he industry during the Second Five- year Plan period. 
The order, ' On the development of machine t ocl building ',after reviewing the 
achievements to date , noted that the Main bottleneck in the development of 
the industry was , "the extreme narrowness of the nomenclature of produced machine 
tools" , which had necessitated large scale imports. Furthermore, the domestic 
industry built prenominantly universal type ,machines . The main points of the 
order wer e as foll ows . First , Stankoob" edinenie was to secure the organisation 
of production of at least 200 types and sizes of new machine tools in addition 
to the 40 then in production . Second , first priority was to be given to the 
buildin~ of grinding, ~ear-cutting, vertical turning andboring ~ machines,automatics, 
and semiautomati cs , including multi-spindle models . Third , the technical level 
of machines was t o be raised , with the development of electrification and hydraulics 
Fourth , St ankoob" edinen1e was to review the plan of snecialisation of !'actories 
to provide a sharp expansion of the n~~ber of types and sizes made at each . 
Sixth , machine tool building outside the specialised industry ,at the 'planned 
-=nterprises', was to be further expanded.
1 
Following what apoears to have been standard practice for the branch, the 
aprearance of the new order was followed by the convening of a conference of 
representatives of the industry, both s pecialised and ' planned ' • The First All-Union 
Conference on machine tool building took place from June 20th to the 22nd . The 
main openinP" speeches were given by M .Kaganovich and A .Fudalov of N.h.TP. The 
former cri ticised the conservatism of factories and their reluctance to take on 
new work; this was unfavourably contrasted with practice in capitalist co~~tries 
where the market and its demands were care~ully studied . ne aJso attacked the 
1.!g,193J ,No .7 , pp .2•3 • 
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complacency of managers who had succeeded in assimilating the production of new 
machine tools in the preceding period and now sho1<>ed no concern for introducing 
further new models . While the primary purpose of the conference was to discuss 
practical problems of implementing the or~er and , in particular , of involving 
the ' plan~ed' factories , the general question of strategy for the industry was 
raised by Al ' perovich in his speech,and the subsequent discussion was diverted 
from its main object by a bitter clash on policy between Al ' perovich and the 
young engineer , G.Shaumyan , t~en a worker of the institute ,NIISTI . 
In his report to. the conference Al ' perovich defended the past policy of the 
industry . In the previous period , he expla'lne~ , all the attention of the 
industry had be~n focused on mastering the techniques of machining the basic 
machine tool components . This in his view was part of the answer to those who 
accused the industry of paying too much attention to universal machines to the 
neglect of more specialised types s 
"In my opinion it i s necessary at each specific stage of development to 
concentrate attention on the central , crucial problem . In 1932 the central 
problem was the Question of teaching people to machine parts of machine 
tools . It is no secret that at our new factories , having collectives of 
1 , 500 workers, we had not one man who had built machine tools at any time 
in the past . There was no point in dreaming of creating our own designs 
unt il we had mastered simple production tasks . This would have been empty 
talk rather than a serious approach . Therefore we put the problem of a 
sharp expansion of the nomenclature before all our factories with great 
force at the beginnin~ of 1933 , and not in 1932. After thousands of people 
had undergone courses of study and learning on the job , and had learnt 
to machine the parts of machine tools , we were obliged to demand that they 
did not get carried away with the mass output of one and the same machine, 
and that they thought about the fact that they are a hotbed of technical 
thought •• • At the start of 1933 we posed this problem with great force 
before all our factories and we have already h~~ a chqnge to this direction . 
-.e have already fundamentally changed the psychology of all our factories". 
Turning to the question of labour skil ls , Al ' perovicb admitted that their 
1 
previous vi ew had been mi staken and that a "serious correction" had to be made& 
l .Stenogrammy _ oervogo vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya po stanKostroeniyu ,20- 22 lxunya, 
1222g,n . d ., (duplicated) , pp . 27- 28 . 
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"We -..:ere teraporarlly carried away by our achievements during last year 
when we worked with complex fixtt~es for all basic operations1 carried away 
to the extent that we believerl we could have a skilled boring machine operator 
within two months, who could within four months become an instructor in bortng•: 1 
There had been considerable achievements using these methods , be declared , and 
they would continue to be used in the future, but for making many different types 
of machine tools co!llplex .fj_xt.ures could not be used and therefore a higher degree 
of skills would be required. Thus Al' perov1.ch was not env1snglng a complete 
rejection of previous practice, but modifications to meet new demanns . This 
fact beca111e clear in the clash with Shaumyan . 
Shaunyan regarded the conference as a positive development but , nev.ertheless, 
thought that certain workers of the industry (probably meaning Al 1 perovich and 
other ob" edinenie leaders) "ere stUl not suf iciently aware that. a ' turn' had 
bePr'l reached . His demand can be sununar.ised in his own words a "From machine tool 
building of mass and large seri~l production , to machine tool building of small 
serial and individual production" . 2 ShaUIIlyan was scathing about the fact t!'l£tt 
the 'DIP' was to be built in a quantity of up to three thousand units a year, 
and that the turret lathe 'factory was taking the same path of "moss production" , 
with corresponding provision of tooling. This provoked an intervention by 
Al 1 perovicb ,who enquired how the turr et lathes -were going to be built without 
the use of jigs and fixtures , To which ShaW!Iyan replied t "In my view, 1f we 
~tto train cadres , then precisely for this reason it is not necessary to 
1.ntroduce mass production at all , but is necessary to organise individual 
production" .J In his reply to the discussion Al'perovich again defended the 
past policy of the industry and rejected Shaumyan 1 s argumentt 
"Our job is not to produce one example each of three or four types of 
machine tools so that the press will write that we are heroes. We shall 
not take that path . It is necessary to master the tec~1olov.y of making 
machine to~ls. The production of 1nd1vi1ual models regardless of cost and 
quality does not amount t o "mastering technology". I say that neither in 
its actions , nor 1n its policy has machine tool building committed any 
4 
errors of principle'! 
1.~. ,p.29. 
2.1.bid . ,p .65 . 
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On the question of the use of ~~xtures , Al'perovich stressed that it depended 
entirely on the quantity of machines to be built . It would not have been possible 
to produce the ' DIP ' without wide use of jigs ann fixtures , and it was only 
because this method had been adopted that the industry had quite rapidly mastered 
t~chno1ogy . Furthermore , he added a justification for the policy of the First 
Five- year Plan of concentratin~ on universal machinesr 
" r1e had to begin production of machines having wide use, which have wide 
sales and justify the use of many fixtures. If two years ago anyone had forced 
us to make all sorts oT. individual and special ~achine tools for the auto-
tractor industry we O'Ould not have had a machine tool industry; but now 
we must move forward by all ways and means" •1 
In taking this line at the Conference Al 'perovich was restatL1g a position 
h~ had taken at a meeting held shortly before at the Club im.Dzerzbinskogo.On 
this occasion he had criticised what he regarded as two incorrect policies with 
regard to the technolo~ical oreparation of productionr the first,the view that 
machine tool building was distinguished ~bove all by the fact that it catered 
for the specific demands of customers so that machines had to be built on a small 
serial or individual basis; the second , that one could adopt the methods of 
technological preparation appropri~te to mass production as in the auto-tractor 
industry . The first line was incorrect, he decbred , because it ignored the fact 
that there was still a large demand for "so- called 'universal'machine tools", which 
could be made on a serial basis with an appropriate degree of tooling .The second 
line had been an "infatuation" on the part of some engineering and technical 
workers of the branch during the first years of its development : it had delayed 
the output of new machines and involved considerable expense . It was essential, 
Al'perovich had stres~ed . to always take •ccount of tne possibility of design 
changes. It was rare , he aknowledged , for factories to make any calculation 
of the cost of fixtures or esti~tes of their economic justificationr the decision 
to use fixtures was frequently not taken just because of the complexity of parts 
and processes, but because of the lack of skilled workers .
2 
1. ibid • , p. 86-4. 
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While the new .POlicy entailed a major shi.ft of er.aphasls for the industry 1t 
by. no means l'!eant that t!-te aim of securing a high denee of seriality of production 
wherever possible had been rejected . At the conference Al ' perovlch stressed that 
the branch was committed to a policy of standardising parts and assemblies to 
the maximum possible extent . In his pre-conference speech he elaborated on why 
this was essential for the Soviet industry: thP aim was to secure the benefits 
of large- serial production even though the product range was widening . Standardisat-
ion of such parts and assemblies as pumps ,gearboxes , tool rests and feed boxes 
would permit a higher ser1ali ty of pro~ uct1on even if the basic products of 
a machine tool enterprise were built on a small aerial basis .Furthermore , it 
would give the ~osstbillty of greater flexibility in building special cachines . 
Al'perovich also noted that the creation of 'typical' {tipovoe)or 'standard' 
machine tools of general- purpose would also factlitate the organisation of large 
serial production for a peri od of tine justifying proper technological preparation . 
Shortly after the Conference Al ' perovich again defended the policy of Phase 
Two as being corz·ect 1n the circ~~stances - as a result the basic skills of 
machine tool building had been learnt . On this occasion he also defended the 
building of very large new enterprises during the First Five-year Plan .Capitalist 
machine tool building firms were typically of )00-600 workers ; they tended to 
have equipment of a low technical level and small serial production based on very 
highly skllled workers . But , 11For the Soviet Union such a method of organising its 
Ol-"D machine tool building b::ise , moreover in a very much shorter ttae than was the 
case in the industrial capitalist countries , was out of the question~ ·e were 
not able to use a sin~le enterori se of Europe or America as a model" . 2 The few 
1.Prednr1yat1e , t9J3 ,No , 1J , p . J6 .l.ote , in Ibaking this proposal Al ' perovich was 
tak~ up an idea earlier oro~ated by Sorok1n . In 19)1 Sorokln had ~oposed 
that Soviet machine tool designers should create •basic ' types of ~chine 
( ' bazisnye ' - this was apparently the first use of this term which suosequently 
became part of the vocabulary o~ ~oviet machine tool building) . Such ~sic 
model s for each of the '"'lain types of machine tool would serve as the foundation 
for a whol e series of model s differing by size and function with a hi~h level 
of unification of P'-'·rts and assemblies between the different varlants.F'urthermore , 
designers , he believed , s'"lould adopt the principle of ' stepped sizes ' ('stupencbat-
~· ) , i .e . the creation of standard size ranges of basic ~achines(brothers ', as 
Sorokin termed them) on the basis of the unification of parts and assemolles . 
This was apparently the first clear call for the creation of what later became 
~~own as a ' gamma' of machine tools - see ~sialisticheskaya rekonstruktsiya 
1 nauka , 19Jl , Vyp . 2 ,pp.115- 127 . 
2.Planovoe khozyaist vo , 1933 .~,o . 7- 8 , p .51 . 
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large factories existing in the west tended to be unspec1al1sed , and ",.e were 
also not able to take the specialised factories of Europe and America as prototype 
because they could satisfy us neither by their vol ume of producti~n . nor by 
their production methods" . He then went on to not.e th!lt the industry had received 
no foreign technical assi stance and described the inability of the Cincinnati 
company to assist 1n the building of the new Gor '.kii factory , because its pror'Osed 
scaJe was considered too ereat and the labour skills of Scvtet workers were 
1 
tho~ht to be too low . However , while defending ~st practice Al'perovich did 
not make clear whether he believed such large factories to be appropriate 1n the 
!'uture , in changed circumstances . This question w r~s to be clarified in the coming 
perlorl . 
The events of June 1933 marked a turning point 1n the development of the 
Soviet machine tool industry but ,as wtll be shown , discussion on broad strategic 
issues did not cease . However, before examining the policy discussions of the 
Second and Third Five- year Plan periods,lt is necessary to briefly consider the 
salient features of the practice of Phase Two . 
c)Practlce 
The main elements of the strate,:ry of Bhase Two were the S,Peclalisation of 
factories by pr~uct , a restriction of the product range and a raising ofthe 
seriality of production • The aim ~as to secure a rapid increase of output and 
a reduction of the cost of machines built • At the same time new modern designs 
~ere to be introduced , replacing t~e models of the 1920s. The practical outcome 
of the adoption of. this strategy can be considered by taking the lndustr1 
as whole , and also by taking indlvidua.J cases in which thepolicy was put into 
practice with particular vigour . 
5efore pursuing strict specialisation by t ype of machine the enterprises of 
Stankoob"edinenie had first to be f.reed from non-machine tool production . This 
was achiPved during the First Five-year Plan perio1a the share of such production 
in total output of the specialised enterprises fell from about 45 per cent to 
i..See Chapter 9, p.339 • 
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nil , with the exception of some consume:r goods1(then produced by most factories 
of he~vy industry) . 
The specl~lisation of enterprises b,y type of machine tool was indeed pursued 
with vigour in 1931, following the VSNKh decree of September 1930 • From 1928/29 
to 1929/30 the seriality of production rose sharply ,althoueh the product range 
~as not reduced, mainly as a result of the taking up of reserves and the reduction 
o~ non- machine tool building activity . But in 19.31 the nunber of types of machine 
built at at the leading enterpri ses declined , leadlng to a dramatic increase in 
the average output per model comoarerl with the previous year . In 19)2 and to an 
even greater extent 1n 1933 , with the introduction of new designs, the number of 
models again rose and the seriality of pr.oduction fell back to the level of 1929/JO. 
These proce~ses are shown in the followLng table ' 
Table 4.! 
The Snec1a11sat1on of the ~!ain Stankoob" ed1nen1e Factories and the Seriality 
of Production , 1928/29 - 1933 
1928/29 1929/JO 19.31 1932 19JJ 
Enterprise 
T/M (S) T/H (S) T/•1 (s) T/M (S) T/ti (S) 
'Krasnyi Proletari i ' 6/? (8?) 3/5 (250) 1/2 (1095) 1/J (793) 2/6 (367) 
1m.SvercUova. 4/4 (75) 6/6 (87) 2/2 (JOJ) J/3 058) 4/5 (n .a.} 
lm ,Len1na 4/5 (161) 4/6 (248) 4/8 (432) 4/8 (275) J/7 (2J8) . 
'SSJ!Iotochka ' 2/2 (?8) 2/2 (172) 2/2 (379) 2/J (244) 2/J (262) 
im.TsK .Hash . 3/4 (145) 2/3 (328) t/1 (1485) 1/2 (n.a. ) J/4 (n.a . ) 
'Komsomolets' 2/2 (54) 2/2 (131) 3/3 (155) J/3 (n .a . ) J/3 ( 139) 
Total(average) 21/24( 106) 19/24(202) 13/18(498) 14/22(.329) 17/23(23?) 
Av .per enterprise J . 5/4. o 3 .2/4 . 0 2 .2/J .O 2 .J/3 .7 2 .8/4 .7 
Total l.nc • t wo new 
16/24(305) 20/32(222) ents . in opn . from ' 32 
T - nQ~ber of tyoes built (l .e,basic type groups- lathes ,drilllng machines ,etc . ) 
M - number of model s bull t (note - nu.'l'lber of sizes not available) 
S - seriality, de~ined here as average number of units built per model in year . 
Source 1 compiled :from Table SA .XIII · 
1.Kholmyanskii, I,~pets1al1zatsiya i kooperirovanie mashinos:roeniya v c~ 
]Yatiletke,M.-L.,19JJ ,p ,J1 . The prioary non-~chine tool ouilding act~vity was 
diesel engine building at ' Krasny! Proletarii - this was phased out 1n 1931 . 
4.J5 133 
It can be se~n that while the level of specialisation of the main enterprises 
(notably 'Krasny1 Proletarii ' and im.Sverdlova) was raised in 1931 , the limited 
size of the production base of the industry prevented the attainment of the aim 
posed by some of restr~cting each factory to a single type: this was achieved at 
two enterpr~ses building lathes , resulting in an average output per model of 
over one thousand units - a remarkably high level by the standards of even the 
German machine tool 1ndustry . However , the types built by other enterprises 
tended to be related by size,weight and production technology. 
The specialisation ofproduction permitterl an extremely rapid increase of 
output at these slx leading enterprisess from 2,552 units in 1929/29 , to 4,849 
units in 1929/30 and 8,962 units in 1931. With the switch to new models in 1932 
output fell to 7,246 in 1932 and 6 ,207 in 1933 • Output would have fallen 
substantially more if production of some basic old models had not been maintained 
at a high level during the years of tr~sition to the new product range, and 
it was precisely the specialisation drive of 1931 which permitted this maintenance 
of cutout . 
f The rapid e~sion of output and rise in seriality was attended by a very marked 
growth of the labour force of the specialised industry - from 4,170 workers in 
1928 to almost 13, 500 in 19)2. The nature of the intake of new workers (mainly 
unskilled ~oung people from the country) and the problems of its assimilation are 
discussed in Chapter Eleven . 
~ith the adoption of the policy of Phase Two expectations with regard to the 
possible attainable output from existing and new enterprises rose by leaps and 
bounds, in part as a result of the counter-planning movef!ient which developed 
vi~orously in 19JO and 1931 . The envisagen maximum project capacities of enterprise: 
reached their peak in early 19)2, and then gradually declined with the 
transition to Phase Three , falling back to the 1930 level by 1936 . This process 
is shown in Table SA .XXVI I • It should be noted that the extra output was to 
be obtained by specialisation and other organisational measures, including greater 
use of shift work than envisaged in 1929 and early 1930 , and not by expanding 
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capacity by further investment . 
Assessment of t~e policy of Phase Two in econo~ic terms is difficult because 
of the lack of appropriate data . 0ost reduction statistics are inadequate and 
the benefits derived from raising the seriality of old models cannot be determined 
because ofthe impact on costs of the assimilation of new designs, Expectations 
with regard to cost reductions were certainly high : a target of a 19 per cent 
reduction of cost of production was set for 1931; in fact costs rose by 4.4 per 
cent. At the im.Sverdlova factory alone costs rose in 1931 by almost 50 per cent , 
compared with a plannen reduction of over twenty percent , owing to problems of 
assimilating new roonels . 1 However , the average value per unit of machines built 
fell to its lowest level in 1931 - 2 ,064 rubles per unit , co~pared with 2,734 
in 1928/29 (specialised industry only) , before rising very sharply in 1932 . Despite 
t,e influx of new workers the output per worker in unit terms reached a level 
of 0.75 in the year 1931 , compared with 0.61 in 1928/29 • a level which was 
not to be attained again until 1938. Productivity fell , ho~ever, in value terms , 
because of the low value per unit of machines built . 2 
T~e results of implementing the policy of Phase Two can also be seen by 
examining two particular enterprises where it was applied with unusual thoroughness , 
probably because the pro1uctsin question , lathes of a relatively simple, 
general-purpose type havin~ very wide use in many sectors of the economy , were 
well-suited to large-s~rial production . Possibly the most successful application 
of the poilcy was not at a factory of Stankoob"edinenie , but at the Izhevsk 
factory of the armaments industry . In 1930 this works ~as given the task of 
producing the maximum possible quantity of machines in the shortest possible time 
in or ... er to reduce import dependence while the new factories were under construction 
From the beginning of 1931 the factory began to prepare the production of the 
'Udmurt ' model , based on an ' American Tool' design . In orderto train workers and 
maintain output ~h~le the new model was being assiMilated , it was deci jed to force 
the production at the same time of a relatively simple lathe of 'Loewe' design . 
t.See Chapter 13 . 
2.See p.424. 
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By May 1931 the factory was building 125 units c mnth of this model. The 'Udmurt' 
was to be bu11t on s large-serial basis W"ith the use of a large quantity of 
fixtures and speci~l gauges, even though there was n~xperience of such a scale 
o"· production either tn the Soviet Union O J.' abroad . As the authors of a review 
of the factory ' s work 1n the First Five-year Plan pointed out , the majority 
of foreign machine tool factories "orked with few fixtures, relying on highly 
skilled workers: 
11This , ~- t~..  e first 1 t i f ~' ' ' ns ance, s a consequence o the specific features 
o~ the capitalist economy, therefore for us in the conditions of a planned 
econo~y such a solution was incorrect . Besides this , the l ack of 
highly skilled labour forced us to firmly take the path of ~ldely using the 
metho1s o.c larp:e-serial production . Takin( this path,we elgn1ficantly 
complicated the process of preparing and assiMilating production, but on the 
other ~and we have secured the oossibility of very wide~v employin& low-
skilled labour (~ades J and 4) anrl we have created a b~s\s for a rapid 
~rowth of labour productivity and a cheapening of the machine tool in the 
future" •1 
The first prototype of the 'Udmurt' appeared ln May 19)1, by January 1932 
oroduction bad reached 60 units a month, by October 150 units a month,i . e .a 
rate of 1, S300 units a year. This model remained in prorluc tlon throughout the 
2 Second Five- year Plan . 
The second case ls that of the ' Krasny1 Proleta.ril' factory . The original 
plan for the r construction of this factory in 1925 had foreseen an eventual capacit~ 
of 1 , 585 units of twelve differ ent types~ By 192? this had been revised to 1,?60 
units of six types~ After the NK RKI survey plans were agatn revised to allow for 
an output o-f' 2 , 325 units of five different types~ but in eax·ly 1930 this was 
6 
radica1ly revised to J ,400 units of only one type, lathes . By the April 19)1 
an output of 4,000 units 1n 1932 and 6,000 units in 19JJ was foreseen • with the 
DIP lathe as the sole model.? In 1928/29 the factory in fact built about 600 
~r.achtnes of six different types and in the following yAar 1,249 units of three 
types . The year 1931 saw a fundamental change: 2 , 190 units were built of only 
l .Volkova,L.K . and Perevalov,E .M.,Za sovetskoe stankostroenie Lizhevsk,19JJ, p .JO . 
2.1bid ., pp.10 and JO . 
) .1ebyachenko, op c1t , p .8 . 
4.Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev , oo c1t, p . 168. 
) .Lebyachenko,loc .cit . 
6.~ •• p.9. 
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two models , ~he TN - 15 and TN - 20 , somewhat Modernised pre-nevolution designs . 
rhe relative simplicity of these models allowed their large-serial production 
without verv extensive use of special jigs and fixtures and without the adoption 
8 
of flow organisation. The new 'DIP' model , however, was from the start intended 
for very large serial production with tecru1ological processes devised for an 
annual output of up to J , OOO units~ A considerable quantity of jigs,fixtures 
and special to0ling was made in order to deskill machining operations , which were 
on a very ~uch higher level of precision than for any previous models . Whereas 
85 fixtures had been used for the TN- 15 , 800 were required for the ' DIP'. In 
tooling up production of the new model the factory drew on experience of large-
10 serial production acquired in diesel building. Cutout of the ' DIP- 200' rose 
from 25 units in 19:32 to about 500 units in the following year . and the overall 
level of output of the factory was maintained during this period of assimilation 
by buildin~ the older ·TN - 20 model in growing number , its output reaching 1, 302 
units in 19:33 .11 As a result of thP adoption of the policy of Phase Two output 
per worker at ' Krasnyi Proletarii ' rose by more than half in 19:31 compared with 
1929/JO , but by only ten per cent in the following year with the tr~nsition 
to building the 'DIP'. Furthermore, in 19:31 the output per worker in unit terms 
reached the very high level of 1 .42 : this was not to be attained again in the 
pre-~ar years . Finally , during the 1929/JO to 19:32 period the number of workers 
employed at the factory rose by 2 . 5 times , the majority of the newcoAers having 
12 
no previ ous experience of machine building. By the end of 19JJ 'Krasnyi Proletarii' 
was firmly set on the new path of Phase Three . 'l'he number of models bull t doubled 
compared wtth the previous year and included a gear- cutting machine of modern 
cesi~n and a multi- tool lathe suitable for work in the auto-tractor industry. 
? .Dokument trudovoi slavy Moskvichei 1 1 - 196 .~ ••• 196?,p.1JO . 
8 .~·:achinery , 1 . 7 . 1931 . p . 97 .R.eport of a British visitor . 
9.511 , 1.9JJ ,No . 10. p .6 . 
10.1b1d. ; Slavnye traditsil , oo cit , p.24. 
11 .See Table SA .XIII. 
12 .See Chapter 11. 
Phase Three , June 1933 to 1941 
a)Policy 
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In the second half of 1933 and in 1934 there were no notable speeches or 
articles on the quest ion of over~ll strategy for the machine tool industry . 
Commentators and leaders o~ the industry ~ere primarily concerned with the reali satkn 
of the policy adopted in the sumMer of 1933, and while ther e was considerable 
discontent with t he Practical work of the branch , notably 1n relation to the 
r~te of assimi lat i on of new model s and the supply of castings , t he general line 
of development was not questioned . As t he demands of the auto- tractor branch 
were clarifed and impor ts were further reduced in 1934 the need to expand the 
production base by involving more engineering factories of otl1er branches was 
stressed on anumber of occasions , in particular by i1,0ren tlikher, now an NKTP 
official~ Orentlikher argued for making the f ullest use of existing GUSIP 
enterprises , restricting the construction of new enterprises to capacity f or 
heavy machines , a utomatics , grinding machines and special machines , In his view 
the main speci alised factories required more vigorous despecialisation in terms 
of types built by each • In November 1933 he argued for splitt ing 'Krasny! 
Proletarii ' into shops for lathes and vertical turning and boring machines 1 Gor ' kii 
into shops for milling and gear-cuttin~ machines , .and im .Ordzhonikidze into 
separat e shops for turret lathes and automatics. As a short term measure he even 
proposed i mporting machine t ool pRrts from forei~n f irms until new capacity 
could be 1ntroduced . 2 
T~e Second Fi ve- year Plan as adopted in 1934 provided for the construction of 
five new enterpri ses to be completed by 1937 . These were for the production of 
grinding machines (two) ,gear- cutting machines , automatics and heavy nachine tools . 
Th i ith Project Capacities of ~ooo and 2,000 units ey were t o be l arge factor es , w ~ 
a year for the grinding machine works , 2 , 000 for the automatics factory and 
1,500 un i ts for the grinding machine factory . 3 Thus the policy of building enterprises 
Other Countries was retained . In May 1934 Al ' perovich of a l arger s cal e than usual 1n 
l.Zaind . ,12 , !1 . 1933 ; 15. 12 . 1933; Vestnik metall ooromyshlennosti , 1934 ,No . 11 ,p . 72 . 
2 -
J .PrZainkdt.,12 · 11 .l933 · t 11 t e 0 plana op cit , prilozhenie ,Osnovnye ob"ekty kapital ' noR;o ·-2e vtorogo pya e n f!. _ • • t·.;:..o;-~-
stroitel' stva •. , pp. 48- 49 • 
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once ag~in defended the policy o~ building large machine tool factories and 
organising large scale production during the First Five-year Plan , justifying 
it as before on the grounds of lack of skilled labour .1 On this occasion he 
also noted that while the auto- tractor industry was now the determining factor 
1nt~e technical development of the branch, universal machines were still reqUired 
1n a quantity permitting serial · , but not mass , pro~uctton . 
In 1935 questions of general strategy once again came to the forefront and 
old positions underwent further reassessment . Two main factors were instrumental 
in provoking renewed debate . First , as related elsewhere , concern over the rate 
of technical progress in the ~apitalist countries led to pressure for more 
intensive technical development in the Soviet industry and , second , the demand 
for high- productivity , specialised equipmPnt rapidly incre~sed , prtmarily for 
th~ aviation ano vehicle building branches . In December 1934 N~TP ordered that 
in ~uture t~e auto-tractor factories would be supplied by the domestic industry , 
f urther intensifying pressure on the machine tool branch.These new de!'lands came 
at a time w"len the production base of the specialised industry was much the same 
as it had been during t"le First Five-year Plan : the only differences were that 
the Leningrad im .Il ' icha works had entered the Glav!{ and the Khar!kov factory was 
enterin~ service . 
The problems of widen iniZ t1e tioazh of high-productivity machines were discussed 
at the Third Conference of Designers in March 1935, which marked a much more 
decisive turn towards the building of specialised machine tools . 
2 
Sorokin wrote 
that the first ' organisational phase ' of the industry ' s development was now ove~ . 
It vas deciderl that the leadin~ enterprises would switch to building ?redominantly 
high- productivity types , in particular automatics and semi- autos; that a policy 
of buildi ng ' basic ' models would be a~opted - each such model would serve 
as the basis for a unified series of variants (or gamma) ,and th~t the building 
4· 
or unit-const~uction machines would be developed intensively . These latter 
neasures fol lowed earlier proposals of both Sorokin and Al ' perovich and can be 
l . Izvestiya, 27 . 5 . 1934 . 
2 .See Chapter 7 • 
) ,2aind .,20 .~ . 1935 · 6 158 159 z Ind 24 
4.Sotsi alisticheskaya rekonstruKtsiya 1 naukaA19J5,No . , pp . - :~. . . 3 . 1935. 
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seen as attempts to enhance the s P.riality of production in the face of a general 
tendency towards despecialisation. 
During the First Five- year Plan period , as we have shown , the structure and 
methods of the machine tool industry of capitalist countries had been regarded 
by all Soviet observers as irrational . The multitude of small firms producing 
a h~hly diversified product range with reliance on small serial and individual 
production base~ on highly skilled labour had been regarded as a product of the 
inherent anarchy of capitalist pronuction. For the Soviet tndustry , in the condition 
o~ the soci~llst planned economy , the path indicated by the German rationalisation 
movement had seemed more rational , i .e. the organisation of large-serial production 
of a limited product range , allowing the employment of less skill ed workers by 
applyin~ many jigs and fixtures . Until 1935 there is no evidenc,:o that this Soviet 
assessment of capitalist machine tool building had altered: in f act Al' perovich 
had conti~ued to stress that the Soviet industry had been unable to follow the 
-·estern • model' • But in 1935 in the wake ofthe conference of designers there was 
some reassessment of the hitherto accepted view, notably on the question of the 
scale of machine tool building factories . One of the most significant contributions 
at this time was that of E .Levin , director of EUIMS , in July 1935. 
The first priority of the Soviet industry was now the building of more coraplex 
~igh-productivity machines , Levin wrote , but the basic line of development 
remained the rational renuction of the nunber of types and sizes built, thereby 
raisin~ the sertality o~ production and lowering costs . The vast number of types 
and sizes whic~ would nevertheless be reguired me~~t that even though the demand 
for machine tools presented by Soviet industry was considerable, production could 
not be organised on a mass basis. Levin continued• 
"The production apparatus of machine tool building must be to the highest degree 
flexible , not only in order to continuously improve t~e design of produced 
machine tools , but also to rapidly aod boldly switch to completely new 
designs , which is particularly difJicult and complex for large-scale 
enterprises. Therefore , it is no accident that both American and European 
machine tool buildin~ factories are small enterprises with 300- 500 workers 
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but with very large and hi~hlv-developed desiv,n offices . Even the largest 
world machine tool building firms such as, for e~mple ,Cincinnati,Herbert, 
and ludwig Loewe, buildin~ an extremely diverse tipazh of metal cutting 
machine tools, are in essence combL~es of specialised factories . This 
also explains the growt,h in the number of machine tool factories" •1 
These facts demonstrated , Levin concluded, that '' •. the production of an enormous 
tipazh of machine t ools requires a significant decentralisation of production at 
many enterprises" . This statement suggests that Levin believed the giant factories 
of the First Plan period to have been a mistake; this assumption is supported by 
his comments on the industry's experience; 
"All the initial a ttempts to concentrate production of the re~uire:i tioazh 
at 10-15 specialised machine tool building factories did not give positive 
results ; on the contrary, in some cases it served as one of the causes of 
the slow assimilation of new types of machine tools , the inordinate 
complication of production organisation and, moreover , the increase in 
cost of the products built . Only after the number of enterprises involved in 
the production of machine tools was increased (at present there are about 
forty) di d the up-turn in the development of the Soviet machine tool building 
industry begin both in terms of the number of produced machines, and 
1n relation to the number of assiMlleted typP.::; and sizes" . 2 
Levin also went on to argue that the form of specialisation adopted 1n the 
Soviet industry was no longer approortate.In Western Europe and America , he 
wrote, machine tool factories were predominantly srecialised by type of machine . 
At first t he Soviet industry had taken the saae path ; correctly in Levin ' s view 
because of the need to rapidly increase output. But the tasks of creating new 
designs and fostering technical progress required that enterprises be specialised 
according to the technoJogy concerned . Thus, 'Komsomolets' would make all machine 
tools related to cylindrical gears : lm .TsK .Hashinostroeniya all machines concerned 
with makin~ and finishing threads; and im .Lenina all concerned with making and 
finishi ng holes. This revised form of specialisation was in fact adopted in 
subsequent years. 
1.Planovoe khozyaistvo ,1935 ,N,.. .?,p.20. Emphasis added . 
2 .~. 
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Levin 's reassessment of the or~anisation o~ ~chine tool building in the 
capitalist countries hinged ~round a single factor - the demands of technical 
progress . It was thi s factor which had been left out of account in the discussion 
and policy conclusions of the First Five-year Plan years ; or , if it had been 
considered , its full implications had not been perceived . This lacuna must be 
seen in the broader context of the prevailing perception of tec~1ical progress 
at the time of the capitalist crisis reviewed in Chapter 3 The new tasks 
c 
posed before the industry t an~ the ar~owledgement of the reality of continued 
t echnical development , together forced leaders of the industry to look more 
deeply at t he lo~ic of the industrial structure pertaining abroad. 
Just before the convening of a major Party technical conference of the Glavk 
in July,Shaumyan reentered the debate , clearly judgine the time rtg~t to once 
again put forward the arguments he had advanced at the 1933 conference . The 
new conference was devoted to a discussion of the practical problems of building 
the high quality high- productivity machines re~uired by the auto-tractor industry , 
and this was the focus of the contribution by Shaumyan and a colleague ,Agapov . 
They began by contrasting without comment the large,well-equipped Soviet machine 
tool factori~s wi th the typical small 1estern factory which often had obsolete 
machines .The Soviet industry built predominantly universal machine tools of low-
productivity tynes. The few specialised models built (like the centreless grinder 
of the Tula factory and the semi-automatic lathes of the lm .Ord~honikidze rror~s) 
were of high-pro~uctlvity types , but most such models were only being built in 
units in exper imental shops . In the view of these specialists the root of the 
problem l ay in a fundamental misaPPrehension of the very nature of modern machine 
tool buildin~ . There was , they pointed out , a basic contradiction between the 
1evelopment of mass- flow proMuction in the engineering industry and the development 
of the machine tool indust ry& the more highly developed the former , the more 
high- productivity , speci alised machine tools were required, and consequently 
the less the applicability of large-serial or mass methods in machine tool 
building itself . This was so first because the quantity of such machines required 
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was limited and , second, because the length of i d time requ re to organise their 
large- scale production inevitably exceeded the time of their 'moral' obsolescence . 
Nachine tool build 1ng , they emphasised , had to constant! 'I change the des~n of 
machines and also cheapen and accelerate their produ~tion . At the root of the 
problem, in their opinion, lay t~e question of thP skills of those building the 
machines t 
"The large- serial production of machine tools existing up to now at the 
machine tool building giants does not demand a l~ge number of highly 
skilled workers and does not f::tcilitate their training . Once organised 
this oroducti on proceeds mechanic~lly; the worker makes use of complex 
fixtures which demand nothing of him but a certain skill and attention . 
It is a completely different situat•on when a factory produces small-
serial special machine to0ls . Here reliance is placed firstly on the 
design ofrice ,and secondly on the highly skilled worker , who can almost 
without any fixtures, make complex and accurate parts by working to 
drawings and marking- up'" •1 
The example of the achievements ofthe experimental shop of the 'Krasnyi Froletarii' 
factory showed , Shaumyan and Agapov claimed, the correct way forward . Here in a 
short period of time a shop with only a hundred workers had succeeded in 
building six new types of machine tools . The circumstances or this production 
were such that workers quickly acquired skills t~ough beinB given large tasks 
and responsibiJ ity. Therefore,they concluded , '! . all the talk about the necessity 
of taking decades for trai~ing cadres is utter nonsense • A most r~pld transition 
of t he basic shops to t~e new tipazh and new methods of work wil l help to solve 
the problem of cadres , whic'"l was al.:nost 1nso1ubJe unrler the previous conditions". 
In July 1933 Al ' p~rovich had rejected this argument on the grounds that it 
was one s i ded: it ignored completely the question of building general-purpose 
machines and other types required in large quantity by Soviet industry . In restating 
his case Shaumyan again adopted this one sided stand, but now in 1935 his case 
must have seemed far more convincing gtven the new tas~s facing the branch, But 
Shaumyan ' s approach failed to tackle two practical problems then facing the 
enterprises ; _f1rst ,that of making the transition from the building of prototypes 
t .Izvestiya ,5.? .1935 . 
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and individual special machines on a one-off basis to or~anisin~ successful serial 
production , even if of a small scale. which ,despite Shaumyan's argunentsfwas still 
required ; second, that o~ producing in quantity commonly used types of machines of 
high technical level, such production representing the core of the output 
programme which all enterprises were under considerable pressure to fulfil. The 
enterprises f despite the new demands , were strongly disposed towards maintaining 
a high level of seriality of their production 1 , and even to increasing the scale 
of producition of at least one basic model in order to ensure that out.put in 
quantity terms rose from year to year . hile effo~ts were being devoted to the 
assimilation of new models. Adoption of the Shaumyan proposals would have 
inevitably entailed a rapid ann pronounced drop in output . It is also doubtful 
whether the oroposed anproach would in practice have resulte in such a quick 
and automat ic train inll of workers as Shaumyan envisaged. 
The contradiction between the necessity of increasing the tinazh and of 
maintaining a high and rising level of output could clearly not be met by adopting 
~haumyan's a1vice alone. Other paths had to be found 1n order to secure continued 
development of the industry. Starting 1n 1935, but more seriously during and after 
1936, alternative means of resolving the contradiction were put forward and 
to some extent put into ryractice . The threP. main paths advocated were the 
development of standarnisation of parts and assemblies , in particular the 
develooment of uni t-cons+ruction ; the develop-ent or specialised prod action of 
parts and assemblies and supnly on a coooeration basis ; and the development of 
flow production methods for the bui lding of basic general-purpose machines . 
The developement of standardisation as ~ means of raising the seriality of 
pr~uction had been accepted as a rolicy aim from the early days of the industry, 
but despite the vigorous advocacy of the principle by the Central Institute of 
bbour (TsiT) , the idea of building unit-construction machines was not seriously 
trken up by the specialised industry until 1935. work on unit-construction was at 
this time restricted to ' Stankokonstruktsiya '; this did , however , free the main 
factories from having to build certain types of special equipmen£. The interesting, 
original work of TsiT on I..ULit-construction is discussed in Appendix 7. 
l.It was noted in 193.5 that in order to raise the level of seriality the ' Krasnyi 
Pro)etarii ' factory WRS buildin the ~T-20 multi-tool lathekin.thteh first half
1 1 crf the year and the 1 :~er MT- )0 ~he secondA i stead of ma ing em L~ paral e • 
es.tn h n~+ 10 P'P.i.G-1 • 
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The pro o ion of product10!l cooperation for the eunply o" part and aso::emblies 
in 193 and 19:3? is discussed else,.·here . This policy was refZ rdei as esc;entlal 
l.n order to accelerate the rate of introduction of new ach1nes, free capacity at 
th basic factories, reduce the cost of the items cone rn 
1
nnd 1 prove their 
uallt.y by specialisin the production techno ogy . Ther ls no douot that the 
pr11ctlce ofthe A er1can machine tool '!.ndustry uas an important influence, out 
also to sone extent that of the British 1nduntry , the level of sub-contracting 
of which hnd impressed Soviet visitors at the time of the 1934 london machine to 1 
exh1b1t1on .1 
The third line of policy Nas put forward tn th autunn of 19)6 .Several writers 
on t.,e subjoct of introducing flo;J and conveyer echnology lnto the industry 
ade reference to Or zhonikidze' s demutd 1n th t year for conv yers to be introduc~ 
1nt.o th 1rcraft 1n1ustry . 2 One of the .. 1rst to propos th option of flow 
sa ~bly with the use of conveyers in the machine tool 1nduatry was Stepanov , 
h"' e uty head of CUSIP , at a meeting of S and machine to~ users 1n September 
1 )6.:3 The use of such production organisation pr supposed lnr e volume of 
oul put or hor:ogeneous products . Such a large volUJ!le could onl v be s cured "for 
com only used types and ' basic ' models of general-purpose ~achlnes . The lndustry 
was in fact beP:innlnP: l;o see a reversion t.o some of the ideas of t.he First F tve-yaar 
Plan years. The leading , VPry large enterpris s of the branch, notably 'Krasny! 
Prolet rt1' ,1c.Ordzhontk1dze,Cor'kii,and 1 .Lenina 1 ~er t Kin on a dual 
character, On the on hand , 1n accordance with the urgent de an s o the til:le, they 
w r,. b"'c ln leading cen t.res for the buil 1ng of special 1sed , high-product..lv1ty 
~Achtn tools required by the auto-tractor , aviation and other hi h priority 
branches; on the other , they were in ef"'ect carryin on the policy of Phase Two 
an:i buUd1n a co par Uvely narrow range of baaic mo:!els of eneral-purpose 
chines on a med1W!I and large serial basis using many jigs an ixtures . From 1936 
tie el'l.and for tS,e adoption of now production techniques for t.hts sector was 
ra1sed1in 19:37 there were dem~~ds for the adoption of other progres lve technolo~y 
or the auto-tractor industry , in particular automatics , semi-autos,multi- tool and 
ult1-sp1ndle Mchine tools , in order to raise productivity . This development .,·as 
1.!!Jn~ • ,6.1 .1935. 
2 ·1'he 
1 
conv yerieat1Qn' _pf aero- engine factories did 1n f ct begin in 1937 -
lno!'l n , 4 . ·i . 1~0 . 
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not lnconpatible with the policy for Phase Three as put forward by Al' perovich 
ln July 1933, but was very far fron the path advocated by 'Shaumyan . 
The adoption of elements of the h lgh-productivi ty technology of the auto-
tr~ctor industry for the proiuction of machine tools built on a large-serial 
basis had the support of Al ' perovich in one of his last articles 1n ~.ay 1937 . At 
t'le saae time be envisaged the organisation of the production of certain standard 
assemblies common to many types of machine tools at special factori~s on a large 
serial basis , The wirlescale development of standardisation , the unit-construction 
principle , and cooperation would be essential , he wrote , if the utdustry was to 
succeed 1.n reaching the probable .final y,ear targets of the coming Third Five-year 
Plan, then seen as 70 ,000 units cutout and a product range of 1,000 types 
and sizes (compared wlth the 300 or so then in production) . Such a growth of 
output would re~uire an expansion of capacity , but Al ' perovich stressed that it 
would not be necesGary to build 'giant ' factorles . It is evident that he had 
some sympathy with Levinsreassessment of the optimal scale of machtne tool 
factoriPs because he now pronosed the bu11d1n~ of teo new enterprises of average 
size, with 700 - 1 ,000 workers each.1 Al'perovich added that the develop~ent 
of specialised parts production foreseen our.inR the Third Plan would give the 
possibility of buildin~ these new enterprises with leas capital investment than 
would otherwise have be~n t~e casP , ~ile these new en e~prlses would be essential 
for covering the large planned t1oazh , the existing large enterprises would have 
to be used to make pa1·t of the output of conunonly used machines on a large- serial 
b'lsis . 
In consi dering the scale of new enterprises it should be noted that action 
bad already been taken in the previous year to reduce the project cupaci t.y of 
two of the new enterprises of the Second Ftve- yearPlan s the ~ull capacLty of the 
Kiev im ,Gor ' kogo automatics factory had been cut from 2,000 units , as seen in 
i9J4 and early 1935, to 650 Wli ts 1.n the autumn of 1935 and 500 units 1n 19361 
the project capacity of the Saratov gear- cutting machine works had oe n similarly 
cut from t , 500 units to 150 .2 It is not clear ,however , whether this measure was 
1.~. ,8. 5.1937 .For comparison , the 1.Ja .Ordzhonikidze factory then had a total 
labour force o.r 3, 770, including 2 ,850 pl'oduction workers -ibid •• 9 .1.19)7. 
2 .S"e Table SA .XXVII . 
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p~ompied by a reassessment of the desirable scale,or simply a response to an 
1.nadeqU:1CY of investment resources . Al ' perovich • s comments on the scale of future 
factories were ~ade "oefore the attack on 'gigantomania' which received official 
backing in February 19)8 and wide l?Ubllcity when Molotov condemned it at the 
1 Eighteenth Party Congr~ss in 1939 . It is not surprising therefore that his 
proposal came under attack. One critic,R.Dorogov , accused Al'perovich of putting 
fo~ard a 'farmers' solution to the problem of expanding production capacity. He 
believed that enterprises of 2 , 500- 3,000 workers were roost expedient because 
·tr.ey were large enough to support a small experimental base and a design office 
abie to undertake modifications and modernisation ~ork . He also believed that 
only three or five new enterprises would be adequate for the branch •2 However , 
t'1e branch l eadersh1p did not alter its po11cyr an ed1tor1<'!l of Stank1 i Instrwnent 
on the Third Plan in July reiterated the view that at least ten small new 
factories were required for flexib111ty .3 
The Third Five- year Plan itself endorsed the new approach on the question of 
scale . It called for the building of a number of new enterprises of average size 
for a number of types, including automatics, planing, boring , vertical turning 
and boring machines and ttrindin~"" ~~tach1nes , to be located predominantly 1n the 
4 Urals,S1ber1a and Far East . Strategic consideration were clearly to the fore , and 
this was true to a~ even greater~t in the S~ptember 1939 SNK decree which 
called for the construction of a large number of new factories for almost all 
the basic types . But these projected factories ~ere by no means smalla two of the 
~a1n projects of 1940 were the Alapaevsk automatics and turret lathes factory 
with a project capacity of 1 ,000 units a year and the Penza precision machine tool 
~orks of ) ,000 units a year (of relatively small machines) .5 
During the Third Five-year Plan discussion of general questions relating to 
the strategy of development of the industry notably diminished, probably because 
by this time the question had ln the main been resolved 1 the structure of the 
industry had been formed and had .general acceptance . However, the shift 1n the 
ci:r!'ction of reestablishing the role of large- ser18.1 production as an 1n tegral 
l.Y.olotov had cautioned against ' g1gantomania ' at the 17th Party Congress in 1934, 
but this had little imPact at the time . 
2.~.,1? . S,1937;An optimal scale o~ 2,500- 1 , 000 workers was also supported by 
two other speclaJ lsts Kultkov and Demkov. - Zaind., 26 • 5 .1937. 
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component of the industry ' s structure,which r~d been evident since 19)6 , now 
became more marked . From 19JJ to 19)5 , with the launching of the policy of 
?hase Three , primary at t ention had naturally been devoted to organising the 
individual and small- serial pro~ uction of specialised, high-productivity models 
previously not built • .But even a.t this time t he building of certain widely used 
general- purpose machines on a large-scale basis had continued . By 1936 the 
continuing large demand for baste general-purpose machines , coupled with the 
shortage of skilled workers which still afflicted t he branch, pro~oted a revival 
of interest in the methods of Phase Two . It is notable that Schlesinger outlined 
his support for mass Production of machine tools in • the Soviet press in June 193~ 
t his would probably have been unacceptable three years earlier . One of the most 
f orthright statements of the modified Phase Three policy was that of Berr1 in 
1938, which was strongly reminiscent of some of the contributions of an earlier 
period . 
Mass and stable large-serial production did not take place under the conditions 
of caoitalism , Berri declared s 
"The well known att empts of German machine tool builders to switch to lal·ge-
serial production of standard machine tools were not crowned with success . 
The crisis of 1929 struck the hardest those specialised factories and shops 
which had switched to large-serial production . The fa ilures in t he realm of 
organising large- serial and mass production of machines tools, inevitable 
in the conditions o~ capitalism. are converted by bourgeois technicians 
into a firm law , whic~ they justify in terms of the specific features of 
machine tool bui lding . The growth of the tipazh •. •• undoubtably makes the 
organisation of large- serial and mass production of machine tools more 
difficult . This complication acquires particular force in t he conditions of 
capitalis~, where the growth of the tipazh is spurred on vigorously by the 
intensive competition , patent considerations , etc •• In the conditions of the 
socialist economy ther e is both the possibility anJ the necessity of 
organisin~ the flow production or machine tools of wide application. The 
thousands of repair shops of different branc..,es of industry and our socialist 
agriculture , the mechanisation of which has achieved vast dimensions, need 
J.su, 1937 ,No . 1) , p.2 . 
h,TrP-tii pyatiletnii olan razvitiya narodno~o khozyaistva Soyuza SSR,on cit , p .122 . 
5 .Eashinostroenie , 8 .J . 1940. 
6 .See above , p. , 11. 
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standard, simple machine tools of a modern type . This enormous demand is 
satisfied by us to an insignificant degree ., .• Our largest machine tool 
buDdin£ factories ('Krasnyi Proletarii ' , im .Ordzhonikidze, Gor'k~i) must 
already from 1939 develop the mass production of certain commonly used 
types of machine tools in parallel ~ith the building of special machines 
of individual and small- serial production . Hass and large-serial production 
of co~~only used machine tools must be organised at a high technical level . 
The standard machines need to be modernised every year" , 1 
3err1 also cal, ed for the introduction of elements of mass and large-serial 
production into the building of more specialised machines Qy the further_ 
development of the standardisation of parts and assemblies. But while promoting 
tne mass production of basic general-parpose ~achines , Berr.i clearly supported 
the line taken by Levin and Al ' per.ovich earlier on th~ question of the scale 
of enterprises required for building such types as automatics , broachlng machines, 
some types of grinding machines , unit- construction machines , etc. Citing American 
practice of building such types in enterprises of 500 to 1 ,000 ~orkers , he 
calJed for this experience to be taken into account by the Soviet industry. Thus , 
the Soviet specialised machine to .1 industry was to have a str ucture consisting 
of a core of very large enterprises undertaking large-serial or even mass pro,Juction 
of standard , basic ,general-pa.pose machines of a high technicallevel , using 
methods dr~wing on elements of the practice of the auto-tractor industry , alongside 
the buildin~ of special and specialised machines required by the advanced technology 
high priority branches ; and also a number of smaller factories specialised for the 
production of somewhat lower-volume , proii·ressive types such as automatics ,gear-
cuttinR' machines, grindinv. machines of different kinds - internal , surface, cylindrica: 
radial dxillin~ machines , and broaching machines. 
b)Practice 
Ev~n before the adoption of the policy of Phase Three the introduction of 
a number of new , modern designs durinP' 1932 had led to some despecialisatlon of 
enterprises compared with 1931. From 1933 this process gathered pace . Ihe number 
of types and sizes built by each enterprise of GUSIP rose rapidly, from an average 
1.Planovoe khozyaistvo , 1938, no . 9, p .45. 
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of 4.2 in 19)), to 6 .4 1n 19)4,8 . ) in 19J? and 9.7 in 1940.1 Such a rapid growth 
of the tlDazh inevitably led to a lowering of the average output per type-size 
glv~n the limitations of the production base . The average number of units built 
per type-size fell from 206 in 1933 to t19 in 19)4, 105 in 19J? and 87 in 1940, 
although there was a slight up-turn 1n 193~ to 11.J . 2 Howev~r , this impression 
of despecialisation provided by the average units per type-size indicator requires 
qualification . If one considers the number of different types of machine tools 
built by each enterprise - an important determinant of the attainable level of 
seriality of pro~uction - and the number of distinct models , rather than sizes, 
'the picture is rather different . Information on the specialisation of GUSIP 
factories in 193) ,1935 and 1940 is presented in the table on the following page. 
Owing to the nature of th~ sources used the data on types are more accurate than 
those on models , and tn general the information is lees reliable than that presented 
earlier for 1928/29- 1933 · Nevertheless , it can be seen that the level of special-
isation of enterprises in terms of basic types built actually rose steadily in 
·the period , reachinQ: the 1931 level again by 1935 • and a ra·t.her b~ber level for 
the industry as a whole 1n 1940 . As the production base expanded typee were 
transfered from the main enterprises to other factories. Furthermore , the total 
range of types btlil t by th ... specialised indus try expanded by half ,from 1.6 to 24 . 
At the same tL~e the number of models built rose sharply , from )4 in 1933 to 150 
1n 1940, with a corresponding rise in the number of mo1els per factory fron 3.8 
t.o 6.8 . This process was particularly marked at the large new enterprises built 
during the First Five-year Plan period . However , the despealal1sat1on was less 
than indicated at some of the leading factories of the branch because there ~as 
so~e ur.l:ication of parts and assemblies between different models , permitting 
a hi6her level of seriality of oroduction . 3 It should be stressed that tois table 
excludes ' Stankokonstr.uktslya ' and also special machines built in large nm1ber by 
the end of the peri~ at the leadin~ enternrises of the branch . 
A further fact which must be taken into account 1n considering the iMpact of 
1.See p .155. 
2 .See p.155. 
) .For e~l'l,Ples at a number of enterr.rises , inclutHng Gor ' k1l , t.har ' kov , 1m .Ord.zhonlk1dzr 
and ' Krasnyi Proletaril ' see Sii , 19J5,J,o .3 , p . J6iPlanovoe khozyaistvo, 1935,No .? , p. 26 
Cor' kovskli krai 1 ~ tro . ll- 6'3. 
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Table 4 .!! 
The SJJec1al1sat1on of GUSIP Machine Tool Factories , 193) - 1940 
l~.JJ 
Enterprise T/M (Types) 
'Krasnyi Proletar11' 2/6 (L,GC) 
1. .Sverdlova 4/5 (P, B,Th ,L) 
1 .Len1.na J/? (D ,Th ,L) 
'Sa~otochka ' ( SZ) 2/.J (Sb/Sl) 
ln .TsK ~ ashtnostroenlya J/4 (L,TM ,DS) 
·~omsomolets ' J/.3 (L ,GC ,C) 
1935 
T/M {Types) 
1940 
T/~1 (Types) 
2/9 (TJ,GC) 2/10 (L ,A) 
J/6 (P,B,Th) 2/? (P ,B) 
2/6 (D,Th) ~/9 (D ,Tb ,B,H) 
2/4 (Sh/Sl) 1/6 (Gs) 
.3/.J tL ,TM,DS) 2/5 (L ,TM) 
J/4 (L ,GC ,C) 1/12 (GO) 
Six old enterprises 
Av . per enterprise 
17/28 ( 11 typ.,s) 1.5/32 ( ll types) 12/49 ( 10 types) 
1 .Crdzhon1kidze 
Cor' kl1 milling m.f . 
khar ' kov tm.Holotovn 
2 .8/4 .? 2.5/5.3 2 . 0/8.2 
-~· 
2/2 (T ,A) 2/5 (T ,A) 2/9 (T ,A) 
1/2 (~) 1/9 (fti) 2/26 (fit ,TI') 
2/2 (iiD/Gc) 2/J (RD ,CC) 2/15 itD,GC) 
~---------------11----~-----------+-----------------
l• ine basic enterprises 
Av .per enterprise 
lrt .Il'icha 
Sara tov g- c m. f • 
m .Sed1na 
Sverdlovsk u-c rn .r. 
ln.K1..rova (Tbtl \si) 
'Stankonormai '' 
Kiev 1m .Gor'kogo 
'Kol!l"unar ' 
L~ingrad turret & a. 
l .Vorosh11ova(H1nsk) 
1 .K1rova {Minsk) 
la.Kirova (Vitebsk) 
1n.K1rova (Gomel ' ) 
Total GUSIP factories 
Av . per enterprise 
1 
Av .Ser1al1ty(W11ts/~) 
- not tn GUSI P . 
22/34 ( 16 types) 20/49 ( 16 types) 18/99 ( 14 types) 
2.4/J . B 2. 2/5.4 2.0/1l .O 
22/)4 { 16 types) 
2 .4/) .8 
2)1 
1/4 (Gtc) 1/5 (Ctc) 
1/J (GC) 1/2 (GC) 
n .a . 
n .a . 
2?./ 54 ( 17 types) 
2 . 0/4 . 9 
18? 
2/2 (VTB/D) 
1/2 (Pn) 
1/6 (Th) 
2/'J (Cs/Gcl) 
1/4 (A) 
2/J (L,T) 
3/3 (L ,T,A) 
2/4 {D ,F) 
4/8 (Br ,Th,DS ,Cg) 
2/4 tD,Gtc) 
2/5 (Sh ,Sl) 
42/150 24 ·types) 
1 . 9/6 .8 
t67• 
• on basis of 1939 output Source• next page . 
Key a T - nu111ber of typea built . 
H - numlter of models built - ~l .B . Approximate . 
Types - L-lat hes ; T-turret l athes t A- automatics & se~~utos1 D -drilling mcs . J 
M-o1111n~ ncs . ;B-Boring ncs . ;P- plan1ng ocs . ;Sh-ahapin~ ocs . , ;51- slotting r 
Gc-gear- cut in~ mcs :~h-threading cs ;Gc- cyl1ndricsl ~1nd1ng ccs . ; 
Gs- surface gr1nd1n~ cs . :G1- 1nternal p-lnairw cs;Gcl-centreless grinding 
mcs .;Gtc- tool anrl cutt er grinding ~tes . JBr- broach1ng cs;DS-d1sc saws: 
TM- tbread-m1111ng rncs ;C-co~bined mcs ;Cg- centreing mcs . ;Pn- precis1on ccs . 
H-hon~ ~cs .,VTB-vertical turning and boring mcs . tRD-rad1al dr llling mcs . 
I 
' 
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5ourcet 
1933 - compiled from Table SA .XIII. 
1935 - based on i·.etallorezhushchie stanki proizvodstva zavodov 3SSR,1,-L, ,1935 . 
(catalogue) • 
t 940 - b::osed on ~:etallorezhushchie stankl ,Prelskurant , 1940- 41g&t. ,I'L-L., 1941. 
Seriality calculated from total branch out out , Table SA . I . 
Note ,1939 outout taken beca~~e 1940 output orobably includes production of a number 
of ~actorles which entered the soecl?.ltsed industry at the end of the year 
and excluded from t"lis table because information on their products is 
inadequate . 
+he oolicy of Phase Thre~ is the extent to which factories continued to produce 
some ~sic models on a large- serial basis. In the ca~e of almost all the leading 
factories at le~st one model or range was built in lar.ge quantity , providing 
the basic element of prod uction in unit 1 terms. Other models were built on 
a much smal 1er scale basis , sometimes ln separate machining- assembly shops or in 
experimental shops. Unfortunately the kind of detailed information on the out~ut 
of individu::~.l models available for the First Five-year Plan is not obtainable 
for later years . However , some indication of the structure of output of a leading 
factory is provided by the following data relating to the im.Ordzhoaikidze works: 
Table 4.III 
The Structure o~ Output at the im .Ordzhonikidze Factory , 1934 and19}2 
(units) 
.o'iel 1934 19J5 
Plan % Actual ?i Plan % Actual 
'136' turret lathe 600 65 462 76 775 75 n.a . 
'137' turret lathe 120 13 72 12 120 12 
'114' semi-automatic 120 13 74 12 60 6 
' 116 ' semi-automatic 20 2 20 1 
' 113 ' semi-automatic 60 7 
'123' automatic 12 1 
'1V38' turret .50 5 
All lllodels 920 100 608 100 1037 100 1301 
Source s19J4P. -Zalnd., 15. 3 . 34;A . - Vestn1k 111etallouromyshlennostt, 1935,f•o .9, p.116 • 
1935P. -Zaind. ,9 . 5 .35 ; A. - Zaind ., 3.1. J6 . 
Ihus in this case the ' 13~ ' basic model accounted for ~bout three-quarters of 
total output and was built on a scale suf.t'icient to justify the use of special 
tooltng . Scattered evidence for other leading factories confirms this pattern . 
l .Thls probably accounts for the fact that at so111e of the largest leading factories 
the output per type- size rose steadily from 1934 to 1937 , despite a_marked 
rise 1n the tipazh,e.g . for Gor~kil ana im .Ordzhonikidze - see Table SA .XXX. 
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Thus the tm.TsK I·.ashi:lostroeniya factorv bull t 7)4 '162-SP' lathes in the first 
~en ~o~ths of 1936 out of a total out~ut L~ that period of ?85 units(i.e.94 per cen1 
whre during the first half of 1935 the 'Krasnyi Proletarii' factory built 405 
TN-20 lathes, and the lm.Lenina factory made almost 550 '507' threadL~g machines: 
both these models were relatively simple ,and old , dating from 1929-)0.1 Large-
serial production of basic models was 'lot restricted to GUSIP enterprises ; the 
Tula factory planned to build 700 of its 'Dzerzhinets' milling m~chine in 1936.2 
The most strikin! case of the organisation of large-serial production, strongly 
reminiscent of the practice or Phase Two was at the 'Krasnyi Froletarii' factory. 
In 1936 it was planned to build the Type26,the intended replacement of the DIP 
lathe, on a scale of 5 , 000 units a year, with a monthly output of 400 units 
as early as November 1937 .J If this had been achieved it would have be~"n without 
up to that time . 
precedent in machine tool building history,. The building of this new machine was 
to involve very heavy use of fixtures and spe~ial tooling - 1,120 different 
f ixtures and 4 1, 200 different tools. Accoriinv to the 1937 annual plan 1,100 units 
werP to be built in the year , but in fact problems were encountered. The viability 
of the design was questioned and this model was not buUt on a larg~ scale basis. 
However , this model is significant beceuse it was the first to be assembled on 
a flow basis . 
The idea of flow assembly of ~achine tools was not newr in 1933 sp•cialists 
o~ the ' Krasnyi Proletarii' factory who had been abroad at foreign machine tool 
firms (presumably in Germany) drew up a project for organising the assembly of 
the tailstock of the DIP lathe on a flow basis , the process oeing broken up into 
separate ,consecutive operations each fulfilled by a single specialised workers, 
the work travellin~ from worker to worker on a railed track , This method was also 
proposed for other important assemblies~ This project was not introduced at the 
tiMe ,almost certainly because after the June 1933 Order and conference such 
large- serial organisation was not regarded as a first priority . Until about 1936 
toe developrnP.nt of machining technology seems to have had more attention than 
ssembly on the groun~s that the higher the ~evel of this stage the easier th 
subsequent stage of assembly because parts would have a higher de~ee of interchange-
l.Problemy ekonomiki , 19J5,~o .4,p .201 . 1 Zaind . , 12.11 ,36. 
2 .~. ,29 . 2 . )6. 
J.su ,193€- ,r.;o .8 , P .44. 
·~.,22 .9 . 36 . 
5. p .'I Q':! 1? 
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ab111 ty . In ac this led to a neglect o" sse bly 
1 
wh1ch began to take an 
1nc:.reasln~ share of the otal production cycle an1! was characterised by low 
u .. Uvl Y ethods ~tlth very little use of jl s and "lxtur s . As a .result 'lighly 
s 111 d fitt rs w re required in order to ob 1n bly of reasonable quality. 
In connection ~it~ the introduction of the Type 26 
1 
fro about the second 
qlr of 19J6,asse bly work was reo.r anlsed , putt1n into pr ctice the ideas of 
toJJ and the call for the adoption of th methods o the auto-tractor industry in 
chtne tool bulldtng . The new methods also resembled thos adopted at the machtne 
tool factory or the Central Institute of Labour in 1933. when flow assembly of 
simple lnthe was successfully organised . 1 At first th~ s e bly of major 
ele ent of the Type 26 :was split up 1nto many a par t ,cons cutiv operations, 
t e ele ents (tnllstocks ,gearboxes ,headstocks , tool r sts,etc . ) belnR conveyed 
fro station to station by t"oeans of roller conv yer -or on bogies running 011 rails. 
Pro r. y 19.38 the eneral assenbly of the whol chin w also organised on this 
sls, with th use of bogies and a railed track . At th s tice many spectal 
nd standard fixtures were introduced and minor m chanis t1on pro\i ide ~:hen 
appropriate . 1 tar in 1939 assembly of the ·niP 200' w s 1so organised on this 
basta and plans were in hands for future flow asscrnbl y of Lhe Gma.ll er serial 
,..IP 300' and 'MT-J1 ' mo' els . Two main factors promotod i.~is lrans1t1on to flow 
a8 mblya first , and probably the most important , the diff r. nt1at1on of operations 
allove~ the enploynent of less skilled labour;second,a substantial rise in labour 
o uct1v1ty was possible - in practice an 1nc:rea of b tween thirty 
and forty per cent wns clatroed . 2 Elenents of flow bl wer lso introauced 
3 at. other factories during the T.bi=d rive-year llan, e .g .nt i .Ordzhon1k1dze , whlle 
a th Cor'kii l!lillin machine works flol'-...,Ork wn quit highl develope!! as early 
as 193?.
4 
During the years 1933 to the beginning of 1940 th nu~b r of factories of 
CUSIP increased from 9 to 23; of the additionnl 14 only four were specially built 
n lO machine tool factories, all o: a rela Uvel v small seal compared with those 
boUt durin the First F1 ve-y~ar Plan. Furthermore , thn enterpr\.ees transfered to 
4.Zalnd . , 2 . 2.37. 
1)4 
the specialised industry '£rom ot~er branches tenderl to be smalJe.r ·than the original 
s1x oasic factories , Thus despite the continued ~ro~th of the main factories , 
the average size of GUSIP enterprises in terms of both number of workers and 
annual output :n unit terms declined COl!lpared nith Fhase T•1o , altho~,.h there 
uas a limited up-turn in the years 19)6 to 1938 ~hen the number of e!lterprises 
1n the branch temporarily stabllised~In 1931 and 19)2 three factories of the 
specialised industry bui1 t over one thousand un.i t 1n a year ; 1n 1940 , seven , 
Factories of the 'planned ' industry tended to be smaller , especially towards 
t he end of the period wbcnthe largest of them had all be2n absorbed into the 
specialised branch (with the exception of military producers) . A very approximate 
estlnate sugvests an averar-e annual output per ' planned ' factory (including military) 
of 820 ~~its in 1933 (cf . 870 for GUSIP) , 580 1n 1937 {877) nnd J70 tn 1940 (840) .2 
From the sparse 1nforl1\ation on the nUil\ber or .machine tonl building military 
factories and their planned output ln various years , it can be estimated that 
their average output 1n units was only sll~hly s~~ler th n for GUSlP factories . 
Lack of data on the • planned' factories makes it ltlposs1ble to provide any meaning· 
ru1 comparisons with the level of concentration of machine tool industries of 
ot.her countries . 
In the tn1t1al period of Phase Three output in unit ter~s fell below the level 
of 19)1 in the specialised branch , but from 1935 output recovered quite rapidly, 
reaching twice the 1933 level tn 19)7 . By 1938 the output or ' Krnsnyi Froletar11 ', 
des;lte a subst~ntially lncre~sed tipazh , was two-thirds larger than in 1931 , and 
1n the first half of 1941 reached the very high rate of 450 units a month . ~ The 
average value per unit machine rose very rapidly with the transition to new, modern 
designs ~ by almost five times between 19)1 and 1937 . Labour productivity in value 
lems rose rapidly with the translt.ion to new models of hlgher unit value , but 
fell in ter ns of units bull t per worxers to a lo~ point in 19)4, before rising 
4 to exceed the 19Jt level again tn 1938 . Production costs were reduced by about 
10 per cent a year between 1933 and 19)6 as the new models introduced in 1932 and 
1933 ~ere assimilated . In gen9ral , it appears that CUSIP recovered fro111 the short 
lern negative consequences of the rapid expansion of the product range initiated 
l .See below ,p .155 . 
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in June 193J by 1935 . In 19J6 the machine tool factories of GUSIP made an over all 
profit for the first time. 
Some of t he basic indicators of specialisation , scale, seriality and 
productivity for GUSIP enterprises are summarised in t~e following table and 
chart . These clearly reveal the main practi cal consequences of the policies 
of the three phases of the industry's development . 
Table 4.IV 
The Specialisatton ,Scale ,Seriality of Production and Productivity of 
Specialised t.~achine Tool 'Bulldin« Factories , 1928/29 - 1940 
Special1sation;per ent . Scale• av. per ent. Sertali ty c 
Uo .of ~o . of No .of .Annual i•o .o~ Output per' 
Types :1odels Types- output prodn. -T-S 
Year sizes (units) workers (units 
1 2 J 4 5 6 
1928/29 ).5 4.0 427 695 
1929/JO ).2 4.0 807 1,250 
1931 2.2 J .O 1,280 1,700 
19)2 2 .0 J .O I ) . ) 914 1,665 281 
19JJ 2.4 ) .8 4 .2 371 1,470 2o6 
19)4 6 .4 755 1,440 119 
1935 2.0 4 .9 6 .4 721 1,)20 112 
1936 6 .6 782 1,280 119 
19)7 8 .) 877 1,)60 105 
19)8 9 .7 1,100 1,225 113 
1939 10.0 1,088 1,075 109 
1940 1.9 (, , P 9.? 341 670 87 
Source • 
Cols.1,2&7 - f'rom Tables 4 . 1 and 4.11 . 
CoL) .- calculated :from Tables SA .XI an1 Table A. t.I. 
Col.4. - calculated ~rom Ta~les SA .1 and Table J .1.1 . 
Col.).- calculated from Tables 12.I,p.410 and Table A. t . I . 
Col.6.- calculated from Tables SA . I and Table SA .XI. 
Col .S.- from Table l J ,VI ,p .424 . 
2.t.:Uculated from Tables SA.I and A.l.I. 
} .Pravda , 7 .10.1945. 
4/3~e Table 1J.VI. ,p .424 . 
1-iodel 
(units) 
7 
1o6 
202 
498 
)05 
231 
187 
167 
Productivit 
output per 
prodn . wrk:r .. 
( uni.ts) 
8 
0.61 
0 .65 
0.75 
0.55 
0 .59 
0 . 52 
0.55 
0.61 
0 .64 
0 .90 
1.00 
0.97 
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Conclusion 
W2 gre not\ 1n a position to draw some general conclusions on the strategy 
of development. of t'le Sr~viet nachine tool industry • In t.he pre- r;ar years the 
in~ustry went through a difficult learning process~ learning not only the skills 
directly relating to the buildiny of modern machine tools, ~ut also the principles 
of organisation of the branch . The foreign Lnfluences are evident. At first 
the advanced practices of the German lnd us try prov.i.d~ a g uide to policy for the 
Soviet industry. In the first phase of ievelopma~t the baslc organisational 
prerequisite - the existence of a separate adr.linistrat.ton for the industry - was 
lacking , pl acing definite limits on the extent to ~hioh lh~ rationalisation policy 
could be put into practice . In Phase Two lines of policy already present were 
accentuated , possibly under dLrP.ct Cerman influence , g\vln~ rise to n very 
rapid growth of output at a time when the industry was begin ing a transition to 
ne~o~ modern designs ,and when il'llports we:r:e at a very high J evel. At the same time , 
during this phase, m~~y came to question "hether foreign organisation and methods 
could provide any model for the Soviet industry oporatln£ , il was believe~ . 
under fundamentally dif.:-erent cond H1.ons. But this r~holesale rejection of t.he 
practices of capital 1st machine building was short-1 ived and did no~ have rnuch 
influence on the development of the illdustry . ~ it.h the in t.ro :iuction of new models 
and the policy turn in the direction of building more spectali.sed types 1 _praclice 
beg~n to be modified and this turn was ~ccentuated in mid-19JJ with the adoptlon 
of a new policy desi~ned t.o secure a faster expansion of the product range. bile 
mMy aspect!'> of the previous stage continued essentially without. change , no1-· an 
'AliiPrican 1 style machine tool builcl ing was grafted on to the existing structure 
to produce R new synthesis ,whlch by tne end of the decade differed in a number of 
respects fromf~tganisatlonal structure and methods of ooth Germany and the UnitPd 
States . 
The unique featur~s of the Soviet industry stemmed from the specific oondlt.lons 
and nemands of the Soviet economy and industry of the perioi . The relatively 
narro;; pr~iuet r.a."tge , of both specialised and general-purpose machtnes , couplelj 
With a large , rapidly growin~ , demand, permitted the organisation of large-serial 
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pro:iuction of a 1 \.mtterl ra.:1ge of basic mojels us1flg methods relying heavily on 
fi~tures and special tooling lwit~ the employnent of relat1~~ low skilled labour . 
In this respect he Sov let industry tooi< rationalisation further than in Germany 
1 
and this form of production or widely used models was to be retained as a 
ch~·acteristic feature of the Soviet macnine tool industry in the post-~ar years . 
~hereas American machine tool building as a whole relied heavily on skilled 
labour and made only ll~ted use of special tooling , 1n the Soviet case this 
ap~'ro~ch was only adopted w~ere essential for the bu1ld1ng of specialised and 
special mach\nes , the number of types and sizes of which was strictly controlled . 
In fact it was precisely the acloption of t.he methods of deskllJ ing the product.ion 
of the basic pro!u~ts , wh1ch permitte~ the transfer of the scarce skilled machine 
tool builders to the low seriality sector of thebr.anch . Skilled toolmakers and 
engineers were of course necessa~y for devising th processes and making the 
tooling required for the large- serial production, but this must have been a 
mor~ skill conserving path than that of basing the industry as whole on highly 
s~Uled workers as was typical in other countrtes . Thus t.he Soviet strategy 
of development was designed to secure a rapid growth of output of modern 
machine tools , and a steady growth of the tipazh in order t.o minimise import 
dependence as quickly as possible , in circumstances of an acute shortage of skilled 
1 r1bour . 
It is interesting to compare the Soviet strategy not. with the practice of 
capitaJist countries in ' normal ' times , out durlnv the exceptional conditions 
of wartime production . In these conriitlons 1 t 1.s necessar)l to bulle large quantities 
of stanrlard machines employing workers of lower skills than usual . Exaaples are 
available from both American and British practice in these circumstances . During 
the First \\orld .. ar the British ministry of munitions took measures to reduce 
the product range of machine tools , the introduction of new designs was controlled 1 
and factories lot'e!e specialised by type of machine in order to raise the seriality 
of production and pe!:mit the employl!lent of lower skilled labour.1 During the Second 
iCorld War a similar path was , · again followed rrJ the British industry 1 aai 
l.Aldcroft ,on c1t , p .290 . 
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flow production was raised as a practical policy for meeting the machL~e tool 
2 
needs of military production. But this experience was also typical of the American 
machine tool industry: flow production of machine tools was organtsed at a number 
of the largest factories • including Cincinnati ,Erowne and Sharpe,and Kearney and 
Tracker . This transition to lar&e-serial flow production was facilitated by a 
reduction of the pro~uction range and the fact that there was a large,gua..ran'teed 
~rket for general - purpose machines ,not; normally attainable 1n peace ttme 
con~tttons .3 In both the £rit1sh and the American cases the normal operation of 
m&Yket forces was strictly circumscribed by direct state intervention to promote 
a rapid growth of output of machines of the required types . This exanple of 
Western practice throws light on the logic of the Soviet strategy , lending support 
to the vtevthat t·t was a rational response to a partlculax set of economic 
c 1rcwnstances. 
But given this broad justification for the path adopted ~ the Soviet industry, 
its practical realisation was undoubtably attended by a number of excesses and 
~istakes , in par~icular dt~ing Phase Two . This phase represented a tTans1tional 
stage duri.ng which the industry began the switch to modern products and methods , 
w!1Ue at the same time attempting to rapidly tncrease out~ut in quantLty ter.rns 
1n orner to reduce imports . The oevelopment of large-ser1~1 production was a 
r-"tlonal response to these demands , given the lack of skilled labour, but as was 
aknowle~ged frorn the sQ~er of 1932, there was an insuff icient appreciation of 
the e~onornics of tooling-up this production . Provision o~ heavy tooling dehyed 
t'"te intrO'iuctlon of sorn~ of the new rnociels and raised costs , while no aDowance 
was m~de for thepossibility or technical progress . These ~xcesses ~tenr..ed not simply 
fro!'l the unbridled activity of productionmen tn the c1rcwr.sta.'1ces of a sellers' 
market , but also from thP. general exaggerated view or the likely gro"th of output 
prevailing 1n 1931 and the first half of 1932 . There is also no doubt that the 
labour skill requirements of the oranch were underestimated at this ttme . These 
les"ons were learnt during toe difficult period of assimilating new mo1els during 
th~> second half of t932 and the first half of 19)3, and this experience of the 
factories must havf' helped the Glavk leadE"rship ln its struggle to gal.n ac eptance 
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of t~e need to 'llOdify policy . 
IJ.ree 
The transition to Phasel- did not represent an abandonment of the previous policy 
and practicP , but its modi~ication in order lo secure a more rapid expansion of 
4 thP product ra11ge and the building of more specialised models . This involved 
a shift of e~phasis , but the large- serial production of general purpose machL~es 
contL1ued and later, froM the mid-' thirties again began to play a greater role . 
During the secon~ half of the neca~e thP. 'production interests ' criticised by 
Al'perovich in 1932 did to some extent reassert themselves , notably in relation 
to the ' Krasnyi Prolet;crl.l' factory ' s plans for replacing the ' DIP ' lathe - the 
serlcus problems encountered by the enterprise in changing its basic model 
probably related in no small part to the very great envisaged scale of output . On 
the other hanri the reassessment of ti-Je question of the optimal scale of factories 
~arked a new stage in the learning process . It came to be ap~eclated that the 
scale of factories in the capitalist countries was not just the product of 
competition , but also a response to the demand for flexibility in order to secure 
2.Thus , in 1940:"To this end (maximum out.put ) the introduction of new designs 
has been reduced to a minimum , the production of special-purpose types is 
avoided as far as possible , and even standard ranges are li>ei.ng simplified by 
reducing the num~er of types and sizes offered . As a result tt is possible to 
employ more intensive methods of production . . " - Hachinery , 15.8 . 1940,p .604 ,Ed1toria: 
On flow production , see ibid ., 28 . t1 . 1940 , p . 230 , ~ditorial . 
}.Proizvodstvennyi apoarat~kostroitel ' not prOI>!,Y~ty.~nnost.l_SShA , frl, t970 , p.85 . 
4 .Gran1ck has argued th•t while the specialisation policy of the rirst Fiv~-year 
Plan period could possibly be justified in terms of the need to reduce import 
dependence at a time when the product range of the industry was very SI;tall , in 
fact this policy was ' abanconed ' before its benefits in terms of reduced costs 
could be realised . Cranick' s interpretation of the specialisation policy of the 
machine tool inc'lustry during the pre- tiar years (oo .c1t . ,pp.69- 74) is open to a 
1umber of objections . First , an~ most important. , Cranick interprets the policy 
chcn~e of 1933 as marking a complete abandonment of the methods of Phase Two and 
a transition to a more traditional ~orm of machine tocl buildin£ founded on more 
hi~~~Y skilled labour . But as we have shown,the large serial-production of general-
purnose machines continued throughout the period and the advantages were realised. 
Secon~ , he tends to exaggerate the extent of the despeciallsation which took 
Place Rfter 1933 , i~noring the fact that snecia)isation in terms of types of machine 
built by eq,ch enterprise actually rose, that tl-t-=> building of the low- seriality 
m~els tended to take ol~ce in separate shops or experimental shops, and that 
r~easures such as uni ~ica tion ~~ere adopted to :ra'1se seriality . Third ,Granick thinks 
the investment in such large new works as the Gor'kii factory ~as misplaced ,because 
it was undert~ken at a time when the specialisation ~licy was at its ~g~t.This , 
he claims , had ' catastrophic ' consequences at the Gor Kii factory when it had to 
~pt to a broader product range requiring more highly skilled labour . There were 
~doubtably serious problems at this factory in the 1932-34 period, ~any stemming 
from the lack of skilled workers , but these "rere not (.irectly related to the 
specialisation poli cy .It had been envisaged at the time of construction that 
this factory woul~ build a large range of types and sizes of milling mac'1ines (as 
Al'perovich noted in 1931) .The basic models which the works strived to assimilate 
cont .next page •. 
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regular tec~lcal pro~ress , notably of t~e more specialised types . Soon a~ter 
this the importance of specialised parts production for securing flexibility also 
caee to be appreciated - this is considered in Chapter Six , However , these 
lessons were only~ put into practtce and, in the case of scale , this was 
by accident as much as des~ in so far as feH new factories ~ere built and put 
L'lto operation before 1941 and .faute de rn1eux the existing enterprises transfered 
to the branch were fairly small compared t.:ltb the ' giants.' of the !<'lrst. Five-year 
plan . 
This chapter has focused on the specialised machine toDl industry with little 
attention to the so-called 'planned' enterprises of other oranches of the 
engineering industry . At first sight the spread OT machine tool building to 
t~ese factories was at variance with t~e striving ~o~ specialisation and for 
the p1.trsui t of a coherent s tr~tegy of development . If such machine tool building 
outside the Glavk had been uncontrolled and pursued by other glavki simply to 
meet their O¥n needs and interests this would have b~en the case. »ut in fact 
th~ 'planned' factories onlv built types and sizes approved by GUSIP,and most 
of tbe main enterprises concerned were quite strictly specialised by type of 
rnr~chine. The extension of the 1 planned ' factory system during the 19J0s facilital.cd 
t.he deepening of specialisation throughout the industry , because the widening of 
the production base allowen the transfer of type from the main enterprises of the 
branch to other factories suited to their production. The main cector of the 
'olanned 1 industry , the mtll.tary machine tool buildlng factories , was quite 
h1~hly sneclalised and in general seems to have followed a similar path to that 
of th~ specialised industry •1 LarP;e serial prorluction of b3s1c models was undertaken 
ln parallel with small- serial and innividual production of specialised and special 
1.n 19)2 and 19.33 rema tned tn pro1uction on a large scale basis for a nunber of years 
- they were not affected by the chA."lge of policy .After the initial proble .... s the 
factory quickly expanded producti on .and its tioazh , oecoming oneof t.he rnos~ 
successful of the branch ' s enterorises by 19J7 .Granick nrRues that the case for 
"'hat we have termed Phase Two w::t~ a .,;ea:kone , but. fails to demonstrate t"lat an 
alternative aoproach founded on a more traditional reliance on skL11ed labour could 
have acbieved- t~e destred atms of rao1dly expanding output and the tipazh ,and 
raising the qualitative level of products an · pro~uctton Methods . 
1.The Izhevst: factory bu11 t lathes and turret lathes, with an unusually high degree 
of unification between the l!lodels ;Tula focused on lllln~ nachines , but also nade 
centrel~ss grinding mach1nes;im.Frunze ,Penza ,built au~omaticsathe Lugansk factory 
spec! 11sed on grinding machlnes;il!l ,Kalinina ,leningrac. at flrst bu1lt turret 
lat~s , later surface grinde'~"s,and two or tbree 1\0r~s specialisej on the build1ng 
of preci s ion machine tools {catalogues and price lists of various years . 
L----~ 
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machines , t~e ~ilitary factories enjoying an advantage ln ~~tion to the 
l?.tter because they ·tended to have more highly skilled workers than was the case 
ill the specialised industry during the earJy years . There was undoubtably some 
erosion of speci:Uisatl.on , however , with the ~o..,th of machine ·tool build\.ng of 
a relatively low technical level at NKZem workshops,NKVD labour comounes, local 
and cooperative incus try , e·tc . in the course of the • thirties , These producers 
supplied lower priority sectors of thP econony and developed oecause the specialise 
1n1ustry was unable to satisfy demands for basic general-pt~pose machines . 
The outstanding feature of the Soviet case was precisely t~1t the nachine toQl 
industry was able to consciously evolve a strategy for its own development, whereas 
the industries of other countries grew in an anarchic manner over a period of 
~any decades . This was possible because of the rPal, fundamental differences 
between the machine tool lndustry ln the conditions of thP. Soviet , socialist 
plan11e::! economy , and under capital ism. Social ownership of the means of 
production provided t he basic precondition for planning on the scale of the 
branch as a whole , glvin~ th~ possibility of securing a un!fied,centralised 
technical-economic policy. It was this central control ~hich permitted the 
~nforcement of the -factory st:ec1C1lisation policy and the 11m1lat1on of the product 
range essential for rapid dev.:>lopm~nt tn conditions of an acute shortage of skills . 
16:3 
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§.WIALIZATION BY PROOE~S - THE CASE OF THE OO'"TRAL FOUliDRibS 
Iron c~st1ngs represent the prioary matertal input of the ~chlne tool 
industry and the avaUab111ty oi' foundry facUlties able to secure a regular 
suoply of high quality castings is a basic condition for success in the branch. 
Steel castings, forgings and stamptngs are Qlso required but 1n smaller quantities . 
The provision of foundry capacity was a major problem for the Soviet machine 
tool industry in the pre-War years and raised interesting policy questions . 
The policy and practice of the machine tool industry with regard to castings 
supply has received the critical attention of a Western econonist .~ranick , who 
provides a very negative assess~ent of Soviet experience in this area.1 This 
chapter is devoted to a review of the evolution of policy and practice in the 
machine tool branch 1 focusing on the role of central foundries. 
At the time of the creation of Stankotrest 1n October 1929 the situation 
with regard to foundry capacity at the enterprises then in the trust or shortly 
to join was as follows: 
- • Krasnyi Proletar1 t' s no foundry , closed down tn 19282 
- lln .Sverdlova a own founnry , but capacity lnadequate,J 
-'Dv1ag~' Revolyuts11. ': own !.'oundry 1 
4 
supplied other enterprises 
- 'Samotochka': own foundry , but old e~uipment and inadequate capacity5 
6 
- 1c.Ts4 Masbinostroentyas own foundry , supplied other factories 
- 1Ift .Lenin a 1 own foundry ? 
8 - ' Komsomolets ': own foundry, small capacity 
In addition the main o1.11tary oroducers 1 Tula and I zhevsk , both hnd their own 
fo~~dry shops, presumably attached to the main production shops of the armament 
factories and having considerable experience . With tbe decision 1n the autumn 
l.Granick ,O.,Soviet rneta1-fabricating and economic development , Wlsconsin ,196( , 
pp.t49-159. 
2 .kats1onal~zatsiya promyshlennosti SSSR,M.-L. , 1928, p.29. 
3 .Borisov ant'! fasil ' ev , oo c.l t , p . to-' . 
4 .Ek.Zhizn ' ,19 .5.29 r!alnd ., 9 . <1 .)J • 
5 .~. '10.12 . :32. 
6.Lebyachenko,on c1t ,p .27 · 
?.Slenno"amy oervOJlo vsesoy:uznogo soveshchaniya.:.• ,oo c!t , p .148. 
B.Lebyachenko , oo c! t • .P .29. 
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of 1929 to construct three new factories the trust was faced with a major policy 
issuer should the new and reconstructed enterprises all be provided with 
adequate foundries, or should capacity be centralised , existing capacity closed 
down , and castings supplied on a cooperation basis. 
Two main factors appear to have influenced the trust ' s policy conclusion & 
first, the general policy discussion on the question of specialisation and 
cooperation of production 1n the engineering 1ndustryr second, the Soviet 
perception of the pro~resstve foreign practice 1n the machine tool industry. 
The general policy debate on process specialisation started before the start 
of the First Five- year Plan 1 and by the time the Plan was approved 1n the 
spring of 1929 there was widespread agreement on the path to be adopted.1 As 
early as April 1928 Gosplan approved a policy, incorporated in its directives 
for drawing up the Five-year Plan, of concentrating the product'ion of homogeneous 
itec-s according to their technological characteristics, so that the production 
of semi-f abricates would be separated off fr~a the basic engineering enterprises 
and carried out at specialised fact~riea . 2 In May 1928 the newspaper 
Torgovo-promtshlennaya ~a7.eta opended its col~ns to a debate on ' what type of 
metal :factories do new neen?' • In his opening article, I,1povetsk11, a leading 
specialist of NK RKI, set the tone of the discussion, Sharply criticising what 
he regarded as a widespread bias towards t~e construction of 'closed' .self -contained, 
integrated enterprises combining all stages of production under one roof, he 
argued forcefully for specialisation by process,with the creation of specialised 
preparatory shops loc~te~ near raw material sources,3 This position was 
supported by all the participants and clearly enjoyed the suprort of the paper's 
editorial staff . 
One o' the contributors to this discussion was Al'perovich, head of Orgametall , 
who also wrote tn favour of the dev@lopment of cooperation between specialised 
enteprises producing a narrow range of products , with the separating off of 
coaplex technological processes , like casting and forging, into specialised 
activities, But he also sounded a note of caution - it would be a mistake to 
1.Th1s needs to be stressed because Granlck focuses on the later discussion of 
cont .next page •• 
think that it ~ould be possible to put these principles strictly into life 
at that tillle given the existing state of development of the econocay . The 
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strivlnt for 'closed' enterprises apparent , hA believe-a , in projects passing 
tlu"ough ·the ~cien t1f'1c and Technical eounc1l of VSNK.h was, he stresEetl , an 
·~~healthy deviation' 1 but it stemmed froru the fact that those responsible 
preceeded !rom the view tbat the difficult supnly conditions thenprevalllng 
would continue into the future. There was thus a conLradlcation to be resolved 
in each particular case between correct principles and present objective conditione 
of supply 1 the difficulties of which were likely to be only slowly overcome 
1n the course of the five year period . Al ' perovich concluded his realistic 
contribution by stating his preference for speclalisation whenever possible , 
and rejecting the path of building ' closed combines• . 4 
Other wrlters favouring s~ecialisation included U . Vysochanskil5(VSNKh-
Clavmashinstroi) , E .Lomov~ Pankin (who favoured a reg16nal solution- independent 
foundry and forging factories serving a range of machining-assembly works of a 
given region)7 and Dobrovol ' skii of Gipromez~ . although the sincerity of the 
latter was questioned by other contributors , Nerverov and Fedorov , on the 
grounds that .in practice Gl1wmetall and Gipromez had been favot.trlng ' closed ' 
enterprises~ Thus by mid 1928 there was ~ulte general support for the 
principle of specialised production of castings and forgings . Furtherr.lore, in 
1928 the first practical measures were taken• Mosmnshtrest closed down a number 
of factory foundry shops , including that of ' Krasny! Froletarii' , and conc~trated 
10 production at a central foundry at the 1m. Vlad i.mir Il' lcha. factory . In • ovember 
1923, on the occasion of the nee ting of machine tool building factory wor~ers 
in Jf,oscow , apparently for the first time , the question of building a castings 
factory for the machine tool industry was ra1sed . 11 By December 1928 the 
19:31-32 as the primary 1nfl uence on policy , ignoring the debate of the late 
twenties~ which had much greater prcoctlcal repercuss1ons . This is related to 
a more 4'undamental weakness of his work - the neglect of the German influenced 
rattonallsat1on movFtment of the 1920s,::tssoctated with NKRKI , which leads to an 
overemphasis on American practice as the primary pbllcy influence on the Soviet 
ei~1neer1ng industry of the First Five-year Ple.n . 
2 .~.-prom .gaz ., 1J . ? .28 , cited by Dobrovol 'sk11. deputy chairman of Gipro~ez. 
J ,ib1d ., t6 • .5 .28 . 6 . ibid . ,27 .623 . 9 .1b1d. ,29 .7 .23J) .8 .28 . 
4 ·.!M!!. ,12 .6 .28. 7 .ibtd •• JO . 6.28 · 10 •l.b1d., 29 .8 .28 • 
.5.~., 15.6 .28 . 9. \.btd. , 13 . 7 .28 
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concentration of semi-fabricates .Production at separate factories ~as 
Glavmash1nstro1 policy 1 incorporated 1n the VSNKh five- year plan for machine 
building 1 and this found its expression 1n the Five- year Plan as approved in 
'ay 1929, which provided :for the construction of central foundries 1n l'loscow 
(to serve Mosmashtrest) 1 and Leniograd • .Fol lowing VSNKh policy of the tiJle , 
these were reg ional-type central foundries , serving a range of enterprises 
of the given area. 2 
By the end of 1929 Stankotrest had decided to build three new factories 
during the Firat Five-year Plan perloi , but it is not known whether policy for 
castings supply had been established at this stage . In early January 1930 
tedorov drew attention to the fact that there lfas already a castings ' famine ' 
in the machine tool industry ; at least 20 , 000 tonnes of castings a year would 
be re~uired for the i1oscow machine , tool enterprises alone and , tn his view , 
the only solution was the construction of an iron foundry factory specifically 
for these factories .J ~y the end of January lt ~as clear that the new enterprises 
were to be mach1nlng-as£embly works, supplied with castings from outside.4 
In the sprin~ and sumner of lQ)O there appears to have been some uncer tainty 
tn the branch on the question of policy for castings supt•ly a.nd in t·lay the 
issue was rt:.ised sharply in the press . hh1le it was clear that the n9l.' enterprises 
were to be purely machining- assembly works, lt was cl~~ed that no practical 
IDP..asures had be"'n taken for creating separate foundry capacity , w 1 th the result 
that there was a gr"w lng danger that the commissioning of the enterprises 
would be delayed . 5 But it ts evident that in the spring Stankotrest was attempting 
to clarify the possibility of obtaining a suitable project for bu.1d1ng t t;o 
central foundry factories for the branch1 on ln '•oscow, and the other in 
li1zhn1-Novgorod (Gor' kii) to serve the new milling nachtne factory . If a readynade 
project could not te obt..alned , the trust was intending t.o approach the Presidium 
6 
of VSJih for permission to have a project drawn up in the United States. 
ll .VoHtova,R.V., 1.n Istoriya KFSS - Har1tsizm-Len1nizm v delstv1e ,l1.,1974, p.141 : 
i.Tor~ . -prom . ~~az , 2S . 12 .28 ; ~a~Uetntl plan narodno-khozx~istvennogo stroitel stvn 
~.Jrd .edn. ,H. ,19)0 ,Supplement . pp10- 11. 
2.VS!ffih .,Osnovnve llnii tekhtlicheskoi rekonstrukts11 nroroyshlennostl SSSR ,M.,1929 , 
v -;-;-r. _;,;,w,_ 
01.2 ' p .• ll'+. 
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By August 1930 t~e position had been clarified and Al 'perovich, who up to 
this time had not refered to the question of castings supply in his published 
articles , outlined the industry 's intentions . The existing foundry of the 
'Dvigatel' Revolyutsii ' factory in Nizhni-Novgorod was to be expanded (presumably 
to supply the milling machine works), the im.Sverdlova factory ' s foundry was 
to be rationalised , and for Moscow a new central foundry (tsentrolit) was to 
be built with an annual capacity of JO , OOO tonnes a year ,7 This decision was 
8 subsequently incorporated in the V&~Kh order on the i rdustry in mid-September 
and finally resolved by Stankoob"edlnen1e at the end of the month.9 The 
intention at this stage appears to have been to build a completely new factory, 
but this did not occur. Instead, apparently early in 1931, Stankoob"edinenie 
took over the central foundry already under construction for enterprises of the 
former Mosmashtrest , and located next to one of then , the 'Borets ' factory. 10 
Three factors orobably combined to bring about this solution . Firstly, the 
urgency of building a foundry for the new turret lathe factory which was to start 
work by the end of 1931; second, the acute pressure on resources which prevented 
the initiation of a new project ( a pressure so acute that the Khar 'kov 
construction had been put into conservation and even the turret lathe factory 
itself threatened) ; and third:ly , the fact that enterprises originally to have 
used the Mosmashtrest ' centrolit ' had by this time been subordinated to different 
ob"edineniya and new sources of castin£S supply found. At the end of 1930 this 
problem arose for the machine tool industry itself • the ' Dvigati ' Revolyutstl ' 
factory was transfered to the diesel buildtng administration , thereby depriving 
Stankoob" edinenie of control over what was to have been the foundry for the 
new milling 111achine factory . 
At this stage it is useful t0 consider the second influence on Soviet policy 
3 .~ .• 3.1 . 30. 
4.Izvestiya ,19.5.JO. 
5.ibid. 
6 .B_iUlleten ' Stankotrest , 1930 .~, o .2- 3, P • 70 • 
? .~., 5 .8 . 30. There was no indication of policy for the Khar ' kov cactory . 
8,Izvestiya ,20 .9 .30. 
9 •lli,1934 ,No .to, p . 5. 
10.~. ,10. 12 . )2. 
5.6 
168 
namely the organisation of castings production in the m~chine tool industries of 
the leading capitalist cou~tries or, more precisely, Soviet perception of this 
fo!'eign experience. Durin~Z: the 1920s the most important and direct source of 
foreign experience was the German engineering industry with which the ~oviet 
industry had well-established relations , notably through Orgametall and the Berlin 
technical bureau. For this reason it is of particular interest to examine 
German practice with regard to castings production . In examining foreign practice , 
and th~ Soviet perception of it, one must consider not simoly the situation at 
any given point in time , but see the tendencies of development s Soviet industry 
was above all interested in the latest , most progressive practices of capitalist 
countries . 
The practice of the German machine tool industry was analysed by Lazarev, 
writing 1n 1929 s "For the present-day organisation of German machine tool 
factories the absence of foundries (frequently forges as well) is becoming all 
the more typical ••• as a result of which the machine tool factor ies are being 
transrormed into purely mechanical enterprises (machining and the assembly of 
uronucts) " •1 This process was aJ so occuring in other branches of the lierroan 
engineering industry, he observed, e .g . the ma.jority of boiler making factories 
had liquidated their prPparatory shops and were being supplied from speclalised 
foundries. In support of his view that this was progresGive practice, ~azarev 
noted that a Soviet engineer visiting Britain had found a similar pattern: of 
fifteen machine tool factories seen in 1''anchester, only four had had their own 
foundr1es. 2 Later, 1n mid-1930 , Perel ' man ,of the Institute of industrial- economic 
research of VSNKh ,observed after a foreign study visit that in Germany the practice 
c .... ~~ .. ,s 
o~ obtaining fer~!ngs on a sub-contracting basis was especially well-developed 
in the engineering industry 1n general s of twenty two factories surveyed ,only 
four or five had their own foundries. Perel ' man also noted that "this already 
generally acknowledged principle" was not carried out with nearly the same 
directness 1n the USA : of 35 factoriP.s visited there , 25 had had their own 
foundries. No exolanation was offered) 
Llazarev , V. ,Ekonomicheskoe obozrenie ,1929 ,No.6 , p.47 • 
2.1bid. ,p.48. 
3.Zdnd . 26.7 0 
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Tbe general strength of German 1nfluence in the late 1920s, coupled with 
the fact that the three new nachine tool ra ... torl.es were projected 1n Berlin with 
~erman technic~l assistance , sug£ests very strongly that 1t was the German 
ex mple that was being followed when they were conceived as machining-assembly 
enterprises supplied :from separate speclalised fou."ldries . Later, after the 
aa<tii}on of this policy , e,:amples of the practices of other countries were 
also clted in the Soviet press . In 1932 Obor1n , after e. very extensive tour 
of British machine tool factories, noted that thirteen out of a total of thirty 
enterprises visited had their own foundries, and even sorne of these purchased 
part. of their requirements from outside suppliers. No explanation was offered 
for why firms adopted a paxticular pattern of supply, apart from tradition 1 no 
relationship between scale and the possession of a captive foundry was observed. 1 
Furthermore , hardly any factories possessed their own forging capacity. In 1934 
Piterov, head of Orgaroetall , after a trlp to the USA wrote that of thlrty mach1ne 
tool factories visited all but t~·o or three received castings and forgings 
from outside suppliers , effectively making enterprises machining and assembly 
units. The quality of castings and. forgings was , he stressed , very high . 2 
'rhus the practice of the three major machine t ool producing countries appeare d 
to lndicate that the separation of preparatory activities from machine tool 
factories and their organisation on a specialised, centrnllsed basis was a 
-progressive policy worthy of emulation by the Soviet industry. 
Stankoob'' ed1nen1e' s en thusiam for central fou."ldries remained high throughout 
19)1, By the summer there was a firm intention to build a second one .in }';oscow 
3 
Al'perovich 
and a site had been selected. In Novel:lber/restated the branch's policy : both 
new a..:\d old factories were to becone machining-assembly enterprises. Looking 
back, he claimed that, "several years ago we fought with great persistence .for 
the necessity of a special iron foundry base for machine tool building" : they 
had succeesed and now the central foundry lrould soon be l.n operation. However, 
the thr~e Moscow machine tool factories alone would need 30,000 tonnes a year 
1.,Yestn1k metallopromvshlen.nosti, 1932 ,rio .10, p.57. 
2.'Zalnd. ,2).6.)4. 
) . lbld • • ? .? . )1. 
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at full capacity and this made it es~ential to build 'Tsentrolit'No,2 as quickly 
1 
as possible. 
In the autumn of 1931 a vigorous campaign developed for the creation of 
sepecialised, centralised preparatory capacity during the Second Five-year Plan. 
'"'a:::lier in the year there had been intermittent discussion of problems of 
specialisation, concentration and cooperation , notably in connection with initial 
plans for the development of the Urals-Kuznetsk Complex. ~n the course of thi s 
discuss ion so~e extreme positions were put forward as a number of economists 
and technical specialists called for the ' taking of specialisation to its limit ' ,2 
In October 1931 sup~orters of this tendency launched a campaign to make 1932 
a ' year of specialisation and cooperation' with the intention of securing 
the fullest poss ible application ofthese principles in the Second Five-year Plan. 
From the start the building of cetral foundries and forges was a central element 
of policy and most particpants, following previous practice , favoured regional 
semi-fabricates factories, rather than organisation on a branch basis . One • 
participant , Reisler , specifically singled out btankoob"edinenie for criticism 
for its intention to build two ' centrolits' in Moscow for its own use.3 All 
participants expressed concern over the continued practice of building ' closed ' 
factories and the tendency of branches to avoi d any relationship with enterprises 
of other branches. lhis ' departmentalism' and 'localism ' was, they alleged, 
threatening the development of industry . 
At the Seventeenth Party eonference in ~ebruary 1932 Kuibyshev , outlining 
policy for the engineering industry in the ~econd Five-year Plan , call ed for 
the -construction of ' narrowly specialised preparatory factories (casting, stamping , 
and forg1ng)4 , This edict must have given encouragement to those fighting for 
far-reaching process specialisation, and in the following three to four months 
reports began to ap~ear of decisons taken b.Y different regions on specialisation 
policy for the new Plan period , together with draft plans for the construction 
1 .~.,7 .1 1.31. 
2 • See the next c·ha oter • 
3 .Bol' shevik, 1932 ,No .1-2, p. 102 . 
4 .Kuibyshev , V. V. , I zbannye proizvedeniya ,H. , 1958, p .338 . 
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of new central foundries and forges. Thus in I1arch 1932 it was reported that 
~osccw intended to organise four regional ' centrolits' to be linked with 
aetallurgical factories , and also a central forge ; Leningrad was to build a 
n~~ber of regional 'centrollts' ( ten to twelve in all) so that only seven or 
eight factories would retain their own foundry shops; Nizhni~•ovgorod krai 
intended to organise a la~ge-scale ' centrolit ' for serving the engineering 
1 
industry of th~ region . At this tir:!.e Sta!lkoob" edinenle caused some annoyance 
to the upholdersof regional ' centoltts ' by its determination to adopt a branch 
so, ut.lon. Early in 1932 the ob,.edlnenie put forward a new idea for solving 
the castings probleoat two of the new enterprises, Gor ' k11 and Khar'kov t combines 
were to be built , lncorpr orating two or more machine tool factories plus a 
foundry to serve the combine as a whole. The Gor' kii. combine was to be based 
on the milling machine factory and was to include factories for the productio n 
of gear- cutting machines, grinding machines and lathes, while the Khar ' kov combine 
was to have factories :for maktng drilling and gri.ucilng machines. This approach 
was presumably ndopted with a vie~~ lo obtain l.ng economies of scale 1a castings 
pro~uct1on. 2 These plans were to be shortllved. 
In t.hP second half of 1932 t,hP Noscow • cen troJ it ' , • Stan.kol it' entered 
s~rvice and thP- t~o main new enterprises began to serlouslv assimilate production . 
At ftrst the im.Ordzhcnikidze and Gor ' ~i i factories had to dra~ on a range 
of castings suppliers because • St,ankolH' was unable to .meei· their needs . Supplies 
were erratic and7Poor quality , wh1ch ~eatly ~l~dered ass imilation of new 
m.:>dels . Towards the end of 19)2 and dw:lng 1933 there were frequent complaints 
in the press about the poor work of 'Stankolit' , notably f rom the Gor'kii 
fact~ry which seems to have been oarticularly badly affected , partly because 
it· wa.s 450 .km. awQ.y from Hoscow , but also because it was f orced to supplecent 
its castings supply from a number of other sources, sor1e of \oihich were LL"lder 
other glavkl. Dlfflcultles were especially bad in relation to castings for new 
nOC.els - SU.Ppliers could not be bothered with small orders , but 'adopted an 
l.Ek.Zhizn' , 14,.J .)2. 
2 .Q>id .; Sii, 1932 ,No.4, p .21; Ek .Zhi~n' , 23.6 .)2. 
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a~'lti-state CO!JUI\erclal approach' •1 These proble!lls forced Al ' perovlch to 
a¥~owledge at the First All-Un ion Conference 1n July 1933 that the castings 
situat1o!'l was far from satisfactory 1 "It is necesaary to say directly as 
and this refirs above all to my9elf , 
self-crltlcism, that we mechanics \mekhaniki)sornewhat underestimated the 
complexity and difficulty of assimilating iron castings; and we are paying 
for tt'' •2 
In 193J there was criticism of the poor work of ' Stankol1t• ,but the 
policy of building the central foundry was not publicly criticised. The first 
public questioning of t he policy of separating foundries from the mac~ine tool 
enterprises was voiced 1n April 1934 by a leading engineer , Shifrin , who asked : 
" •.• is lt not expedient for large machine tool factories to have t.h(lir mm 
foUlldries?" • .3 Shifrin directly related the need for such a reassessment with 
the change in the industry's general policy which had taken place since the First 
Five-year Plan . Formerly factories had been projected for the building of only 
two or threF types each on a mass bas t s , now they were striving to rapidly 
w1ien the product range so that ench factorv would be butldtng up to fifteen 
types and sizes , some on a small batch basis • In the new circUJI'Istances Shifrin 
considered that building fo~,dries at each large factory was the only ~ay to 
ensure high qual i ty castings . The difficult situation at th~ Gor ' k11 factory 
provoked another observer , Tarlinsk11, into an angry denunciation of the Glavk' s 
whole pol i cy wi t h re.gerd to castings supply & " • . • the co 1struct.lon of machine 
tool buil di ng factories wi thout t~air own foundr y shops, and equalJy the llqidatlon 
4 
of foundry shops at old ~~~.ach11le tool factories , was a most flagrant. error" • 
He ~eed that 1n theory there were benefits to be derivedfromthe centralisation 
of casti ngs producti on - concentration of resources , ease of mechanisation ,etc . -
but tn r elation to the Gor ' k11 factory at l east he believed that in practice 
results had been disas terous . Castings received from ' Stankollt ' were extremely 
unsatisfac t ory and suppl y was m~de even worse by the situation on the railways . 
l.~priyatie ,No .15-16 , p.zo. 
~2 .St enosraamy , op cit, o.26 . 
l ~.Predpriyatle k19J4 ,N~ .19, p.5. 
3.Zar6a.,z.4.J • 
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.But a strong additional arg~ raisd by Tarlinskil was that 1n the period of 
assimilation of new models it was essential for designers to participate in t the 
making of castings ; this was impossible for designers of the Gor 1 k11 factory and 
th~ situation was exacerbated by the fact that all pattern maktng had also been 
centralised 1n Moscow . fhe result was that whole batchPS of castings received 
fro11 1 Stankollt I had to be scrap red because of des1gn errors. . Finally, he a)9) 
noted that at the time of its commissioning the works had had no forgings base 
and suppli es had been obtained oaly through the personal contacts of the director 
with other enteprise directors . In order to secure supplies a s~lJ forge had 
been organised , meeting 40 per cent of requirements, but by October 19J4 a 
proper mechanised forge was under construction . 
Clearly if the original plans of t he Glavk had be~n reallsed t.he construction 
of foundries :ot both Khar ' kov and Gor ' kii would have t aken place during the 
~econd Five-y~ Plan as part of the project for the creation of combines , bu t 
by late 19JJ this sche e had been abandoned leaving the two Jarge enterprises 
totally dependent on outside suppliers , frequently located at considerable 
distance. Gor ' kil was supplied by 1 Stankoll t 1 , lm . TsK ···Rshinostro~nl~, 'Komsomolets • , 
1m .Sverdlova (Len tngrad) , ~he neighbouring ' Dviga tel' RevolyutsH I works and a 
number of other engineering factories . 1 Khar 1 kov was supplied prir.1arUy by 
the Odessa tm .-enina works, but also by about fifteen other engineering factories , 
2 some located B.s far a:fteld as Ufa ,Tashkent, and Ryazan . In these circumstances 
tt was hardly surprising that demands for the constructl.on of on-site foundries 
began to be r aised . Action was forthoa.dng , although the GJavk seems to have been 
very reluctant to alter its oolicy . In April 19J4 there was a report that worK 
was to start o~ a foundry shop at the Khar 1 kov factory: this was to be a powerful 
shop with a capacity of 18, 000 tonnes a year . Construction work began before 
the end of the ear . 3 At the Gor ' kii factory action was also taken after 
persistent demands by the factor y for GUSIP to remedy the situation . It was at 
.(_...J...., 
fil'st decided that a smal 1 f ee' -.y of 1 , 500 t&nnes capacity would be built 1n 
1. rotd . 
2~~' kovskii stankostro1te1 1 nye ,oo cit,p .J4 . 
3 .~. :Zaind. ,2J .4 . J4 . 
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order to cover r equirements for prototypes . At the same time Gipromash was 
ex~loting the possibility of building a second , larger foundry of 1) ,000 tonnes 
a year capacity , but this was not included in the 1935 Plan.1 
The building of foundries at Khar ' kov and Gor ' kli did not amount to a 
rejection by the Glavk of the policy of specialisation and centralisat ion of 
2 
castings supnly . In 1935 GUSIP in fact t ook over the Leningrad 'Tsentrolit' 
and inthe fol lowing year the TDaisi 'Tsentrollt ' also joined the Glavk , primarily 
as a castings base for the r >Cently transfered im .Kirova factory . Furthermore , 
the new Kiev im.Gor ' kogo automatic machine tool factory , construction of which 
be~a~ in 19)4, was not originally provlderl with its own foundry • capacit y was 
developed only later during the Third Five-year Plan, but by 1940 this amounted 
to only 2, 000 tonnes a year . J Thus , the policy of supplying castings on a 
cooperation basis was not rejected , but was to some extent modified . It is 
notable in this context that in 1935 and 19)6 there were a number of report s· 
that the work of ' Stankolit ' was i mproving and certainl y the volume of public 
crttictAtll diminished. In fact after 1934 there was hardly a single criticism 
of the central foundry ' s work on the part of representatives of the ' Krasnyi 
Proletarii ' and im .Drdzhonikidze factories , the two most fully dependent on its 
activities , apart from conplaints about the excess ive allowances ( a general 
problem not speci fic to 'Stankolit ' ) and the rough form in which castings were 
supplied . 4 
In an articl e at the end of 1936 the director of ' Stankolit ' ,Fantalov, one 
of the most ardent supnorters of the concept of ' centrolits' , also supported 
modiFication of the original policy of ~eeting all re1uirements f rom centralised 
foundries . Fantalov criticised the Glavk for its policy of making ' Stankolit ' 
produce castings for the tooling industry as well as for machine to•'ls: the 
universal ism of the foundry ' s product range was regarded as a major source of 
1 .Predpri~e , 1934,Ifo . 19 , p . 5. 
2. The 9Pe~ied by Granick on the basis of the above- cited Tarlinskii articler 
'By lat e 1934 this poli cy of process specialisation bad been recog~ised as a 
mistake ' (pp.81-82) . But 'Iarlinskii o;.1as writing as an independent JOurnalist 
and not as a s pokeman of the Glavk which , from ~arlinksii ' s own account ,strongly 
r esisted the erosion of its policy. 
3 .Piashinostroenie 8 . .40 . 4.Zaind ., 15. ) . )4; 9 . 1 .36 . 
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the factory's probleas of quality and h~h cost . It was not the job of 'Stankolit' 
to produce aJ.1 t.h'l castin#r.s required by GUSIP, he stresse4. Some I!IB.Ch1ne tool 
factories had their own SMll 'foundries, he noted, but instead of using the!!! 
to moet their neAds for small batch and individual castings they tried to satisfy 
t eir general castinEtS needs , preventing •Stankolit.' from fulfilling its role 
ns the main base for Moscow machine tool build1ng . Thus Fantalov was arguing 
for sttuatlon in which factori es would meet t~eir own neods for one-of£ and 
sMall batch cttstings for orototypes and special l!lodcls , leaving ' Stankollt' to 
concentrate on batch castings •1 
In 1937 and 193~ wlth the replacement of the industry ' s leadership past 
pollees were subjected to critical review. But at this time hardly any cr1tic1os 
was cade of the policy of centralising castings sup ~Y I rather the Glavk's 
practical realisation of the policy was attacked and blamed for bringing the 
idea of ' centrolits'1nto di~pute. Thus Shestopal' and Berti sserted that , 
"The prevailing negative relationship to 'centrolits' because of the poor work 
of the Moscow 'Stankolit' factory, stems not from th unsoundnes of the idea 
of ' centro) its' , but exclusively from shortco ~nge of c6nstruct1on and 
leadership" . 2 There were frequent accusations at th1a time th"1 t. the construction 
of the 'centrol!ts• had been deliberately delayed• th action of 'wreckers' 
acr-ord1ng to !err1 in 1938. 3 
It. is clear that foundry capacity at the entepr1s s ~as increased during 
the ;:,econd and Third Five-year Plan periods , but the construction of foundry 
shops at the ne~ factories previously without the was slow. Investcent 
resources were scattered over any projects and the building offoundry capacity 
appears to have had lower priority than the extension of basic machining- assecbly 
shop capacity . The Khar'kov factory's foundry , start d in 1934 had not been 
4 
completed by 1940, although in operation at an earlier date. A foundry and 
fnrg~ere under construction tn the Second Five-year lllan at the Gor'k11 
factory , but the foundry was not finished by 1940.5 At t~e end of 1939 tbe 
1.~. ,10.12.36. 
2.Plan .Khoz . ,1937 ,No.7 , p . 28 . 
J • .!lli., 19,3A,lio .9 ,p.39;see also Sii, 1937 ,No.19,p .2. 
4.Khar'khovsk1i stankostroitel 'nve~oo c1t,pp.J1-34 .In 934 the factory was still 
_ beln supDJ.ted bv twelve factories.I'ashinostroen1e.18.l . 0 • 
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'Stankokonstruktsiya ' factory reported t~4t it now able to make its own large 
casti~s and was free from dependence on 'Stankolit ' •6 The new Saratov factory 
was building a foundry in 19407 , while the Krasnodar im.'"'edina factory 
~ad its own large fouodry and supplied other machine tool factories in addition 
to providing castings for the Metro.8 Thus by the war almost all Soviet 
machine tool factories had t~etr o~n £OQqdry capacity, ~lth the exception of 
'Krasnyi £roletarii' and im.Lrdzhonikid?.e and even in these cases it is possib1e 
that small foundries were built during the ' thirties to facilitate the building 
of prototypes, special and heavy machines. By the end of the 1930s the 
machine tool industry ent.eprises wP-re obtaining over half their castings from 
specialised producers on a co~peration basis, a higher proportion than for any 
other branch of engineering? the average proportion for which was one sixth~O 
Before assessing the machine tool innustry's policy for castings supnly 
lhe history the three central foundries w11J now be briefly reviewed , and the 
abortive project for a central foundry,'tsentrokuz ' , considered, 
'Stankoli t ' 
The early history of this central foundry has already been discussed. 
Originally intended for Mosmashtrest , it was projected by Gipromash on the basis 
o~ materials sup 0lied by Orgametall, suggesting possible German technical 
ass1stc.nce~1 It was transfered to the machine tool i ndustry in 1931 and began 
operation in the following year , although at the time far from compJ ete. irom 
the start there were many serious problems stem~ing from lack of experience, the 
non-completed const ruction and poor leadership on the part of the Clavk • .......... 
According to pl~s the full estimated value of the ~oundry should have been 
28,6 million rubles , but by the beginnin~ of 1933 only 12.3 million rubles worth 
of work bad been carried out12 • For 1933 planned output was 13,500 ton~es; in fact 
output achieved only 7,500 tonne~~ The official commissioning of ' Stankolit' 
5~Hashinostroenie , 15.2 . 40 . 
6 .~.4. 11.39 . 
7.ibid .,8. ),40. 
8,so-fet Krasnodar skii stankostro1tel ' ny1 ,Krasnodar,1961,p .7;Plan .Khoz. , 1938,No .7 ,p .51 
9.Berri ,L.Ya ,Spet sializats1ya i kooperirovanle v promyshlennosti SSSR..t.H . , 1954,p.252. 
10 ,Vo1kov ,s.A::Trudy Leni AAradskop:o inzhenerno- ekonornicheskogo instituta 1m. 
V .~1 .!1olo+.ova-;vyp.3 ,1947 , p.8J • 
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(at the time called the factory im.Voroshilova, a name never used in practice) 
took place in March 1934 and it was then descri~ed as a fully mechanised works 
having superior equipment to th~ casting shops of the new tractor factories 
of ~tallngrad and Khar'kov and the Gor'kii automobile works! approximately 
seventypercent of machine tool castings were formed with the aid of machines~ 
During the years 1933 and 1934 the poor work of 'St~kollt' earned it the 
reputation of being the worst factory in Moscow .3 One of the most serious problems 
was the low quality of castings produced. fhe spoilage rate in the first quarter 
of 1935 represented 36 per cent of gross output, but this was exceptional 4 
For 1936 the annual average was 20per cent rejects, 19)7 17 .7 per cent and 19)8 
17.o per cent. 5 These high rates must be sePn in the light of the generally 
high rate of casting rejects at the time: in 1937 for machine building as a whole 
the rate was 17 .8per cent , and for the machine tool indust·y as a whole, 19.J 
6 per cent . ' Stankolit's performance in this respect was in fact suo .erior 
-~ 
to that of some of the even larger foundry shops of the tractor factories,e .g . 
spoilage at the Chelyabinsk tractor factory was 2J.O per cent in 1936 and 
24.6 in 1937.7 The p~or quality of castings supplied to the factories caused 
considerable losses both thro~h such faults as excessive hardness and above 
al~ because of the excessively large and variable allowances , which necessitated 
additional ro~h machining and complicated the use of fixtures and the maintenance 
of technological discipline.8 Furthermore, castings were supplied 1n unfettled 
form , forcing the factories to organise special fettling facilities~ In 1935 
and 1936 t~ere ao ears to have been some improvement in ' Stankolit ' s performance , 
but t~is does not seem to have been maintained. 
The performance of 'Stankolit' was evidently poor , but it is also clear 
11 .10 let Orgametall , oo cit , p.65. 
12 .Rroekt vtoroYo pyatiletnego pla.~a razvitiya narodno~o ~~ozyaistva SSSR,M.,1934, 
Vol.l . supplemen~Osnovnye ob"ektv kaoital ' no~o stroitel ' stva , ,pp .49-49. 
13.~ •• 10.12 .32;6.1 . ) 4. 
1.~, 1934 ,No . 6 , o .38 . 
2.Volkov ,op c1t , p.91 . 
' :Zalnd .,28. 10.J5. 
5.Vol~ov,op cit,p .92. In 1940 the primary causes of spoilage were as follows , 
blisters 43.7per cent of total ; sand and slag inclusions 20.9 per cent; 
~correct dLnensions 17 per cent , and cracks 7.1 per cent (ibid) . 
6.Flao.Kho?.,1937,No .?,p.23. 
? .Volkov ,op cit ,pp . 112-113. 
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ther~ were a number of substantial reasons for the situation, largely beyond the 
control of the factory itself. The two basic problems were ,first, that the 
construction of the f oundry was not completed as originally planned and,second, 
that the Glavk did not provide satisfactory conditions for its viable operation . 
The project capacity of the factory was 30,000 tonnes a year , to be reached 
by the end of 1936. In fact , cap city at the end of 1936 was only 18-20,000 tonnes .1 
But at this time the foundry was being expanded, not for t~e pre>duct1on of 
cachine t ol castings, but for casting tubing for the Metro .2 The non-completion 
of const~uction meant that patterns had to be stored in the street or scattered 
around the shops , leading to damage and consequent waste of cast1ngs .3 On the 
second point , as noted above , the Glavk expected 'Stankolit ' to produce castings 
for the tooling industry , despite the £act that the activity was very different 
from its basic task. This universalism of produr.tion was seen by supporters 
of the central foundry as a major re!lsoo for the high cost of castings . 
In the Third Five- year Plan period the work of 'Stankolit' reo1ned 
unsatisfactory• at the tiecond ~11-Unton 
d 
1938 it was reg8fed as one of the three 
~onference of Foundrymen in ~ecember 
4 worst foundries 1n the country. Pro oleii.S 
reported in 1940 were familiar: the progr&JIIJ\e of castings for small batch ~~~&chine 
tools was not fulfil1ed, castinge were not supplied in the necessary sets, delivery 
tiaes were erratic, the proportion of scrap was high and allowances were excess1ve .5 
6 
By 1939 capacity had beDn increased te 55,000 tonnes and was still being expanded, 
but 1t appears that much of this extra capacity was not used for machine tool 
buildlfl! . 
'Tsentrolit' 
The history of the ~en1ngrad cent~l fouddry, 'Tsentrolit' bas a numbP.r of 
s!Jtllarities with that of 'Stankolit ' . The constructien of a central foundry to 
8.S1I ,1933 ,No .1 0, P• 9 . 
9 .Pla.n .Khoz . , 1938 ,No .7 ,p.51 ;Za.ind •, 9 .1 .36 • 
LZ&lnd , ,10.12 .36 . 
2.Za.Ind , ,28 .5.36; Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan na 19J6g. ,1•1 . , 1936,p.J28. 
) .Pia:n:'Xhoz. ,1938 ,N e.6, p .8? • 
• Volkov ,op ctt ,p .91. 
5.Plan .Khoz. ,1940 ,No.11- 12,p. 146 • 1939 M L 6.~osudarstvenny1 plan razv1tiya narodno~o khozy~ 1stva soyuza SSR vg. , . - • • 
'919 ,p.262. 
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serve eogineeri.ng factories subordinated to Lenu.sht:rest was discussed by the 
CollegiUJI of Glavmashinstroi as early as December 1928. It was then envisaged 
that this regional foundry would fully meet the needs of the Metallichesk11 
factory lm.Stalina, ' Rasskli Dizel' • , ' Elektroslla' and the 1m.Sverdlova machine 
tool factory~ The project , completed by March 1930, was elaborated first ~ 
2 Cipromez , later by Gipromash, and a capacity ef 40,000 t (mnes & year was envisaged. 
With the dissolution of Lenmashtrest the central foundry was transfered to 
the 'Kotloturbina ' trust~ Construction began in August 1930.4 Early in 1932 
lt was envisagedthat the ' centrolit ' would supply castir~s to six Leningrad 
enterprises, including im.Sverdlova, with an output of 13,000 ·tonnes 1n 193J 
rising to 60, 000 tonnes 1n 1937.5 Considerable cost savings were predicted: 
'Tsentrolit ' was projected for an average per tonne cost of castings of 273 
rubles , compared with ~ level of 559 rubles at the im.Sverrllova factory 1n 
Uecember 19)2.6 
In December 1932 the question of f or who11 the foundry was being built was 
raised in the press . By this tiae it was in operation , but far fron cemplete. 
Factories which were to have been supplied from it were ept1ng out and beginnin! 
to build their own foundriP.s so t~t 'Kotloturbina' was ~eing forced to accept 
haphazard orders in order to use the capac! ty. 7 Accerding to the original project 
the foundry was to have consisted of two sections, one of small castings of up 
to 100kg., having a catmcity of 12,250 tonnes, and one of large castings ,of up 
to 25 tonnes, wi tb a capacity of 28,000 tonnes. The twe shops were to share 
8 common auxiliary services andthis was to be a major source of scale economies. 
In fact only the shop of l~e cast 1.ngs was bull t, an.<l by the end of 1932 even 
this was only half completed and mec~n1sat1on ef casting was almost non-existent? 
l.Tore:.-prom .gaz. ,6 . 12.28. 
2. ibid. ;I7.vestiya ,6 .? .30 . 
).Izvestiya,6.7 .JO . 
4,Volkov,op cit,p.90. 
5·.1i_let bor'by za sovetskoe mashl.nostroenie,L.-M. , 19J2,p.261. 
6.Zalod., 3.12.32 . 
? ,ibid. 
a.Vo'ikov,op cit , p .90. 
9.~. ,).12.)2. 
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Tbe problem of demand and tbe non-compl et i on of t he foundry led to a slow 
rate of growth of out_put . In 1934 only ? , 1V~ to .. .nes of castings were produced , 
1 
risin~ t o 10,913 t onnes 1n 1936 , although the 1935 pl~n had pr ovided f or an 
output of 1). 000 tonnes .2 In 1935 'Tsentrolit ' was transfered t o GUSIF as a 
central fo~~dry for the machine tool industry in general, and the im.Sverdlova 
factory 1n particular , but castings for other branches still formed a l arge 
part oftotal output) Factories supplied from :the leningrad fnctory in 
19)6 included ' Kcasnyi Prol etarii ', the Khar ' kov factory and the Zlatoust tooling 
4 works . Plans for the develop ent of the foundry were reviewed and it was 
decided that the building of planing machines at the neighbouring 1m.Sverdlova 
factory would be transfered to a shop of henvy machine building at 'Tsentrolit' . 
Construction of this shop began in June 1937 and at the same time tbe two 
enteTprises were combined . In the following year , however , construction of the 
new shop ceased ann both ent~rises regained t~eir tndependence.5 In 1938 
castings f~r machine t ool build1np represented just over half total output of 
the foundry; ot ·er castings wer e "'.ade f<~r turbine building and the I~oscow 11etro . 
In 1940 output reached 12 ,805 tonnes , B4 per cent representing machine tool 
c·1stings.6 In 1941 the centr al foundry was renamed , 'Lenstankol1t ' .7 
As with the Moscow foundry many of the problems of ' Tsentrolit ' stemmed 
fro~ the fact that its construction was not completed - before the War capacity 
was only hal f that originally pl anned . Overheads '•ere extraordinarily high 
because equi pment installed was designed for a considerably larger output than 
that achieved . FurtherMore, many shops were not finished , including the repair 
shop, pattern and other stores , and a shop for rough machining and painting of 
castings , The non- completion of auxiliary shops ~eant that mueh production area 
was used instead . r educing capacity and product1v1ty ,Nevertheless , before the 
~ar the cost of castings su~plied by 'Tsentrolit ' was no higher than at other 
Leningrad foundries proNuclng equivalent castings and labour productivity was 
hlR.)ler then at foundry shops of such factorl~s as' 'Russki1 Dizel '' and i.m.Stalina , 
which should have been supplied by the central foundry ac,.ording to the origl.J.al 
plans .s 
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Tbaisi 'Tsentrolit' 
In the late 1930s the machine tool glavk possessed a third central foundry 
ln T~lsi . Construction of this .factory began 1n 1930 and by 1939 it han a 
1 
capacity of 2 , 500 tonnes , although it ~as originally intended to have a capacity 
2 
of 10,000 tonnes . Prior to 1936 this foundry apt:ears to have served a wide 
range of enterprises , in particular engineering factories as~ociated with "the 
3 oil industry, With the transfer to GU'IP of the im .Kirova factory from the oil 
engineering industry , the 'Tsentrollt' became a specialised machine tool industry 
4 foundry , supplying im. Kirova , which did not possess its own castings ~~se . 
The Central Forge Project 
The questicn of building ' tsentrokuzy ' , central forges on the lines of, 
th2 central foundries , was raised on a number of ocassions during the F lrst 
F 1ve- year Plan . Hezhlauk argued for powerful central forges as eru:ly as May 
19285, ann in 1931 the newspaper Ekonomicbeskava Zhizn ' promoted a vigorous 
campaign for their construction , wi t.h the partic.ipatlon of members of t.he 
Coi'Uillllunlst Aca emy and Gosplan6 • I n March 1932 it was reported that a central 
forge was to be built 1n Moscow to serve the regi.on during the ~econd Five-year 
Flan. .7 At. sone point early in the Second Plan GUSIF decided l:.o build a central 
forge to se1.·ve tne machine tool industry, locating it at the f·iurom ' 3tankopatron ' 
factory , 8 In tht? autumn of t9J4 it was reported that this forge was being 
equipped, and in August 1 Jf Lapin, chief engine"r of the Glavk. reported that 
the central forge wotud be commissioned by the end of the year ,9 However , 1n 
a detailed review of thP. state of cooperation ln the branch ln early 1937 
Al ' perovich made no mention of this prnJect , and Berrl, wrU.1ng in 1938 , observed 
10 
that the forgings base had not l:een strengthened. The fact that this project 
was not mentioned again after 1936 must mean either that it was abandoned, or 
that the forge was compl~ted but used for other purposes • 
1 .2inegenov .,V .F . ,Lenln.ttadskll. komnunisty v bor ' be za tekhnicheskuyu rekonstruktsiya 
nromvshlennosti ,L . , 1972, p. 24. 
2.Froblemy ekonomiki , 1935 ,No .4 ,_p .193 .• 
J.Borisov and Vasil'ev,oo cit,pp.1P,2-18J. 
h.za.lnd. ,3 . 2 . 37. 
5.Bortsov and Vasil ' ev , op clt , p.1°2. 
6. tb1d. j pp182-183. I 
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An Assessroent 
Faced with a backward,universalist structure of industry lnherlted from 
Tsarist Russia,Soviet planners and technical specialists from about 1928 
resolved resolved to transform the engineering industry by adopting the 
pro~essive prineiples of proces~ specialisation then highly developed in 
Germany and also practiced 1n the USA and to a lesser extent 1n Britain . In 
182 
practice project organisations ~~d planners favoured the building of regional 
central founnries and to a limited extent this idea was incorporated in the First 
Five-year Flan . The machine to~l industry , following Ger1Bn practice , was 1n the 
forefront of this movement for orocess specialisation and projected its 
enter,p±ises accordingly . The industry favoured branch ' centroli ts', but 1n the 
event had to take over an existing project originally intended as a regional 
foundry, because tm,e and in~estment resources were lacking . 1nvisaglng rapid 
development of the industry the branch leadership intended to build further 
central foundries to serve other new enterprises or combines. With the sharp 
reduction in the plan ed rate of development of the industry which occured tn 
1931 these plans had to be abandoned , leaving the Gor ' kii and Khar ' kov factories 
without _ local castings bases . The supply arrangements established for these 
enterp:tises were unsatisfactory and after pressure t"le gJavk agreed to build 
foundry shops . Nany problems were experienced with the central foundries; their 
construction dragged out and thev suffered from poor leadership on the part of 
7.3orisov and Vasil ' ev,op cit , p.269 .In the post:.War years plans for uniting 
' Lenstankol it ' and lm .Sverdlova were reallsed.The former began to build machine 
tools from 1955 and in 1959 thP. two ent~rprtses werP. combined (ibid. , pp271-274) 
~.ibid ., o . 182 ; Volkov,op cit , o~ .92-9J . 
1.GOSUdarstvenny1 olan • • ,1939 , op cit , p.262 . 
2 .1~~oriya industrializatsii Gruzhlnskoi ~SR , 1926-194t ,Tbil1si,1968,p . J65. 
3.~ . , p.509 . 
4. ibido ,pp. 556 f 822 I 
5 .Tor~. -orom ,gaz ., 8.).28 . 
r
6 .~konomicheskaya zhizn ' , 22 . 11 . 31 ; 15.11.)1. 
8.Fredpriyat1e , 1934, "lo .19 , r .5. 
7 .Ekonomichesk"' ya zhiz n ~ 14.3. 32 • 
9 .Plan ,khoz. , 1934,Ho.8- 9 , p . 2~ ;Za.Lnd. , ) .8 .)6. 
10.~. ,9 . 1 .37 ;Plan • .n.hoz. ,19J8,no.9 , p . )1. 
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·the Glavk, ... hese problel'!s served to tliscredH the very idea of specialisation 
by proce s tbr.oughout the engine""ring industry. t,evertheless , the e1ach1ne tool 
industry rlid not reject the pr1nciple: ' Stankolit' conttnued to be the main 
supplier of the Moscow machine tool factories and by the ~ar half of all castings 
supplied ln the branch were on a cooperation basis, a higher proportion than in 
~ny other br?~ch , 
There w~re a nwnber of powerful argUJ!lents in favour of centra11sin;;; castings 
production . The organisation of large-scale specialised foundries would permit 
the use of mechanised techniques and sp~cial equipment wh1ch were un1~ofitable 
in the small foundries attached to engineering factories . This had particular 
force in Soviet conditions of the late ' twenties when many factories of the 
industry had small, primitive foundries relying on hand work. Furthermore , 
central foundries would permit the concentration of sktlled wnrkers and specialists 
with a knowledge of casting technology , an important factor in the machine tool 
inrt ustry in view of its high qt~lity requirements . The organisation of spectal 
foundry factories would also permit economies of scale ln t~e provision of 
1 auxiliary services - pattern making , repairs,etc. . At the bet-inning of the 
Fl~st Five-yAar Plan these potential advantages of central founrlries appear 
lo have been sePn in a rather abstract way, without account of the conditions 
which would make the theoretical benefits tangible. Insufficient account was 
taken of the degree of specialisation in terms of the homogeneity of castings 
required for the introduction of mechanised techniques securing 
worthwhtle cost savings . The question of design stabiltty and the need to allow 
for technical chan~es appears to have been overlooked, while theproblems of 
buiiding and assimilating lArge-scale new capacity were greatly underestimated. 
The former problem of securing hornoeenei ty of castings was particularly acute 
for the regional foundry approAch: the 'centrolits' as originally conceived were 
in fact highly universal enterprises serving a very broad range of users: in the 
case of the Leningrad 'Tsentrolit ' its level of mechanisation would,as a result, 
have been lower than at some ... actory foundry shops. A final general difficulty 
was also underestimated _ the probleJil of securing stable cooperation and supply 
l .See Volkov 
00 
cit pp.85-86 on the economic benefits of central foundries, 
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relattons in the cond1 tions of the Soviet econoey of the period. 
As Al'perovich admitted in 19J3.,the complexity of the pro·olem of securing 
the machine tool industry a regular supply of good quality c~stings was seriously 
underestimated.The pxoblems experienced llere closely related to the general 
question of the str8tegy of dev6lopment of the branch . At the time when the 
castings policy was adopted the branch was enter~g the second phase of its 
development with stress on the large-scale production of a limited range of 
products . Given these conditions the policy of building central foundries had 
a definite logic a the large-scale,relatively stable demand for castings would 
permit the use of mechanised techniques and offer the posslbiltty of reaping 
economies of scale . If in 1929-30 the prospect of a m\lCh broader pro:luct ra.nt;e 
subject to regular technical change had been foreseen , and foreign experience 
examtned a little more cr1tical1y,rather different policy conclusions might 
have been reached . 
The biggest problem experienced when machine tool factories were dependent 
on outside supnlie~s for castings was securing requirements for new codels and 
one-off machines . The making of ca stings for prototypes requires very cl~e 
cooperation between designers, pattern makers and foundrymen : fre uent changes 
of design and technology may be unavoidable before satisfactory permanent 
solutions are ~ound. From 193J when the product range began to expand rapidly 
and the building of specialised and special machines on an individual and small-
batch basis began to be pursued as a regular activity alongside the medium and. 
large b~tch production of general-purpose machines acute problems arose. The 
foundries were despeciallsed and t~e essential close contact with the factories 
was lacking, in particular for the Gor'k11 factory located at a dtstance from 
.·loscow. Thus, in deciding to take the path of orocess specialisation the industry 
seriously underestimated the implications of technicC!l development. and the 
broadening of th@ product range. 
If foreign practice had be~n examined more closelj it migbt have bee~ seen 
that there was some relationship between the scale of foreign machine tool 
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factories and the pattern of supply , In Germany , where sub-contracting was highly 
develoged , the majority of machine tool factories were small . In Britain t her e 
were a number of quite large factories,e .~.Herbert ,Lang ,Asquith , Arc~~ale,etc .,all 
smaller than those built in the USSR during the First Five-year Plan , but all 
possessing their own foundry capac1ty .1 In the USA a stm~ tendency could 
have been observed . As the V~~Kh report of 1929 on technical development during 
the First Five- year PVm itself noted, without. comnent, the Cincinnati milling 
machine factory , the l argest in the USA , had built its own foundry as early as 
1911 in order to secure a higher quality oroduct than could be obtained on a 
sub-contract basi s . 2 Thls trend was alsD noted by hagoner in his history of 
the A111erican machine tor-1 lndustry :"There was a trend during the fl.rst decades 
of the t.wentieth century amonfT the larger tool builders to acquire or establish 
their olin foundries and ·t.hereby free th~mselves from the dependence of the not 
always very rel table services of the custom foundries". 3 These larger firms 
in both countries produced a w:i.de :range of ,Products and were 1n the vanguard 
of technical progress . 
These considerations suggest that a more rattonal policy for the Glavk 
in the Second Five- year Plan would have been to adopt the solution ut for"Ward 
by Fantalov , the director of ' ·ta.nkollt ' in 19,36. The central foundries should 
have been completed and freeo from a]l non-machine tool casting activity so 
that they could have concentrated on sup~lyiigcastines for the medium and large 
b:1tch models produce1 by all tbe major factorles , At the same t1me foundry shops 
should have been built at 311 the leading eote;rlses of a suff icient scale to 
meet the demand for prototypes and individual and small batch production models . 
In the event the Glavk's indecisiveness caused unneccessary diff'1culties .On the 
one hand it failed to secure conditions for satisfactory work of the'centrolits' 
(although to some extent this was beyond the Glavk 's control ,e .g .• the pro ltction 
of Het:ro tubing and later , presU!Ila.bly , military items )and on t.he ~ther it allowed 
entep:dses to construct or reconstruct their own foundries on a scale sufficie t 
to neet a11 or most of their requirements. This inevitably led to a scat~ering 
of investmeJLt resources, lon~ construction del2.ys and made it more dif icult to 
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turn the 'centrolits' into viabJe enterprises. One has the i mpression that 
factory managers and possibly members of the Glavk ad.mit1istrat ion were quite 
happy to see the 'centroJits'fail , and took no action in order to improve their 
work 1.n order that the principle of ' own foundries ' would be rehabilitated. They 
were not unsuccessful. 
In the post war years a ~pecialtsation ; recess on the lines of that 
lnnicated above appears to have heen c8rrted out and the perfornance of 'Stankolit ' 
;.;reat'y imp!'oved.According to Berri the cost r.er tonne of castings produced 
by this foundry in 1953 was one half to a third of the level at fou~dry shops 
>f the machine tool factortes . 4 In recent years new 'centrolits' have been 
)Uil t for the machine tool industry and process speci~lisation remains a basic 
5 
~lernent of policy . 
1.0borin ,V . F .,~estni.k metallopromyshlennosti , 1932,J~o.10,pp • .58-62. In his 
enthusiasm for the centralisation of castings nroduction ,Oborin denied t~at 
there was any relationshio between scale and the possesston of foundry capacity 
in the British machine to'11 industry .His own evidence dem0c1strates the contrary. 
:o:st of the larg~st Br~tish fir.;ns did have their own foundry shops ,although 
in somP cases part of requirements were met from outside;the only exceptions 
were ;.,ard t wholJ y dependent on outside supplies) and Churchill ,which obtained 
castinas -from another machine too] factory . Cincinnati 
I 
2 .VSNKh ,Csnovnye rtnii. .,op cit,p.114isee also Hen of nurpose , 1884-1964 ,IH~ 1965 , p. 
J .Wagoner,op cit,p.56. This tendency ha!'l continued since t.he "ar, the largest 
firms again hetng involved cin 1963 only lt out of 800 machine tool firms had 
t heir own f~undrles , but they tended to be the very largest - Drowne & Sharpe, 
Cincinnati , Gisholt,etc •• lhe proportion of castings produced from these 
captive found~tes rose from 12 per cent of total castings produced for the 
i ndustry in 1954 to 34 per cent in 1963 (Eroizvodstvennyi apparat stankostroit-
el ' no i promys"'llennosti SShA ,11. , 1970 , pp .49-.53) 
4.Berri,op cit,p.199. 
5. e have found no evidence to sup ort Granick ' s suggestion that the idea of 
centralisation and specialisation of castings production fell into official d 
disfavour in the years 1940-54. Such works as Shestopal ,Y.M.,Biok v proizvoptve 
stanochnos:o lit'ya,!· .,1945;0m<'l ovskU ,op cit ; Volkov,op cit . and Berr1,1954, 
all supuort the principle but , as opposed to the earlier period, are concerned 
to define more rigorously the conditions of its application, notably the work 
o: Volkov who provides r detailed an~lysis of forms of organisation of castings 
produrtion and the minimum and optimum scale of foun~ries. Berri is scathin g 
about the ideas of the ultra- specialisers of 1931-32 and the building of 
universal regional foundries, but stresses that once properly speci~ltsed , the 
'centrolits ' were profitable enterprises (Berr1 , ~p . 196-199) .Later commentators 
on the ore-war central foundry experience were also agre~d that the principle 
Has correct , but that avoidable mistakes in its realisation served to discredit 
the idea.e .g . ,Oi>!arovskii,A.G. ,~petsializatsiya oroizvodstva 1 razmeshchenie 
nashinostroitel ' noi promyshlennostiSS3R ,~ ., 1959 , p .44 iZabelin ,B .M .,Kontsentratsiya 
.!_spetsializatsiya promyshlennost1 v usloviyakh reformy ,11 .. ,1970,p.21. 
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SoJUe of the probleos of castings suoply were those co a on to all cooperation 
1n the 19JOs and wlll be considred in the following chapter , One dif.s.iculty 
experienced throughout the oeriod was that castings were supplied with excessive 
llvwances. This led to considerable wastage of tal and eo plicated t~e use of 
progressive technological processes a fixtures had to be designed with provision 
for a wide variation 1n the size of castings , nnd rough machining processes 
occupied a rnuch larger role than usual in fore1e;n englnetrrlng with a consequent 
high pronort1.on of Jat"les i n t hemachine tool et;ock , The major. , but not sol e , 
cause of this problem was the oractice of assessing the oorformAnce of foundries 
bv weight . At ttm s there was an element of ve te i~t e~t Ln this practice 
t the factory level,e .g . at toe im .Ordzhonikl ze f ct.ory 1n 1936 it was reported 
th t wor~ers received extra pay for machinin off th exc ss eta1.1 There is 
o doubt th t from the point of view of t~e foundries it was uch easier to 
w •k to large allowances and ~or this reason the pr ctice was widespread before 
2 th start of the First Five-year Plan . 
The machine tool industry experienced many problems with castings and 
forgings Rupply 1n the pre- ar years . But this does not me n that the industry 
was wrong tn at tem1>i inp; to introduce progres 1ve pr\nc1p1 es of organisation at 
tkis time . The fact that the branch ' s 1 eadf>rsh1p d 1d not. just. accomodate itself 
to the traditions of the past and the transitionnl difficulties of the present 
is t~ its creditr to have done so ~ould have b n to abd1cn e lts responsibility 
or raising the general technical and organisational level of the Soviet engineering 
industry • On the other hand the abstract approach of the ultra-specialisers 
of the years 1931 and 19J2, who called for the taki.ogofproce s specialisation 
to its 11m1ts nd reco ::rtended the construction of reglonnl central folL"ld.ries 
and forges and the closing down of factory shops was clearly incorrect and if 
pu lnlo ractice twhlch is was not) would hnve seriously disrupted Soviet 
1mi us tr.y tn tho 1930s . 
1 .~!aehinos troitel ' , 1936 ,No . 10 , p .19 . 
2.SOtolallst1cheskaya rats1onalizats1ra v bor ' be a poteryam1 ,op cit ,p .162 . 
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Chapter 6 
SPECIALISATION BY PARTS lli 11!EORY AND FhACTICt; 
188 
One for of division of labour in engineering production , n ely process 
Epec1al1sat1on , has been considered; a second form ,specialisation by parts, 
Lnvolvlng the organisation of specialised production of particular machine 
ele111ents - parts , sub-assemblies , units ,etc. as a sepa ate acUvtt.y was the 
o joct of live]y debate durtng the First Five-year l~lan podod and had some limited 
pr ct1cal appltcation in subse~uent years . As with procesa sp~ciallsation a 
rrecon11tion for the successf'ul organisation of part specialisation ls ~e 
xlstencc of a sufficently large demann ror rel tiv 1y homog neous lterns, giving 
t e poe ibility of scale economies from the use of spe 1al1s technology, 
c ncentration of certain skills , the er~ective us o cer 1n specialised 
ux111nry serv1ces ,etc. T e regular production of semi-f brlcates or parts on 
specialised basis ~ives rise to the possibility of establishing sub-contracting 
rPla ions betwe n a rnaln factory producin" a finished product and the specialised 
UP"' ters. In Soviet. wrl..ttns:s this rel~tionship ls subsuMed under t.he concept 
of 'coopernt1on' (koopA:r.irovanie) , which CAn fllso have th 111eaning of the joint 
participation of t~o or more enterprises in the re ltsation of a specific project, 
or he us by one enterprise of spare capalcty to produc He s re~uired by 
another ent«pr1se on a more or less peraanent bas1s .Th1c 1 tter form of cooperation 
~y not involve specialisation of production: 1n fact this for of relationship 
7 oronote un1versa11sat1on of production at. a given enta:price . This chapr.er 
1 ievoted to a review of t~e debate on parts specialis t1on and cooperation 
oot.h ln general and as appliej to the machine tool industry , ana also the 
practical evelopment of the principle in the branch in the pre- ar years . 
~he Debate of Speclallsatlon by Parts 
Durins the 1920s rationalisation of production was priMarily directed towards 
e ur1ng conditions for raish~~ the seriality of produ tion at existing machine 
bulldtng enterprises , :which were g~erally of a universal character . At this tll!le 
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specialisation both in theory and oractice tended to be restricted to branch 
snecialisation anc:1 tl)e specialisation of enterprises by type of product . Li'rom 
about 1928 , as related abov~ , process specialisation began to be discussed , 
but in the debate on tl)e ~esirable type of enterprises for the engineering 
industry the ouestion of parts specialisation was ~ar~y raised at all , although 
one contributor,P .Fedorov , did argue that it Mas time to begin to think about 
1 factories making individual parts . 
In 1929 and the first ~ of 1930 there was little public discussion of 
problems of specialisation by parts in the engireering industry, but a number 
of important practical cases arose which helped to set policy for the entire 
First ~ive-yr-ar Plan period. In 1929 a controversy broke out over the reconstruction 
of the AMO vehicle factorv in ~oscow - should it be a complex plant producing 
all main assemblies and components within its own walls , or should it be an 
assembly type factory supolied by specialised parts entevprises? The chief of 
the administration charged with the reconstruction ,M.Sorokin , favoured the former , 
'American ' ,course; the director of the factory,Likhachev, the latter. This policy 
clash, which also involved questions o~ foreign technical assistance , was eventually 
resolved by the Politbureau at the end of ~anuary 1930 in Likhachev' s favour. 
Stalin is reported to have taken the view that the first large factories ha d 
to be of the complex type because assimilation of production would be difficult 
2 
and it would be easner to assist one factory than a dozen. In the 1929-30 period 
it was also decided that the new tract··r factories would be of the entegrated 
type . These rlecisions by no means mean t that these factories made everything 
for themselves : in all cases some major assemblies and parts were supplied from 
specialised producers. 
A turning point in the discussion of the question of spectalisation by parts 
came with the rrom.Party trial in late 1930 . One of the char~es against the 
1.Torg. -prom .gaz . ,3 .8 .28. bil' 
2 .Dlrektor - I. A . Likhachev ,H,, 1971 , pp . 14 and 251 ;Dobrovol ' skii ,E. ,Daesh avtomo · , 
¥. ' 1971 f pp . 50- 59. 
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defendants was that they deliberately held back t he development of production 
soecialisation in the engineering indush-y and the trial seems to have provided 
an opportunity for those favouring far- reaching specialisation to raise the~ 
voices . The first shots in the campaign were fired by Shukhgal ' ter and 
uorokin , the latter now head o~ Stankoimport . The former , in an article entitled , 
'Decisively put an enn to the consequences of wrecking in machine building', 
published while the trial was still in pr~ess , cal1ed for a c~mpaign under 
the banner of ' specialisation and cooperation in machine huilding ' •1 Taking 
advant~ge of this new situation , Sorokin restated the case he must have argued 
a year earlier and which had been rej<"cted by the Poll tbureau. His article 
amounted to a wholesale rejection of the policy adopted by the auto-tractor 
in~ustry of building integrated factories, which were dismissed by SJrokin as 
' universal' enterprises and therefore by implication equaLed with the universal 
entaprises typical of Tsarist 4•ussia . ·An outline of an alternative plan was 
presented , involving the construction of many narrowly-specialised parts producing 
factor es serving asr:;embly plants : this,Sorokin insisted , was a matter not 
2 of the St?.r:ond: Five-year Plan, but the First. 
This article by Sorokin rTas follo-..;ed by further contributions on similar 
lines early in 1931 L1 which he further developed hts arguments and extended 
t~em to the machine tool industry. 3 Further fuel for the debate was applied 
by 6astev's work at the ~entral Institute of Labour: this was used by Perel ' man 
13.nrl others for arguing that the very 'anatomy ' of mod.ern nachines pointed to 
the necessity of building them from standard units producerl by specialised 
factories . It would , Perel' ;v.tn believej , be g ui te easy for socialist machine building 
to fully apnly any gocd organisatioi~al principle which capitalism could not ta:te 
4 
to its logical conclusion . 
From the end of 1930 to about the summer of 1932 discussion of problems 
of specialisation j.n the engine13ring industry w1s dominated by a tendency , later 
rejected as a ' leftist ' deviation (on t'1e grounrls that the ideas and proposals 
put forward were divorced from the demands and possibilities of objective 
.5 
reality) , which called for the taki11g of specialisation ' to its limit ' . This 
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' ultr~-speciallsation ' tP.ndency had representatives ln Gosplan , the VSNKh Institute 
"" "~ of 1n.:lustr1al-economlc research, the Com unist Academy »t_the press , notably the 
newspaper Ekonomicheskava zhizn ' .6 A major forum for discussion of problems 
of specialisation and cooperation in machine building was a discus-ton at the 
Communist A~a~emy in the sum~er of 1931 at which two reports were presented; the 
ftrst by Kritsman on specialisation and cooperation of parts producing factories , 
and t~e second by Perel ' man on the application of these principJes to the 
Ural-Kuznetsk Combine . Kritsman ;argued !.hat the diff'iculHes experHmced at 
thP. Stal1ngrad tractor factory showed that the ' closerl ' enterprise even 1.f 
or the mass- flow pro~uctlon type could not secure thQ mass production of all 
co~pone~ts , so that batch production with lts inevitable switching of machines 
from one type of work to another had 't.o be carried out. alongside true mas 
production . Krltsman favoured the widescale develop~ent of specialtsed parts 
factories producing on a mass- flow basis , freeing the rnaln factory solely 
forth~ asrembly of the final product , This path , ho claimed , would overcone 
the basic problem of t~e Jaree enterpri se organisation . ~G<nowledg!:ng that 
st:r1ct stanclard :l;!sation of parts would be required , KritS111€1n ar.gued that the 
bu1ld ing of spec tallser1 .factories could not awa1 t. such standardisation ; rather 
the creation of the faetories would create favourable conditions for carrying 
out the standardisation work. Admitting that this was an al'!lbitious plan whi ch 
could not be realised all at once , ··ri tsman nevertheles~ believed that there 
were no ~jor obstacles to putting it into practice . 7 
l .Za!nri . 7 .12 , ,)0 . 
2 . ibid . ,30 . 12 .,)0 . 
) ,See .Bol' shevik, t9Jl ,~lo .6 f er the fullest presentation of Sorokin ' s positioa . 
4 .VARNITS0 , 19J1 ,No ,J ,pp .20- 21 . 
5 .The first t r aced use of thi s term was by Veiteman ,who after a visit to the 
USA and Germany with a commission of members of GOMZy and Mosgipromez in early 
1930 ~oncluded that , whil e these or ganisat ions had already adopted the correct 
principles of concentrati on , speci alisation and intenslfleati on of production, 
t hey had not been eufrlc ient lv decisive , and hnd ' not gone to the limi t ' (do kont sa) 
(Vei tsman,S .E.,Ob or~anizatsli oro1zvodstva na zavodakh metall opromyshlennosti 
Amerik1 ,N. , 1930 , p . 1l J . ) This phrase was t.aken up by Perel ' man lVARNITSO ,1931 , 
No .J , p ,22) and subsequently used by some participants in the Co!lUllunist Academy 
debate . 
6 .The followinu were leadin~ advocates of the ' ultra-spe~laliaatlon ' tendency= 
Kritsrnan ,Do1Tnlkov ,Guran ,Sorokin ,Ferel' man ,Ru1akov and Kogan . 
7 .Spetsiallzatsiya i koouerirovanie v mashir.ostroeni.! SSSR ,J.l • ..:L. ,19)1 ,pp,7-18. 
Kritsman ' s report to the Communist Academy meeting summarised the ba~ic 
positions of the ' ultra-specialisation' tendency and was supported by all· 
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~he other participants . !he ide8s of these specialists fotmd their expression 
ln initial plans for the Ural- Kuznetsk machine building combine , ~hich was 
to include man.v specialised parts factories and a vehicle factory with an output 
of 2 million units a year!.1 This debate marked the apogee of the ' tak\ng specialis-
ation to its logical conclusion' tendency . In August 1930 Dol 'nikov, oneof 
t.he participants of the Communist ncademy meeting , further elabora t.ed hts 
position according to which specialisation of parts production arose logically 
from the very anatomy of machines built under socialism. Specialised production 
organiSAtion , in his view, had to be fo~nded on the new socialist science of 
B!Shinovedenie , or 'crit ical technology '. uastev's work was clearly the 
inspiration , but Dol ' nikov was mildly crittc~l of Gastev for his alleged kust~ 
approach , neglecting the benefits of mass flow production. Dol 'nikov concluded 
with a call forth~ construction of ' machine building ' kholkhozy' ' •2 
In October 1931 the ' ultra-specialisers' launched a neH campaign aimed at 
aking 1932 a year of specialisation and coo.:eration with a view to obtaining 
the ! corporation of specific projects based on t1ese principles 1n the Second 
Five-year Plan.3 This was a three-pronged attack, involving representatives 
of the Communist Academy , Gosplan and the newspaper ,EkonomichPskaya Zhizn '. The 
culti- shop factory basic to the capitalist economy had outlived itself the 
paper confidently as erted4 , while Rudakov (Gosplan),~ne of t~e leading activists 
of tbe carnpa ign, declared that , ' only by specialisation and cooperation on these 
lines (speci?~isatioa by parts ann cooperation - JC) can we overtake the capitalists 
technlcall v ?.nd economically 1n ten years'', 5 Despite the stress on parts 
specialisation , a]l the successes of t~e c~rnraign reported in 1931 and early 
6 
1932 were examples of pr.ocess specialisation. 
Libid , ,p.68. 
2.?uti industrializatsii, 19J1 ,.No . 14, p.22 . 
).Ek .Zhizn' ,20 . 10. 31 • 
• lb1d .,14.10.31 . 
5.1bid . 
6.1bid . ,16 t 11 .31 : 14.J .32 . 
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Early in 1932 the f irst serlot~,public,theoretical counter-attack against 
the' ultr a- specialisation' tendency was launched • Writing 1o Bol ' shevik, 
M .Heisler ,NKTP, sharply or t ticised Sorokin for seeing specialisation and 
cooperation as the primary factors in the development of the s .... viet economy and 
rejected Sorokin's counterposing of specialised parts oroducing factories to 
'universal' enterprises . Sorokin's incorrect views were ascribed to his uncritical 
ab~orbtion ' of all he saw , heard and read about America', his uncritical 
appl icat ion of the experience of the motor industry to other branches (like 
machine tool building) , and his one- sided stress on the construction of new 
~actories to the neglect of specialis~tion and cooperation in relation to 
existing industrial structure.1 ~eisler himself was cautious in his assessment 
of the desirability of extending specialisation , although he was not against it 
and did favour t'1e building of regional central foundries . Heisler is reported 
argued for 
to have/against the building of new specialised factories , and/limitation of 
further specialisation to semi- fabricates production at a major meeting in 
ttarcb 1932 at wh ·.ch representatives of NKTP ,Gosplan ,research institutes and 
other interested parties discussed plans for specialisation ,cooperation and the 
geographi cUlocation of machine building • At this meeting the main report was 
delivered by Perel ' man , who once again argued against 'closed ' enterprises 
and for the further development of specialised factories for parts and processes.2 
This contribution of Reisler provoked a bitter putilic exc~ange between him 
and another specialist ,Igishev , which continued into June .In the course of it 
netsler sharply att.:>cked Sorokin for ' paper schemes ' ' he had ,Reisler declared, 
created ," pictures of • ideally ' and ' rationally ' bull t enterprises in space'' instead 
of providing concr ete analyses of the specific preconditions for specialisation 
and cooperation in e~ch branch .3 I~iehev also criticised Sorokin for exaggerating 
the significance of ~peci. :lisation and cooperati~n, but also considered that 
Reisler was conservative 1n his estimation of the scope for application of these 
principles during t he Second Five- year Plan, later descri ing him as a ' harmful 
' eq uilibri st ' ' • 4 In Igishev • s vie~ 
l .Bo~s_tlevik , 1932 ,No .1- 2 , pp . 92- 93 • 
2,Ek,zhiza ' , 14 .4 . 32; 12 .6 .32 • 
~ ~ 
rleisler was incorrect because in the Second 
~?t12 .6.12 . 
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Plan technical reconstruction would be completed and "the scale of production 
will assume truly gigantic proportions.The sh.~re of mass-flow production will 
g:::ow hmeasurably in this interval of time" •1 These were asswnptions basic to 
the position of all the ' ultra-spec1alisers', and Reisler not unfairl y responded 
by cla iming that Igishev\s position was 1n essence the sa!'le as Sorokln' s . 2 
A useful step 1n the struggle for g~eater clarity and realism 1n the 
~iscussion on speci~lisation and cooperation was a major article by Pepper, 
Sukharevskii and Kholmyanski i published 1n Elanovoe Khozyaistvo . In a balanced 
rP.view of th~ wAin positions Pepper criticised a number of extreme views and also 
SPt out the objective ~if 'iculties facing Soviet industry 1n developing 
speci "'~lisation of' production. ThP latter included t he inherited structure , the 
oroblems stemming from attempts to reduce t he product range at the s-me time as 
new complex types of products were being introduced, the inadequacy of the 
production base in conditions of a rapid growth of demand for machines, and 
finally conservatism and 'wre~king'. Reisler was criticised for underestimating 
the significance of !,larts specialisation and cooperation, and Sorokin ' s character-
tzat1on of the auto- tractor factories as ' universal' was dismissed on the grounds 
that taese enterprises were in fact h~hly specialised because they produced only 
one type of machine on a large- scale permitting economic production of many parts 
' , within a single combined enterprise aSorokin:s solution would simply lead to 
an undesirable prollfe:ration of smal 1 factoriPs. The tendency which called for 
the takin~ of specialisation 'to its logical conclusion ' (Perel ' man and others) 
was bluntly rejected s"The degree of realisation of special1sat1onat each stage 
of our industrialisation depends not on ' logical de ands ', not from so-called 
'principles ' and'immanent laws' of specialisation, but on the development of 
t he productive forces , o~ the level of concentration, on whether mass production 
is possible or is already predominant , on whether there 1s only individual 
oroduction , on t he level of standardisation, and on t~"e general level of planning" •3 
Realism was beginning to return to t "e discussion . 
1.Ek.zhizn • , ~ .4. 32 . 
2.ibid , 19 .6 e)2, 
J .Plaa .Khoz •• 1 Q'12, No .J , p .1 03 • 
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By the aut.umn of 19.32 the extreme positions of the 1 ul tra- speciallsers 1 
appear to have been ~enerally rejDcted an1 a more considered and differentiated 
npproac~ ~dopted . This new aDproach was exemplified by a contribution by Kurskii 
tn Se utember , which reviewed the debate and outlined future orospects for the 
practical developnent of specialisation a no cooperation , Kurski \. criticised 
PP.rel 1 man and Kritsman
1 
for Lheir schematic approach to specialisation and 
resort to superficial arguments in general terms& what ~as required in Kurskii ' s 
opinion was the elaboration of the qut-stlon of stages nf special isa t1on and 
cooperation of new and existL~g factories in accordance with the level of 
devel~prnent of the pro~uctive base of machine building itself . The development 
o~ specialisation by parts required the provision of neces~try productive capacity , 
the develooment of transport , and a high level of planning , and could only be 
hckled by looking at the specific clrctlrnstances of each inoividual branch and 
region. 
Reviewin~ progress during the First Five-year Plan period ~urskii ~owledged 
that with the exception of the auto-tractor industry (in which over one hundred 
enterprises were involved in cooperation, those within the bJh~h being of a 
specialised nature), co,.,peration in t'le engineering industry Has then only to 
an insisrnificant deRree based on factort~s specialised by parts . 'l'his situation 
was explained by the necessity , Rt the e:iven s "'a'!:e of ass lmila Ling production 
in basic br~nches of machine building , of constructing technolos1cally closed 
~achining-assembly factori~s, concentrating t~e p=onuction of al, basic parts , 
Despite lts weak develop·-:ent Kurskii believed that. the preconditions for further 
speci<'ll isation of pro·iuction by parts !-tad been created . The inaaequate 
dPveloo~ent of parts speci~lisation was in his view beginnin~ to hinder the 
development of cooperation a the inadP.quate prodnction base was fosteri.ng a 
t""ndency for r ,..ctories to make items for t hemselves which could be prodtlced at 
au~" lo'-:er cost ~t specialised enterprises , But Kursk1i stressed that expanding 
LhrPsman appe rs ;.n have been out of favour by this time because of views 
on the question of t.he location of tn~ ustry during the Sec ·.ond Five-year Plan -
seQ Flan ,1936,No . J , p .41. 
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th production base elone was not the answer ; there also had to be an improvement 
of prnduction organisation , a stronthen1ng of tnterbranch planning and, as a 
first priority , a strengthen tng of khozraschet . ur kJ\ sin 1 e:1 out !!lachine 'tool 
bull~lnR n' t~P makiflF or agricultural oachtnery as two branches which ~ould 
r~qu1re furt~er develocment of parts an 
1 next ftve-year plan . 
assemblies specinllsatton during the 
From the ""d of 19J2 debate ofgeneral guastlons of spnctallsation and 
coope~·attnn p;reR.tly cHm1nished •2 The SPcond P1an tt.sel f was certainly not fo~ed 
on thA far-rP.achln apoltcation of the nriciples as the 'ultra-special1s1ers' 
~ad demand~ in 931 - 32 . It did call for furth r sp clnlisatton and cooperation, 
but placed the m'lin emphasis on process pec1.."ll1snt1on • .Ent prises created durlng 
t~e First FLve-year Pl n for the production of cer nin parts (beartngs ,chucks , 
Ch3~ s, tcJ wer to be further developed, anrl t the sn P tl the specia~1sed 
pro uctlnn of a n u er of parts in mas demand co on to nany branc es of 
engine ring was Lo be organised ,e.g . gears,sh £ts,f1ttln s na f stners . _bis 
would provide a basis for the growth of cooperation. Thus the idea of ure 
Rasembly f(l.C!torles had no place and the parts whlch were t:o be produced at 
sper·lallsed fetGtor.1es were of a type widely used thrOilfo!,hout the enllineering industry . 
GenerAl quP.Pt1ons of specialisation and coope tlon almost '1sappeared from 
public debatA for three years and interest only revive with the approach of 
he Third Fiv -year Plan . CrdzhonikidzA stresse t~e 1 pnrtance of developing 
conoeratlon at the NKTP Soviet in 1935 , but this did not give rise to ~~y 
v.rnct1cal ca pa1 n3 • but at the Soviet in the ollowln Jun t e first shots 
wer~ fired 1n a new drive to extend parts sper-1al1. at1on and cooperation . At 
the session of the S viet Pudalov, chairman of the tP.chn1cal council of t•h'TP\ 
de a power ul plea for the furthP.r rlevelopme..nt of cooperation in ooviet machine 
'oul.ldlng .At l.tl t, time , he observed , everyone shled a'Way from lt 'like the devil 
1 .Ek . Zht~n' , 2 ,9 .:32 , 
2. An except ton was Kbolmyansk11' s r<=>v1.ew of spPc1al1 atlon and cooperation in a 
nU!'Ib~>r of branch s of engineering published ln 19.33 .This provided n sober 
as es nt of achievements a .future prospects ,with fr nk aknowledgement of V c 
Ob~ c•1 ff!culttes . - Kholmyanskl1 ,I.,Snetslnl1zatsiya 1 koonerirovanie 
_ Bhl<tostroeniya v ~o1 pya tllet.ke . ~1 . -L. ,1933 . 
?·Ord~nonl.k11 e ,G. K.,Sta.t ' i .i rechi, .,t957,Vol.2,p.680. 
"·6~~ ~~o~ t gn:-e~31tltra~~n~xttr~eg~~ltc~Srws ~n~ st~ 
---A-" ~1• ~ h~>aA nf' C':;ltoV"'P~hTJ1"1')"' •------------------------· 
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f·r·om holy water ' • Examples of succesfuJ cooperation tn the Amer1.c:m machine I ool 
indust1~y were r.:lted and the benefits in terms of full utilisation of capacity 
and cost reduction stres~ed . 1 A month later Pud.alov continue i what was clearly 
a campaign by the technical coun¢11 with an article 1n which he observe1 that 
t'1e engineering industry had still n ~ J.'P.nouncoo the practice of carrying out 
t.~e entire production cycle in one factory . Now the time had come to take the 
ieJ pat.h already taken by the American ,German and Bri.tish lndu., · r,. Glavki -were 
e:tjoined to draw up n~ for the specialisation ofpronuction of parts , assemblies 
and accessories s this above all a~jl. ed to the machine tool industry and auto-
tractor branch. The prod.uct.ion of such ·items as spindles 1 control levers , 
ge~rs, pistons , bearings and othPr standard parts could be concentrated at 
specialis~ed factorlP.s and Pudalov m~de the radical suggest..ion t.hat the pr occas 
could be aidecl by the organisation of trade in such parts , Finally 1 he raised 
t'te possib\.lity that a l arge shetre of l.hese 1 tems could be produced by the 
industrial cooperative system of 1ocal industry Utlder t.he ' patronage ' of the 
corresponding branch . 2 
Shortly after Fudalov ' s article two of t.he main protagonists of the earl.ier 
discussion adoed their voices to the campaign for the development of specialisation 
anti cooperation . Pe~' rnan , also a member of the NKTP technical council , 
called for the development of standardisation o ... oarts on a brar.ch basis giving 
the possibility of organising mass , spec i alised productlon , J Sorokln also 
• l·c.orl( 
returned to the theme of extending speciallsation r 1.f you ~ a typical Soviet 
enterprise 1 he obs~rved , then one was struck by the .tact that together with 
the basic producti on shops 'there was a multitude of auxil i ary shops , and a 
tendency t owards kustar work and ' univerr~lis~·. Planned specialisation and 
4 
cooperation was , he concJuded , an urgent necessity . While there was an element 
of implied retrospective sel~ .justi:fic(}.tion in Sorokin ' s contribution , in seneral 
the new discussion took a very dif~erent form from that of five years earlier • 
the abstr act general theol:'istng was no"~ absent and future developll\ents were 
~·~vet pr1 NKTP ,Sten .Otchet..!. 1H.,1936 , P.157 • 
• Zai "I'i , ,28 . 7. 36 . 
3 .Flan • Khoz • , 1936 , 1 o • 8 , p . 49 • 
4.Bol' shevlk , 1936 ,No .16 , pl) .45- 52 . 
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outlined in concrete and realistic terms . As will be shown the machine tool 
industry was very much involved in this second round of pressure for specialisation 
and the development of cooperation 1n the engine~ring industry, which continued 
into 19'37. 
In the contributions of 1936-37 there was an ad~itional important argument 
1n favour of the further developmenet of specialisation and cooperation which 
had not been employf'.d during the First Five- ye{ga Plan: its role 1n securing 
flexibility in the event of product changes. Thus Kogan, calling fo~ the 
construction o~ a number of specialised factories on a parts and process basis , 
observed that during the Second Five-year Plan most new ent~rises had been 
built with a full set of prodnction shops as factory-giants , each .individual 
shop emp~inv up to 2- 3 , 000 people and renresent1ng 1n effect a factory in itself, 
whereas what was now requireo , he beJieved , were specialised factories employing 
J - 5,000 people which couJd be u11t in a short time and would provide flexibility 
~n the event of transition .from one type of mac~ine to anothet'~ This point was 
also stressed by Kurskii ln a call for further development of parts specialisation~ 
Pressure for the furthPr development of specialisation and cooperation in 
the engineering industry continued during the 'lhird Five- year 1-'lan. r now with a 
much more explicit strategic dimension . Policy was presented at the Eighteenth 
Party Congress in Harch 1939 by l·iolotov and Malyshev • commissar of heavy 
machine building. ExcessivP.ly narroH special tsation was condefll.ned , and emphasis 
placed on intra-regional specialisation and cooperation . Malyshev was very c1·itical 
of the inadequate level of cooperation and the attitude of many factory and 
branch leaders towrads fulfilling orders on a sub-contract basis. although he 
conceded that the breaking up of the commissariats had undoubtably mane cooperation 
~ore difficult , Gosplan was criticised for its alle~ed lack of activtty in 
fostering cot.)perative links between ente: .. :prlses and branc~ es, and 1alyshev 
C~lled for the formation of a new high-level body t.o take responsibility for the 
1.froblemukonomik1 , 193? .No .3-4, pp.4G-41 . 
2. \.bid . , pp .190-191 . 
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problem, prefer. bly attached to Ekonomsovet . It was also evident to Malyshev 
that it was necessary to take measures to stimulate the fulfilment of cooperation 
orders and production not provided for in the plan. In order t0 achieve t his 
lt ~as , he believed , necessary to establish prices wnich woul1 stimulate the 
fulf1l~ent o: such orders and , possibly , introduce a special bonus system for 
factory and shop leaders . 1 It seems probable that at this time the problec of 
c~peration had as~umed particular importance and urgency because many civi lian 
nachine building enterprises were being given additional spacial mil1t ary orders , 
frequently for products not directly related to those normally produced. t-lalyshev ' s 
proposi!lsdo not appear to have been inmleroented . The splitting up of commissariats 
1n the r.'I:'!Chine buUdin.g- defence industry branches appears to have caused cons1derablt 
1tf icuJttes for co ",perationa Berri, •n-lLing in late 1940 , reported that 
cooper, tion had become very complicated as sub- contracting relations established 
Within NKs became transformed into inter-me relations ,which were then broken 
as com~issariats strived to carry out cooperation sole+Y ~ithin their ~ own limite . 
Serrl call ed for the strenghtening of the Gosplan and Ekonomsovet apparatuses 
2 
~ ordar to combat this harmful t endency . 
~clalisation bv Parts in the }1ach1ne Tool Industry 
In the 1920s the limited ~achine tool building activity was almost entirely 
se~-contained in the sense that tbe machine build ing enter prises invol ved aade 
al l parte and assemblies themselves. At this time the machi nes were not fitted 
with electric motors, hydraulic mechanis ms or prectsion ball and r oller bearings • 
the low tec.hnic~l level reduced reliance on outside suppliers. T e re does not 
appear to have been any proposal for specialising the production of any parts 
associated with machine tool building untU hay 1929,when the NKRKI r eco;nmended 
tnat the making of certain standard items such as fastners (nuts ,bolts,washers,etc , 
and controls (levers, hand whee1s,etcJ should be centralised a t a specialised 
terprise , thereby freeing space at the main factories .3 No action wa.s taken at 
1.XVIU s" ezd VKP b Sten • otchet . ,K . , 1939, pp. 301; 38 3. 
2.Plan .Khoz. ,1940 ,No.ll-12, p .147 • 
) .E'~t.Zhizn • ,19 .5 • 29 • 
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this time, and in none of the articles by representatives of the1ndustry in 
the second half of 1929 and the ftrst half of 19JO was the possibility of 
200 
specialisation of parts production raised . Al ' perovich was , however, well aware 
of the widespread practice of sub-contracting for parts and assemblies 1n the 
~merican engineering industry1 , so that his silence on the subject probably 
indicates that he believed it premature forthe ~oviet machine tool industry. 
Shortly after the Sixteenth Party Congress Kaganovich raised the question 
of specialised parts production in the branch. Following the example of the 
Arner.ic.::ul machine tool industry firms should "be free from the making of standard 
1 tems, llJbricating mechanisms and or'\.ve f'ittings , he wrote , and orders for 
these parts given in a centralised manner to kustar workshops and other 
machine building enterprises . 2 The first evidencE: that Stankoob"edinenie was 
seriously thLnking 1n this way came in January 1931 at the All-Union meeting 
on machine tool bu Uding - the meeting aknowledged the enormous iJilportance 
of the standar~ isation of parts and the freeing of factories f rom making standard 
items, and welcomed the decision by the board of t ,e ob"edinenle to concentrate 
the making of standard ite~s at one specialised factory .J It was possibly this 
decision which led to measures for the equipping of a specialised machine tool 
chucks a.nd accessories factory, • Stankopatron' , in Huron • .By this time debate 
on specialisation andcooperation had broken out in t he press, a prominent role 
being· played by Sorokln, hearl of .:>tankoimport. Therefore ,it was not surprisng 
that he very quickly set out his ideas on the subject in reiation to the machine 
to , l industry 1 tself . 
Sorokin's arguments on the question of specialisation and cooperation in 
the machine t ool industry closely matched those in relation to t ~e motor industry. 
A machine tool as an object of production w~s , in his view , no different from 
a vehicle; both were no oore than collections of parts and assemblies. Therefore , 
~principle t 1ere was no reason why the building of machine tools could not be 
l.Torgr-prorn.gaz. ,)1 . 12 .2?. 
2 .Zalnd., 24.? .30 . 
3 •lli , 1934 ,No .1 0, p. 6 . 
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organised on the basis of specialisation and cooperation as in the motor industry . 
Foreign machine t ool building could not do this however , he claimed , because 
of the anarchic nature of the cap~talist system, competition between enterprises, 
product differentiation and the consequent small scale of production. Further.~ore, 
abroad the machine tool indwstry had developed before the motor industry and 
acquired a compl ex structure formed over decades . Inthe ~oviet Union with 
condttions permitting the mass production of commonly met types the situation 
was quite different an~ favourable to the nevelopment of specialisation and 
c -ooera.tion • .Lhus the machine tool industry , he believed , had to organise specialise• 
prcduction on a large-scale basis of gears , stanrlard items , pumps, accessories, 
electrical equipment, a number of small parts, safety devices , forgings, stamped 
parts and castings . J.\loreover, a• very large :factory was re · uired for making ~s 
and fixtures . Sorokin regretfully noted t hat this principle had not been adopted 
either 1n relation to existing enterprises or new and , echoing his earlier 
characterisation of the auto-tractor factories, he. remarked that , "As far as I 
know, the projected factories of turret lathes and mill ing machines are by the 
scope of their production universal enterprises" •1 Finally, as noted elsewhere, 
S~orokin called for production cooperation of a difPerent kind - the supply 
of parts and assemblies by forei~n firms until their domestic production had 
been organised. 
This radical proposal met lit ~le response from leaders of the branch and 
plans for the development of specialised parts production were of a modest 
nature . In N,..vember 1931 Al ' perovich noted that in the conditions of the planned 
economy the branch had thP. possibility of a maximu!'l standardisation of parts 
and the or anisation of the production of st~dard items at special factories .2 
This vie~ was later reflected 1n the NKTP order of June 1~32 , which stated that 
factories for the pronuction of standardised parts , regional actories for gears 
and factories for attachments an~ accessories had to be provided for in the 
J 
investment olans f~the neYt five-year period . At the conference of desir~ers 
1.~.,t6.2.31. 
2.§.!!, 1931 ,no .H, o .1. 
3 .su, 1932,t,o. 7, p.2. 
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which fol1 owed the order Al ' perovich again returned to t.he question , but this 
time put the main emphasis on t~e neP.d for preparatory work before cooperation 
could be successfully realised. It was essential , he stressed, to carry out 
standardisation and other measl~es secur.t~ interchangeability of parts& little 
hadbeen done in this direction to date . Serious persistent work or all designers 
was in Al ' perovich's view the ' sole precondition ' for the effective realisation 
of ''our basic pol icy in the next Five-year Plan - thP. policy of maximum co:>perat1.on 
of fActories and t~e separating off of special factories and preparatory shops -
foundries, forges , factories making all required accessories for machine tools, 
fs:~.ctorie s for making standarn fixtures and , in particular , a fact ory which 
1 
~·111 ma·,e ge;:crs for our machining-assembly factories" . 
At this time active measures were ln fact being taken to organise the 
specialised production of standard items and gears . The im .Dzerzhinskogo factory 
in Perm be~an to prepare large- scale production of fastners , gears,purnps , chucks 
2 
a:1d other accessories .for the branch as a whole . This plan was abanrloned , however , 
whP.n t"le enterprise was transfered to another administration before 1933. In the 
summer of 1932 it was announced that the plan of specialisation of machine 
building for Nizhni-Novgorod krai during the Second Five-year Plan provided 
for t'1e construct ion of' a specialised p,ear-aaking factory to serve the whole 
mac,ine tonl 1ndustry3 , Also in 1932 the 'Stankopatron ' factory started work . 
This enterprise was com~isstoned quickly because it used the building of an old 
t~xtile 7actory and equipment from a bankrupt German ~trm,' Samson erke' . Its 
main pronuct was chucks for mRchine t.ooJ s , but 1 t a1 so made some accessories and 
4 standard fixtures . By 19.32 the branch was be ina supt lled with electric motors 
on a re~ar ~sis from enterprises of the electrical engineering industry , 
n ntablyth"" Hoscow im .lepse works , the Khar ' k --:v electro-mechanical factory and 
the I eningrad ' Elektrosila ' works. 
1.ffi ,193':3 ,No.1 ,p .J , 
2.Lebyachenko,o~ c~L . p . )2 . 
3.Ek.zhizn ' ,2J .6 , J2 . 
4.Lebyachenko ,op cit, p.J3. 
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With the transition to the third phase of the industry ' s development , 
nl ' pP-rovich ber,an to pose the task of developing specialised parts production 
and cooperation as one of the means of realising +he policy of rapidly expanding 
t.he ti pazh, but as the conference ,.,f machine tool builders in .- uly 1 Q33 
demonstrAted t'lis course did not have general supoort at t'::~e factory leveL The 
HRTP order instruct ed Stankoob" edinenie to organise in 1933 the centralised 
nrorhtct ion of basi c standard items (fas~ners , levers , handwheels ,etc , )1Di scussion 
at thP conference , on the few occasions the topic of cooperation was raised , 
focused on obstacl es to i ts realisation . Al ' perovich in his opening report admitted 
that opposition to fulfillinF- cooperation orders was not simply a matter of 
conservatism on t~e part of ~actory managers , hut an anti- cooperation psychology 
incluce~ because i n no branch of machine building was there a correct attitude 
to me ting hhe needs of customers .2 Factory repreeentattves made a similar point . 
Krupnyshev of the im .TsK Mashinostroeniya f ctory blamed NKTP for the poor level 
of development of cooperation : " • • if from this moment there is a change of policy 
on th.e part of HKTP in relation to enterprises which have in view cooperation ; 
if a policy of pressure (hazhi m) is not pursued , then we will be able quickly 
to carry out cooperation".3 But Zhbal.tov , tt,e directo;rof ' Krasnyi J.'roletarii ' , 
was much more sceptical and in a colourful speech summed up what was probably 
the attitude of many managers in Soviet industry at this time . In his view policy 
ror cooperation was in mal'lY respects mistaken . Refering to cooperation for the 
supply of castings , gears , etc . , he claimed that 1" • • such cooperation now , in 
our conditions , for the next five years could bury machine tool building" • He 
believed that those who proposen the idea t>: Sllj)""lYine all the gears required 
by the industry from Gor ' kii must be joking , Zhbakov added that he understood 
t .e type of cooperation used when two fa, tories worked t~etner to produce large 
nachine tools , but ' nothing would come ' from producing parts of one type in a 
s~gle place .At present , he adoP.d , he was already receivinr, chucks from one factory 
but 'they were ' no good for t'1e devil''~ 
1.lndustrializatsiya sss~ , t932-1937 , p . 249 . 
2 .2}eno~rammy ,op-cit , o~ .3J-J4 . 
J , ibtu . ,p.6o . 
4 -oibid . 1 pn.?0- 71 . 
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Al'perovic~ returned to the question of the attitude of entepr1ses to 
cooperation orcle-rs shnrtly after the conference. hen he sharply criticised the 
'utterly dlsgrace4'ul r.elatlonship ' of factories towards orders from other 
f~ctories , If an enterprise was obliged to ~~ke , say , gears for a second 
factory then they were usually su~plled in such a disgraceful way and of such 
poor quality that any desire to resort to further cooperation was Ln~ediately 
killed , and the second factory then strived to obtain resources ln order to 
make the gPnrs 1 tself . This attitude ,Al ' pcrov lch concludnd , was .a remnant of 
tne psycholoe-y , " stand in the queua and wait t.o see what happens" •1 
After the All- Union conference and , 1n fact, until the en of t9}4 there 
apnears to have been little if any action on the question of parts specialisation 
and cor"pera tion , and l.t was hardly mentioned in art lcles in the press on the 
1ndustr.y . The probleMs of castings supply n.nd transport2rna.y well have fostered 
and reinforced a widespread hostility towards the centralisation of production 
of parts ~~d semt- fabr1cntes such that the Glavk felt disinclined to ralse the 
~atter . One exception to this rule was a call by Al'perov1ch 1n April 1934 
for action to free the machine tool industry from dependence on the electrlcal 
engineering industry the very reaction ho h.\.mself had condemned in relation 
to lndividu~l factories of h~ own glavk was , ap~y, acceptable for the 
glavk in relation to oth"'r branches . Al ' perovich urged the necessity of rapidly 
organ1s1ng within the glnvk a factory with 1ts own design burP.au for flaking 
special small motors nnd all electrical accessories~ Action •rrts in fact taken 
in the following year . 
A turning potnt in discussi on of specialisation and cooperation policy for 
the oachine tool industry came at the end of 1934 when a number of leading 
repr~ntatives of the industry visited Bri..tai:n for the Olympia machine tool 
exhibition . Reviewing their impressions of the Br itish machine tool industry 
t.aganov1ch and Al ' perovtch stressed both the close relationship bet..wePn the 
1n iustry an~ elPct.ric~l equ1pnent firms and tho existence of a la:rl'!e number of 
1.§.2!s1alist!:~he .:;;kava rekonstruktsiya 1 na uka , 1933, No .8 , p? . 169- 170 • 
2.Al ' p~ovich noted the role oi transport proble~ts 1n frustrat1ng cooperation 
1n hay 1934 - Za.Ind . ,27 .5 . )4 . 
3 .Zaind . ,26 .4 .) 4 . 
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small firms servicing the nachtne tool factories by supplying pumps , standard 
1 tms , fit tinES. chucks , cha 1.ns , signal lights, etc . "This yet again emphasi~ 
theyconcluded ," that the rapid develooment of the machine tool wdustry dur1.ng 
1 rec ... nt years has been linked with the work of various other branches of industry", 
The lesson for the Soviet !'lachine to(:'\1 industry was clear s"without a full- scale 
base of allied production 1 t is impossible to develop modern lila.Chine tool 
building" , This lesson was reiterated by Kaganovich two months late1· and he 
called on the branch to organ se the spreclalised production of electrical 
equipment, some types of bearin~s for high-speed machifies , pumps and standard 
2 items. Levin , director of ENINS, also supported this line claiming that in 
Western European and American machine tool building about thirty per cent of 
all parts were obtained in finished form from allied suppliers permitting better 
production organisntion and reducinu costs . He also calledJ~te organisation 
of speci~lised production of electrical equipment and bearings ,J 
Desnite this nropaganda for spectaltsed production and cooperat1on,action 
tn 1935 was restricted to the supply of electrical equipment. This problem of 
inter-branch supply seem.s to have been particularly acute at this time . In 19)4 
it was reported that the Khar ' kov electro-mechanical factory , the sole supplier 
of button control units, was planning to meet only 60 per cent of the industry' s 
needs , forcing the factories to make their own .4 In April 1935 Lapin, chief 
en~ineer of the GUSrF complained that Glavenergo was supplying electrical 
equipment of insuf-iciently modern des~n and inadequate quantity so that no less 
than 2 .000 machine tools built in the previous year were still without motors . 
~hen challenged the hean of Glavenergo , Filimonov, is reported to have 
re-plted that a" In 1935 we will meet 75-RO per cent of the demand of 
machine to~l building for motors and starters - we consider that this amount 
ts sufficient". 5 This situation forced the mac,., ine tool industry to place arders 
1.Zaind . ,6.1,)5. 
2 ;Sol ' shevik, 19)5,N o .6 , p .16. 
3.Flan .Khoz •• 1935,No .?,p.27. 
4.~ •• 16.) . )4 . 
5 .~. ,20 .4 .35. 
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with small workshops and promcoo95 with no previous experience resulttng in low 
quality and high costs .
1 
By the end of 1935 GUSIP had decided to produce its 
own electrical equipment at a factory in Khar ' kov , 'Elektrostanok' . ·rhis small 
S?ecialised enterprise began work in 1936 under t he technical leadership of the 
laboratory of electric drive of ~~ll1S , and by the begin nin£ of 1937 Al ' perovich 
was reporting that it ha~ alrea~y given a number of important products which 
the industry had been unable to ob"".atn from the Khar ' kov g l.ant .2 
In 1935 there were signs that the approach of the mochtne tool industry 
towards specialised parts produntion and coop~ration was beginning to change ; 
i n 1936 the question came to occupy a centr8l place in policy discussion , not 
only in the branch but, as related above , in the engineering industry as a whole, 
In this case it ~prears to have been the machine tool indu~try which played 
an independent role in bringin~ the issue to the fore . It was t he Fourth 
Conference of Desib~rs in April 1936 which brought questions of specialised 
parts pro uction and coop~rat1on to the forefront , closely associating them 
Uth s~curing co:lditlons for technical progress . Shortly before the conference 
Levin observe~ that the quality of Soviet machine tools still lagged far from 
fnreiv.n standards nartly because such items as fastners and controls were made 
by the factories themselves , whereas abroad sub- contractors were r esponsible 
for their production and at the same time performed a. relatively independent 
L~novatory role: At the conference Dikush1n , a leading engine r of the branch, 
gave a report on the American machine tool industry . This was not published at 
t·e time , but in later article apparently based on his conference report , Dlkushin 
emphasised that the achievements of American producers were possible t hanks to 
the good work of ' allied ' branches of industry, notably t hosP. concerned with 
hydraulics and electrical equlpment ."Generally speaking'; Dlkushin wrate," one 
has to say that today ' s innovations which are completely changing the design of 
l:lachtne tools , have been crf?.ated not by the machine tool bullders , but by the 
hydraulics and electrical produc~rs • • • But we have 11ot yet even been able to get 
\ ,Dependence on small factories of local industry cou11 bP hazardous because their 
Priorities were not necessRr1ly those of heavy indust y ,e .g . in 1936 Levln 
r~port~ that a. small Len l.ngradfactory specialised L .... ·' making of gauges and 
indicators £or which there was a large demand 1n the machine tool industry . But 
cont .naxt page .. 
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~ood bolt.s from our sub-contractors". 4 Thus a ne1-: argument in favour of the 
development of specialised parts and as-embl1as production came increasingly 
to the fore ; speclal1.satton gave the possibility of promoting t.~chtlical progress . 
In the resol utions 'of the conference the Glavk was urged to organise special 
f~ctories and shops for the making of standardised hydraulic drive elements , 
special electrical apparatus , spindles for internal grinders , fitt1r1gs , etc .5 
A major turning point in t~e campaign for the devf'lorment of specialised 
parts pro,'luction and cooperation came with t he Sov l.et of NKTP ln JUne 19)6 . As 
related above , at t.his meeting Pudalov made a plea for the development of 
cooperat ion • drawing on the experience of the American machine tool industt·y . 
In his speech to the Soviet Al ' perovlch also spoke on the topic , adflitting that 
"Everyone agrees in principle that. cooperation ls nece ssary , but tn practice 
lo(e sa bot.~ge it" • However, he was conv tnced that. the level of d ... velopment was 
6 now such t,at the practical problems coQld be solved . Shortly after the Soviet 
~he Glavk outl1.ned its plans for improving the sltuat1.on 1 small batch and individual 
production of special electrical apparatus was to be organised at the ' Elektro-
stanok' factory;a special shop for making precision spu1dles and centres for 
hi~h-speed machines was to organised at the ' Kal1br ' toolin~ factory , which was 
als~ to make appropriate high- precision bearings ; r= · 1 1 P hydraulic elements 
were to be made at a factory in Khar ' kov: and , finally , the production of fas~bers 
was to be organised ::at the Hoscow ' Stankonormal '' factory . In outllntng t~ese 
plans Al ' perovtch put forward a proposal for fostering a deslre to C0"1perate 
~t the factory level: " The fulfilment. by factories of cooperation orders should 
be specially stimul~ ted and s.,rve as one of the independent indica tors of plan 
fulftll'lent" • 7 
the local industry admi ni str ation to which it was subordinated wanted to star 
this production in order to make clockwork mechanisms for toys ~ (Zaind .,6.4 . J~) 
2 .zal.nd., 9.1.37 ;S ii , 194J ,t~o .9-10 , p .4 . 
) . ibid . ,6.4,J6 . 
4 -
·~· ,6.8.;6 . 
5._lli, 19J6 ,No ,6 , p .6 , 
6 .Sovet ori Ni>:TP , op cit , p . 144. 
7 .~, 1936 ,No . ~ ,p . 6 . 
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The Soviet was followed by a f1 w:ry of acttvlty in t A branch , including 
the conven1n~ of a spec1~1 conference a which pxble of specialisation and 
co::>pernt1.on were discussed and a soecial syste. of ~ ~s elc.borated to provide 
an incentive for factortes to reveal unused ~uip ent and put it to use ~ing 
parts re~utred by other enterprises. 1 ~t about this t~e quite extensive 
cooporatl~n was organised for t~e production of special machine tools urgently 
re~ulred foe thP. tractor factories. 2 The ie ue of speclol1satton end cooperation 
occupied a large place in discus!':ion of the br.ancll ' s t.ochnlcnl plan for 1937 , 
but not enough to satisfy at least one critic. Khavin launched a sharp attack 
on the Glavk's 1eadershtp for its alleged nAglcct of the po sibilltes of 
cooperation and called for the narrow spectalisat1on of factories on the production 
o~ individual p~ts and as eoblies and t~e develop~e t of very u1de cooperat1on .3 
These ergUJ:lents were rem1nisce:It of Sorokin ' s proposals of the First Five-year 
Plan eriod , but they do not appear ~o have found ucb su~port . 
At the end of arch 1937 a special meeting vas held on the probleo of 
cooperation in the machine tool industry with the pa~11c1pation of the deputy 
Narkom of henvy industry, Bruskin ,Al ' perovinh an a number of factory directors 
and r.eprer(.nl')ta ttves of E:lDtS and allied branches of 1 nd ust:cy . 'I'op1cs discuased 
included the supply of be~rings , thP. quantity of which was s atisfactory , but not 
the range , especia11y of precision types .Fu~~erMore,the technical specifications 
of those produced by CPZ1 and GPZ2 did not even conform to branch standards(OS'!') • 
this last shortco~ was to rectified .The supply of electrical apparatus was 
deecdd inade uate and there was a cal for the organisation of s~ specialised 
4 
factories to make various netal itens. 
With the replacement of the branch ' s leadership and thegpneral disruption 
of 1937-38 the campaign for specialisation and coop ration seems to have subsided. 
The siluntlon In the branch at t e end of the Seeond Five-year Plan period will 
n w be brtefly r eviewed . Electrical equipmr-mt was bastcal 1y supplied by the 
electrical cngtncerln.tr industrv , eXCF' ot for some types of special equipment 
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mane within GUSIP by the ' Elektrostanok' works in Khar'kov . The first Sovie-t 
machines with hydraulic drive mecianisms were produced by the Khar' kov machine 
tool factory irom about 1935. In the following year it ~as reported that a 
factory was being equipped 1n the city (rpparently attached to ihe Khar ' kov 
tooling works) for the centralised production of a full range of hydraulic 
e~uip~ent re~uired by the branch. 1 In 1937 'Gidroprivod' started work, but 
according to a reporL tn 193R its p1·o ~ct ~e covered only 10 per cent of 
requ1rements.2 Bearings needed by the in1ustry were supplied by the two maln 
bearings factories ,GPZt and GPZ2 of the specialised bearings industry. In the 
course of the 'thirties there were mounting complaints that the precision 
bearin~s required by high- speed machine t o- ls were not being supplied in 
adequate quantity and quality. Early in 1936 Al 'perovich indicated that a 
special shop for 1~kin~ precision bearings and spindles was to be established 
at the ' Kalibr ' measuring instruments works, but later in the ~ Lapin announced 
tm~t the glavk had decided instead to equip a speci~l shop at the ' Stankokonstrukt-
siya' factory for making precision bearings from parts supplied b,y GPZ1. Careful 
selection and matching of components to h~h standards of accuracy would,it was 
believed, permit greater precision than was obtainable from the larger enterprise.3 
It is not known whethPr this scheme was realised. Presumably the machine tool 
industry was competing with the aircraft industry and other top priority military 
related branches for precision bearings and suffered accordingly. 
By 1938 the position with regard to standard fas~ers was rathermore 
sat1s~actory . In 1936 t~e Glavk managed to secure the transfer of a factory 
of Remmaahtrest in Moscow at which the production of all types of standard items 
4 
was to be organised , 1n particular fasteners and controls . This factory , 
'St~onormal '' ,began work in 1937 and in the same year additional capacity 
was also organised a t the im .Ordzhonikidze works . The 'Stankonormal '' factory 
also began to build mAchine tools (internal grindi1~ machines) and fears were 
1.~ •• 3.8.)6 
2.Plan .Khoz .,1938 ,No.9,p.51 . 
3.~ .• 3.8.)6 . 
4.~. 
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expressed t at the production of fasteners would be sacrificed . Kowever, it was 
resolved that fulfilMent of the plan for standard items was to be an essential 
precondition for a positive I 1 evaluation of the whole enterprises performance. 
The centralisation of fastener production al1owed the use of prgressive technology 
and greatly reJ uced costs , e.g . cold-upsetting ~ethods were used for making bolts 
givin£ an output of 15, 000 units a shift , comp~ed with only 200-250 a shift 
at the im.Ordzhonikirlze factory where turret lathes were employed , while 
fasteners produced on a small scale at the ' Komsomolets' factory cost 8- 10 times 
more per unit than those made at 'Stankonormal ' ' •2 However, 'Stankonormal' ' 
was unable to meet all the renuirements of the branchs 1n 1940 it was to ~ake 
18 million units against a total ~d of 32.6 . By 1940 specialised production 
had also been established at the liev im.Gor'kogo factory ,and this enterprise 
together with im .Ordzhonikidze was to give a t"urther 2.8 million units, leavin! 
12 mi1Ji00 units to be supplied by f~ctO:~es themselves on an w1specialised basis.3 
Finally , chucks and ot'"'er accessories were made bv the ' Stankopatron' factory 
in Hurom . There were few reports of its activities durina: the period, but 
Berri laconically observed in 1938 that it pro1uced low quality chucks which 
the m~chine tool factortes 
4 han to remake. There were no other factories in 
the Glavk for making n~chine tool acces£ories and no specialised factory for 
maKing fixtures. 
During the Third Five-year Plan years policy with regard to speci~isat1on 
and cooperation did not change , but the momentum built up in 1936-37 appears 
to have diminished. In 1939 two small Leningrad factories were transfered 
to the branchr one for the production of dividing heads, and a second factory , 
'Stankoprlnadlezbnost '', which pro1ucen vices,hydraulic chucks and mechanical 
steplesa drive units for m~chine to~ls . 5 According to an editorial of Stanki 1 
InstrUMent tn $eptember 1939 the industry was planning to organise a shop 
for producing gears at one of the gear-cutting machine building factories; the 
production of electric pumps was to be ex"anded at a factory of the cooperative 
1.SUt1938,No .10. , p.48 . 
2 .Mashinostroenie,10.7.40. 
) . ibid . 
4.Plan.Khoz . ,1938,No . 9 , p .49 · 
5 .1en1nP-radska.va promyshlenr est' za 50 let ,L . 1967, P .231. 
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system in Moscow , and drive chains were to be made in greater quantity for 
t ~e branch by another Moscow enterprise. It is not known whether these measures 
1 . were carried out . In t he samemonth the maJor SNK decree on the industry also 
called for the constr uction of new f a ctories to supply oarts for machine tools, 
inclur ing three new entperprises ~or ma~ing f ixtures and standard i tems and a 
2 
-factory of c~ucks . There is no evidence that these fact ories ,.;ere in fact built. 
Thus with t he development of the industry in the Second and T ird Five-year 
Plans ~ome nrogress was made tn developln~ parts speci311sat1on and cooperation , 
but this pro~ess was of a ¢uite limited nature : only the cir,st steps away 
from the ' closed ' enterprise had bePn taken . 
Some General Considerations 
Specialised parts production tn the Soviet machine tool industry by 1941 
was underaevelor~d comcared with the practice of Western Europe and the USA . 
It was also considerable less extensive than had been desired by some specialists 
in the Fi rst Five-year Plan period. But if we look at performance in the light 
of real pl ans which the machine tool industry adopted at various times we see 
that the niscrepancy between intention and r~~i~tion was not so great ' real 
plans never envisaged the mas s production of standardised parts and assemblies 
on the scale proposed by some specialists not direct ly concerned with the indust ry. 
Failures ther e certainly were ; a speci~lised ge~r-making shop or factnry was 
nPver estRbli shed , centralised production of accessories was never organised on 
the sc-~~le desi.xed , the production of standardised items on a centralised bnsis 
did not achieve t he l evel f~ese8n earlier in the petiod . 
The extreme ' ultra- speciRlisers' of 1931 and the first half of 1932 were 
clearly unrealistic and the criticisms of their positions advanced by such 
specialists as Reisler,Pepper and Kurskii in 1932 , and later by Berri were just . 
l.su , 1939,Uo .9 , p . 5. 
2.Q1.rektiv* KPSS 1 sovetskogo oravitel ' stva PO khozyaistvennym voorosa111 ,11. , 1957, 
Vo1.2 , p .n02 . 
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The ideas of Sorokin,PPrPl ' m~n,Kritsman and others were indeed abstract and divorced 
from the actu~l and 1~~ed1ate)v reAlisable level of development of the productive 
fo:r.ces an1 of planning. They were also harmful because, while their tc1eas were 
not in fact reflected in the Second Plan as adopted , they were for a time influential 
at ar earJy stage in the preparation of this plan and many of the proposals 
at this ti~e must have aroused the antagonism of practical worker.s in industry 
tow~~ds t~e very i dea of parts specialisation and cooperation . There is strong 
evidence for this in the speeches of some contributors at the first All-Union 
cnnference in 1933. rhe exaggerated ~iews of the ' ultra- spec1aJisers ' were a 
component of a widespread over-estlnation of the achieveable rate of development 
of t 1e 50\'iet economy prevalent in 1931 and lasting , al belt in a to:eakened 
form , untiJ about thP autumn of 1932. However , if the case of the machine tool 
industry is typical , practical workers in inr'!ustry (like .41 ' perovlch) and 
representatives of NKTP1 had throughout this period a more sober vie~ of the 
desirability and fe::~.slbili;ty of developing specialised parts production and 
cooperat 1 on in the s~ort run, 2 
At the begi.'lnlnR; of t.he First Fivr>-year Plan the obstacles t.o t.he clevelopm~nt 
of spe(',f l~lis'ltton 'hy perts wer.p formidable , The planners did not start with a 
~ 
clenn sl"·te: t,~e tnherl ted irtdustr1a1 structure was one of universl'!l enterprises , 
not specialised by type of ~~chine , let alone by ~~ts or processes . Furthermore, 
branch specialisation was ver."Y p orly developed 1.n the engineering industry. 
':'h 1s the establ1shiTlent of rational branch and factory specialisation ria.s aJ1 
1 • H o pub] ished evidence has been found indica tirg that ej t'"ler Ordzhon lkidze or 
M,Kaganovich supported the ' ultra-specLal 4 sers'. 
2. This we believe rP.latP.s to a m~jor weaNness of G£anick ' s treatment of this 
problem: he does not analyse the st~ges of the specialisation debate and the 
rtse and fall o~ the ' uJtra -speci~lisatlon' tendency , and does not sufficiently 
differentiate the views of soecia) ist.s put:. fon1ard in the press ancl at general 
policy discussions, from tn~ ··•ews and actions of t~ose directly concerned 
with industrial management and plann1n~ . Thus we do not acc~pl Cranlck~s view 
that t~ere was a large gtuf betweon ' Soviet offic~al opinion' and the ' realittes 
of Soviet industrial organisation ' - at least in the pertod in question (:see 
Granick ,oo cit , p .15J.) Symptomatic of Granick ' s fnadeqaate differentiation of 
positions is his st:.atAment t."lat:"A 1954 book a ttacked the ' harnful' prewar 
ideas of ;uild1ng spec L3.lised plants for the product ion of individual components" 
(ib1d , p .152) , This is quite untrue .IIer.ci in the work concerned was indeed highly 
crttica1 of t1.e • ul tra-specialisers ' , but was fa.r f...-o.m being opposed to parts 
specialisation as such~see Br:rri , on cH ,.Pp . 250- 25J) ,terri ' s views on specielisall• 
of parts production and co~peratlon put forward in 1c54 follo~ closel y his 
19)8 view~ on tl1ese questions in relation to machine tool bullding(Plan . lChoz ,, 
19.39,Ho .9; . 
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essential first step and first priority of the Party and industrial leaders . 
Dranch standardisation was at a very low level and interbranch standards for 
parts of machines almost. non- existent . In the years of the First and l.:iecond 
Five- year Plans major problems remained. The need to rapidly assimilate£1 complex 
new products and fo.r:ms of pro luctlon organ i.sation in a very short period of 
time in a situation of inadequate skills and an acute shorta.ve of investment 
'-' 
resources and p<)Or transport. natu.r11lly favoured the building of large , vertically-
tntegrated enteDrises . And while skills rose quickly as t'1ese enterprises were 
assi·1ilated , investment resources for building specialised pa~ts :factories were 
scarce and considerattons of time tended to make the expansion of existing 
integratel factories a morepractical proposition than t~e buildins of new. An 
addittonal factor which cannot be ignored is the fact that the relatively high 
J evel o"' ~<\ct.ory spec tA.l isation by type of machL'le met in a 11 umber of branches 
o" the engineering industry , including machine tool buildi.ng , coup] ed i4ith the 
large scale of proii uction of homogeous products , , 1ean t that ec anomies of scale 
of within- plant production of parts and assenblies could b€ reaped in cases 
where specialised production on a centralised basis may have been a more economicallJ 
expedient solution in other countries . This must to some extent have applied ln 
the m'3..Chine tool industry , es"Jecially during the r'irst I<'ive-year Plan . ' ith 
t11e expansion of the product range which occured during the 1930s the economic 
rationality of specialisation of parts production must have grown, but was 
frustrated by the inadequate pro1luction base and invest!!lent resources . We consider 
t~at these objective obstacles to specialisation by ~xts were the primary 
factors determining thE }Pve] achieved in t~e nachine tool industry before the 
.• ar , and in view of these rr:>al problems it would hardly have been rational for 
the industry to have attempted to push parts specialisation much further than 
it did . 
The greatest supply difriculties were those encountered when other branches 
of industry were involved . The most seri6us proble .. s a pear to have been those 
concerning the supply of electrical equipr1ent from tbe electrical engineering 
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lniustry .Provision of f:ven basic standard motors and starters was inadequate 
iil1-i t~e situation was worse for special equipment , The demands of the industry 
grew rapidly during the ' thirties and the technical level of products r~ui'red 
r:rew considerably , The machine tool glavk was forceit to organise i.ts ow small 
scale speclallsed production in order to meet sone of t.,e high-priority special 
demanrls, but this was clearly not a s:~tisfactory solubion, ~:hereas electrical 
eq11l.prnent suppliers in t,he USA and other coun~es played an active irulovative 
role and helper! t.o :raise the techni ca.l level of mechtna ~onls as a whole , in 
the USSR they appear to have reluct~1t1~ tailed behlnn the nachine tool branch, 
plaving a purely passive role . A similar situa·tion was met. wttb regard to 
bearinps : normal requi.rer..erts were adequately met , but precision bearings required 
in ever larger quantity as cutting speeds rose in the course of tbe decade were 
very poorly sup~lled. Hydraulic equipment represented a somel;hat different case 
ln so far as there :s.las no established hydraulic equipment producin~:r brMch 
at the ttme so that from the start the branch was forced to organise its own 
prorluc Uon . These problems of interbranch supply can easily be explained . 
lnterdepartment.al bar.r:iers were evidently a major factor i!•oning out problems 
requ Lrerl the men iation o! NKTP or ot her· high -:level body . But another important 
factor appears t.o have be~':.>n t 11at t,he machine tool 1nrlustry was qu:mti.t.atively 
not a Jar"e customer for either the elect:ri.cal englnerr:tng or bearings industries , 
and rHd not hAve ] arge b3.rga in in :I!' power . Furthert'lore t supply 1n~; branches seeJn 
to hwe retaliated at tlm<C?s .f-or poor supply of machine tools from the machine 
4 ool industry; and frequent] v argued th::~t inade.,uate machine tool supply was 
'tind"'rl.nF the fulfilment o-r their obli'!ations . An editorial in Hashinostroenie 
in 1940 asked t"le question - why was supply ln the branch so bad? :"Because many 
of them { supn1 :i ers) , preceding from narro1o-rly departmental interests, and the 
fact that ~he rnachlne tool builders' orders are frequently ' insignificant' by 
v·lume and promise less profit and more hrollble , hook or by crook push them into 
+he backgrou."'d and nrag out their fulfilment for months and sometimes years .1lut 
hen; can they possibly be • triflinp-s ' when one is talt1ng of satisfying the 
vi tal needs for machine to ls of our liiach1ne building and defence J.nti ustry and , 
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in fact, all branches of the na tiona.l economy" ~ 
The question of cooperation ls so~ewhat difr ~ent with spPclf1c features 
and nroblems. ' Coop~xation ' took t~~ee for~s.First, specialis d production of 
parts or semi-fabricates 1n special ~actory of shop, these items being supplied 
to a nunber of enttrJr\!Ses on a regular basis. Second, the u e by a factory of 
~pare capacity to meet the needs of another enterpriser such production was not 
neces ar1ly spec lal ised tn t.he sense of amp) oy tng specialised tf'!chnology giving 
soalo economies . Third, there was cooperailon for the production of specific 
products on a once only basis,e.g.the buildln of special machine tools . This 
last form of cooper tion was ,uite ~idely eflploye~ 1n the branch and for producing 
non-machine to~l items at machine tool actor1es ,e .g . tractor spares, ~uipment 
for the I etro , and components "for military equipment later 1n the ' thirties . It 
was al ost certainly unwelcome from the point of view of the factory , but such 
orders usually hed gov~iment and Party weight behind them and their fulfil~ent 
h~ hivh priority . This for~ of cooneration, together with the second type, ~urfered 
greatly from inade~uatc planning. In fact cooperation order were not really 
planned at all during t.he period in questl.on , Le. they were not. provided for in 
t.he arutua.l plan , but. werP. regardeo as an ext.ra above-plan ctlvity. The 1941 
2 Bnnu9l plan was the first to provide specific assignnents for such rders . This 
lack of planning made it easier for factories to avotd thetr obligations and 
led to the use of nda1nlstrative aethods to secure compliance. This shortcoming 
was t ties aknowled ed,e.g. Granovsk11 and Z.arku ,writtn 1n 940, adoitted 
that the poor planning of co~peration led to situgtions ln which orders were 
fUlfilled ," •• excl stvely under the pres ure of the orderer, and under the threat 
of repression" .J This lack of planning plu"' the any other problems (transport, 
standards, interdepartmental barriers,etc . ) coupled w1 h th absence of any 
financial incentives for the fu1fillnent of conpera.t1on or{lers,see s to haYe 
led factories to dell.hera.t.e efforts to sabotage cooperation by supplying sucb 
poor quality products th t. the orderers prefer d to i etr own . In 1936 
foro of regular bonus syste for the successrul 
- sot 1 llstic~eskn1 oro vRh1~nnos~M ., 1940,p . 268 
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fulfil111ent or co ~peratl.on orders and this demand was repeat~d by halyshev at 
the E~hte~n tn Party Ongress , bu·t. there is no evidence that action was taken. 
It ts quite probable , hoHever , t.hat there wece some one-orr bonuses for the 
completton or specific projects on a cooperation basis . 
The lack of plann tng and incen t.i.ves for cooperat.lon riuring the 1930s also 
may have in ~~t rAflected an oversimrl1f1ed theoretical understanding then 
prevalent . There appears to have been a bel \ef on the part of planners and others 
that the socialist planned economy by its very nature would ead to ·the successful 
realisation of cooperatlona preconditions were confused wi.th actual posslbilitl.es , 
and the real problems of realising these preconditions not fully appreciated . 
There is a defintte hint of such a misconception in Ordzhonikidze' s declaration 
at the 1935 Soviet of Nh."TP 1 "What is cooperation? This means that. an enormous 
number of ent•erp:ctses act at one command for solving a single bsk, helping one 
another ••••• In all th,. capttal1.st world Lndustry is split up tnto separate 
ftrms 'Which struggle against one another ~ith the utmost fierceness. Here lndustl.-y 
is concentrated in a single fist , subordinated to a single wilJ; we need to know 
only how to use 1 t tntell1gently ••• Out fa.~tor1.es oust be imbued wit~ a 
Bolshevik ciesire t.o help one another. Cooperation is an extraordinal•lly powerful 
lever in our hands. Of course , one needs to cooperate in a proper lilBJlner, and 
not like muddlers ." t The probl.en was precisely that the objective situation 
of the enterprise was such that l.t had certain collective interests of its own , 
which dirl not necessarily directly coincide with those of the ' single ~ill ', ~~ile 
~he ' Bolshevik desire to help one another ' was in itself an 1.nsuff1c1ently 
powerful motivating factor . This problem was related to the general underdevelopment 
of khozraschet cechanisms for bringing the interests of t~e Pnterprlses more 
1nto J1ne with those of the economy as a whole . Improved khn~raschet relations 
~ith some form of flnanclnl compensation for the costs and inconveniences of 
fulfU1 ing outside orders , together w ll.h penaJ ties for non-fulfUment could have 
greatly lmprovew the situation s from the sug-estions 1n the press in 1936 
tt does appear that some industrial leaders were beginnina to think 1n this 
direction , but this l.ni t1a t.ive was cut short. 
1.0rdzhonik1dze ,G.K.,Stat' i 1 rech1 ,N., t9.57 , p.o80 . 
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It has bet:.n argued that the vertical integration which characterised/Soviet 
engineering industry 1n the pre-war years (and later) was an unintended 
consequence of the pl ann:l.ng system itself as it operated at the time t a 
plan ln~ system which , because everthlng was subordinated to the su1gle aim of 
maximum output • fostered a short term outlook ~~d hostility to any form of 
regu~ ar dependence of one enterprise upon another •1 We believe this to be an 
1nade~uate explanation , pJactng excessive weight on the role of the gross 
output pl<tn inoicator as a behavionral determinant. As noted above , the objective 
connitions of th~ Soviet economy of the 1930s were tn many respects not conducive 
to t,e nevel opment of parts specialisation and cooperation - the inherited 
structure, lack of skills , limited investment resources , inadequately developed 
transport syc.tern, and later the del"\•.nds of a rapid growth of military production , 
etc , In this s i tuation the drive for maximum output , itself not simply a matter 
of preference but imposed to a large degre- by external forces , could not but 
exacerbate the situation . At the same tlme the high rate of industrialisati on , 
1nvolvittg rapid development of the productive forces , ciea.ted both the conditions 
re1uiring a furth~r extension of the division of labour anrl preconditions for 
1ts realisation. It was this complex interrelationship which the ' u1 tL·a-spec1al1sers ' 
~1ri not understand , but "hich came to be appreciated ~1 the course of the ' thirties . 
1.Gran1ck,op cit , p . 170 , 
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Chapt er 7 
THE CHOICE OF ~1ACHINE TOOL TECHNOLOGY 
With the adopt i on of the policy of rapid industrialisation Soviet industry 
was ~aced wi th the question of which types of machine tools were most ap , ropriate 
for use in the engineering and ot her branches and for production at Soviet 
ac~ine tool building enterprises. This was a specific case of the more general 
probl em of the choi ce of appropriate industrial technology which had exercised 
ec0~o ists , technical speciali sts , industrial and political leaders during 
the second half of the 1920s1• By the star t of the ~ irst .J.i' ive- vear Plan the 
principle of building large new enterprises and reconstructing the old on the 
basis of the latest ,modern technology of the caoitalist countries had quite 
wi despread acceptance ; but this ~eneral policy injunction had to be translated 
tn o real life decisions specifi c to each branch of i :rlustry . ~hat was the 
' lat est capitalist technolo~ ' ? Some invoked ' progress ive ' American mass production 
ani counterposed it to ~est European ' backward ' universalism ; others went further 
nn~ consi~ered all capitalist tec~nology backward and inapDropri~te to the 
cond itions of the Soviet , soci~list economy . This oroblem had to be solve4 at 
a t.1:ne when skills - technical , plan ing anri man'igeri~l - ~rere a scarce resource , 
an~ t he pressure for quick s olutions intense . This chapter is devoted to a 
consideration of the problem of technical choice as it related to t he machine 
tool i ndustry in the inter-~ar years . 
Discussion of the choice of technology is usually conducted by economists 
in terms of factor endowment , the availabil ity of capital and labour and their 
cost . In real life the choice of technology is not made by economists , or even 
by •he planner (except in a very general sense) , but by engineers and other 
~echnic~l , uractical wor~ers tn rlesign offices an~ enterprises . Furthermore , 
l'):> t er!'IS of the i r discourse , as the case or- the ·'lachine to ~} industry clearly 
~P onstr~tes , ~re nften far removei from those of the economist ; the choice 
in rea.lity take a quite dlff'erent form , being not bett-reen different c'l egrees 
o~ 'capital intensity ' or ' l abour intensity ', but between degr~es oi ' specialisation' 
or 'universality ', between ' flexibility ' and ' specificity ' , and between technologies 
l .See Davies ,R.W.,"Aspect s of Soviet investment policy in the 1920s" , in ~ocialism , 
Oa~~t3i ism and Ecanom1c Growth Ed .Feinstein ,C. H) ,Cambrirlge ,1967 , pp. 28)- J07 . 
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appropriate for use by workers of different skills and physical capabilities. These 
ter~s are not unrelated to those of the economist, but their relationship may 
be in~irect or tenuous . The end result of w~at may in practice be purely 
tPch~tc~l decisions have economic signi~icance , but the activity of choice cannot 
b~ dirPctly assimilate~ to the ' choice'of economic textbooks . 
The fact that Snviet policy was directed towards the use of the latest 
tee, 10loRy of the capitalist countries makes it necessary to analyse its 
development durinf the period in question . Soviet industry was faced with a 
pre-existinP- structure of machine technology: thP stoak of machines inherited 
from Tsarist nus · ia presente~ a spectrum of technical s6lutions , as did the 
range of machine tools actually available on the world market at the time the 
decis ions on rapid industrialisation were taken . From this structure of machine 
tools the set most appropriate to the demands of the Soviet econony had to be 
chosen. The following section provides an analysis of the development of machine 
·o~l technolo~y in the capitalist countries in the relevant period in or~er to 
reve:-tl the nature of the structure of technical solutions facin g Soviet industry . 
The ~eve~op~ent o~ Machine Tocl Technology 
In considering the ~eveloo~ent of machine to~l technolo~y a distinction must 
be made bebreen the .verall tendencies o~ develop,nent and the more ephemeral 
features conditioned by t~e state of the capitalist economies in the short run . 
~on:unctural factors have at times exerted a definite influence on the development 
or machine tool tech~olo~ , buthave not altered the main line of advance . 
~evelop~ent ~as not proceeded as a smooth , evolutionary process , ut a complex , 
~talectical process exhibiting stages of ~volutionary and revolutionary change; 
t~e forward movement taking a spiral rather than a linear for~ .Three main sta~es 
c~n be nistinguished . First , t'1e initial stage of tl1e widely universal -rtachines ; 
seconi , a sta~e of difrerentiation of operP.tions and the specialisation and 
s plification of machines , leading to a third phase of concentration of operations 
an~ p:ro·,;ing- col'llp1 exi ty , Each st::~.~e poses certain demands in terms of the skills 
re1utrer'l for the operatiorn of the rnac~i'les , and also tends to be associated with 
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certain characteristic forms of organisation . While the path of develop~ent MS 
a logic inherent to the technology itself , the motive forces of change have been 
of an economic and social character stemming from the conditions of capitalist 
machine production . The main phases of development will now be briefly considered. 1 
The early machine tools were of a universal nature capable of machining 
a broad range of workpieces and performin~ a wide r~ge of functions ; i . e. they 
had a low level of object and functional specialisation . In turn , machine 
operators needed a considerable range of skills and the accuracy of the work 
depended to a great extent on their skills• they were craft workers , re 1uiring 
long traininH. Production at this stage was generally of an individual or small 
batch type . The universal lathe, boring machine or planing machine are typical 
examples of the machine tools of this first stagP. of development .2 
With the gradual increase in scale of production which occurred with the 
development of capitalist machine production a orocess of di~ferentiation and 
specialisation began , leading to the creation of new, more specialised machines, 
e .g .the milling machine, gear- cutting machine and automatic lathe. Later, even 
more specialised variants apoeared,eg.thread milling , copy milling and plano-milling 
machines . Both functional ~d object specialisation took place, the lattrr 
entailing a re~uction of the range of workpieces machinable on a given machine . The 
progressive specialisation led to the decomposition of the production proces3 
and the machine began to incorporate an ever larger share of the skill previously 
the perogative of the worker . The range of skills required by the worker consequen-
tly declined. lhe all-round mill -wright disappeared, eiving way to the 1~ore 
narrowly specialised turner, miller , borer , etc. who still re~uirerl , however , a 
quite high level of skill. But as the process of differentiation and specialisation 
1.The general tendencies of machi~e tool develop~ent have be~n analysed in a 
number of works notably Kutta ,F.,Chelovek, trud,tekhnika,N.,1970 and Touraine,A ., 
L'~volution du travail o~vrier aux urs-ines Llenaults ,Paris ,1955 .Tbe labour skills 
aspect has been considered by Cole,G,D .H.,Trade Unions and munitions ,London,1923 ; 
and Gastev,A.K.,Kak nado rabotat' ,2nd.edn.,M., 1972,pp224-29J. 
2.See Kutta,oo cit,pp.151- 152 ;Touraine ,op cit,o.2J . 
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deepened the worker was re~uced to a machine op~rator able to work a range of 
different types of machine tool after only abrief period of training. This process 
allowed work of an ever gre~ter precision to be obtained with the employment 
of workers of less and less skill . The ultimate expression of this tendency 
is the special purpose machine desi~ned for fulfilling a single operation on 
one specific workpiece - here object and functional srecialisation are most 
highly developed . The basic condition for the use of such machines is a scale 
of production adequate to secure a profitable level of utilisation and this 
entails changes in the system of ~oduction organisation characteristic of the 
ph~se of the univers~l machine, 
During the st~ge when univers~l m~c~ines were pre~ominant two basic forms 
of organisation of production were possible . First, machines coud be grouped 
according to the type OT e1uipmPnt - f~~ctional organisation - giving shops 
oP lathes , milJinv machines, etc . This form tended to reinforce the universalism 
of machi 1es and workers . Second , machines could be arra,n@ed in groups according 
to the object being machined - object or~anisation - appropriate in cases where 
major parts were being machined , each requiring many operations ,This form gave 
the possibility of developing difTerentiation of operations and machine specialisat-
ion . In pra·ct~ both forms of organisation tended to coexist at any e;iven 
enterprise. 
With incr easing seriality of production it became nrofitable to extend the 
process of specialisation and operational differentiation to the point of 
creating a new organisational form , continuous flow production . The essence of 
this new for m was summarised by Ford himself :"Dividing and subdividing operations, 
keeoing the work in motion 1 - these are the keynotes of production" . As applied 
t.o machining processes continuous flow organisation involved the breaking down 
of the work cycle into separ ate operations and sub- operations , each performed 
by a separate , more or l ess specialised machine , the machines being arLanged 
in sequence accor ding to the work flm-1 . The transfer of the workpiece from machine 
to machine could be effected by hand or mechanical transfer devices . The 
t.Ford ,H.,My l i f e and work, 1928, p . 90 . 
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~evelopment of flow organisation further accelerated th~ process of machine special-
isation and worker neskil1ing. 
Machiae specialisation and operational differentiation with continuous flow 
organisation ~ere pushed to the point where contradictions appeared which could 
only be resolve~ by reversing the trend of development . Machine specialisation 
became unprofitable; the differentiation of operations led to an increase in 
the number of units of machinery , which in turn demanded more space and also 
inreased the time spent on inter- machine transfers . Differentiation of operations 
tended to bighten the role of inspection work 1n order to maintain quality 
standards , while the necessity of trans erring the workpiece from machine to 
machine had a deleterious effect on quality because thP workpiece h!ld to be fixed 
for machinin~ many times . In general , machine diff erentiation and specialisation 
met diminishing returns • It is notable that highly differentiated continuous 
flow organisation has often found its fullest expr~ssion under wartime conditions , 
when it cermits the assimilation into engineering production of large numbers 
of women and young workers normally excluded because of trade union opposition 
to dilution of thelabour force . 
These negative tendencies at a certain point promoted a new stage of 
development of flow product1on and machine tool technology, characterised by 
the concentration of operations and the creation or more complex , multi- operation 
machines designed for the simultaneous or sequential fulf.lltl'lent of a nUMber of 
1 operations on a single workpiece. This intensification of technical processes, 
frequently associated with a transition to a higher level of automation, overcame 
many of the problems of the previous stage and permitted a higher level of 
produC'tivi ty . The modern transfer line is a characteristic example of this new 
stage of developMent of machine tool technclo~y . The concentration of processes 
freed machine production from the limitations of the old, manufacturin~ division 
of labour characteristic of the previous stage of developMent , and gave rise 
t .Onthe two stages ' diT erentiation ' and 'concentration' see Dem'ranyuk,F .,Bol'shaya 
~etskaya entsikloped1ya , 2nd edn .,Vol .J4 ,p.287 ;Prokopovich , A.,Tekhnicbeskii 
,progress v stankostroenli ,~ ., 1957 , pp .96-97 t Touraine,op c1t ,p .29 the new stage 
is here termed the ' ph ~ sP. of recomposition ' • 
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to a reversal of the deskllling tendency . The new machines require highly skilled 
setters , maintenance workers, repair men, etc ., often needing a broad knowledge 
of electrical , hydraulic and mechanical mechanisms . But with the development of 
more complex machines the basic machine operator also requires a higher level 
o~ skill and understanding of the technical principles of the e?uipment; skills 
an~ experience of a quite different and higher or.der than those possessed 
by the universal, craft worker o~ the first stage of machine development . The 
Physical and mental aspects of the work process divi,ed at the previous stage are 
now reunited at a higher level . 1 
The general outline of the unfolding logic of machine tool technology reveals 
the overall tendencies and permits an assessment of the degree of ' progressiveness' 
of different machines at any point in time . However, ~oviet decision makers 
had to chose specific models to meet certain specific demands and their range 
of choice was quite strictly circumscribed by the actual pattern of development 
of machine tools in the period immediately preceding the time when the choices 
were made , Hence it is necessary to consider the concrete facts of ~achine 
development and t~e specific conjuncture at the time of the beginning of rapid 
industrialisation in 1929-30. 
The early development of "1achine tools will '10t be considered here except to 
note that in the USA in the period 1850 to 1900 a ~hole series of new progressive 
machine tools was developed lar~ely in response to the demands posed by a 
succession of new leading engineering branches , notably the armaments industry 
(especially small arms) , sewing machine building, bicycle building and , from 
2 the early twentieth century , the automobile industry. In the decade preceding the 
1914-18 War the use of specialised and special purpose machine tools developed 
str'Jngly in the USA , especially in the large serial and mass branches such as 
sewing machine building and t~e motor industry, There was , neverthelss, caution 
on the part of many nmnagers and complaints in the technical press of the period 
1.Kutta,op cit ,pp .158- 159 . 
2.See Roe , J ,;; • ,English and American machine to~"'~l builders ,i'lew Haven,1916 ; 
Rosenberg,N ,,"'Techno1ogical change in the machine tool industry , 1840- 1910", 
Journal of econoMic history , 196J ,~o.4,pp .414-443 . 
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that users frequently showed a preference for general purpose types of lower 
1 
productivity . The use of special- purpose mac~ines was mainly confined to the 
textile machinery branch characterised by a high level of product stability and 
a large volume of output. In Europe the bias towards universal type equipment 
was much greater , with lit t l e use of special-purpose machinery except in such 
br~nches as textile machinPry , and sewi ng machine building in particular . 
In the immediate pre-War period a development inthe United States opened 
a new stage of machine tool technology - the adoption of the continuous flow 
principle of organisation at the Ford ~actory,Flow assembly was first introduced 
in 1913 , and by the end of the year the benefits of flow organisation of machining 
processes were also being propagated by Ford engineers , who stressed the advantages 
stenming fron the elimination of ' trucking' betweP.n operations and the reduced 
working capital requirements ,which were deemed sufilcient to justify investing in 
i f 
specialised machines even/thev could not bP used to full capacity .2 
The First world Var h~d a number of important anrl lasting consequences 
for the develop .ent. of machine tool technolOP'Y and production organisation in 
thP. engineering industry . Two main forces were at work . First , there was the 
necessity of ~~ss pro~ucing military equipment , notably shelJs , rifles and 
ammunition and , later, a1rcraft and aeroengines . These produ~ts required very 
accurate machining for fully interchangeable assembly . Second, with the depletion 
of the skill ed male labour force work processes had to be adapted to permit the 
entry of large numbers of untrained worKers , including many women and youths . 
These demands led to an intensification of the process of work differentiation 
and spPcialisation with the breaking down of processes into their simplest possible 
elements requirin~ the minimum of skill. Although many special- purpose machines 
were employed the main thrust was to simple , standard machines , in particul~r 
lathes , drilJin~ and milling machines,often without power feed, These machines 
l.E . .2; ."Grlnders with all sorts of attachl'\ents are being bought for perfectly 
plain grindin&r , universal mll1 ing machines are user! :'or manufacturirt.g work that 
is Rore suited to the Lincoln type of machine and fifty seven varieties of 
feeds and speeds are provided where seven or even less would be equal to the work 
in hand . This means a higher investment than necessary and very often a lower 
(rate of)production than machines just suited to the work" - American fltachinist , 
1910,Vol ,)) ,Pt . 1, p.279 · 
2•The iron age ,4. 12.191) ,Vol.92 , pp .1276- 1277 • 
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eould be quickly and cheaply as1 bull t , required little adjustment and maintenance,.,, .,. 
were very easily operated , This form of production technology and organisation 
on a flow bas~s was not restricted to the USA; in Russia similar methods were 
employed; and also 
union opnositi on . 2 
in Britain,where the dilution of labour met vigorous trade 
A crucial factor permitting the use of simple , standard machines was the 
rapid expansion of the Proployment of jigs and fixtures whic~ took place during the 
War years . This was a major change for the European engineering industry , and also , 
to a lesser exent , the American , The use of fixtures and special tooling secared 
interchangeable parts, cheapened production , eliminated fitting and allowed the 
use of less skilled workers in both machining and ·assembly . 
Technical development of machine tools was slight during the war years' all 
efforts were devoted to output maximization.3 However , from about 1920 technical 
advance resumed and the les ons of the war began to be absorbed by both machine 
users and makers ; the subsequent eYents of the 1920s are of considerable relevance 
to to problem of machine tool choice in the USSR. The outstanding feature of 
the decade was the appearance of a new class of machines combining features of both 
general purpose and specialised equipment . The high productivity of special 
purpose and specialised machinery in large serial and mass Production was aknowledged 
but its use was often found to be uneconomic because of its 1 ack of flexibility . 
Special purpose machines , while enjoying a temporary vogue in Britain in the 
early 1920s4, were as a rule not fav~ured in either the USA or Europe after the 
War . Ford , often regarded as an advocate of the use of special purpose machinery, 
was in fact opposed to its use except when justified by the specific nature of 
certain parts and operations.5 Narrowly sp~cial machines often had to be scrapped 
if products changed and had a very low resale price .Furthermore , they often 
required lengthy and expensive dev~lopment work , requiring close contact between 
user and maker for this reason many special machines were built by the users 
themselves . 6 on the other hand , for the larger scale production which developed 
1.Rozenfel ' d and Klimenko, op c1t,pp .125- 128 . 
2.Engineering , 14 .3 .1919 , pp .2 54-255;Cole , op cit. 
3 ·Engin"'ering ,14 . 1 . 19, p . 255 ;Mechanical engineering , 1930 , A ril ,p .411. 
4.See Machinery , 13 . 12 .1923 , p .J45. 
li .Ford ,on cit,o.90. 
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1n the 1920s in many branches , often linked with the adoption of flow organisation, 
the traditional general purpose machine was no longer economic in view of its 
low productivity and htgh labour skill demAnds. Its mai.a spheres of use were 
jobbing-type engineering and repair work . 'fhus there was a demand for a new 
class of machines combining features of both special and general purpose ty~es. 
The resolution of the contradiction between the benefits of specialisation 
and the costs of limited adaptability appeared 1n the early 1920s in the form 
of new ' proriuction ' machine tools which at the time went under a dtversity of 
names- 'semi-universal' ,' semi- special' ,' special-production' ,'standar~ special-
purpose' and's1Bpl1fied standard' machines . References to these new production 
machines appear 1n 1924 , when ·they were defined as , "standard in that (they) 
7 
can be used for. a variety of work of a slm1lar nature, but bull t for high~ production" 
These production machines were frequently based on standard general-purpose ~odels, 
but were simpler in having fewer speeds and feeds, a smaller range of adjustment 
and easier control , permitting the em·:)loyrnent of relatively unakUled labour. 
These new machines took full advantage of high- speed tools developed in the 
pre-War period , giving them a level of productivity allowing them to successfully 
compete with special-pur. pose equipment . 8 
. 
As this new class of machines developec new features beean to emerge . First, 
the relative simplicity of the machines proved conducive "to the extension of 
s tandardlsat ion of parts and asee;"1blies . Second , automatic features began to be 
incorporated , further rec'l.uclng skill requirements and o~"rmittlng the m\J.ltiple 
manning of machines . A Jeading machine to~l engineer writing in 1928 observed 
that," •• through the whole range of types the terms semi-automatic and automatic 
~re repeatedly met . Ihe tendency appears to be to make standarj type machines with 
such automatic features as will enable thelr control in numbers~ one operator •.• 
this tendency may ultinately solve the problem of purely high-production specl&llised 
Mchines , the general utility of which is questioned on the grounds of lnsuffiaien t. 
scope 1n production range" • 9 
6.techanical etlllir.eerln~Z 19JO ,Nov. ,p .961 ;1'tachlner;t ,12 .4 . 1 ~8 , P• .S'/ . 
1 .Machinery , 18. 12 .1924, p :J5J, "Production machine tools" • 
B.<ln production machine tools see , ~. ,2 . 19.1924,p.1;The iron age , t4.4 .1927, p .1072: 
American machinist ,1929 ,Vol . ?1 ,p.427 ;Mechanical e~ineering , 19JO ,Nov ., p . 961 . 
9.~rlcan machinist (European edltlon) , ;o.6 .28,p.2 E (A .B.W1nter) . 
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The development of production m'ichines was promoted by the extension of 
large serial and mass producti~n in the engineering industry, notably in the 
United States , Mass production also promoted ~~ even more radical solution to the 
problem of securing high-productivity and adaptability: in 1923- 25 at the Morris 
Motors Engine factory in Coventry Herbert Taylor and Frank oollard pioneered 
the ur~it construction machine tool and the transfer line , marking the opening 
of a new stage in the development of machine tool technology~ The first transfer 
m<~.chines were not entirely succes.:;fuJ , but they did incorporate many standard 
units . In subsequent years Taylor became a vigorous advocate of the ' unit 
construction ' principle2 ; all machine tools • he be11eved , could be built from 
standard Machine units reduced to the simplest possible elements and operated by 
push but ton controls , with operations linked by automatic transfer anrl timing 
devices. The use of interchangeable units would, he believed . perm.tt. the very 
rapid construction and reconstruction of highly specialised equipment .3 Early 
in 1929 Taylor promoted his idea of a ' unit continuous svstem of manufacture ' 
in the USA , finding a more sypathetic repsonse than in Dritain , where his ideas 
had met with some scepticism . But as in Britain some specialtsts raised doubts 
as to whether the new unit construction mac~lnes were flexi ble enough . The 
desire for flexibility was now an overriding consideration as the influential 
general manager of the Jones and Lamson Machine Co . ,Ralph E .Flanders stressed r 
" An earlier tendency in this country towards highly-specialised machines received 
a severe check when it came to be rea11:sed that design changes were not to be 
~sional and minor, but were to be regular and radical instead . This has led 
production mangagers of most automobileshops to a decision in favour of standard 
tools designed for the application of special equipment (i .e .fixtures andtools- JC) 
which transforms them into special machines for a given part , but permits them 
4 
~o be changed over for other work at not to great a cost" . Nevertheless , the 
first elements of unit construction machine tool nuilding began to appear in 
:oractice in 1928- 29 , notably drilling machi11es with unit heads .5 This development 
WP.s greatly facilitated by the auPearance of reliable and compact individual 
l .See Institution of Automob1leEn~ineers ,Proce~dings 1 24-2 ,pp.429-438; Woollard ,F. , 
Principles of MaSs and flo~ nroduct1on ,London , 19 ,pp.26- JO . 
2.Thi s ter m was used by 'l'aylor - Machinery,1.11.28,pp . 137-1.41. 
3.1b1d . 
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electric motors and hydraulic units . In the United States , certainly , the principle 
of unit constractlonachieved a high degree of acceptance & one review of technical 
develop~ents in 192Q singled it out as the ~ost important new innovation in the 
machine tool 1ndustry6 • Thus on the eve of the crisis and at the time when Soviet 
industrialisation was gathering pace a radical new principle appeared ,necessitating 
a major reevaluation of traditional views on tne choice of machine tools for 
certain types of quant ity Production . 
The tendencies towards the use of production machines and unit construction 
found their fullest expression in the USA , In Europe both tendencies were present 
but to a much less marked degree : reliance on the traditional general- purpose 
machine tools was much greater . However , ther~ were notable changes in engineering 
product~on technology in \riestern Europe in the 1920s , with a definite tendency 
, 
to convergence with American practice • This fact must be considered 1n view 
of the currency , particularly in some Soviet literature of the late 1920s and 
early 1930s , of two stereotypesc the 'American' path of mass production ( 'Fordlzma') 
and the 'European ' path of smal,er scale , ' universal' production . The 
intensification of the tendency towards the diff erentiation of work processes 
into ever smaller elements and the as.,.ociated development of more specialised 
machine tools was closely linked during the 1920s with the penetration of 
continuous flow organisation into a widening range of branches of the engineering 
industry in 'both the U:-3A and l.!.urope . In Europe, notably in Germany but also, to 
a lesser extent , in Britain and France, flow methods formed one of the central 
components of the rationalisation movement . rols movement represented an atte~pt 
to introduce the benefits of Amer ican large scale production into a traditional 
economic str ucture characterised by a sw~ller scale of markets and greater produot 
diversity . Ratio~alisation , embraci~g a reduction in the number of activ~ 
enterprises , increased standardisation and a reduct :ton in product ranges created 
conditions in which flow organisation could be adopted . 
In Germany high priority ~as £ranted to reaping the benfits of flow production. 
In order to minimise investment demands , emphasis was placed on non-mechanised 
h ,Am~rican nachinist ,9 . 2 . 1929 , pp .62- 6) Emphasis added . 
5.Machinery , 13. 12 .1928, p .351 . 
6.Ibid . ,12. 12 .1929 ,p . 336 . 
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flow work att ained by a reorganisation of the machines into sequence according 
to the work flow , but without tha use of transport devices .1 By the end of the 
decade f l ow organisation in machining had been introduced in the motor industry , 
the electrical engineering in~ustry (Bosch ,GEC and Siemens) 2 and even the machine 
tool industry (Ludwig Loewe) 3 • Althoue:h restricted to a limited number of 
progressive f irms these organisational c~anges began to exert an influence on the 
German machine tool industrys in 1928 it was reported that,"The latest development 
OT the German industries is ~haracterised by an increasing use of quantity 
production methods and , in part , by a ~radual transition to the system of continuous 
line oroduction" , and this was leading to •• "the replacPment of the standard 
universal machine tools by special tools which have their speed and feed rates 
4 adequate to the Proper special purpose", This trend continued in 1929 , but 
it was evident that the general engineering user was still the main sector of 
the market ; as a review of the year ' s developments noted ,"In accordance with 
the requirements of European pro~uction schP.dules,machine tools of the universal 
tvpe , which can be readi1y adjusted to suit a varlety of components , have shown 
a marked predominance . At the same time there has been a definite increase in the 
demand for single - purpose machines simplified as far as possible. Further., it may 
be noted that in s ome instances machines have been so designed that they may be 
readily arranged for continuous line o-roduction" . 5 
The pressure on firms of intensified competition and more frequent product 
changes were also being felt in the USA before the onset of thP crisis . The turn 
to~1ards proc1uction machines has been noted , but in t11e late ' twenties there were 
even advocates of the use of standard general puruose machines in order to gain 
6 neater flexibility even in quantity production. The lessons of the Ford e~perience 
in changing from the Model ' T ' to the ' A' in 1927 after a run of over twenty years 
se~m to have been qui ckly apor~ciated . The new Ford factory at River Rouge had 
more adaptable machine tools than those previously employed and this new development 
1.Rubinshtein ,M. ,Kapitalisticheskaya ratsionalizatsiya ,11 ,, 1930 , pp . 54- 55 . 
2 .~ . , p .62; See also Brady ,R, ,The rationalisation movement in German industry , 
U .of' Califor ni a , 1933 , pp .156- 161 • 
) .Ludwig Loewe and Co .,Aktien~eselschaft Berlin , 1869- 1929,Berlin , 1930, po.94- 99 . 
Ii,~ e.chin·ery , 13 . 12 . 1928 , p . 3 51 • 
) .ibid ., 12 . 12. 1929 , p .360 . 
t -
.American machinist , 9 . 2 . 1928 , p. 255 • 
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was welcomed in Britain: it was noted that Fern ' s new equipment was "very much 
more flexible, and could be used in this country without any alteration at all" , 1 
One further very important aspect of mac,ine tool development \n the 
industrially advance~ capitalist countries at this time must be considered 
for a fu1l appreciation of the nature of the changes w~ich occured the question 
of the skills of workers operating and servicing the machines . Dramatic changes 
took place during the ~Jar and the 1920s in both the USA and ~estern ~urope ; 
c~anges made possible by the htgher level of specialisation and automation of 
machine tools and the new forms of production organisation. The consequence . 
can be briefly summartsed2: a mass deskilling of the labour force of the 
en~ineering industry . Some general statistics reveal the magnitude of this 
process . In 1930 the structure of the American engineering industry labour force 
rTas approximately, skilled workers 25 per cent , semi-skilled 55 per cent and 
unski~ J ed 20 per cent~ In Germany the proportion of skilled workers in the 
engine =--ring industry fell from 68 per cent in 1925 to 43 per cent. in 19284; while 
in Britain the proportion of skilled workers fell from 60 per cent in 1913 , to 
50 per cent in 1921 and 40 per cent in 1926 , with a corresponding increase in the 
share of semi-skilled workers from 20 to 30 and 45 per cent respectively,5 This 
deskil ling was accompanied by an increase in the employment of women and young 
workers in the engine~ring industry . 
Summarisin~ the development of machine tool technolo~ in the 1920s , the 
main features were; first, an increasing reliance on ' production' machines as 
oprosed to the universal on the one hand , and special- purpose machine on the other ; 
second , the ap -earance of a new method of building high-productivity specialised 
machine tools ; third , the spread of continuous flow production organisation to 
Europe with signs of some convergence in American and ~uropean machine tool 
technolo~y . These developments did not spell the death o~ the general- purpose 
machine tool : in many branches it remained the basic equipment and during the 
! .Institution of Automobile Engineers ,Proceedings,1930- 1931 , p .193 . 
2.This question is also considered in chapter 11 . 
) .Recent social trends in the United States ,NBER,New York,1933 ,p .808 . 
4.Rozman,M .,Kapitalisticheskaya ratsionalizatsiya i rabochii Jdass,N.,1940,p.223 . 
~ . Balfour report,Survey of industries ,Part IV ,London ,1928 ,p.152 . 
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period it underwent technical improvement as design features originall y pione~red 
on special and specialised machines gradually found wider application . 
The crisis and machine tool technology 
The influence of the crisis on technical progress in machine tool building 
has been considered elsewhere ; in this section only its impact on the degree 
of specialisation and automation of machines will be analysed. The crisis posed 
certain economic demands on machine tool technology . The volume of output was 
generally reduced , procuct differentiation tended to rise , the level of production 
specialisation fell and the drive for profitable oper tion in the circumstances 
of a greatly restricted market posed the need for an intensification of ~ 
production processes . 1 The two main demands were therefore productivity and 
flexibility . The primary tendency l-iaS for the despecialisation and universalisation 
of machine tools , while at the same time theproductivity of general-purpose 
machines was further enhanced by the adoption of technical developments accumulated 
in the previous period, notably the ne~o~ super-hard alloy tools. The need f'or 
cost reduction and intensification of production also led to a deskilling of 
£eneral-purpose machines by means of simplification and lightening of control, 
achieved by the use of electric devices, pneumatic chucks , automatic gauging 
devices , etc. This ' revolution' in machine tool design led to a resurgence 
in the use of the standard general-puroose machines , their employment being 
extended to serhl production previously th~ preserve of more specialised 
production equipment . 
By 1933 this new trend towards the use of general- purpose machines was being 
aknowledged as a si~nificant development by engineering industry specialists: 
a British observer noted thatz 
"In boom conditions attention is centred on getting output, and much high 
production plant is installed regardles ~ of expense , the only factor of any 
account being , apparently, that of increasing production. I· ow under the 
present conditions of business, production processes must not only be made 
to conform to smaller schedules; the manufacturing range must also be made 
1.The imPact of the crisis on capitalist ~rorluction methods is discussed by 
Rozman:op cit;Rozman,M .,Problemy ekonomiki,1935 ,l o.4 ; Werkstattstechn1k,1932 , 
No .5i Leik1n , Zalnd.,7 . 11.1933 · 
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wi~er in order to rnaintain the amount of work in the shops . This change has 
caused t~-,e production en&rineer to modify considerably "''is estimate ('\f the 
relative value of different types of plant. No longer is the high production, 
multi-spindle , multi-station machine able to justify itself to the same 
extent, so that thoughts are necessarily turned to the more standard types 
of machines . But apart from considerations of market conditions, developments 
of the past few years in the machine tool i~1ustry are sufficient to call 
for a change of outlook on the relative commercial value of the specialised 
high-production machine ant the standard tool . In the early days of mass 
production the standard tool possessed only f eatures resulting from normal 
development , whereas the the hi~h-production mac"''ine was relatively much 
more advance~ due to the impetus designers received under the pressure of 
production needs . The general employment of high-pr oduction plant greatly 
incrP.ased knowledge of machine to0ls ~erally , and this knowlerlge was 
" 
utilised to develop the standard mac~ine , until at the present time , when all 
factors are taken into consideration , it is often found that this type of 
plant is the more profitable".1 
These new general purpose machines were suitable both for w ~rk w1der the conditions 
of the crisis and when maxkets revived SO'Tlewhat in the mid-19303~ 
11hlle thP crisis led to an extension of the scope of general -purpose 
machines, technical development in the field of high-productivity types did 
not altogether cease and in fact gathered pace as the conomic revival led to 
reequipr.in~ o~ the large serial and mass production branches , notably those 
producing motor vehicles and consumer durables . The need to allow for rapid 
product changes was not. a dommant consideration in choosing equipment; versatility 
was obtained by employin&r unit-construction machines,the development of which 
evolved with great rapidity in the 19JOs. Typical of the new trend was the range 
of 'Powerpack ' units develoPed by Ingersoll, providing the basis for many high-
productivity, spe~i~lised but adaptable machining installations, including 
transfer lines for machining su(:h components as cylinder blocKS and rear axle units • 
As the lar~e-scale production branches revived interest in high-productivty 
s~cialised and auto na.ted machines of more traditional types once again developed: 
the majority of new American models of 1935 were of this type .3 The significant 
l.The machinist ,4 .3.193J,p .6.5E ,Editorial.; see also hachinery ,30. 11.1933, p .248. 
2.The machinist , 13 .6 .19J6 , p . J1JE. 
) .Machinery , 12 . 12. 1935, p .328. 
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feature of these new specialised machines , however, was their greater flexibility 
compared with earlier examples, and this flexibility not only made them suitable 
for meeting American demands of frequent product changes, but also rendered 
t~em suitable for use in European conditions . 1 One of the interesting features 
of' t~e We~t European engineerin~ industries during the 1930s was the production 
and use of American type specialised machine tool s . A number of machine tool 
firms began to build American 11odels on a regular basis , and some American firms 
established their own production facilities in Europe , e .g .Cincinnati . Thus by 
t lae mid-1930s in Britain the Churchill company was build ing Cone and Fay 
automatics , BSA was making Gridley autos . , and ~merican-type high productivity 
gear- cutting machines were being built by a number of firms .2 It is possible 
t~at this trend was influenced by the Soviet practice of using high- productivity 
specialised equipment . 
From the mid- 1930s and throughout the rest of the decade the demands of 
rearmament exerted a very strong influence on machine tool technology . This 
complex question is discussed separatel y in Appendix 5 • In general military 
demands served to accentuate tendencies of development already evident , including 
the need to create high- productivity , soecialised machi •tes of great flexibility, 
and also the trend towards deskilling machines by the wider adoption of a range 
of automatic features . 
This review of the development of machine tool technology reveals above all 
the complexity and historical relativity of the solution to the problem of machine 
choice . The categories ' general- purpose ' ,' specialised ' and 'special ' machine tool 
are not static in content but highly dynamic , changing in response to economic 
conditions and technical possibilities . Furthermore, the basic ty~es of machine -
latee, drill ing machine , automatic , etc. - are not by their nature of 
a certain degree of universality or specialisation ' there is a range of possibilitie 
within each type group . Analysis of the development of machine tool technology 
in t~e inter- war years also indicates the conditional nature of the distinction 
between 'American ' and ' European ' forms of nroduction organisation andmachine 
tool use and the need to avoid an oversimplified counterposing of one to the other. 
t .The iron a~e , 20 .6 . 1935 , p . 83 . 
2 .Machinery , '3 . 10.1935 ,pTl .2f--JO ; also Sii , 1935 , .~ o • 2 , P • J • 
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Certainly in the early ' twenties the European Pngineering L~dustries were 
characterisect by a reliance on universal machine tools and non- flow forms 
of organisation , with a much lower average level of seriality of production than 
in the USA . nut in the course of the decade, especially in ~er~Any, under the 
imPact of the rationalisation movement , a definite convergence began to place 
which by the end of the decade was exertin~ an influence on machine design in 
the direction of greater specialisation. This trend continued in the 1930s when 
American- type snecial ised and automated machines found much more general application 1 
partlv because thP machines thPmseJves had been marle nore adaptable to meet 
t~e circumstances of thP crisis . It is notable that one of the most advanced , 
1-till'h-prod uctivity machlninP systems of the decade was installed not by an American 
firm, but by the Citroen comnany in France •1 Further"lore, ln t.he 19')0s the 
German machine tool industry develoned a new range of high-productivity,multi-tool 
lathes and turret la t'1es for use by workers of relatively low skills. Thus at 
the time of the First Five- year Plan there was definitely a difference betwe.-n 
the average practice of America and Europe , but the latest,most progressive 
production and technical practice of Western Europe was undoubtably comin~ into 
line with that of tf-te United States . 
The Evolution of Soviet Policy 
This section is devoted to a review of the Soviet discussion of the problem 
of the choice of mach~1e tool technology , both from the point of view of the 
types of machines to be built by the domestic machine tool industry,and the types 
to be installed in the Soviet economy. This discussion was carried on in 
in1ustrial and tec~ical press (and occasionally in the pa~es of Fravda and 
Izvestiya) , at machine tool industry conferences and within VSNKh and NKTP . It 
was usually linke~ with broader discussion of thepath of development of the 
machine tool L"ldustry, considered separately in Cl,apter Four . 
l.A mul ti-statlon unit construction production line built by the American firm, 
Ingersoll,for the machinin~ of cylinder blocks .See The ~~chin1st,Vol.7~,1934, 
pJi29-6Jf\ . 
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Four main periods can be identified , al thou9'h it is difficult to identify 
clear boundaries marking the transition to new stages of discussion ; the first 
period ran from about 1926 to about the su.rn:-:er of 1929;th~ second from mid- 1929 
to mid- 1933 ; the third from mid- 1933 to about the end of 1934; and the final 
period from the beginnin~ of 1935 to the outbreak of War . These periods are now 
considered . 
~~ - '-'id-1929 
During the three years prior to the foundation of Stankotrest the output of the 
~~ctories building machine tools consisted entirely of relatively simple and 
primitive universal models of lathes , drillin~ machines and planing and shaping 
machines . Virtually no grinding or mil l ing machines were built , and no tur:r.·et 
lathes , automatics , gear- cutting machines ar special machine tools . 'l'he sole 
representative of the industry to write regularly on nolicy questions at this 
t ime, M.Orentlikher , held a consistent view on the ouestion of technological 
choice which was first stated in 1926 . Orentlikher was critical of the universal 
nachine tool on the grounds that many of its features were rarely useo and that 
t~e ranPe of feeds and speeds was excesRive for normal purposes. On the other hand, 
special machine tools employed abroad in mass production were inflexible . His policy 
concl usion was that , ~-ven the predominance of 'semi- serial' or serial production 
and the fact that mas~ uroduction was exceptional ,attention should be focused 
on ' simple , standard machine tools with a limited circle of work'. These machines 
were to be supplied with appropriate fixtures to raise their proAuctivity and give 
1 the possibility of expaniling thei r range of work . Thus , Orentlikher was effectively 
calling for the adoption of the production .•1achine tools then beginning to 
find wide application in foreign industry . He also added that if special machines 
were to be built th~y should be based on standardised parts and assemblies 
2 
common to mor e universal machines ; such a compromise would give greater flexibility . 
Orentlikher restated his views in January 1929 . rroduction-type machines 
werP a~ain favoured , and on this occasion be also observed that , for the years of 
l.Vestnik izhener ov ,1927 ,No 12 , .D . 542 . 2.srstema r or£an1zatsiya , 1~26 ,No .4 , p . 12 . 
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t1e First Five- year Plan , " • . 1 t is necessary for us to refrain from producing 
automatics, semi-auto~tics and a number of specialised machine tools and also 
lit+le- use~ machines - multi- spindle drilling machines , keyway and two- spindle 
1 milling machines , thread millers, gear-cutting rnachines ,etc ." . 
Al'perovich , at this time ~ead of Orga~etal1 , also had definite views on 
t~->e aopropriateness o-r dif erent types of machine to Soviet conditions - 1n 
t~is case American or Cerman technolo~y. American Machine tools were, he observed, 
on average 20- 30 per cent more expensive than European equivalents , but were 
more pro uctive and required less skilled labour for their operation. ~hey were 
generally sold tooled~ uo for the makin~ of a specific part at a predetermled 
rate of output, an permitted the adoption of superior forms of production 
I 
organisation . Al ' perovich s policy conclusion was that Soviet industry should 
order from the American industry only the most soecialised machines intended 
for fulfilling specific production processes, otherwise the additional cost 
was "completely unjustified" • 2 The main alternative was for Soviet industry 
to purchase from Germany , a policy which had , he believej , certain definite 
anvantages stem~ing from ~eography , stable fo~e\gn relations , the good knowledge 
of verman practice possessed 0y many Soviet enginePrs,favourable credit conditions, 
the German willin~ness to provide technic~l services, and finally, the suitability 
of German machine tools to voviet conditions and demands .3 
German machine t ools were , Al ' perovich aknowledged , generally of the universal 
type . They were f r equently copies of the best American models (although often 
out of date) , they were cheap , but sometimes of po'r quality . But while recognising 
the advantages of buying German machines he was critical of uerman practice of 
~achine tool choice which , he believed , gave rise to a bias towards universal , 
low productivity tvpes . There was a general tendency , Al ' perovich observed , for 
t~e power- to-weight ratio of machine tools to rise and also £or the value per 
unit machine to steadily increase . Further , it was "quite obvious" that the more 
expensive a kiloqramme of machine tool , the cheaper would be the cost of each 
1 .Tor~. - prom .p;az . ,30 . 1 .1929 . 
2 .~. ' 17 . ).1928 . 
).Novosti stan'.tostroeniya v Germanii ,: ., 1927 , p . .5. 
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kllogramJne of metal cut by it , "even takin g account of the amo:ttisa tion of its 
n-eater initial cost" •1 In fact 1 he added 1 "In those cases where such product! ve 
machines have beP.n secured work of an appropriate character and volume and also 
suitable tools , a dearer machine will always be more profitable to use than 
a cheaper one". But German industry did not buy such modern productive machines . 
According to Al ' perovich, when asked why this was so German managers answered 
that, "'Je are not rich enough to pay .5.5 marks per tilo of machine tool". This 
he characterised as a " primitive commerical" explanation , rather than a proper 
"ens:ineerin~ - cost calculation" apryroach . Soviet industry , he added , suffered 
from the opposite "deviation":"Very often we take little interest· inthe cost of 
the machine to0l , so long as it is the ' last word of technology' and corresponds 
to 'the latest fashion' ''. 2 Thus while aknowledging the need to employ more 
spe~ialised and productive machines when conditions per~itted (these machines 
were to be purchased from the USA) , Al'perovich saw the German machine tool 
industry as the primary supplier even though its products were usually of a 
universal type . 
Minimisation of foreign exchange costs was clearly a major factor in 
Al ' perovich' s arp.ument for reliance on the German market , and this consideration 
was clearly influential in other proposals of the period . M.Sorokin argued for 
the acquisition of foreign secon1 hand machines , in particular from the USA , 
where even quite new machi~es were discarded because of rapid obsolesce~cet in 
4 
the following year this demand was echoed by Al'perovich . In February 1929 
another specialist ,I .Rybal ' skii- Butevich proposed measures for raising t1e 
productivity of the existing stock of old machines by repairs and ~odernisation , 
5 
leavin~ the machine tool factories to concentrate on more complex ~roducts . 
The First Five-year Plan itself ,adopted in May 1929,posed before the machine 
tool industry the task of meeting the demand for the most widely used (Khodovoi) 
types of machine tools . But the building of ' special machine tools ' (clearly in 
1.~.,p.6. 
2.ibid. 
3 .T"Org .-prom . gaz . , 7 .14. 1927. 
4 .~. ,17 . :3 .1928 . 
s.~. ,2 .2.1929 . 
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this case both specialised and special-purpose types) was to be restricted to 
a scale sufficient for gathering exnerlence in preparation for their prociuction in 
the following five-year p~~iod~ The Plan dtd not lay down which types of machine 
tools ~ere to be installed at the new and reconstructed enterprises of the 
en~tneering industry . Thus , ln this first period, the l'lain emphasis was on the 
general-purpose or production type machtne tool . 
!lld-1929 - Mid-1933 
In policy discus~·ion during the first period the main stress was on f!1achine 
tools of a relatively unspecialised type suited to thP demands of small and 
nedium serial production , but in 1929 , ~specially after the adoption of the Plan, 
this emphasis be~~~ to be challenged. The NK RKI survey of machine tool 
buildtng published in May 1929 considered that the lathes built by Soviet factories 
were excessively universal and complex, and attention was drawn to the neglect 
of high-productivity machines (turcet lathes,automatics , semi-autos.,etc , ) despite 
the 'considerable demand ' for them.2 In his report ~~ the conclusions to be 
drawn from the survey M.Kaganovich stated that with regard to the structure 
of types built Soviet machine tool building had to emulate the American industry. 
C~1cern over the structure of machine tool production and installations probably 
moun~ed following the strug{lle in Ciprornez in !i'ebruary 1929 for th~ a~option of 
mass production technology at the new Stalingrad tractor factory~ Americ~n mass 
produrtion engineering technology was also championed by Sorokin 4 and H.Gurev1ch. 5 
In December 1929 Gurevich sharply attacked the orientation of the domestic machine 
tocl industry to the demands of the ' serednyak' user : large-scale users were able 
to acquire foreign equipment , the remainder were forced to accept the inadequate 
Soviet ll'lac!'lines . The increasing emphasis on .mass production required. he concluded, 
the damestic oroduction of modern machines orientated to the advanced , large- scale 
us~rs .6 Thus in the course of 1929 the policy outlined for the Five-year Plan 
period began to be challenged and this criticism gathered strength in the following 
year, 
1,!1atiletnii »lan narodno-khozyaistvenno o stroitel ' stva SSSR,Jrn .edn .,M. , 1930, 
Vo1.2,pt .1 ,pp .1 -157 · 
2.Sotsiallsticheskaya ratsionalizatsiya v bor ' be s poteryam!, OP cit,p .158. 
, .See Ilyin ,Y. and Galin ,B.,Those who built Stalin!TZ'ad ,N .Y ., 19J4,pp . J2~38 • 
• Torg . nrom .gaz . , 12 . 1 . 1929 . 
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In this second period a number of distinct schools of thousht can be 
identified. First there was t d h a en ency w lch favoured the use ~d nroduction of 
universal machine tools . Second , there was a broad tendency which favoured 
specialised machines , and within it two main sub-tendencies _ one favouring 
an 'American • solution . the other the use of stmple.speci lised machines . Third , 
thPre was a radical tendency which offered a critique of all existing machine 
tool technology . Finally , there was the position of Al ' perovich , the head 
of the specialised machinetool industry , a position which changed in the ccm:se 
of the period and cannot be directly assimilated to any of the main tendencies , 
but also cannot be considered a distinct school of thought . The arguments of 
the representatives of these tendencies will now be reviewed . 
For universal machine ~ools 
The views of those favouring universal m~chine tools must be infered because 
their position was not stated in discussions in the press . However, there is no 
doubt that this tendency was dominant during the period prior to the First Five-
year Plan and extremely influential during 1t. This scho 11 of tho~ht, which 
took traditional European practice as its model, had adherents both in the 
machine to r,l industry itself and in user branches of industry and other sectors 
of the economy. In th@ machine tool i trlustry it is evident that many concerned 
with production , as opposed to design, favoured the building of a li~ited range 
of ~eneral-purpose machine in large quantities . On the user side there was a very 
substantial demand for univers~l t ypes on the part of repair shops ,FZU schools 
and small and medium sized engineering shops and factories . Even in some of the 
larger factories there was a bias towa~ds universal equipment , as will be shown 
below . The use of universal machine tools was the traditional practice of the 
Rus~lan engineering industry and was clearly regarded by many practical workers 
as the well- tried practice of the leading West European countries and therefore 
~orthy of emulation . Furthermore , supply possibilities must have reinfor ced this 
attitude 1 German universal type machine tools were more readily available and 
cheaper th~~ American specialised models , while the machine to~ls built by Soviet 
factories before and during the First Five-year Plan period were all of the 
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general- purpose type . There were good reasons for this bias to universalism 
from both producers ' and users ' standpoints and the persistence and vigour of its 
critics testifies to its strength. 
For speci alised machi ne tools 
The second school of thougnt is that which be~an to assert itself in 1929. 
n. number o ... different positions within this tendency can be distinguissed , the 
most influential being the ' American ' path advocated most strongly by M.Kaganovich 
of NKRKI (later ~KTP) and M.Sorokin of Avtotrest (later Stankoimport) . One of 
the earliest public statements of this tendency was th~t of Kaganovich at the 
Sixteenth Party Congres~ in July 1930. He began by comparing the structure of 
types to be built by the end of the Plan period and the structure of the American 
machine tool stock of 1930. In the USA automatics accounted for up to 10 per cent 
of t"le stock in mass production enterprises , but they did not Pigure at all in 
plans for the Soviet machine to~l industry. Lathes, however, accounted for 20per 
cent of the American stock , but were to account for '!.lmost fifty per cent of 
Soviet output. For milling machines the proportions were 10 and 5 per cent 
respectively . American machines were certainly more expensive than German , he 
admitted, but their productivity was such that they gave a lower cost per unit 
of output : the higher the quality of the machines, the less the number nP.eded 
and the higher the oroductivity . Furthermore , Am~rican machines were tooled- up 
for specific processes , whereas Soviet machines were built for anonymous buyers 
1 with harmful consequences for productivity . Shortly after the Congress Kaganovich 
restatei has position and his policy conclusions for the Soviet machine tool 
in 'ustry .American machine tools , he wrote , had be n developed under the influence 
of the mass production motor industry , which demanded maximum productivity and 
great accuracy for interchangeable parts . They tended to be more rigid than GerMan 
~achines and to h~ve relatively simple controls . The lesson for Soviet machine 
tool building was that it had to use all the latest achievements of the Americ~n 
industry , Account had to be taken of individual cases and requirements , but , 
''American types of machine to,ls , the designs of which are orientated 
Lm .s" ezd VKP( b) , sten. otchet, op cit . P . 520 • 
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primarily to mass production , for high productivity and for simplicity of use and 
control should be better suited to our conditions than German machines Hhich 
up till now have be!'>n orientated primarily to saall -serial and large- serial 
production" .1 But while prol'loting thP case for building American- type high-
productivity machines ~aganovich also called for a l i mitation of the number of 
tvpes and sizes built and the introduction of flow production methods into 
~achine to~l building . These policies were not compatible with the rapid 
assimilation of speciali sed types in the circumstances of 1930 a his position 
was thus to some extent contradictory . 
"!-'.ark Lavrent ' evich Sorokin 1-1as known as the An1erican . Such was his nickname . 
rle knew about this and even seemed to be proud of it";2this was the comment of a 
recent work which , in part , discussed the role of Sorokin as head of Avtotrest . 
Sorokin was one of the most consistent and vigorous advocates of American technology 
and industrial organisation during the first two Five- year Plan periods • .£!'rom 1931 
he frequently expounded his views on policy for the machine tool industry and 
p.,.esented a radical alternative to the practice of the branch . "The task of the 
machine tool indust ry" , he wrote , '' is to help industry outlive 1 ts archaic 
bias tow~rds the methods of the fitter's workshop as rapidly as possible" .J 
The bias towards universal machines shmm by many enterprises was , he believed , 
an element of this backward technicql culture and closely linked with the low 
level of specialisation of production in the engineering industry . With the 
wide- scale anoption of the nrinciples of specialisation and co,peration the 
universal machine would have an "extremely modest place". Under capitalism there 
~ere major obstacles to the replacement of universal machine tools in the shape 
of competition ,limi ts on the speciali sation of production,the existence of small 
enterprises , excessive u.ro~uct dif~erentiation , etc •• The Soviet , soci~list , planned 
economy alone offered the possibility of fulJy reconstructing industry on the 
•· a n • ' • • • 4 1 f S kin ' ' .i1o6rovol ' ski ,E .,Daesh avtomobil •! ,M., 1971 , p . 3 . For an early examp e o oro s 
oassionate Americanism , see his booklet Ob Amerikanskikh tempakh ,M. ,1930 . He 
was an economi s t by educati on and had com,ercial rather than industri al experience 
be~orehis a~pointment as cha~man of Avtotrest in 1928.Two recent works provide 
a ne~ative assessment of his abilities in this post (ibid., and Direktor -
I.A.Likhachev ,i1 .,1971 , pp .1 J - 15} .A more positive as...,essment of his techni cal and 
or~anisational abil ities as director of the Tula arms factory in the mid- 1930s 
., i s provided in I storiya Tul ' skogo oruzheinog;o zavoda ,1712- 1972,.·1. ,197J , p. 226 • 
.... . sotsialisticheskaya rekonstruktsiya i naUka , 1931 ,vyp .2- 3 ,p . 122 . 
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basis of specialisation and concentration of production, although Sorokin was 
careful to note that such a reconstruction could not oe achieved all at once . 
3tarting from the as~UMption that the Soviet engineering industry would be so 
reconstructed he proceeded to outline what he considered to be the appropriate 
choice of machine tool technology. 
The startingpoint of most of Sorokin's contributions ~as a comparison of 
~~e ~tructure of the machine tool stock of the USA with the planned and actual 
structure of Soviet machine tool output . Such a comparison revealed the Soviet 
• industry ' s neglect of hi gh- productivity types . In Sorokin s view the leading 
tlacl-tine tool using branches by 1931 ~ere the auto-tractor industry , the aircraft 
industry and the builoin~ of agriculturaJ machinery , L.e .all branches characterised 
by large-serial or mass production, with the auto- tractor branch to the fore 
with respect to nachi ne tool technology. Therefore , he ·celieved , the domestic 
Machine tnol industry had to rapidly assimilate ~he h1gh-productivtty types needed 
by this and other leading sectors . Universal machines would of course still be 
ne~de~ , but in relatively small quantity , and Sorokin believed that the requirements 
of the repair sector could best be met by building combined mach1nes , 1 .e .highly 
universal machinE's combining lathes t milling and dr111 ing machines in a single 
1 unit . 
The expediency of installing high- productivity automatics and semi-autos 
was argued by Sorokin with exaror:les drawn froa the motor industrv , which sugil:'ested 
that not only were there substantial savia~s to be derived from reduced labour 
costs , out also savings stemming from lower fixed and variable costs . In some 
cases , he demonstrated , a single high-productivity machine had a lower initial 
capital cost than several universal machines it replaced .2 But there were also 
significant capital savings to be obtained from reduced floor space requirementsa 
one square metre of factory uroduction shop area had a cost of 115-120 rubles, s o 
that if four machines were replaced by one of eq nlvalen t output per Wli t tine a 
sav1nr of up to 4 ,000 rubles could bP. achieved. Furthermore , the higher rate of 
output led to acceleration of the circulation of working capital ~ith consequent 
1 .Za!nd.,7.2.1931J Sotsialistiches~~ya rekonstruktsiya i nauka ,1931 ,Vyp. 1, pp.l12-114. 
2 .See belo~ , 1"1 . 2~.2 . 
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savings . The conclusi on for Sorokin •as clear - ~~e building of automatic , multi-
spindle and other h~~h-productivity machines had to beco~ the leading direction 
of n::~chine tool building . 
While promoting the building and use of relatively complex, high- productivity 
machine tools , Sorok1n was also concerned with the need to supply industry w.ith 
more specialised :machines. Nass- flow production wlt.h differentiation of the 
production process into a large number of simple operations offered the possibility 
of using rtany simple machine tools , obtained by simplifying standard universal 
models ,e .g . by reducing the number of speeds and f·~eds to a minimum , or by 
removing the lead screw from lathes . Such machines were easier to use and repair 
ani were of much lower initial cost than the usual standard machines . Sorokin 
favoured. the bniloing of the most common general- purpose types on the foundation 
of 'basic models ' incorporating many st~ndard parts and assemblies allowiny the 
c•~eation of ranges of 1nodified and simplified machi'les for specific purposes .1 
FinalJy , Sorokin favoured the building of 'flexible ' special machine tools 
by the unit-construction principle . The building. of machines fron standard sub-
as~emblies opened the way to the creation of narrov.ly- special machines of very 
high proctuctivity combining a number of operati ons , and also gave the posFibility 
of making the standard as .. ernblies on a large- serial 2 or even mass basis . Despi~e 
his enthusiasm for Ameri can technology , Sorokin cautioned against an •extraordinary 
infatuati on ' with Am~rican types of machine tools they were generally the 
best , but thoseof other countri es , in particular Germany , were worthy of 
attent ion.3 
The ' Ameri can' school had many other representatives , but their positions 
~ere similar to those of Kaganovic~ and Sorokln , The mair. thrust of this tendency 
was towards the buildin£ and use of the high- productivity types used in American 
l!ldustry autom~tics , semi-autos ,multi- spindle dril ling machlnes ,ceatreless 
grinders , special milling machines ,etc . These machines were relatively complex 
l .Sotsialisticheskaya rekonstrtiktsiya 1 nauka ,19Jl , vyp .2- J ,p . 115. 
2. .~. , pp . 115- 127 iZaind . ,12 . 2 . 1931 . 
) .~. ,12 .2 .19)1 . 
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and dif~icult to build , and sometimes required quite highly skilled labour for 
their ooeration and servicing. They also tended to have a high initial cost. 
It is rUfficul ties such as these "'hich gave rise to a rood if Jed solution to 
the problem of machine tool technology based on specialised equipment . Oneof the 
most cohPrent expositions of the case for an alternative at>proach Has that of 
a prominent machine tool en~inerr and dPsigner, A.Pankin , presented in the 
1 
summer o: 1930. Pankin ' s initial prPmise was the same as that of Sorokin 
Soviet industry had to make a decisive transition from serial to mass production. 
Under capitalism , especially in the USA , the relative cheapness of machine tools 
made it possible to employ general- purpose type machines in serial and even 
mass production , but , Pankin stressed , this was not a rational practice . ~~ass 
production permitted the employment of machines with a very limited range of 
reeds and speeds ,without lead screws ,with very few accessories,etc •• In Pankin',s 
view the correct path for Soviet industry was that of building special machines 
of a simple nature for a whole series of characteristic components . 
Pankin saw very great benefits from the uqe of such slmple,special machines 
as opposed to the more complex conventional high- productivity types. The simple 
~achines were ,he observed , intimately con1ected with a certain system of 
pronuction organisation which he believed to be best suited to ~oviet conditions, 
i . e. the dlfcerentiation of the production process into the smallest possible 
simple elements ,as opposed to the pFactice ofconcentrating operations permitting 
the use of multi-tool and multi-station mach1,1es of high- producttvity . The main 
advantage of the former approach was that workers of very low skills could be 
eMployed to operate the simple ,specialised machines , whereas the second approach 
(the ' American' path) required skilled workers to set and maintain the 
~achines and make ap~opriate tooling . The simple machines would be cheap,easily 
aP~ quickly built , would give substantial foreign exc~ge savings and simplify 
la.bour training . Pankin did not rule out the use of more complex, high- productivity 
eauipment; the relative expediency of one or other path depended primarily on 
the seriality of production, and in practice a mixed approach would often be 
adopted . Thus Pankin oresented an alternative to both the 'European ' and'American ' 
l .Sii , 1930 ,No . 1- 2 ,pp . 2- 5. 
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tendencies , his ~osition being closer to that of the practice of the ?irst orld 
"ar , w~ ~any simple , special machines were used in mass ~eduction permitting 
the eroplovment of inexperiencPd , low skilled workers . 
In the autumn of 1932 a more extreme variant of this approach was put forward 
by A .Zernov of Stankoob" edlnenie . "The future of socialist indus try , '' he wrote , 
"u.'ldoubtably belo:'\gs to narrowly- special.lsed giant factories working to a 
continuous production flow . ~ach machine tool in such a flow fulfils a limited 
and unchanging funct i on . ! his permits the deslgning of it as nar~owly soecial , 
and the large quantity of similar nar rowly- special machine tools al lows them to 
be prod ucea on a ser lal or , frequently , a large- serial oasis" , 1 Such a high 
degree of snectalisation was ,Zernov belleved , unacceptable for capitalist 
industry and t.herefore Soviet industry would have to create its own independent 
designs . This could b~'·st be achi evec by building machines fr.om standardised parts 
and mechanisms on a unit- construction basis . One of the main advantages of this 
approach , in Zernov ' s view , l'as that 1t would grea·t:ly reduce the skill requ.l.red 
by machine operators . But even narrowly- special machines required some skill 
for their operation ; this requirement could be eli!!linated entirely ,he believed, 
by automating the machines , with the eventu3l possibil i ty of creating a unified 
automatic "production organism" . 
One factor missing from both Pankin ' s and Z~rnov ' s arguments was the need 
to allow for product design changes a both abstract from the demands of technical 
oro£ress . Zernov ' s call £or unit- construction ~as ai~ed not at securing rapid 
reconstruction in the event of design changes, but at achieving rapid initial 
construction . It was the question of flexibility which formed the focus of the 
arguments of t~e third main tendency on the problem of machine tool choice . 
''F'or a revolut i on in machine buildin~!' 
At the First Conference of Industr ial Hanagers in early 1931 A.l<.Gastev , 
head o1 the ventral Institute of Labour, at a session of the section on machine 
building , declared that , "Those machine tools which we have now and which we 
i port from abroad lag so far behind present day technical thought that their 
l .Sotsiali.sticheskaya reitonstruktsiya 1 nauka , 1932 ,No . 9-10 , P • 85 • 
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only place is in a muselllll" . 1 Gastev and his team at TsiT , notably N .Bakhrakh, 
were alone in the S~iet Union of the First l'ive-year Plan 1n presenting a radical 
critique of all existing machine tool design and production practice and in 
of~ering an alternative which they believed to be the only rational path for 
the soci:::list , olanned economy . Gastev ' s views on ' technical reconstruction ' 
of machine bui lding were first stated in general terms in the spring of 19302 , 
but. did not receive public attention until May 1931 when almost a whole page 
of Zaindustrializatsiyu was devotPd to t~e work of TsiT under the heading 'For 
a revoluti on in machine building' • The work of TsiT is considered in detail 
elsewhere ;3here only the main elements of Gastev ' s alternative policy will be 
considered . 
The TsiT ·,.·orkers rej~cted the traditional machine tool classification 
into 'universal ' and : special ' machines , and even the usual type classification -
lathes, milling , drillin~ machines ,etc . The basis for classiflcatlon had to 
be functional , in so far as all machines are composed of a small number of common 
functional elements , e .g . elements of rotation,or backward and for~:ard motion . The 
new machine to~l building was to be based on standard functional elements which 
could be very raoidly assembled to make machines to meet the demands of snecific 
pronuctton processes , l.e . each machine would be narrowly- special , but at the 
same time highly adaptable .Gastev considerd that :\.t would be possible to make tne 
standard functional units at s~ecialised enteprises on a large-serial or mass 
~sis, while engineering factories would be able 't.o easily assemble their own 
machine tools. Repair and maiote~ance work would be transformed - faulty units 
4 
would simply be replaced . 
The radical proposals of Gastev and his team found immediate support in 
certain quarters . Hisideas were propagated with great enthusiasm by a prominent 
engineer,E.Perel ' man 5, while at a meeting in the Communist Academy in 1931 an 
economist ,Krasovskii , likened Gastev • s analysis of machine functions to ~ endeleev' e 
table of elements.6 But it is doubtful whether Gastev regarded his work as offering 
t.Pervaya vsesoyuznaya konferentslya •. , op cit , p.222 . 
2 ,See Kak nado rabotat ' ,M . , 1972 ,pp.44J- 449 . 
3 .s~e Appendix 7":--
li. ,zaind . ,26 .5.19)1 ;11.) .1932 ;Bakhrakh ,N. , et al . ,Standartlzatsiya mashin ,t.J. , 1933 . 
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an immediate practical solution for ~oviet industry; its importance lay in its 
future potential. The rese~rc~ work of Tsrr on technical reconstruction was 
suprorted by a Party '"'entral -.:om.mittee decree of 6th Hay 1931?, and had the 
back in~ of M .Kaganovich within NK'l1P •8 
1 Stankoob" edinenie" and the choice of machine tool technolo~ 
Finally in this review of the main schools of thought on the question of 
th,..,. choice of machine tool technolory e consider the position of the specialised 
machine tool indust y and its head , Al'perovich . Unlike the other participants 
in the debate Al ' pProv1ch had direct responsibility for the realisation of 
technical policy in thP. industry and for this reason his ideas are of particular 
interest and importance . 
On a number o~ occasions during 19JO Al'perovlch aknowldeged that the types 
of machine to~ls then bein~ built were too old and simple to meet th~ demands 
posed by tndttstrialisation . 9 In Harch 19:31 he responded to Sorokin 1 s critlcisons 
of the branch ' s polictes and outlined his views on technicRl choice , The path 
of development of Sov let machine to"'l building could not bf;l determined simply 
by analysing the development of world machine tooJ technology , he stressed ; 
ac~ount had to be takP.n of the specific features of the Soviet situation and the 
tasks posed by the current and future Five-year Plans . There were a number of 
factors which comoined in the s~or.t run to present an unusually large demand 
~or universal-type rnachines .Large nu~bers of si~ple lathes ,~tng rachines , 
universal ~11ling machines ,P.tc . were required by factory FZU schools and technicums 
~h~ new ,giant factories re~uired very large toolrooms in order to make the tools , 
jiBs and fixtures needed in starting up production; and the new collective and 
state farms , and the MTS , required many universal machines for their repair shops. 
Therefore , Al'perovich concluded ,simple universal machines were needed in such 
larger quantities than envisaged by Sorokin . However,he did not deny the importance 
S.Perel' man • s enthusiastic endorc;ement of Gastev ' s work is worth quotinga"~e have 
(here) without. doubt , a manifestation of enquiring socialist thought , a striving 
to free technolopy from the captivity of isolated individualism to which it has 
been condemned by capitalism with its individualistic bias . The practical 
realisation of th~se new tendencies will open hitherto undreamed of horizons,an 
epoch , as it were, of socialised machine building technology giving the possibilit 
of buildinR: any combination ~or any form of mechanical wor~ from a certain number 
of groups and ":ranges of parts .. cont .next page •• 
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of rapidly organising the oroduction of high-productivity machines needed by 
the auto- tractor and other branchess the difference between his own and borokin ' s 
ryosition was , he impli ed , one of emphasis~ 
By November 1Q31 Al'perovich had moved cautiously in the direction of 
the ' Ameri~an' specialisation tendency . The machine tools built by capitalist 
firms were , he w~ote , exces-ively universal, bein~ built to meFt an uncertain 
demand and designed to satisfy all possible requirements of users • Competition 
and patent law tended to in~uce irrational product differentiation and a low 
1 vel of standardisation of parts , Universalism was also fostered by the building 
of machines for co)onial and semi-colonial markets (the British industry was 
clearly in mind here) Al ' perovich regretfully observed that Soviet practice 
of placing orders abroad also revealed a striving for the acquisition of machines 
o~ exces~ive complexity and universal i ty indicating that the work for which they 
were intended was not known . Soviet indust ry, he concluded , needed universal 
machines for the purposes outlined earlier , but , "an ever larger part of the machine 
tools for industry must have either a quite narrow production purpose or 
2 possess some , extr emely limited universality". Al ' p rovich stres::;ed t he need 
to rapidly organise design work on tvpes of a more specialised nature than those 
then in oroduction , including multi- tool lathes , semi-autos and simplified milling 
machines . Ameri can models were to be copied , but converted into metric terms 
and to Soviet standards . 
It is impossibl e to trace the evolution of Al ' perovich ' s views and the policy 
of the branch 1n 1932- 33 without examining a number o~ related eve~ts of the 
~eriod . At t~e SeventePnth Party Conference 1n January-Febraurv 1932 a number 
of speakers called ~or the bui1din~ of hieh-~ade , special and specialised machine 
Perhaps , as a result ofthis , between the future socialist m~chine building 
technology and present cay capitalist tec~oloqy there weill be a difference 
such as that betwePn the European al~habet and its thirty or so letters which 
one may combine to express any word or thought , and the Ohinese alphabet ,with 
its thousan-is of characters , al1ost one for every separate word" - V~ITS0 , 1931 
l.lo .} , p.21 . 
6 .Soetsializatsiya i kooperirovanie v mashinostroenii SSS.\ ,M. -L . , 1931 ,p .47 • 
? .TsiT 1 ego metody NCT ,r1 .,1970 ,p . 125. 
3 .~. ,22 .6 . 1932 . 
9 . e .~. Zaind .,5.8 .1930;12 .9 . 1930 . 
! . ibid.~1931 . 
:'> • 1 hi~ ., ? .1 t. 1 m 1. , 
tools , including automatics and semi- autos . 1 G.Vol ' _pert , writin~ 1n Pravda in 
Febt·uary , called for the building of tens of types of powerful and special machine 
tools not then foreseen in future plans . 2 But the most important event for 
~echn1cal poli cy was the outbreaR of public discassi on about the new standard 
' DIP ' lathe just entering production at the ' Krasnyi Proletarii' factory . This 
debate began 1.n February ann ended in a public 'trial ' of the machine in t•1arch . 
The new standard lathe was basically a copy of the GPJ:man 'VIF ' lathe , probably 
the best toolroom and general- purpose machine of its type of its day . Critics of 
the choice of this model for Soviet production charged that it was excessively 
universal and compJex and , because of this, too expensive . It was difficult to 
bu1ld and required quite highly skille<iworkers for its operation and maint~·nance . 
It was , in fact, a classic example of ' European ' machine tool tecru1ology , Defenders 
of the ' DIP ' pointed out that there was a large demand for such machines for 
toolrooms , repair shops and general machine building ; that the building of the 
ao"el represented a tremendous advance for Soviet machine to :U builaing 1 and that 
it was sound policy to first build machines of great complexaty because this 
performed an invaluable trainine, function for workers and specialists so that 
subse0uent models would present no difficulty .) Shortly before the ' court ' on 
the lathe the technical council of Stankoob"edinenie under Al ' perovich' s chairman-
s~tn mssued a decree on the discussion 1 aknowledgtng the importance of the questions 
raised 1 in particular the fact that it was important to elioinate excessive 
~1versality and complexity . Dut in essence the decree w-as a defence of the ' DIP ' 
in terms similar to those outlLned by Al ' perovich in the previous year a Soviet 
industry required large numbers of high-grade , niversal toolmaking lathes . But it 
vas decided that this monel would represent no more than ~hirty per cent of total 
lathe production .The decree also aknowledged the correctness of the principle of 
ouilding ~chines of more narrow or special purpose by assembling them from standard 
as"'emblies made on a large-serial basis , and of bullding simplifed vartants of 
4 
standard nachines like the ' DIP' giving more specialised equipment . The 'court' 
apoears to have endorsed these conclusions: the ' DIP ' represented a new stage in the 
development of the Soviet machine tool lndustry ,but the ' DIP ' could not be the sole 
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product of the ' Krasnyi Proletarii' factory bee~ use Soviet industry required more 
sreclalised machines .5 
The ' DI P' debate and tbe widely publLcised ' court ' pushed the question of 
tec11nical uolicy for the m!lchine tool industry to the forefront and this,coupled 
with tnitial estimates of the demand for machine tools during the oeccnd Five-year 
Plan , aupe;:~rs to have made tl:le NR'I'P leadership ,and Ordzhoniktdze in particular , 
receptive to proposals for a change of' course . By Hay it seems that a target 
of 70- 80 ,000 units output ln 1917 had been provisionally adopted , with considerable 
emphasis on the development of large- serial and mass production in machine building • 
.Lhe events of l'iay- June 19)2 are w1fortunately rather obscure , but it a.Ppears 
that a young engineer , G,Shaumyan , presented a report to Ordzhonlkidze sharply 
critical of the widespread enthusiasm for universal machine tools and strongly 
ar~utn17. the case for building automatics , semi-autos and othel' high-productivity 
t ypes . Af:ter readin!! this report Ordzhonikidze cal 1ed a rneettng of interested 
oarti.es in Hlt"'l'P . This was apparently a stormy gatheri.n~r , a number of leading 
~orkers o~ the Commissariat arguing against Shaumyan ' s report : but it was adopted . 
Ordzhonikidze rewarded Shaumyan with a new flat , and shortly after on 1st June 
1932 the NKTP Order No .407 aopeared , setting out policy for the development of 
6 
the machine tool industry , 
The NKTP Order outlined the main lines of technical policy for the branch 
durL"lg the Second Five -year Plan . Stankoob"edinenie was t.o start producing special 
machine tools for the auto- tractor industry . Particular attention ~as to be devoted 
t o t he building of no in ding machines , gear- cut tbg machines , autoJlla tics and s emi-
autos . The best European and Anerica.n models were to be taken as a basis for 
~electing types for domestic prouuction ; they were t o be chosen from those moaels 
imported into t.he USSR in quantity and alread,y proven in use . There was to be 
a maximum standar disation of parts and t~e usP of st~ndard assembl1es .7 
1 .XVII kon-fP.rentsiya VKP(b) , st .ot chet ,H. , 1932 ,pp .195 :2J4 . 
2.Pravda ,11 .2 . 1932 . 
J .For arguments for and against , see Khavin ,A., Kratkii ocherk istorii industrializ-
atsii SSSR ,M, ,1962, p .2)8 ;Byli indust1:ial ' nve ,M. ,1970,p .157 ;Gudov , I. ,Sud ' ba 
raboche£~ ,M ., 1970 , p .40 :Kas ' yanenko ,V .I .,Bor ' ba trudyashchikhsya SSSR za 
~icheskuyu nezavlsillost ' promyshlennost1 , 1926- 1932gg. ,H., 1960, pp .29-JO , 
IJ. .SU , 1932 ,ho .2 , p .26 . 
; . Khav1n ,~cit a1 5 let bor ' by za sovetskoe mashi nostroen1e LL.-M., 19J2,p .41 . 
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The J!llle 1932 ~·KTP can be seen as an official call for a change of technical 
oolicy, but it by no means signified that the specialised machine tool industry 
as a whole had ~ccented that a change of course was neceseary . lhe circumstances 
leading to the order were hardly conducive to gaining whole hearted suppo±t 
within tl-te industry for the major innovation effort demanded . 1be intervention 
of a young outsider must b~ve been deeply resented and it seems likely that 
Al'perovich h1mse:bf was one of the leading workers of the Commissariat (he was 
a member of its collegi~~) who opposed Shaumyan's report . At the first conference 
of designers in July he refered to the fact that there had been a ' legislated' 
solution to the problem of technical policy , which may Nell have indicated his 
personal reservations . Nevertheless , at this confetence he outlined a provisional 
output structure for the final year of the Second Plan .which marked a very 
considerable break with nrevious pr8ctice 1 turret lathes,automatics and semi-autos 
wPre together to represent no less than 16 per cent of total output , and grinding 
machines up to 15 per cent.8 
The chan~e of policy outlined in the June 1932 order was linked with a 
1937 output target of 70- 80 , 000 units . 4In the subsequent months , and especially 
the early months of 1933 , this aim was pro~essively scaled down . At the same 
time pressure for the elimination of import dependence steadily mounted . These 
two factors had serious implications for the policy of the oranch . First , the 
reduction of output targets and the·general rate of development of the economy 
meant that the industry could not so easily solve the problem of building high-
producti\d.ty machines by constructing ne;r specialised +actories - such machines 
would have to be assimilated by existing enteprises. Second , import substitution 
demands required t'"lat a la.rge range of new types be introduced in a very short 
period of time , inparticular t~ose needed by t~e large- serial and mass production 
branches for wl-tich import dependence was greatest . Writing in ~·1arch 1933 .nl' perovich 
fnlly aknowledged that a reRl ch?nge of course was essential . 9 The building of a 
few simple machines had to cease; a base cor building automatics had to be 
organised ; machines had to be built to ~eet tl')e specific requirements of custon.ers, 
6.See Byli industrial ' nye , oo cit , pp . 157- 153 (me~oir of a .S.~ritki~J, and Ocherki 
razvitiya tekhnik.i v SSSR - mashinostroenie , .. .,L.,1970,p.?6. 
7 .sn ,1932 ,~o . 7, p . 2 . 
8.~. , 19'33 ,ho .1, p. l . 
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and machines of ' l i mited application ' had to be assembled {rom standard assemblies. 
Al'perovich had now enbraced many of the demands of the ' American' tendency , and 
in his last point had even moved towards Gastev ' s position . Shortly after this 
3oroKin reentered the debate , once again calling for the production of a range 
of specialised hi~h-p:oductivlty types , including unit-construction machines~ 
On 16th June 1933 a new NkTP order appeared , settin~ out policy for the branch 
during the Second Five- year Plan : it is this measure , and ~ot the order of 1932, 
which marke the transition to a new stage of policy with regard to the choice 
of machine tool technology . 
hid- 1933 - 1935 
The NKTP order of June 1933 notec! that machine tools built t.o date had been 
predominantly of a universal type ; many types were not produced at all, including 
grinding machines , automatics ,semi- autos , and special and simplified machines 
suitable for use in mass production , These types were now to be built , taking_ 
the best American and European models as a basis , with a stress on simplicity 
of design , ease of control and suitability for the use of standard assemblies .2 
This order marked the bP~inning of the transition to the production of more 
specialised types , but in the period 193~ to early 193.5 debate continued on the 
machines 
q testion of the emphasis to be placed on high- prorluctivity/as op~oserl to the 
universal types then still do~inating the Soviet industry ' s output . The ' universalist 
tendency was undoubtably still a force , and as before there were still others 
who placed one- s i ded emphasis on the use of more specialised equipment . In 1933-3~ 
+here were a number of proposals for a more balanced approech tailored to the 
specific needs and oossibilites of Soviet inrlustry . Thus Orentltkher on a 
number of occasions argued that Soviet industry still reQuired large numbers 
of universal- type machines to ~eet the needs of the repair shops ,FZU schools , 
toolroom.s anfi factories of general machine building , anl de"lared that relatively 
nore such rnachines were required in the USSR than in t~e USA .J But at the same 
time Orentlikher ar.vued for much PTeater emphasis on specialised types required 
9.Sii ,1933 ,No ,4 , p .1 ' Pe relomnyi moment '. 
t .~. ,3 .4 .1933 . 
2 .Industrial izatsiya SSSrt ,1933- 1937 ,p ,248 . 
1.~ •• 15. 12. 1933 ;Pl anovoe khozyaistvo , 19J4,No .8- 9 , p .JO . 
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by the lar~e-serial and mass branches , calling for the pr-oduction of both complex 
a1tomatics,multi-tool and multi-spin~le machines and simplified,operational 
machines . Orentlikher believed that the scopefor the use of simplified machines 
for specific operations was greater in the Soviet Union than in capitalist 
countries .Operational ID::!Cl-)ines could, he argued, be obtained by simplifiying 
Lmive sal machines by removing lead screws , reducing the number of feeds and speeds , 
etc . , giving the possibility of producing them quickly and cheaply using quantity 
production methods.
1 
1hus Orentli~her presented a synthesis of three tendencies -
for universal machines,and for specialised , the latter in bot'1 its 'American' 
ann simplified ,special machine variants . 
At this time Kaganovich also argued the case for buildin~ both American-type 
high- productivity , specialised automatics and semi-autos and also special 
operational machines for use in large-serial and m:.:t ss production . On the former 
he called for the buildinu of machines combininu operations, and machines combining 
several machininv tmits in one installation with automatic transfer mechanisms 
between the units~ Unlike Orentlikher , however, ~aganovich did not refer to the 
continuing importance of universal machines, persisting in the forthright 
'Americanism ' which he bad always advocated . Al ' perovich, on the other hand, 
maintained a more balanced position, although he s~owed ~ tendency to stress 
the importance of high-productivity specialised types with more vigour than in 
the previous period. The auto-tractor branch , he now stresEed , was the most 
tmoortant machine tool user and therefore determined t he line of technical 
development . Cheap machines of the standard , universal type could be used for making 
motor vehicles and tractors , he observed, but it was far more profitable to design 
and build on an individual and small serial basis specially tooled-up automated 
~achines of narrow purpose in order to secure 1ow cost machining of mass produced 
;,arts. Thus he concludeti that ".,the main task of machine tool building consists 
:~ achieving a minimum cost of machining components, even though the complex and 
hi ghly oroductive machine tools created f or this purnose will turn out to be 
relativel.v expensive'' .J On the other hand , ile pointedout that a large number of 
1.Planovoe khozyaistio, 1934 ,No .8-9 , PP .30-31. 
2 .ibid ., 1934,No .3 , p. 27 ;XVII s" e2d VKP(b) ,st . otchet ,N. ,1934 ,p .472 . 
).Izvestiya , 2? .5.34 . 
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~~iversal machi~es was still needed, the scale of demand being sufficient to 
justify their serial, but not mass , nrocuction. 
Anti- universalism tendencies began to emerge at thelevel of the machine 
tool buildin9; enterprise in the summer of 1934, when a public controversy 
flared up ~er the Glavk ' s technical policy, focasing on the choice of models 
to be built at the new Khar ' kov factory . Representatives of the enterprise claimed 
that the ra~i~l drillitg machine model chosen by &~D1S was excessively complex 
and universal an ~eatured unnecessarily complicated controls1 • The director 
of the im.Sverdlova factory , Kalashnikov, also argued that models being produced 
were excessively universal and there:ore not suitable for use tmder Soviet 
conditions . 2 However , others were prepared to defend the universalism of the 
~achines criticised on the grounds that it was best to first build such highly 
complex machines , and that universal machines served to teach workers the skills 
of machining} 
At the end of December 1934 anorner was issued by NKTP providing for the 
construction of Soviet machines to meet the needs of the plan ed expansion of 
4 
t~e auto-tractor factories, These machines were to be of a predominantly high-
productivity , specialised tyoe, The eighteen months between June 1933 and the end 
of 1934 can be regar~ed as a transitional period in which the first examples of 
s~cialised , high-oroductivit~aJa~~~sbuilt and a foundation laid for their 
regular production . With the new order the specialised machine to~l industry 
made a further step in thP direction of adoptin~ the ' American ' pqth advocated 
by Kaganovich ~d Sorokin . 
19J5 - 1941 
The implications of the NKTP order were discus ed at the Third Conference 
o: Designers in March 1935. ~riting just be~ore the conference Sorokin once 
again declared that high- productivity , automatic and sPmi-automatic machines had 
~o predominate in the tipazh.Over half the machine t ool stock of the country was 
loc~ted at engineering industry enterprises and , he claimed , 72 per cent of these 
na.chines torere at larp:e- serial or mass oroduction factories r this sector had to 
1.Zaind, ,24. 5.1934 . 
2.~. ,2.6 .1934. 
1 , i.bi n , t 2ll • 5, 1 O~l.J.; ?? 1 t, • t O~l..l. , 
?.38 255 
determine the profile of the Soviet machine tool industry .But , he aJso stressed, 
contrary to a widespread prejudice the use of high- productivity machines went far 
beyond the motor industry; such roodels as the Fay ,Baird ,Cone and Bullard automatics 
the Blanchard surface grinder , the Cincinnati centreless grinder and the 
Gleason gecr-cutting machine could be used in many other branches of medium 
engineering having serial or mass production . The fact that at thE: till£:: many 
factories showed a bias tow~rds simple machines was , he ad~ed , no grounds for 
accepting that their use was cor•ect .5 
The conference of designers was ~tnly devoted to discussion of the allocation 
of a tipazh of specialised , hig~-nroduottvity machines betwe~n enterprises, and 
also the ouestion of unit construction machine tool buiJding . In a report delivered 
at the conference on foreign machine tool developments an engi~eer ,Kashirin, 
noted that more productive equipment was finding increasing aoolication in Europe . 
Foreign practice was also cited in suprort of the vie"; that high-productivity 
equipment cotlid be used in large- serial as well as mass production.It was noted , 
nowever , that th~re were some AmPrican machines having a productivity almost 
unusable in ~oviet conditions ;e ,g . there were machines with an output rate of 
two hundred parts per hour - even at the expanded Gor'kii auto factory there 
would be only four positions requiring such a high productivity . Ambitious targets 
were adopted by the conference: the entire tioazh for the auto-tractor factories 
had to ::tsslmilated in 1916 ; the leadinP' f~ctories had to switch predominantly to 
the output of high- oroductivity machines .6 
At about this time the specialised machine to-1 industry also appears to 
have ~ccepted the necessity of rapidly developing unit-construction machine tool 
building . Gastev , with some irony , observed that almost at once machine tool 
builders had reorientated to unit construction after seeing the advanced machines 
ir.stalled at the Citroen factory in France ; irony because this 11as the path he 
had been advocating for the last three- four years.7 The branch began ouilding 
unit-construction machines , but did not ap~ly the principle in the thorough going 
way dernan.-led by Gastev and the TsiT workers . 
4.Bol ' shevii< , 1935 ,U o . t\ , p .13 . 
5 .~. ,20 .3 .19)5 . 
6 ·ill£. ' 22 .J • t 915 . 
7.0r~anizatsiya truda , 19J5 ,No .6,p . 2 . 
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The conference of designers marked the achievement o~ a policy concensus; 
high- productivity machines were to be the main focus of the l eading factories 
o-f' the specialised machine tool industry, unit- construct ton 'llachines were to be 
developed , but universal - type machines would still be built . On the latter 
ooint even Kaganovich conceded that during the First Five-year Plan years the 
building of universal types for the use ofrepair shops and general machine-building 
could not , "be held arrainst machine tool building of that time , because we will 
oroduce these types of machine tool equipment in a certain quantity in all 
circumstances in the future" •1 The conference was followed by a campaign against 
reliance on universal machines at large- serial production enterprises , interpreted 
by the newspaper Zaind~strializatsiyu as a drive against European machines. The 
'ltrasnyi Proletarii ' :factory was accused of building German- type machines as 
opoosed to American • German universal m~chines with complex components were 
considered inapprooriate . 2 The Mosgipromash was condemned for orojecting the 
new Orsk locomotive and dies~l engine factory for the installation of equipment 
of predominantly German and British origin , whereas , it was claimed ,equivalent 
A~erican enterprises were equipped with high- productivity machines of American 
types with much differentiation of operations . The project organisation defended 
its policy by pointingout t~at ~uropean equipment was better known,and that 
highly specialisef equipment had been deliberately rejected because in the event 
of desi~ c,anges processes would have to be revised : it was easier to use 
general- purpose equipment in serial production~ This exchange was hardly a 
convincing demonstration of the irrati onality of universal equipment. The nature 
of t,e ' universal ' machines was not discussed by the newpaper, which also vaguely 
talked of ' nar~owlv snecialised' machinery ; if this was seriously regarded as 
suitable ~or the enterprise in question t~en thP project organisation can hardly 
be blamed for rejectine: it. . 
In the second half of 1935 and in 1936 there l·Tas little discussion of the 
question of which type of machine tool to build . Factories were striving to build 
tne new specialised , high productivity machines , and at the same time some 
l .Bol ' shevik , 1935, no .6 ,p .13 . 
2 .Zaind . , 14.6 .1935. 
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lea~ing factories were also attemnting to assimilate new , improved ,ganeral-purpose 
mo.~els . ::he"'e were stil1 complaints about the alleged excessive universal ity 
of the machines produced , notably by representatives of the motor industry . Thus,twc 
'ZIS' factory engineers criticised t~e lathes built by Soviet factories for their 
large number of feeds and spe~ds; simplified lathes were required , they stressed , 
with a limited number of feeds ~d spe"'ds , and without lead screws . 1 'r.ith the 
develop;ent of the Stakhanovite movement demands ap rear to have changed to some 
extent in the opp"'Site direction . Now workers were demanding machines with a 
large range of possibUities , having fully mastered the skills of machining • .1.'hus , 
the ' Krasnyi Prol etari i ' factory ' s replacement for the ' DIP' , the Type 26 , 
described in 1936 as a ' Stakhanovite ' machine because of its more limited speed 
and feed ranges2 , was condemned in the fol1owingyear for not meeting Stakhanovite 
~e~nds for an increased number of speedst 3 
Policy for the Third Five- year Plan as se~n in 1937 followed the already 
determined path , but with greater emphasis than ever on high-productivity types 
and a more mar~ed stress on the automation of machines of all types . Al ' p~rovich , 
reviewing the position reached andfu+,ure prospects in uay 1937 noted that at least 
h~lf of the machines built during the next Plan period had l:.o be sui ted to the use 
of super- hard alloy tools, all machines had to be electrified , at least one 
fifth of all ' so- called ' general- purpose machines had to be converted into 
se~i-autos , and at least 80 per cent of specialised and special machines intended 
f or specific operations also had to take the form of semi- automatic models~ ~his 
stress on semi- autos appe;.:rs to have been pronated by the need to reduce the 
skill demands nosed by new machines and may well h~ve been influenced by military 
pro ·uction considerations . 
There is no doubt that in the Third Five-year Plan period military production 
considerations exerted a stron~ influence on machine tool technology choice 
oolicy. This question is discussed at length in Appendix 5 The great stress 
on automatics "'nd semi- autos evident at the Eighteenth Party Congrees5 , and in the 
l.Zaind .,22 . 1.0 .1936 . 
2 .Sii ,1936 ,No .8 , p .5 ; Zaind. , 22. 9 . 1936 . 
3 .Hanovoe k.bo7.yaistvo, 1937 ,N,._ . 7 , p .42 . 
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S~K decree of September 1939 can probably be ascribed to concern with mePting 
the derands for high-productivity equip ent of a skill saving nature ~equired by 
such branches as the smaJl arms and munitions industry and the aircraft industry. 
The SNK decree was critical of the inadequate supply of special and high- productivity 
machines ; this was hinderin~ the adoption of progressive technology in the 
en.g-ineering and defence i ·1dustries . The decree laid down guidelines f .:r the 
coMing period , which included provision of greater power and higher speeds of 
cutting, full electrification , the automation of control , the use of standard 
as!':emblies , anr'l also made a calJ. for the rapid orn;anisation of the building of 
high-productivity machines for use in mass pro'uction , primt=~.rily those required 
by military branches , including narrowly specialised machines ~or specific operations 
multi - tool ,multl - spindle, and unit construction machine tools .6 
Simultaneously with this stres~ on high productivity types ( to a greater 
extPnt than ever before) , a policy of modernising , automatin~ and simplifying 
general- purpose machines was adopted . Providing universal machines with devices 
~reatly simplifying their control facilitated the development of multiple machine 
manting with the aim of making the most efficient use of skilled machine operators . 
lhe simplification of older general - purpose machines for use by workers of low 
skills by convertin~ them into highly specialised operational machines was adopted 
as oolicy in th~ engineering and defence industries .7 rhus the policy of creatir.g 
simol~ , hi~hly specialised machines advocated by Pankin in 1930 was taken up in 
practice ten vears later ; t~e machine building factories now had the skills and 
resources to carry out this work th~mselves without relying on the specialised 
~achine tool industry . 
Ne are now in a position to summarise the evolution of machine tool technology 
policy in the pre-uar years . Prior to 1929 emphasis was placed on general-purpose 
types , although there were demat~ds :for the use of ' production ' machL1es ; between 
1929 and mid- 1933 a number of lines of policy were put forward ,ranging from advocacy 
5.The building of aut os and semi- aut9s was stres o.;ed in thP theses to Nolotov ' s 
report to t~e Congress, in 1'1alyshev s report and inan interruption of the latter by 
Stalin , who expressed concern at the apparently smajl nro~ortion of such machines 
in total out put ( XVIII s" ezd VKP( b) , st . otchet • • ~ • , 1939 , pp • 386- 387) 
6.D1rektivy KPSS i s~tskogo pravitel ' stva . , op cit , Vol . ~ , pp.60t-603 . 
7~ashinostroen 1e , 16 . 1 . 1940 ; t? . 1 . 1940 : 9 . 2 . 1940 . 
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of universal types to a radical rejection of all existing practice , but with 
counting emphasis on the neP.d to build American-type high-productivity machines 
of ~ more specialised nature. By Mid-19JJ the building of such machines had 
be~n posed as an immediate task for the machine tool industry , but this policy 
~as only pursued with vigour from the beginning of 19)5, when a policy consensus 
ln favour of priority for more Gpeciallsed m~chines was achteved . In the years 
19)5 to 1941 specialised , h1gh-pro~uct1~y machines were gtven priority, unit-
construction machines were> built , and moUI'lting emphasis was placed on the 
automation of machine tools as the demands of mllitcu-y production intensified 
and the problem of the supply of skilledlabour became rnore acute. Throu~hout 
the Second and Third Five-year Plan years the building of universal machines of 
modern design was also regarded as essential , but the appropriate degree of 
universality was a matte:r o"f debflte . Finally , in the immedlate pre-War period 
the making of operational machines by simpllfi.ying and adapting general-purpose 
models became official ~olicy in both civilian and nilit~ branches of the 
e:l(. in eer\ng indus try . 
The Choice of Machine Tool TechnolO£Y at the Level of the Enterprise 
Before considering the practice of technical choice it is necessary to 
e;.:amine the actual procedures a~opted 1.n selecting equipll.'ent for any given 
enterprise . In the case of the selection of machine tools for installation at 
engineering factories it is possible to deduce both 'normal' and ' best' practice 
from a number of cases cited 1.n the literature ; these cases generally refer to 
the motor industry . 
A useful general statement of the problem was provided by an engineer , 
1 !t.M .Gradusov , in an article published in December 19.32 . Gr1ldusov gave an account 
of t.he usual procedure for choosing na.chines . Technological proces~:es for the 
cachining of components were elaborhted by nrotsessniki on the basis of data and 
specifications on the items to be ~ade. The protsessnik determined the processes to 
be employed , the m~chine tool , the necessary fixtures and cutting and measuring 
1.S1I .19J2,No .12, pp .8- 11 . 
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tools , and the regime of work to be adopted . On the basis of the data provided 
by the processman , the rate fixer (normirovshchik) established the time required 
for the various operations involved . As Gradusov pointed out , this division 
of r nsponsibility deprived the processman of the possibility of taking account of one 
of the most im~ortant v~~bles , i.e . the choice of the best method of machining 
from the ooint of view of the time expended . The ideal solution , in his view, was 
'·or one peorson to undertake both tasks . When the proces es for all components and 
the equipment required hRd bePn decided, the final stage of project work was the 
establishment of the number of machines needed , the aim being to secure a 
maximum rate of utilisation of each machine tool. In practice , Gradusov admitted , 
nrocessmen were not as a rule acquainted with all the machines available on the 
market, with the r esult that many project organisations vested the choice of 
specific models with one man , a vy:borshchik , who had a detailed knowledge of the 
range of equipment available . 
Gradusov listed a number of factors which had to be taken into account in 
selectin~ machine tools . First , there was the problem of which country and firm 
machines should be obtained from 1 Soviet machines were preferable but , 
ironically, information about them was often extremely difficult to find . In 
choosinB; equipment a simple rule was followed' buy German machines when standard, 
relatively chea p and average or low quality equipment was a pplicable, but American 
~odels when special machines or standard machines of higher quality were required. 
Thus, in practice the procedure outlined by Al ' perovich in the ' twenties was 
apparentlv widely followed . Other countries were to be regarded pri.marily as 
sources of special machines . Second , the degree of automation had to be fixed, 
e.g. should normal lathes, turret lathes or automatics be employed? The decisive 
facto~ according to Gradusov ,were the number of components to be machined and 
t he productivity of the equipment . More accurate solutions to the problem required 
data on the price of machines,operationalcosts, setting up times,etc. ,and it 
is clear by implication that in practice such information was often not taken into 
account . Gradusov noted that i~norance of the possibilities of automatic machines 
from the point of view of setting up and retooling freque~tly lei to their 
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rejection and. resort to more ' understandable ' ,simple machine tools.Other factors 
to be t;:;.ken into acc:ount. included the precision of the work, t he quality of the 
machines , the relationship between mechanical and hand onerations (the latter 
to be re~uce~ to a minimum) , and finally, what Gradusov termed the two 
neglected aspects o.~ machine c'1oice -the ' loading' of machines and their price . 
On the former, he noted that the unutilised ~oreign equipment revealed at some 
enterprises in recent times showed that insufficient attention was devoted 
to securing maximum utilisation at the stage of projecting . The loading of 
individual machines could only be determined at the end of the project work by 
SQ~ing the time expenditures for al1 components . It was therefore out of the 
hands of the individual processman , although as Gradusov pointed out, it was 
precisely at this last sta~e that the degre~ of specialisation of equipment was 
determined . Howeve:r, he did not draw the necessary conclusion - the pursuit of 
maximum utilisation of each and every machine would lead to a bias in favour of 
the a0option of universal- type equipment . On the question of prices, Gradusov 
noted that the demands of khozraschet at t~e level of the enterprise made it 
i~nerative to take account of the price of installed equipment . In practice, 
however , oroject workers did not the prices of' macrines or the financial terms 
of their acquisition . 
From this <>ccount a number of conclusions can be drawn. First , the selection 
of equipment was approached pragmatically , with technical considerations playing 
a dominant role; little attention being de '-•oteri to economic aspects . Second ,while 
the price of equipment was a relatively secondary concern of project workers , 
t1ere is no reason to assume , a oriori • that there was a bias towards expensive and 
excessively specialised enuipment - on the contrary, kn~wn , simpler , universal 
e~uinment was prefered to more complex , automated machinery , even thou~h in 
r ... ~ctice this probably resulted in a higher capital-output ration than would 
otherwise have been the case . Third , in determining the degree of automaticity 
-ac1ir.es the basic factor taken into account was the scale of output of the given 
co~nonent• cost considerations were secondary . The overall impression is that 
- I 
in normal practice rule of thumb methods prevailed with technical expediency 
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taking precedence over economic considerations . 
In the case of high priorlty , large- serial and mass production enterprises 
employing much foreign equipment a more rigorous procedure appears to have been 
adopted and from accounts of specific cases more can be deduced about ' normal ' 
practice . A good examnle of the selection of equipment for a priority project 
is provided by tho case of the reconstruction of the ' AHO' vehicle factory in 
Hoscow in 1930- 31 , described in January 1931 by h .Sorokin .1 This major reconstr-
uction was based on Ame~ican practice with adoption of the flow principle , while 
t he methods of machinin~ represented , " • • the last word in this field (with 
account , natura:lly , of the scale of production)" . Special attention , clai.llled 
~orokin , had been devoted the t he use of labour-saving mechanisms. But the main 
thrust of Sorokin ' s ac~ount was an attack on the prevailing practices of machine 
selection , which , he considered , were in need of a radical review . ''We frequently 
strive", he wrote ," to ' smooth down ' equipment in accordance with the magnitude 
of the production assignment . As a rule such an approach is fundamentally incorrect, 
because it entails solving the problem by the line of low-~roductivity equipment . 
In the conditions of modern technolo~y it is frequently more expedient to adopt 
more productive equipment, and go for its deliberate temporary idleness , rather 
than buy less productive mechanisms with the aim of their one hundred ner cent 
2 
utilisation". This was to be a point of contention throughout the decade ; was 
it right to buy expensive equ1pment ,often involving large foreign exchange outlays , 
even though part of the time it would be idle? Sorokin found it necessary to 
demonstrate that such an approach , at first sight wasteful , was in fact economical1y 
rat ional. 
Sorokin provided a number of real lfe examples of the adoption of specialised , 
labour-saving machine toolsfor the AhO reconstruction , the projecte1 capacity of 
which was for an output of 100 vehicles a day . For the boring and reaming of 
gud~eon pin holes of pistons (600 pis tons a day) two alternatives were available; 
first , the use of two turret lathes , together costing 7 , 500 rubles and requiring 
l .Novaya tekhnika ,No . 2 , supplement to Zaind . ,9 . 1 . 1931 . 
2 .1bid. ,original emphasis . 
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two workers for their operation , the machining of each oiston requiring 2 minutes; 
second , the use of one four- spindle machine (semi-auto?) costing 7 ,500 rubles 
and requiring one worker. This latter machine permitted the machining of four 
ptstons at a time , the operati on lasting half a minute . ihe second method was 
selected .(:'or !:'•10 on the grounds that it was both capital and labour saving , the 
caoital saving beiniZ' obtained because the production area .. for one machine was 
freed . In another case of machining the housing of an oil pump the alternatives 
were , first , four single- spindle , verticRl drilling machines costing about 
thirtePn thousand r.ubles and operated by four workers , producing four parts an 
hour , and second , one multi- spindle , multi-st~tion machine operated by one worker 
(less skilled) , giving a higher output than four machines together and costing 
about 20 , 000 rubles . It was consi&:lrei that the savtng of three workers and of 
productive area , and the higher rate of output , justifiedthe choice of the latter . 
But the most productive method was not alwavs selected; in the case of milling 
t~e ends and caps of connecting rods a technique was adopted which gave an output 
of one hundred sets a day with one worker , although other methods were available 
giving: a much higher productivity - "For the scale of oroduction at the .\t10 
factory the chosen method is the most profitable". Thus the project workers 
::!:esponsible for the AHO factory 1.·econstruction adopted a flexible approach , tallorin€ 
the machine tools installed to the scale of output and , while accepting the 
viability of using speci?.lised , high-proc'l uctivity equipment at less than full 
load for some functions , rejected such equipment when less productive methods 
gave a satisfactory rate of production . It is interesting to note that an American 
ex.gert wrote in 1932 after a visit that the At-,0 factory was , " . .• . by far the 
largest and best equipped plant in the world devoted solely to the manufacture 
of •rucks and huses .Basically, the equipment is the last word in American practice" •
1 
A very similar approach ap ears to have been adopted in selecting equipment 
for t~e Gor ' kii automobile works (GAZ) , although in this case there does appear 
for sa.ving 
to have been a more definite striving/of capital or , at least , of foreign 
exchange expenditure , It was aknowledged that Ford pr.oduction technology could 
h 1 W"'S much smaller and the GAZ works was not be ~irectly copied because t e sea e ~ 
1.Automotive industries , 12 • .3 . 1932 , P .419 • 
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~ fullv il1tegrated plant . The scale of t~e GAZ fac+ory was, however , considered 
ereat enough to permit the widescale adoption of the flow principle. It was 
claimed at the time that considerable cost savings were obtained by rejecting 
excessively specialised equipmenti for machining pear box co~ponents alone 
a savL~B of 270 ,000 dollars was achieved. Much of the equipment was identical 
to that used at thP Ford factories, however, for the simple reason that Ford 
~1as Bt the time switchin~ from the r oae1 A to the new V-8 models , and a 
considerable quantity of second hand machinery , tools and dies for the former 
Has sold to the USSR for the GAZ f3ctory - an additional capital and foreign 
2 exchange savin? factor . 
A third case of the selection of e1uipment for a vehicle factory , in this 
instance a light car works, is the im.Klll car plant built on the basis of a 
small , existing assembly factory in the years of the Third Five-year Plan .3 
rhe technological proces:;;es of this integrated plant were projected for an 
annual output of 60 ,000 units a year , or 200 a day , with the adoption of the 
flow principle to a wider and deeper extent than at any existing Soviet vehicle 
factory . It was aknowledged that the machining of components could be undertaKen 
"lOSt cheaply if the latest , high-productivity , automated machine tools were 
e~oloyed , but at the same time it was recognised that with a daily output of 
only 200 cars a day such e~uipment worlid be loaded to only 30 - 40 per cent. 
Deroyanyuk therefore found it necessary , as Sorokin had nine years earlier , to 
"".rp;ue against the prevailing a oproach to Machine selection 1 "In aporoving tec'"anical 
projects it is usual to require that the average utilisation of eguipment in 
cachine shops be not less than eighty per cent. ~f instead of special machine 
tools one took simple mac'"aines with fixtures , the coefficient would at once 
improve , but the time o"' machining the components would be increased two-fold , 
The number of machines would also e:row a greater area l-70uld be required, and also ~ , 
£ore workers to ~an t~e machines . ~ven the outlays on purchasing equipment would 
not always be lower" • 4 
l .Planovoe khozyaistvo , 19)2 , No .~-7 , p.255· 
2.See .lilkins , ~l . and Hill,F . ,American business abroa.d :Ford on six contL'lents, 
Detroit ,1964 , np . 2:2) and 227; and Sorensen ,C. and Williarson ,S.,Forty years with 
?ord ,london , 19 57 , p . 208 . . 
3 .!'aashinostro1. tel' , 1940 ,r1 0 .4 , pp . 3-6 . Demyanyuk , deputy chief engmeer im .KIM factory. 
4 .ibid. , p.4. 
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Demyanyuk provi1ed a number OT exa~ples to show the expediency of buying 
nigh-pro~uctivity equipment decpite ~elatively low rates of utilisation. For 
turning the carriage of a gearbox synchromesh mechanism, for example, two 
alternatives were availablea first , the use of three suitably tooled turret lathes 
of total cost 9,500 dol1ars , with a machining time of eight minutes and a rate 
or utilisation of 80 per cent ~or each machine and, second, the chosen variant , 
a Baird multi-spindle , semi- automatic lathe costing 7 ,500 dollars giving a 
time of machining of only 1. 56 minutes and a utilisation rate of 56 per cent. Under 
con~itions of two shift work the first variant required six wor~ers; the second , 
only two . In the second case the required production area was halved. Thus des'~e 
thQ lower rate of utilisation the second variant was considered the more rational 
choice, while , "The low coefficient (of utilisation) is our reserve capaic1 ty". 
The sca.le of oroduction was not considered adequate , however , to justify the 
employment of a number of Progressive types such as surface broachers and rotomills. 
Only 26 ordinary lathes were installed out of a total stock of 1,153 machine tools , 
and the structure of the stoc~ by degree of specialisation was a s follows & 
universal machines 35 per cent, specialised machines 40 per cent , and special 
machines 25 per cent. In the interests of labour saving , multi-manning was 
adopted wherever possible , the layout of equipment being deliberately arranged 
to facilitate this form of machine 1 use . 
A number of conclusions can be drawn from these three examples drawn from 
the experience of the motor industry . First,the normal procedure placed considerable 
emphasis onthe neeo to secure a high rate of utilisation of equipment, with a 
consequent bias towards more ~~iversal , less productive machines; this was not 
necessarily the best solution from the economic point of view in so far as it 
raised thP. demand for skilled labour and in many cases must have resulted in a 
hie;her ca;pital- output r<~tion than rrould have "beE>n the case if more specialised 
equipment had been used. Second , for the mas~ production vehicle factories a case 
had to be made for breaking with this rule in order to justify the installation 
of high-productivity machines s such machines were in fact installed and, as shown 
in Appendix 4 , this gave the Soviet vehicle industry a stock of very similar 
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structure to that of the United States motor industry , Third , in selecting machines 
considerable stress was placed on the scale of output of components as the main 
determinant of technology ; project workers , while aiming for the ' best ' most 
nodern technology, selected m~cbines appropriate to the given scale and were 
pr pared to reject variants excessively productive for any given operation , 
Fifth , the capital- saving possibilities of specialised and special,high-productivity 
n~c~ines were aknowledged in all three cases , and atLention was paid to other 
sour<·es of capital saving , notably savings in factory floor space . Sixth, in the 
cases of botl-l the AHO and im.K~ f<\ctories (a.ncl possibly GAZ - information is 
lacktn~) labour saving , in particular economy of skilled labour, was regarded 
as an explicit; aim ln selecting equipment . Finally , in aJ, three cases the principle 
of arranging machines accordin~ to the flow of work was ~dopted wherever 
appropriate . 
The Practice of Hachine Tool Choice 
Thi~ section 15 devoted to an examination of the evidence on the actual 
practice of machine tool choice in terms of the structure of the machine tool 
stock and new installations in different periods . 
Before 1929 
On thP basis of the data of the 19)2 machine tool census it is possible to 
discern the ~ain features of the practice of nachine tool choice durL~g the 
restoration period preceding the First Five-year Plan . Some caution is re~uired 
1n so far as ·the data refer to those machines of the April 1932 stock which had 
been installed before 1929 , so that the structure may have been modified to some 
extent by the relocation of some machines and also by withdrawals from the stock , 
although thP. latter are believe~ to have been 1nslgn1flcant . The main features 
of the machine tool installations of the 1918 to 1928 period wer~ as followst 
t .See .1\p .. endix 3 for a more detailed anaJysis of thP finnings of the census. 
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1. ~uite a high nroportion (45 per cent) of all installations prior to 1929 were 
in non-machine buUding and metal working sectors . Of the machines installed 
in the machine building industry over one quarter went to only three branches -
the building of locomotives and wagons , electric power equipment, and 
agricultural machinery . ~ew installations were predominantly directed to 
branc~es of small and medium serial production. Thus , from the structure 
of user branches and ~tors one would not expect the employment of highly 
specialised , high-productivity equipment . 
2 . Cf the total number of machbes installed , alJlost 70 per cent were of foreign 
origin , includin~ three-quarters o~ those installed in machine building and 
other metal work in~ branches . Imports were overwhelmingly of German origin . 
3. Few of the machines instal1.ed in the machine building industry during 1918 
to 192R Rent to new enterprises founded within that period a about 85 per cent 
went to enterprises founded before the Revolution . 
4 . The main emphAsis lras placed on machines of wide universality , although at 
neH enterprises founded during the period slightly more emphasis was placed 
on types of intermediate specialisation sui table for operation by semi-skilled 
workers . 
) , At new enterprises founded within the period rather greater use was made of 
simple machines without pov:er feed than during the pre-Revolutionary years 
(or the subsequent Plan period) , ft~thermore, somewhat greater use was made 
of automatic and semi-automatic machines . 
6. The structure of types of nachines installed ill the 1918 to 1927 period did 
not differ in any significant respect fron the structur€ of installations made 
befo_·e the Revolution: the proportion of ordinary l<'lthes was virtually unchanged, 
that of mill ing "\a chines and gear-cutting machines decl.ined , but the share of 
such progressive types as automatics and grinding m<Jchines showed a slight 
improvement . In 1928 t~e structure improvedt the share of ordinar~ lathes fell 
and of grinders rose sharply , starting a trend which which was maintained 
during the following Five-year Plan. 
?. 51 268 
7 .ThE' universal nature of the machines installed dlll'ing the period naturally 
resulted in a relatively high average skill requirement . At enterprises founded 
nuring the years 1918 to 1928 the average skill of workers manning machines 
in the Production shops in April 1932 was ) .2 (on the eight point scale) , 
co rpared with 3.1 for enterprises estabJ ish~d before the Revolution , while 
the proportion of workers of relatively high skills (grade 4 and over) was 
about the same as at the earlier enterprises , i . e . the machines installed 
in the years prior to 1929 did not give rise to the process of desklllL'lg which 
characteri sed the engineering in~u~tries of other couatries in the 1920s . 
In general , we can say that on the evidence of the 1932 census there l-ias little 
change in the practice of machine tool choice conpared l-7ith that of before the 
Revolution . At a time when attention in the engineering industries of the 
industrially advanced capitalist countries was turned to ' production' machines 
manned by semi- skilJed workers the Soviet industry continued to employ low-
pro1uctivity , widely universal machines re1uiring relatively high worker skills . 
The First Five- year Pl an 
The primary source of evidence on the practice of ~~chine tool choice 
dt~ing the first Five-year Plan period is again the 1932 census, taken in April 
of that year and partiaJly updated to 1934 before its publication in 1935. 
Unfortunately the stock of t~e military sector was excluded . The main conclusions 
of relevance here are as follows1 
1 . 0uring the Plan poriod almost two- thirds of all new machines installed went 
to the machine building ann ~ther metal working branches ; the remainder going 
to lower priority sectors (mainly for repair purposes) , having much lower 
qualitative demands an!'i relyins: overwhelmingly on relatively simple, universal 
tynes of machi ne tools • .. 1 thin the m3.chi ne building sector , almost thirty 
per cent of all new installati ons went to only three branches - the making 
of automobiles , tractors and agricultural machinery - characterised by a 
very high level of seriality of production and a wide adoption of the flow 
principle of machine arr angement . 
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2. Durin££ the pe,..iod 58 per cent of all. new installations were imported machines 
compared with 70 per cent in the preceding 1918-1928 period , In t~e machine 
building and other metal working secto:r , however . 64 per cent of installations 
were of imported machines , compared with only 45 per cent in other sectors 
of the economy 1 over seventy oer cent of all iropo:cted machine tools during 
ths Plan period co~ent to the metal working secto:r:. Almost thirty per cent of 
all imported machines installed in ~chine building and other metal working 
were of American origin , compared with just over one fifth in the preceding 
period . 
3. Of the new installations during the Plan period , 37 per cent went to new 
enterpL1ses founded during the period itself; while ove~ half, 52.5 per cent, 
·were used for the reconstruction and expansion of enterprLses founded before 
the Revolution . 
4 , New installations in machine building went predominantly to branches characterised 
by mass or large serial production of light or medium products (by weight) . 
These branches tended to have an above average use of flow organisation 1 the 
above mentioned three leading branches possessing no less than 55 er cent 
of all flow-arranged mac~ines in April 1932 . 
5. During the First Five-year Plan ~E>riod ·the proportion of widely universal 
machines in new installations somewhat declined compared with the pre- 1929 
years , aMounting to one third of all new installa.Uons . The main emphasis 
was placed en types of intermediat~ specialisation, notably at new enterprises 
founded in the Plan period itself . ~achines of very narrow specialisation 
occupied a very small place ln botb the stock anrl new installations. 
6. During t he Plan period the sharP of semi- automatic and automatic machines 
(notably the former) increased , and reached quite high l ~evels at new enterprises 
founded within the period, especially ~t the mass production auto- tractor 
factories . Quite a significant role was played by relatively simple mac~ines 
without power feed, notably in branches producing 11ght ,high precision products 
on a mass or large serial basis . These machutes could be operated by workers 
of relatively low skills despite the precision of the products concerned . 
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?. The structure of types of machines installed during the Plan period changed 
substantially compared ~ith the preceding 1918 to 1928 period , wit h a marxed 
shift towards progressive types such as automatics , grinding and milling machines 
and gear-cutting machines , and a corresponding decline in the share of lathes 
and mac "lines of the planing , shaping and slotting group . This shift was particularly 
marked at the auto- tractor factories and other mass and large- serial production 
enterprises developed during the Plan period . The strucutre of types ef 
newly instal1 ed machines at ne"'' enterprises founded during the Plan period 
was much more progressive than t~at of new machines installed at older enterprisef 
durin.2' the same period . 
9, A striking feature of the new enterprises founded during the Plan period was 
the low average skill of workers manning machine tools permitted by the 
structure of types and degrees of specialisation and automation adopted. whereas 
machines in the production shops of enterprises founded during 1918 to 1928 
were manned by workers of average grade 3.2, at the new enterprises the average 
grade was only 2 .8 ; in the former case over 30 per cent of n~chlnes were 
manned by workers of grades 4 to 8 , but 6nly 16 per cent at the new enterprises. 
Thus the technology ch"sen for the new enterprises of the First Five-year 
Plan permitted large savings in skilled labour • the semi-skilled worker 
became the dominant figure in production . 
Durin~ the F'i.rst Five-year Plan years the Soviet engine""ring industry made 
a break with the past an1 a-1opted the latest technology of the industrially 
advanced capitalist countries . A measure of the progress in this direction is 
provided by comparison of the Soviet and American n1achine tool stocks at the 
end of the period . A detailed analysis is provided in Appendix 4 This 
shows that machines installed at new enterprises founded in the Plan period 
had a similar structure to that of the American stock as a whole . 1'his comparison 
reveals, however , a number of consistent structural dif ferences , above all 
a Telatively higher sh~re of ordinary lathes in the s~viet stock and a related 
S~""aller share of grinding me.chines . These differences can be explai.ned by 
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the structure and qua11 ty of the mat rial input , the supply possibilites for 
nachines of various tynes , and an avoidance of expensive machines requiring highly 
skill eo 1-'or kers for their operation . In the high- priori:ty motor industry ,relying 
honv Uy on i.moorted equipment. , the $tructure of the stock in 1932 to: as very 
similar to that of the American motor industry , and 1 t ap~ars tha·t in such 
.,iPh .Priority bra.'lches the latest American technolotry was adopted almost without 
adaptation , 
During the First Five-year Plan period the rnachinesbuH t by the domestic 
F4ch1ne tool inrustry to:ere overwhelmingly of the general-p~pose type , and 
many progressive types were not produced at all , notably autom:ntics , semi-autos , 
al.rr.ost all types of grir~d in~ nachines , many types of mllli"B mach.1nes , broaching 
machines , ~ear-cutting machines and cuttinr,-off machines . Domestically produced 
equipment tended to be installed in the auxlliary shops of t,he main enterprises, 
Lbe basic pxocesses being performed by imported cachines . 
The Second Five- year Plan 
The main factor shaping the structuxe of i nstallations during the Second 
Five- year Pl an period was the sharp reduction Ln the reliance on imported equipment 
and the shift of emphasis to supply from the domestic machine tool industry . As 
noted above the struct1.1re of output in machines built in 19J2 was extremely 
backward by foreign standards and the of~icial concern with the necessity to 
r"lpldly expand the tipazh at a time 1o1hen imports were being sharply curtailed 
is understandable . But in the circumstances t~e reduction of imports from about 
12 , 000 units in 1932 to 7 ,750 ln 19JJ and 4 .400 in19JU , despite the reduction 
of the rate of new installations , inevitably had the effect of re'!ucing the quality 
of machiol!s inst alled ln all but the most favoured , high priority branches .The 
trend towarrl s greater specialisation establ ished in the First Five-year Flan 
years was checked ; a process of univer.salisation of the stock once again became 
anparent . This :process was aknowledged with concern at the t1me a a Za!ndustrial1zats-
~ editorial of Y.larch 1935 declared that a" The machine tool stock is being 
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supplemented prefominantly by general-purpose machines, especially in recent 
years in connection t.:ith the transition to suoplying factories mainly with 
1 
~dine tools of Soviet production" . - Some of the forces giving rise to this 
trend are now considered . 
The changL11g structure of domestic production is shown in Tables SR ~"' o."cL SR.)(' , 
In 1934 ordinary lathes represented 43 per cent of total output , grinding machines 
5.3 per cent and milling ~achines 7 .6 per cent . In the course of the Second Five-
year Plan period , fol 1 owing the policy laid down by the June 1933 NKTP Order , 
a whole series of important new models was introduced , including many specialised, 
high- productivity tvpes , However , the cutout of the progressive types was still 
small before 1937 and ~eneral- pL~oose types predominated. Inadequate skills 
appear to hcve been the main obstacle to introducing more progressive models ' 
there was a clear correlation between the complexity of each type of machine 
and the year of its first production ,and hence the year when the stock began 
to be suppl emented by Sovi~t-built machines of a more specialised nature .2 
1 .rr~ ., 2? . 1 . 1<ns is 
2 · vt ence ror tnls orovided by ccef~icients of complexity of production of various 
types of machines , worked out by a Soviet economist , Yu .Noizhes ,on the basis of 
1939 prices an~ 1938 a~tual costs and labo~ outlays . (Unfortunately the method 
was not revealed) ,These coefficients provide a useful indication of the relative 
difficulty of buildin~ different types of machines. A si~ple bench drilling 
machinP orodu~ec by the im , aslennikova (Kuibyshev) fact4ry was taken as a base . 
The results are shoHn below : t he year of first Soviet proiluction has been added 1 
Coef~icients OT complexity of types of machine tools , 1938-39 . 
Relatively simple tvpes coefTicient 
1 .Eench drillin~ me . 
2 .Shapin~ mc . (500mm) 3 . 0 (1929 
1.0 ( 1929~* 
J .Lathe (up to 150mm) 3 . 0 (1929 
4.Turret lat he ( up to 25mm)3 . 0 (1931 
) .Lathe (150-200mm) 3 .8 (1929l 
6.Vert .drilling mc . (small) 4 .0 (1929 
? .Bolt threading me . 4 . 0 (1929 
8 ,l.illing mc , (horiz . ) 4 .5 (1932) 
9.Lathe multi- tool 5. 0 (1933) 
10 .·Turret lathe (up to 50~ 5. 5 (1932) 
11.Slotting mc . (small) 5. 5 (1929) 
Types of medium complexity 
l.Hillina- (vert . ) 6 . 0 (193~l 
2 .Vert .drilling (medium) ~ .0 (1929 
3 .Turret lathe (up to 80111l! )6 .3 ( 1934 
4- .Lathe (2?5- JOOmm) 7 . 5 (19'30) 
) .Milling( universal) 7 . 5 ( 1911) 
6 .Disc saw 7 .5 ( 19~3) 
? .Gear- cutting , ' Pfauter'. 8 .0 (19'33) 
Hedium complexity, cont . 
8 .Slotting me ~medium) 
9 . Broaching me. 
tO .Thread- milling me . 
tl .Lathes (300- 400mm) 
12.Planing mc . (small) 
13.Surface grinding me . 
t4 .Cylindrical grinding me. 
Complex Tynes 
1.Lathe , semi-automatic 
2 .Boring mc . (small) 
) .Drilllng ,vert . (large) 
4 ,-cadial drilling ~mediuu) 
5 .Surface grindi.'lg ( rned iumJ 
6 . Internal grinding me. 
7 .Lar~P l.thes (400mm plus) 
8 ,Gear-s~ping me . 
9 .Vert . turnlng & boring me . 
coeffici'3nt 
8 .0 (1934) 
10.0 ( 1 936) 
10 . 0 (1934) 
12 .0 (1934) 
12. 5 t1929) 
12 .5 (1935) 
14. 0 (1929) 
15. 0 (1934) 
15.0 \1934) 
15. 0 (1936) 
15 .0 ( 19J4) 
15.0 (1936) 
15 .0 (1935) 
18 .0 (1935) 
18.0 (1SJ4l 
20 .0 (1936 
20 .0 (1934 10 .Lathe automatic 
11 .Plano- milling me . 20 .0 (1934) 
cont .next pa e •• 
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Furthermore , the first production of <>. number of the most important progressive 
types , notably automatics and internal , surface ,centrel ess and thread grinding 
machines took place at enterprises of the defence industry and there was pr0babl y 
sone delay therefore in the diffusion of such types to all but the highest priority 
civilian branches . 
The trend towards universalism of machines was not simply a matter of the 
abiJity , or in3bility , of the domestic industry to build more speci~lised types 
(althou~h thi s was clear ly the primary f~ctor) ; other influences were at work . One 
factor wh"ch affected the supply situation was the distortion of the assortment 
which b~c~me a oersistent , instit utionalised phenomenon at this time , acting 
contrary to th~ demand for the production of more complex, high-productivity types . 
Examples of tttis practice are legion , but the nature of the distortion is clearly 
reveale~ by t he two unusually acute cases relating to the specialised machine 
tcol industry shown on the next _page . The bias was towards the production of the 
simpler machines produced vri th the minimum labour input ( trudoernkost ' ) 1 By 
oroducing the simpler fTlachines the plan was more easily fulfilled in quantity 
terms and , depending on the price~ o: the m~chines concerned , was often the 
easiest way of maximis ing the gross value of output . In 1937 , for exam"le , 
types of 
it was reported that ' Krasnyi Proletarii ' had built tw~special , high-productivity 
machines for producing wagon axles , each with a productivity e~uivalent to about 
twenty-five ' DIP' lathes ( i . e . output of components per unit time per machiPe) . 
cont . from previous pa~e . 
12.Boring me . (metHum) 20 . 0 (1931) 16 .Cyldrcl. grinding(med . ) 
!) .Planing mc . (medium) 20. 0 (1932) !?.Thread- grinding me . 
!~ .Surface grinding (lcrge) 20 . 0 (1938) 18.Boring mc . (large) 
15 .Centreles~ grinding me . 20 . 0 (1934) 19 .flaning mc . (large) 
~All ' 1929 ' built prior to the First Five- year Plan - exact date first 
22 .5 (1936) 
24. 0 (1937) 
25 . 0 (1935) 
30 . 0 (1940) 
built unknown 
Sourcet Moi zhes , Yu. ,"Problem~ ra-zmera predpriyatiya v stankostroenii" in Trudy 
Leningradsko6to inzhenerno- ekonomichesko o instituta im ." .P ,Jt.olotova , Vyp . ) , 
194? , on . 2- 3 . Year first built (ap~rox . ) from IablesSA .XI I&XIV a~d other 
sources . 
Usia~ these coefficients of complexity Moizhes estimates that the average complexity 
~~ the Soviet machine tool stock at the beFinning of the Third Five-year Plan was 
~ .61, but the ~verage complexity of Soviet- built machines during the Second Five-
year Plan comprised only 5. 36 .Therefore , the hi5her J evel of the_ stock must have 
derived from imported machines , presumably a large contributio~ oeing ~ade by those 
or 1929- 33 . Moizhes estimates that the average ~o~plexity durlflg the 1hird Pl~ 
should have been 7 .4 ,giving a possibility of ra1s~ng the level of the stock . (lbid , p64 
27!.. 
But these progressive machines were removed from production on GUSIP's orders 
on the grounds, it was alleged 1 th~t it was better far accounting pur~oses to 
~ive twentv- five 'DIP' s rather than one special machine .2 
Plan Fulfilment and the Assortment , 19)6 and 1938 Table 7 .I 
t .Extent of fulfil!lle!"lt of 1936 annual plan in first ellzht months (value terms) 
oer cent ner cent 
Drill in! machines 83 .0 l·.illing machines 52 .6 
Plani.np- & shaping mcs , 79 .9 Gear-cutting mcs. so.o 
Turret lathes 73 .6 Autos & semi-autos )1.1 
Ordi."'acy lat~es 72 . 1 Crindinv. rr.echines 20 .0 
Total GUSIP output ?J.J 
2 .Bxtent of fulfUment of 1938 first half year plan (unit terms) 
oer cent uer cent. 
Slotting machines 
Drilling machines 
Ordinary lathes 
Grindin~ machines 
Source • 
1936- Za!nd .,2? .9. 19J6 . 
118. 0 
112.0 
10) . 0 
86 .J 
Gear:cutting machines 75.6 
Automatics and seMi-autos 7J.5 
Planing machines 52 .4 
Boring rnac~L"'es JJ ,J 
Total GUSIP output 96 .2 
1938 - Planovoe khozyaistvo , 15)J8 ,No . 9,pp.L~6-47. 
T~us the planning system induced a bias towards simpler machines, gene-ally of 
a unive~Srtl type , ann hinde~ed the production of automatics ,~ear-cutting machines 
and grinding mac '"lines , but aJ so boring; and olan ing machines , req u1.r 1nfT a large 
1.nT>ut of skilled la hour . 
The bias towards universal equiprnent showed itself on t~e demand side as well. 
First there was conservat.ism; a distrust of new, complex equipment., coupled with 
IUl apparently widespread view that certallt types of automatic and high- productivLty 
machinery could only be eMployed in t~e large mass production auto-tractor 
f ctories . Thls bias was also linked with the view discusGed above that all machltles 
hgd ~o be fully utilised. ~t was these assumptions ann prejudices against 
l.SeP Sii,t9)7 ,No .12,p .2 and Planovoe 'khozvaistvo,19)8,No . 9,p.4?. 
2 .Zalnd ., t0.5.1937. 
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progressive equipment which were frequently assailed by Sorokin and others through-
out the perion , notably in 1935 when the campaign against universalism reached 
a high Point . But the bias towards universaJ equipment on the part of enterprises 
and project offices 1--ras not simply a matter of conservatism. In capitalist 
countries ,as Soviet writers so frequently observed , universalism of machines was 
induced by the need to adapt to changing market demands under the ppur of 
competition . In the Soviet case enterprises were faced with uncertainty stemMing 
·rom impBrfections of planning , and also , especially from the beginning of the 
~econd Five-year Plan period , the need to rapidly expand product ranges . 
Adaptability therefore became a desirable quality of the machine tool stock . This 
was occasionally frankly admit ted by engineers when far.ed td th critic ism in the 
press for alle~ed ' fear ' of high- productivity machines . 1 Possibly at this time 
already , but certainly later , an additional factor was stre~hening the case for 
universalism at engineering enternrises , namely the demand for. adaptability in 
the event of a transition to military production . 2 
It is difficult to determine the extent to which the price structure of 
domestically built machine tools infuenced machine choice at the level of the 
enterprise in the Second Five- year Plan period ani later when economic criteria 
of performance and khozraschet began to play a greater role . The problem was 
that not only toere domestic prices of machine tools substantially higher than 
foreign , but the price differentials between machines of various types were more 
extreme than usual on the world market . This problem gave rise to concern from 
about 1934 when the Soviet inoustry began to produce high- productivity models. 
An editorial in Vestnik metallopromyshlennostl in 1935 sharply peintad to the 
problems caused by the So·riet price 3.nd cost differentials . For example , the 
'1"~3 ' automatic of the iro.Ordzhonikidze factory cost 10. 5 ttmes the 'TN-20 ' lathe: 
abroad the differential was only four times . "Such a gulf between the cost (and 
price) of complex , modern machine tools and simple machines", it concluded ," is 
- h. b ·1d. " 3 L i ex~remely dangerous for technical proPTess in Sov Let ffiac ~e u~ 4ng • n v ew 
i.See the case cited above ,p .25o . 
2 .See Appennix 5. 
3, Vestnik met?-llopro~yshlennosti, 1935,No .10,p. 5 . 
?. 9 2:16 
of the possibility of substitution for many machining operations , it pointed 
out , it would not be surprising if enterprises used pr!l!l1tive,cheap machines 
11stead of the most advanced designs. The campaign for reducing prices which 
~evelopP'i in 1935-36 was primarily aimed at Cllttinp: the prices of new ,high-product-
ivity machines in an effort to reduce i:hese large differentials which were 
promotin.!! a un 1. versal ist bias . 
In tl-te West in t~e early 19'~0s th"' princl.ple of unit-construction was eagerly 
adopte1 in the search for ~reator adaptability of specialised and special machine 
tools , In the Soviet Union the first unit-construction r:a.chine l>tas built by 
the'StMkokoostrukts~;ra' factory in 1934 , but intensive developmt•nt took 
place fron 1935 when order-s were received for machines f'or t.he auto-tractot· 
!actorles . Unit-construction machines wore frequently both capital and labour 
s2vtng , the saving being of skilled labour because operations replaced were 
generally those performed on a number of complex , ~eneral-purpose type machines . 
r.n Ulustration of the possible savings involved is provided by the following 
example from t93f. . For machininf a housins: for a vehicle gearoox two a:l ternat.ives 
werP. available for achieving the desired output1 
l .Twenty universal machines 
Cost of rnachines( r,) 
Factory area (sq .m. ) 
.i o , of workers 
Time per component 
Source s Pravda , 1J . 9 . 19J6 . 
100 , 000 
100 
32 
13 . 5m1ns . 
2 .0ne unit-construction machine 
70,000 (Lnc.fixtures) 
12 
2 
S4 sees. 
Even at substantially less than full utilisation lhe more productive machine was 
i.he least cost alternative . 1 
By 1937 the domestic industry had made considerable progress in Lhe production 
of specialised, high-productivity machines and the stTucture o:f output had 
greatly improved compared with 1933 , but automatics and semi- autos still 
~epresented only 2 .9 per cent of total out:.put in the specialised indusr.l"'J and 
~::1.'ld1ng l)l.achines only 5. 7 per cent,. Imports rose in 19J6 to above the 19JJ level 
but felJ by more tba., fo)?lf in 1937 . 'rbese imp.?rts appear to have been dir-ected 
l ,See also Sii 1ru•':l: o . 1-2 , pp .6- B • _, 7~- . 
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~~rily to ~he highest priority branches - auto- tractor building ,aviation and 
allltary branches . Therefore , the structure of the new installations and the 
stock as a whole for many low priority , civilian branches of the engineering 
1n1ustry cannot have improved . or may even have deteriorated , owing to the 
11n1tat1ons of domestic production possibilities . The forced use of lower 
productivity general-purpose machines for work best performed on more specialised 
nachines must have been wasteful of both capital and labour., especinlly in branches 
ch1racterisen by mass and large- serial production . It should be noted here that 
the use of general- purpose machines !.n serial production increased in the West 
in the early t9JOs as such machines underwent rapid technical improvement 
raisin.;: their productivity and slnpl ifying their control. But in ·the Soviet case 
most of the ~eneral-purpose models in production at tbia time were those of 
pre-crisis desiP:n not really sui ted to the use of super-hard a] loy tools . In 
Reneral ,as Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev adflli't , ''T.he cbangesin ·the overall structure 
of the stock , and changes in the relationships of individu~l groups of mach1.ne 
• tools , taking place in the Second Five- year Plan , were not sufficently satisfactory": 
19'36 to 1941 
The Third Five-year Plan years are considered separately because there 
were a number of unique features to the practice of selecting mac~ine tool 
lechnology . Two new factors exerted a mounting .influence ; first , a general 
labour scarcity accompP.nied by an intensification of the shortage of skilled 
workers and , second , the demands of military prorluction began lo exert a more 
powerful influence on both the production and use of machine tools. But the 
practice of the Third Plan period l'as still affected by the pressures which had 
been active in the preceding period givi~ rise to bias towards universal equip ent. 
In the summer of 19)8 Gastev , in one of his last pleas for greater attention to 
U!llt -c<!lnstruction, noted the ' unfortunate • fact that ," •. enterprises on demanding 
t~e latest narrowly-spe~i~l and high- productivity machine tools are forced to 
i~ke more or less suitable machines or even simply universal machine tools of 
l.Alzenshtadt and Chikhachev , oo ci"t , p.208 . 
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obsolete desi,:ms" •
1 
This was echoed a year later 1n an editorial of Stanki 1 
instrument 1 "The growing deMand for nachine tools is satisfied as a rule oy 
s quantitative increase in the outout of relatively simple machine tools , sometimes 
a~ the expense of the cutout of h~~-grade , extremely necP.ssary and first priority 
achines" . 
2 
As before this problem must have been especially acute for civiHan 
br~~c~Ps of the en~ineering having secondary priority . 
Despite thP s~rious suppl v problem there 1-1as a move towards the employment 
of sp~clalisen equipment in seri al production branches , notably the machine tool 
industry itself'. rhis pol ley was formulated at the Fu:st AlJ-U.nion Conference 
of :roriur.t:\ on F.ne lneers of the machine tool ind uotry 1n 19'37 , mul ti.- tool , multi-
spindle ,automatic and semi- automatic machines were to ba introduced in large-serial 
cachlne tool build1ng3. Some successes were claimed , notably at ' krasnyi Proletarii ' 
and im .Ordzhoniktdze, and a conference was h~ld 1n 1938 to dlscues the further 
develooment of the transfer of auto-tractor industry technology to other 
serial produ~t1on branches .4 
The con tltlued shortage of specialised equipment led to a cam,Paign during the 
in,...ertiate ore- i\ar years, starting in 1937 , for the l'lorlernisatlon and modification 
of th"" existing st.ock in order to raise its productivHy and meet devmnds for 
scarce types . This campaign was clearly associated with attempts to reduce the 
demand for skilled engineering industry labour ; many - of the molilfications 
were dir9CtP.d towards deskilling through the specialls·tion of general- purpose 
achines and the provision of features stmolifyD1g control . Examples of such 
odificat1ons include the conversion of ordinary lathes into sel!li-automatics 
(it was estimated that if 15 per cent of the total lathe stock could be so 
converted 12 , 000 sKilled lathe operators could be freed for alternativ~ work)~ 
the adaptation of machines for work with harn-alloy tools , the introduction of 
and 
features reducing auxili~ry time , jthe creation of simple ,operational machines fron 
~eneral-purpose models , e .g . la.t~es were convertPd into speci~l boring ,gear-cutting , 
6 
h~n~ , lapping and spec1~4 ~rinding m chines . A lP.adlng plnce in this campaign 
l .Castev ,A .R. ,Kak nado rabotat ' ,M., 1972 , p .450. 
2 .Sil ,19J9 ,No .9,p .J . 
) .511 ,1937 ,No .8 , p .4 . 
4 , ashtnostroitel' , 19J8,No .9 , p .26 . 
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was occupied by the armaments commissariat ,NKV , which pursued a vigorous policy 
of modernisation and modification , fittln€ many machines with aulomatic features 
an1 s~plifying others for operational work. ? The neans of deskilling and raising 
t. ~e productivity of the existing stock required relalively small canital outlays , 
1t was est lroated that a 'deep' moder nisat'ion could be carried out for 20-2.) per 
cent of the cost of a machine and a 'small ' modernisation for 7-12 per cent 
of its co~t . 8 It could be argued that this course should have been adop~ed earlier , 
but t.he obstacle to its c1evP1opment Has pr.obably the lack of sktlls and experience 
of' machine tool tec~ology : measures securlue: an econony of capl.t:ti and skill 
t11.,mselves require an input o:f engineering sk!lls ,which were one of the scarcest 
resources in the earlier stages of development . 
The drive for modernisation and modification became closely as .ociatcd with 
the campaign for mul tlple manning of machines , a campaign clearly proaoted 1n 
response to a growing shortage of skllled workers . One of the main fol.·ms of 
modification of existing machines was provision of devices making H posG1ble to 
operate more than one machine of a general-purpCJse type at a time . The lightening 
of control aJso made it possible to employ a greater proportion of women nnd 
youths as machine operators . 
The trend towards deskilling was probably associated with military production 
demands and these demands nncioubtably exerted a more general influence on 
r.achine tool technology at t'"lis ttroe . On the one hand a number of military branches 
re~ uired high- productivity machines of ,a,n adaptable nature ; on the other, the 
n~ed to rapidly convert civilian branches to military production must have fostered 
u:tlversaJ i'ty . Between 1937 and 1 Q40 the number of special machine tools produced 
a year x:ose from 962 units to 6 , 700 . ·and it can reasonably be assUl'!led that many 
of these were required for milita_~ production . The influence of milli~ demands 
on oachine tool technol ogy 1n the pre-War years is considered in detail in 
Appendi~ 5 · 
5 • .:ashinostroenie , 16 .1 . 19ll0 . 
6,, 1bld . ' 17 .1 . t940 . 
?.1bid .9.2 .1940 . 
B, lbtd . ,17 .1.1940 . 
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.:!cmclusion 
'de ar"' now in a position to dr.aw SOllie conclusions .from this review of 
Soviet choice of machine tool technology , The situation in 1929 from the point 
o .. view of englneerlng technolo~y was in many respects a fortunate one for Soviet 
tn~ustry, By 1929 much experience of large-serial and mass flow production 
.,H.t:\ been RCcumulated in both t1e United States and Western Europa , Machine tool 
tE-c-hnology for such prof3uction had made considerable lll·ogress: tht> production 
'!WC~ine of a fairly specialised but reasonably flexible nature had been developed, 
he Q~lt-construction principle had been formulated and was entering practical 
nplication, an~ thP skill requirements of machine tools of general and specialised 
application were much lower than they had been before the War or in the early 
lQl.Os . Therefore , t.he latest , ' best ' capitalist technology was indeed well-suited 
io Soviet requirements , Furthermore , because of the convergence of the best 
European , notably German , practice to that of the USA there was a possibil'1.ty 
of obtaining suitable progressive equipment and also technical assistance from 
closer _ better-known European markets , as well as directly froc the USA .• This was 
especially the case frorn the early 1930s when European firms began to build an 
increasing number of American- type mac-hine tooJ s , The deveJ.op!!:ent of machine tool 
tPC~~olo~ during and after t he· crisis was also favourable to Soviet industry 
tn so far as specialise~ equipment beca~e more adaptable and the skill demands 
o~ many types of equipment ~ere further reduced , 
In the 1920s tbe un1ve:t:sal machine tool pred om ina ted in Soviet engineer lng. 
~uring the First Five- year Plan years a ~etermined breAk was made at the new 
enterprises of l~rger seriality , notably in the automobile and tractor building 
oranches which adopted • American' techno] ogy in almost unadapted form . Given the 
decision to build the aul..o- tractor factories of a certain capacity ·the choice 
of technology was effectively predetermined: by 1929 flow organised production 
usin~ specialised equipment suited to t~P. employment of se~i-skilled workers 
was normal for &~erlcan and European motor industry factories even of a smaller 
ecale than adopted 1n the Soviet Union . To have adopted a more pri!'litive technologJ 
.aM organisation , given the scale , would have been tantamount to adopting a path 
291 
involving higher costs , and much higher capital and labour , above all sKilled 
labour ,requirements per t.mi t output . It is true that - the high-productivity 
tlachines instal led in the nasr"~ prorluction factories needed skilled toclmakers , 
setters , repair men ,etc. but a relatively small force of such workers could 
service many machines and rlurin" ~ the initial period many of these functions 
w~re fulfilled by foreign workers , frequently t t' .represen a .~.ves of the machine tool 
SLlpplying firms . As show in th f n e case o the motor industry,for high priority 
projects involvinu much forei~n equipment 1 o ~ se ection procedures were quite 
rl~orous and careful account was taken of the scale of production and relevant 
costs , 
By 1933 the Soviet machine tool industry had adopted a policy of granting 
hip.-h priority to the domest1 c production of specialised , high-productivity 
types of machine tools . However ln the 1930s ,nesp 1 te policy 1n favour of such 
equipment , a restrictive import policy coupled with domestic production 11rnitat1ons, 
and pressuresstemrninSt from the planning system, the cho.ice procedures at the 
enterprise Jevel. , the demands of product changes , military production requi:ren:ents , 
etc . tended to proMote ~~iversallsm ln the machine tool stock . A tendency already 
apnarent in t~e First Five-year Plan probably became more marxed in the Second 1 
a dualism of technology developed with , on thP one hand , American-type advanced 
technology and "'~rp~nisation in the hil?"h- priority branches with access to 'foreign 
l:lachinery and the best pronucts of the domestic machine tool industry and , on the 
other , the loner priority civilian branches, which t.:ere forced to accept the 
low-productivity, general-purpose products of the domestic industry . The latter 
rmst have lnvol ved the use of more machi nes , skilled workers and factory floor 
nrea than would otherwise have bern necessary,with consequent harmful economic 
effects in terms of lm~er productivity and raised costs . These trends were to 
some extent counteracted by measures to raise productivty and desk111 the machine 
stock from abnut the mid- 19J0s , tncluding the Stakhanovite movement , and the 
campaigns for modern isa tlon and modification of !".achines an~ multiple canning . 
Looku
1
g at the practice of the Soviet engineering industry and the products 
of the machine tool branch one can say that none of the policy tendencies of the 
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First Five- year Pl an period was a~opted in ful l . ~he outcome was in fact a 
compromise betl\ecn the demands of the ' Americi'ln ' , specialisation school , \orr lch 
~1~ nchieve considerable success , and the ' European ' universalist tendency . 
This outr.ome to a large extent reflected the I:ealit.y of the industrial structure 
which developed in the 19J0sj the thoroughgoing transition to specialised large 
ser·ial and mass production foreseen by Soroki.n and others was not achieved . 
The Pankin-Zernov idea of using simple , special Jllacb1nes found somelil"'lted appllcatlo1 
just before and during the War , bnt on the whole it was not favoured' the path 
of very extreme operational differentiation was already being reversed in the 
est at the time when lt rras put forward . Fina1J.y, the r adical proposals of 
Caste" hnd some impa.ct , but in a much more limited form than he envisaged . 
Ctrcumstanc9s were not conducive to radica] changes in technoloey and methods 
-time was against experimentation • .By 1941 there was Jlttle place for radical 
visions of the type put forward by Gastev , Perel ' man and others in the First 
Five-v~ar Plan , when it was widely believed that there rras no task beyond the 
Bolsheviks given the will : the experience of the 1930s promoted a more sober 
assessment of tec~~olo~y and the conditions of its use . 
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Chapter 8 
~ME ASPECTS OF TECHNICAL PROG~SS IN Tffii MACHIN], TOOL INDUSTRY 
By 1929 the Soviet Communist Party and government was committed to a policy 
of as rapidly as possible ' catching up and surpassing the advanced capitalist 
co~trles both technically and economically' and, as a means of achieving this 
aim, to the use of the latest, most advanced, technology of the capitalist world~ 
The aim and means, and the situation of the Soviet economy of the period, make 
it essential that any analysis of the technical development of the economy as 
as wbole , or of particular branches, be situated within the context of the 
interaction of two different and mutually opposed social and economic systems • 
.!:he rate and directions of technical development in the capitalist countries 
exerted a profound influence on ::>oviet economic development, just as certain 
aspects of technical and economic progress in the Soviet Union bad a reciprocal 
influence on the west. More concretely , Soviet industrialisation effectively 
b~an at a time when the capitPlist economies were entering the most serious 
economic crisis yet experienced ; a crisis the duration of which coincided 1n 
time with the First Five-year Plan. ihe Second Five-year Plan tooK place at a 
time when the capitalist economies were passing tlu'otlp'h a oost-crisis depress ion, 
follmred by a limited revival. The fact that the crisis exerted an in:Quence 
on uaviet trade possibilities is often acknowledged , but another important 
aspect - the extent and nature of technical progress in t 'ne capitalist economien 
during and after the crisis and its influence on ~oviet development - has not 
been considered 1n the literature . The first part of this chapter is devoted to 
a consideration of the rate and directions of technical progress in the machine 
tool industries of the major pro1uc1ng countries from t he late 'twenties, Soviet 
perc~ptton ofthis prop-ress and responses to it • .1.n the second part, some aspects 
of technical innovation , its institutions and mechanisms, in the Soviet machine 
tool industry of the period are discussed in the light of the preceding analysis 
of technic::tl oro&ere'":s in the West . 
l • 
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Before considering the Soviet per ception of the impact of the crisis on 
technical development in the machine tool industry it is necessary to briefly 
look at the broader question of Marxist analyses of technical progress in general 
under the conditions of capitalism at its monopoly stage . Under the conditions 
of pre- monopoly capitalism,as 11arx had s~own , the main driving force of technical 
proness was seen as competition between capitals both on the do .estic and world 
markets, with the development of 1 monopo y , assessments of the possibility 
of technical progress hinged arou_11d the question of the degree to which competition 
remained an essential characteristic of the capitalist system . The classic 
analysis of imperialism presented by Lenin indicated clearly the contradictory 
impact of monopolisation on technical progress . On t~e one hand, the growth 
of mono~qy gave rise to a tendency to decay and stagnation with restriction 
on competition,monop~ly pricing and the possibility of artificially hindering 
the introduction of technical novelties. But , Lenin stresBed, monopoly could 
not for long suppress competition a" • • the possibility of lowering costs of 
production and raising profits by means of introducing technical improvements acts 
t o t1e benefit of change . Dut the tendency to stagnation and decay characteristic 
of monopoly continue to act and in individual branches of industry , 1n certain 
t i 1 d f tim it gets the Upp
er hand" • 1 Thus while 
countries , for cer a n per o s o e , 
t here was a tendency to stagnation and, as an expression of this, to the holding 
back of t•>ehnical progress, Lenin warned against the absolutlsation of this aspect= 
competition remained , and intensified during crises, givingthe possibility at 
t1r:.es of very rapi d technical development • 
Lenin ' s analysis of manopoly capital and 
technical progress was that held 
1o the 
1920
s by most economists ; despite the prevalence of monopoly and the 
2 
widescale technical progress continuen. 
onset of the ' general crisis of capitalism' 
i 5th edn Vol • 27 o • 397 • 
1.Lenin ,V. I .,Pol noe sobranie sochineny~kapitali~m i ek~~omicheskie 
2.See,for example, Varga ,E. ,Sovremenn_ 
pp80;92- 100 . 
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Those to the Left of the farty (Trotsky ,Preobrazhensky) tended to have a more 
negative assessment of the possibility o£ further development of the productive 
forces and placed greater emphasis on monopolistic restriction of technical 
progress.1 To the Right , Bukbarin placed greater emphasis on the rapidity 
and wtde scope of technical change I.Ulder imperialism before the cr'is1s . 2 
iith the onset of the crisis , in the years 1929 to 1932, there appears to 
have been a widely prevalent view that technical nro~ess had been , if not 
hal ted, then neatly curtailed. This is not eAsy to document because referer,ce 
to technical progress in the capitalist countries during these years are rarely 
et. (The speeches of Stalin and other Party leaders stress the unprecedented 
depth and scope of the crisis but make no reference to the fate of technical 
progress) . There are some indications, however , of the geaerally held view. 
Dukharin , at the time the head of the Scientific Research Sector of Vru1Kh 
Uater tiJ\.TP) and one of the most prolific writers on questions of science and 
technology during the First ~ ive-year Plan, on a numb!!r of occasions stressed 
t~~t the crisis was leading not to technical advance , but regression.Thusa 
"Foraerly crises gave an impetus to technique to a certain extent; the most 
technically progressive enterprises adopted new improvements, lowered their 
co~ts , extricated themselves out of th~ crisis, competed with other enterprises 
and made differential profits . The other enterprises had to catch up with 
thea, to reach their level and so on. Now a di£ferent tendency can be observeda 
a slackeninY of technical progre~s. lhis is due to t~e far reaching development 
oi the monopolist character of the structure of contemporary capitalism, to 
the extraordiaary depth nf the crisis and the absence of any clear prospect 
of future improvement . This practice and theory of technical ru:ression began to 
flourish 
/ towards the end of the period of so- called 1 inc'lustr1al prosperity' •• . Thus 
th1 contradications of present-day decaying capitalism are undergoing a 
tre~endous strain; its technical shell is still moving forward, but it already 
vears iron fetters; further proPTes~ is already outside the groove of capitalist 
relations" • 3 
Tnat this was a general view is supported by evidence from the machine tool 
1c: :us try 1 tself • lolri ting at the end of 1931 Al' perov ich observed that: " In 
conditions of the crisis, when basic users o~ machine tools obviously do not 
1 .'i'he: following is tyoical of Trotsky a" . • after the War .• one can speak ""On.iy of 
k~ good t~e dest uctton , but certainly not of the further development of 
the pr<'ductive forr-es .. (Evropa 1 A.merika,~.,1926 , p.8 cited by .rloginskii,G ., 
Zakat kapitalizma v trotskistkom zerkale,M.,19J2 , p.15) .Preobrazhenskii 
held th~ t 1 monopoJ..t;m • 1 ed to the curtall.men t of accumulation and tt'le 'thrombosis 
1 
of the productive forces,includlng technology . (see ZAkat kapitalizma ,M.,19.31) 
3.4 
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intend to purchase any new machines, .• . the stri ving of machine tool builders to 
create new machines disappears as well"~ Similarly ,Sokolov , in a popular 
vcrk on the machine tool industry publ ished in 1932 , confidently asserted that a 
•rhe gigantic socialist construction taking place here i s accompanied by a 
reaouldio« of people on a new technical and socto-econo~ic basts, whereas for 
tb~m (the capitalist countr ies - JC) economic develop~ent hits rock bottom and 
t.echnology f r eezes and goes int o r everse". 5 
Further confirmat ion that the prevailinp- view during t l-te perlod 1929 to 1932 
vas that the crisis curtalled technical development 1s provided by later 
contributions which s ~ecifcally made the noint that , ~espite a general 
tendency to strutnation , in fact t echnical progress had continued . One of the 
first such ten"bative acknowleo9emer.ts came at the end of 1933 {i.e, after the 
low point of th~ crisis) when Leikin , after f irst observing that the crisis 
had greatly intensified the tendency to technical stagnation, preceeded to 
analyse the directions of t echnical proFres 
,. 
which had 1.n fact OCcl!J13d - 1.n troductior 
of ne~ materials , changes leading to the intensification o~ production processes, 
~he development of flexible means of p..coduction adapted to the current liJDited. 
scale of output and t he possible f u ture expansion .Above all , ~elkin stresr~d 
that the technology of weapons and their production had been the main element 
of techni cal progress . This led him to conclude t hat ;"The crisis has not halted 
~hnical develop•llent • .• the Trotskyist notion of th stagnation and 'thrombosis' 
6 
of th · oroductive f orces has been refuted yet again" . From this tine on 
ackncwledgement that technical progress had not halted became more and more 
in 
fzequent in the Soviet press , although/one of the most ~uthoratative works 
of the period on technical policy published in 1934 E ,\;iranovskii still asserted 
that t'''rhe technical regress of capitalism in the period of the present day 
::r1s1s is a most vivid ill ustration of the retarding influence of crises on 
Ule development of technology'' • ? 
Z.S'!e,f or example , Bukharin , h .I ., "Tekhnika 1 e konomika sovre!llJDenogo kap1 talizma" , in 
Etyudy,M.-L., 19J2 ,especial y pp .84- 95· 
J .Bukharin ,N .I. ,Socialist reconstruction and the st ,·le for technl ue,l' .. ,1932, 
pp8-10 (in English based on a speech of Aut;u.st 1931 • 
.SU ,19J1 ,llo .11-12 , p.1. 
,Sr.SOkolov ,A. ,Sovetskoe 5tankostroenie, H., 19)2 , P .6 · 
.~ . • 7 .11.3) . 
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As Bukharin had observed , the general view of economic cr ises held by Marxists 
was that , with the intensifaotion of competition which took place as firma 
strived to extricate the.Ytselves from disaster , ne·,: technical means would be 
created and introduced in the hope of cutting costs and securing tncreased profits: 
In the initial period of the crisis technical development may indeed slow down 
(~d probably did in the years 19JO-J1) , and to t his extent au\harln and others 
were correct in their assessment ; but where they were wrong was 1n absolutising 
this technical slowdown and in seeing no possinility of a further renewal, or 
even intensification, of development , This overestimation of the depth and 
serinusness of the crisis , coupled with an underestimation of the possibil1Ues 
of a capitalist solution to it being found , is understandable in the light of 
its unprecedented sever~ty and the prevailing expectations of a revolutionary 
solution to the contradictior.s of the system , but it was to have repercussions 
for Soviet technical policy . 
A further related mistaken assumption appears to have had wide currency 
at the time of the First r 1ve-vear Plan and t he early part of the Second. 
Stea~~1g from the above mentioned asse~sment of the prospects of technical 
development under capitalism , the slogan ' catch up and surpass ' tended to be 
interpreted in the sense that the Soviet Union had to catch up and surpass 
a given , relatively stable level of technical- economic development ' the crisis 
~ave rise to an illusion that the target was static . This led to the view t hat 
Soviet industry simply had to bulld ne\': factories at the l evel of the best 
available caryltalist technology lof 1929) and assimilate the production of the 
latest pro..iucts and, having successfulJ.y achieve1 this , proceed to surpass the 
capitalist countries by building its own newer factories and producing its own 
nelier nror<ucts. During the time of' the First Five-year Plan ,in the face of 
immense difficulties and demands for great sacrifices , and vlth the capitalist 
countries in crisis as a backcloth , this was an understandable and reassuring 
Ulusion . Again , evidence for this phenomenon is indirect , notably in the 1118.lly 
later statements , appeals and e planations to the effect that ' catching up and 
7.Tekhnichesk.a.:ta r ekonstruktsiya v pervoi pyatUetke,~l . ~L ., 19J4 , p .16, 
t .cf.,Lenln, op cit , vol.24,p . J69 . 
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surpassing' involved pursUit of a moving tarvet. This static approach to the 
capitalist technical level appears to have been strongest in the early 19J0s when 
the first successes of assimilating modern technology had been achieved. As wil1 
be shown, it was not easy to keep up pressure for further effort to pnsb technology 
to a still higher level. 
~ov1et Recognition and ~esnonse to Technical Cha~ Machine Tool Building 
The first frank admissions that the crisis had promoted intensive technical 
development in the machine tool industry came in 19J4. Prior to this there were 
a number of hints that technical development had continued, but tts scope and 
intensity were not recognised. Levin, director of ENIMS, reviewing the 19JJ 
leipzig Exhibition , noted that the crisis had cut the number of exhibitors and 
that there were no new design ideas.however, i.nprovements were noted - reduction 
of ~achining time, centralisation of control, raised precision and the use of 
hydraulic drive mecban1a~s . 1 Similarly, Leikin in his above mentioned review 
of technical developments, noted that there had been succes~-es in the use 
, 
of hy<iraullc drives and .. eatures securing the flexible application of madtine tools. 4 
In May 19J4 a controversy broke out over the t ype of radial drilling machine to 
be built at the new Khar 'kov factory • for the first time the practice of copying 
aodels of 1929 was challenged and the r~ht to design more modern original 
achines deroanded.3 nut it was M.Orentlikher, head of the machine tool section 
in the 1920s and in 1934 an engineer of the technical-production sector of NKTP, 
whofirst really alerted the machine tool industry to the seriousness of the new 
situation and the falseness of previously held conception. ••oting the sharp 
cut back in production and the des~lalisation of factories which had occured 
during the Depression , Orentli<her continuedc 
"It would however be incorrect to think that the crisis of capitalism has 
entailed a full caseation of the development and improvement of machine 
tool design. Some foreign engineers , ch~racterising the present-day state 
of machine tool bu1ld1.og, contrast the action of the crisis to an unpleasant 
aedicine , which, despite its extremely unsavoury taste, brings about some 
positive results . What positive results has the crisis brought about in the 
t .S1I,1933 ,No .5,p.1J, 
z.zund., 7.11 .33 . 
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opinion of these foreign engineers? It induces technical worker s to exert 
themselves to the u~~st to seek mehhods of weaKening the impact of the 
low utilisation of t~e productive apparatus and of the growth of costs of 
production. ~espite the extraordinary cutback in outlays on experimental 
work extremely productive machines have been designed in recent times , 
improveme~ts in production technology have been achieved, etc. ~s a 
consequence of these improvements, !!Chine tools profitable as recently as 
1929-30 have by now already become out of date . The extreme intensification 
4 of competition induces continuous improvement of machine tool design" . 
The main directions of technical progres~ identified by vrentlikher were the 
use of hard alloy tools, leading to increases of the speed of machines and 
the use of more rigid fixtures, r eouction of leading times with the use of 
hydraulic and electric chucks, the very rapid introduction of hydraulics, 
the replacement of milling and planing by broaching , and the design of machine 
tools for use with new light metals and alloys finding increasing ap9lication in 
the motor industry~ Thus ,Orentlikher concluded, technical thought had moved 
forward in the years of the crisis; the Soviet industry would have to rmg~ously 
study these changes and criticall y assess them in determining its tech~ical 
po1 1cy, One point in Orentlikher's account may have been inaccurate if another 
-Soviet expert writing at about the same time is to be believed. Piterov, 
head of Orgametall , writing during a visit to the USA , reported that at all the 
n~chine tool factories visited the design staff had been retained , or even 
6 strengthened, despite the crisis . Thus outlays on experimental work may not 
have been cutback quite as sharply as Orentlikher suggested. 
I 
The imPications of Orentlikher's article were disturbing for Soviet 
industry. All the new models which had been introduced in t he previous five 
years as examples of the very latest capitalist technology, and were still being 
introduced in 1934, were those of · 1929-30 or earlier and , furthermore, 
a large proportion of the machine t ools imported at such a great cost during the 
Five-year Plan were now, it appeared , out of date . In ~ovember 1934 Orentlikher 
) .7his controversy is discus~ed below, p . 322. 
4,Plan.Khoz. , 1934,No . 8-9,p. 22 Emphasis added. 
5.ibid,oo.22-27 . 
6 .Zaind . ~23 .6.34 . 
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restated his case in a further article dral1ing attention to the role of new 
su]:er .. hard alloy tools in transfor ming machine tool desi.gn a the • tron l aws 
o: competition" were , he believed, forcing a switch to the new tools and hence 
1 new machine tools adapted to their use, whether this change was desired or not. 
From subsequent events it seems that many in Soviet i ndustry did not at this 
time take Orentlikher' s assessment very seriously. 
In the autumn of 19.34 a number of the leaders of t he machine tool industry , 
11clud1ng Kaganovich , Al' perovich , Levin and Yannlkov(Tula arms factory) had the 
opporttmity to see for themselves at the London"" ~tachine Tool Exhibition. This 
experience made a great impressi on on the Soviet visitors . At the Seventh Congress 
of Soviets early in the following year , ~aganovtch related how when the Soviet 
engineers first looked at t he exhibition they at once decided that ther~ was 
nothing to be learnt . He , l•aganovich , had t1en told t "'em not to be 'dilettantes ' 
and to study a few exhibits in great depth; they bad done this and ,as a result , 
had concluded that the Soviet industry was lagging behind. This , Kaganovich 
declared, sbowed how correct and timely had been Stalin's warning to workers of 
the metallurgical industry thR.t they must not become ' swollen headed' with their 
achievements.2 ~hat were the developments revealed by the London exhibition? 
First , it was evident that the ~ritish machine tool industry han made very rapid 
progress during the previous four-five years , and that an important role had 
been plaved by allied branches, notabl y suppliers of electrical and hydraulic 
equipment • .3 Second , the speed of cutting had risen very sharply with the 
adoption of hard alloy tools , e .g. a lathe ~·ith a maximum spe~d of ) , 000 r.p.m . 
was shown (the DIP lathe had a maximum speed of 6or r . p.m . ), ann a small turret 
lathe of 4,000 r . p. m. (compared with 600 r.p.m . of the im.Ordzhonikidze factory's 
• 1)6 ') 4 . Third , very rapid developments had taken place in the use of hydraulics, 
assimilation of which was only b~inning in the US R in 19)4. ether developments 
included the simplification of control , automatic gauging , the use of electric 
l.Yestnik metallopro~ ysblennosti,19)4,No .1 1 , p . 61 . 
2.7 s"ezd Sovetov , ~~ ., 19:35 ,Byu1Jeten ' No . 10 , p.45. 
) .Zalnd ., )0 .11 .34J6.1 .J5. 
4 .~zd Sovetov , op ci+ , p.46 . 
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motors f ully integrated into the machines, and the use of roller bearings . 
KSRano\lich concluded from this experience that ther e "'as sti ll a very great 
deal of wor k t o be undertaken before the task of catching up and surpassing 
could be realised . 1'1easures had to be adopted to meet the challen&rel there llere 
still very POwer f ul forces promoting techical development & 11In capitalist 
countri es competi tion and the str1Ying to pull out of the crisis and hold a 
position on the market at times force the large enterprises to enormous risks 
in the search for new designs , giving rise to thoro~hgoing technical revolutions 
in the branches of industry served by the machine to "'l industry" •1 Tl;o 
recommendations were made . ~irst , in order to secure rapid technical development 
a major strengthening of experimental work was an essential first pr1ority2J 
second , the role of the designer had to be greatly enhanced .J This theme was 
taken up by Or dzhoniki dze in hi s speech to the Congress of boviets , when he 
drew general lessons for t e Soviet e r1gineer1ng industrya 
"The designs of machines must be contiauosly impraved . We 111ust take all 
the best exa~ples of American and ~urooean technology and adapt them to 
our needs , anri then it is necessary to boldly tmprove them . itere the 
greatest danger is to become r ooted to the snot . Hence t he enormous role 
of the desi~ner ••• Our machine builder have still not yet sufficiently 
develooed a taste for new designs and new machines, for the improvement 
of mechanisms, and without this lagging behind and stagnation are inevitable . 
4 A most r esolute str\tgP'le must be waged against such conservatism". 
The Seventh Congress of bovtets 1n January-February 1935 is significant as 
·the first major public occasion at which the possibility of Soviet industry 
~echnically falling behind t~e capitalist countries was raised,and the essential 
task posed of not only ~ssimilating the best C"Pit~list technology, but further 
raising its level. 
The machine tool 1nd , stry was im.mediately aff ected 1 1fKT.F, preswnably at 
i.a;anovicb' s instigation, issued an order at the beginning of 1935 calling for 
the introduction of new models to repl~ce basic models first produced less than 
l.Bol' shevik,19J5,No .6 , p . 17 . (Kaganov1ch) 
2.~. ,6 . 1 . 35 (Kaganovich and Al'perovich) 
] • .l_!"ezd sovetov , op cit,p .46 . 
4.0rdzhonikidze ,G ,K , ,Stat' 1 i r echi,H . , 1957 , Vo1.2 , pp .642-64J • 
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three years before . ' Krasnyi rroletar11' was to master a new lathe of its own 
d~sign with a speed of up to 3 , 000 r.p.rn ., and 1m.Ordzhonik1dze was to r eplace 
its turret lathe by a new machine with a maximum speed of 1,500 r .p . ~. 1 This 
order has all the signs of a panic lleasure , and was to cause serious problems 
for the 'krasnyi Proletarii' factory : later, as we shall see , it was to be 
criticised . Reporting on the Third Conference of Leslaners 1n March 1935, 
Peshkin wrote that even ' Krasnyi Proletarll' ~orkers themselves would admit 
t. ha t. the ' DIP ' lathe had ' outlived 1 t s age ' and needed to be replaced by a 
fundamentally new destgn. 2 Presumably it was felt that the lag was so great 
that modernisation of existing models would prove inadequate . 
Criticism of ENIMS and t~e glavk leadershtp for its technical policy mounted 
lnthe S\lJ11Jlier of 1935, 1 t being widelv felt th~t they were not respondlng adequately 
to the demands of accelerating technical progress. Shaumyan and Agapov , for 
example, charged that EN.INS was taking the path of least resistance by stUl 
recommending for production foreign ~odels of 1925- 29.3 The lag of the industry 
4 vas the main topic of the branch ' s Party-technical conference 1.n July, and 
shortly after this NKTP issued a major order on the role of designers 1n the 
engu1e ring industry , which outlined measures for tackling the task of securing 
further design improvements in already produced machines •5 
Acco~~ts of the rapidity of technical change in the est , coupled. with 
sharp criticisms of complacency in t ne Soviet industry continued in the autumn 
of 1935. Kaqanovtch returned to t~e lessons of the London exhibition and wrote 
of a lag of 'several years ' in ~oviet designe6 , while Al ' perovich ,Sorokln and 
others had an opportunity to see the latest Am rican machines at the Cleveland 
bXhibition and a number of American machine tool works.? Th1s experience seems 
to have stretfhened t~e :iositlon of those demanding action. Thus/' Visits to the 
USA e.nd other countries by our aircraft,motor and machine tool builders have shown 
l .!storiya SSSR ,195?,Ho .2,p.49 . 
2.Zalnd. ,22 .) . )5 . 
) .Izvestiya, ) .7 . J5 • 
• Za!nci . ,1 5.?.)5. 
5.Ib1d .,1S.7 .35 . 
6.Ibid , ,1.8.35. 
1 .Zalnd . ,23 .10.35 . 
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how intensively Soviet machine tool builders must work in order not to fall 
behind ••• A sig.ni.ficant number of branches of engineering 1n the capitalist 
countr1~s made ~reat strides during the crisis".1 Bashta, the leading hydraulics 
expert of the branch and deputy editor of St~ki i instrument , attacked illusions 
held by a section of workers in the industry s "The widespread opinion held by 
this group that we have already ' caught up ' , and that we have even 'surpassed • 
other countries 1n the realm of machine tool buiil.d.ing , is harmful conceit" . 2 
Clearly , there were many in the industry who believed that having taken a leap 
from the technology and ~hods of the nineteenth century to those of modern 
••merica and Europe ~fforts could be relaxed and gains consolidated at this new 
technical level. The Party, .. ' NKTP and the industry' s leadership , recognising 
the considerable technical development occuring in the capitalist countries kept 
up the nressure for chan~e. however , and posed ever more complex tasks for solution 
The attempt to abruptly change the modele built by tne leading factories 
ran into difficulties and this seems to have led to some reconsideration of 
11ethods of securing t chn:tcal development . The Fourth l.onfe_ence of Des1L.~ers 
in April 19)6 devoted considerable attention to t he modernisation of existing 
11odels as a central element of technical policy • lhe resolutions of the conference 
also outlined measures fDr the promotionof experimental work as a vital 
co•ponent of the modernisation effort .3 
The danger of falling behind the technic~l development of the capitalist 
countries was a central theme of the speeches of a number of leading NKTP workers 
at the Soviet of NKTP 1n May- June 19)6 . Pudalov criticised ' responsible wor\ers 
1n heavy industry and in particular machine building ' , who in the press and 1n 
public speeches declared that the Americans had been surpassed and overco.me. This, 
he stressed , was harmful self- deception , for, "The capitalist countries do not 
"'ait, and w111 not -.ait , for us to catch up with thel!l • .Lhey are going forward, 
conquering ever newer technical posi~ions, and this imposes a very great deal 
upon us". 4 Rukhimovich , deput (llarKom, went further - he listed a number of branches 
t .yestnik metallouromyshlennost,19J5,No .10,p.J ~ditorial (editor then A.D.Pudalov). 
2.SU, 19J5,No .10 ,p .6. 
) .SU,19J6 ,No .6 ,p-o.1-J . ) 6 
.SoVet pri NKTP SSSR ,25=29 tyunya 1936g . (Sten .otchet. ,M. ,193 ,p.15J. 
8.12 
294 
in which, compared with a few ~ears earlier, ~oviet industry had, he believed, 
fal~~en behind; these included the auto-tractor, power equipment, measuring 
lnstruments and turbine building braaches.1 This same point was stJ:essed by 
Ordz'lonikid-ze :"From month to month I month, from year to year we must raise 
out technology and our industry to ever greater and greater ttl.ghts. If we do not 
have this perspective before us all the time we may come to a halt on one good 
engine •• a good tractor, or bloooming mill •• and stick fast to them. Dut technology 
.. advances all the t1me and he who lingers even for a moment on the path of 
advance falls behind11 • 2 Thus we have a oicture of Soviet industry having pulled 
itself up to a modern level and freed itself from t~e threat of subjugation to the 
world capitalist market , being subjected to a new source of external pressure 
over which it had very little control a the pressure of rapid technical development 
driven forward by the fore~~ of competition and an arms race fueled to a great 
extent by hostility to the Soviet Union 1tself.This external military threat 
ade it impossible for thP Soviet Party and government to ignore the pressure 
of technical advance , in particular in those sectors directly and indirectly 
related to armaments oroduction ( a large proportion of the modern economies of 
the 'thir-ties) and forced them to seek mechanisms for promoting independent 
technical development or, at least, for mitigating the consequences of the 
possession of a lower level of technology where this was the case. In this 
perspective the Stakhanovite movement, coinciding in time with this concern 
far the maintenance of t echnical advance, can be seen as a bold attempt to 
harness aass enthusiasm to the task of catching up and surpassing the forward 
oving tecbnology of the capitalist world. 
At the Soviet of NKTP the nachL~e tool industry was not singled out as a 
later 
case of ' falling behind', but in a number of contribution/in 1936 and in 1937 
1t was clear that some specialists did think that this was then happening. 
Telyatnikov, in a thorough and well-informed review of recent technical developments 
1n nachine tool building, expressed the view that there was no oiher branch 
vb1ch had exp~rienced such rapid pro~ess 1n recent yearsr work on design 
1.1bid 'p.202. 
2.0rdzhon1kidze,G.K,oo cit,p.668. 
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iaprovement intensified during the c~lsis . The technical changes in the hest 
had not been reflected to a sufficient degree in Soviet machines , he stressed, 
" ... the basic par t of the machine tools we make still refer to those types 
t: 'hich we copied f rom the best foreiS~;n models four to five years ago and even 
earlier, but which are now alr eady old fashJoned''~ The experienced engineer , 
Satel ' , also consi~ed that the latest machine to ;ls were ~undamentally dif erent 
from those produced prior to 1933-34 and concluded that ,"In machine tool building 
we lag from America and partially from Germany by 5- 10 years ,Ihis can be said, 
incidentalJy , of many other spheres of our machine building".2 
A useful review of some of the painfully learnt lessons of the struggle 
for industrialisation was presented by a leading Soviet specialist on science, 
tPchnology and the economy, M .Rubinshtein , in the autumn of 1937, "The task 
of catching up and surpasf"ing the technical and economic level of the advanced 
capitalist countries" , he wrote ," does not at all mean the achievement of some 
kind of immobile target , This target itself 1s dynamic. Despite the general 
crisis of capitalism the economies of the capitalist countries are not at all in 
a state of total stagnation ••. :Qespite all the decay •f capitalism technology 
does not stand still. Thus in this contest of two worlds,which is expressed in 
t he slogan 'catch up and surpass' , capitalism does not surrender a single position 
~ithout a fight, and with all the successes of our rapid assault on this front, we 
stlll have not a few lag~ingsectors". 3 
The question naturally arises ; did technology in the machine to0l industry 
1n the capitalist countr ies advance during and after the crisis in the manner 
described by Soviet industrial leaders , planners and technical specialists? Or 
was the external techni cal progress invoked as a whip to drive on Soviet industry? 
There is no doubt that drawing attention to external pressure and threats was a 
eans of mobilising mass activity , but the the contemporary evidence of kestern 
specialist , presented 1n the following section , lends support to the view that 
this external pressure of technical progress was a very real phenomenon. 
l.Problemy ekonomiki ,1936 ,No ,4 , p . 52 . 
2. '!. 3.Ind . , 27 .8 . 36 . 
) .30f'shevik , 1937 ,No . 21, p. 70 . 
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The Development of Machine Tool Technology 1929 - 1941 
Although generally derived from empirical observation alone, without any 
theoretical analysis, accounts of the nature of technical development of the 
machine tool industry during periods of depression and crisis presented by Western 
machine tool builders and academics r each conclusions similar to those provided 
by orthodox I<larxist theory . 'l'he following statements by leading American 
machine tool building specialists summarise the prevailing view in the ' twenties 
and 'thirtiesa 
"The history of every depres!=iion shows that precisely in such times are 
improvements mostly made in desi~ns . This is perfectly natural for two 
reasonst first , because the machine to~l builder has more time to think 
in per iods of that sort, when the pressure of pronuction is relieved , and 
second, because the pressure of competition and the necessity of getting 
business drives him to coaxevery possible bit of business his way by 
bringing out newer and better machines" 
1 E.F .DuBruhl , National Machine Tool Builders Association,USA , 1922. 
''In periods of low production the skilled designers , engineers and 
mechanics o:f the machine tool industry are kept at work ou 1mprove111ents 
in machines that time does not permit when work is being done under 
high pressure to meet delivery demands" 
H.Lind , National ~lachine 'Iool Builders Association ,USA , 1936~ 
This view is sup ported by ltlagoner, the historian of the Am ricaa industrt : 
ef'orts to improve machine tools tended to vary inversel y with current 
demand for existing machines ,J while w.brown , in one of the few economic 
analyses of innovation in the rna.chirre tool industry , also concluded that 
4 innovation occured when demand fell . 
Given this unanimity GO the general dynamics of innovation in the industry , 
did this relationship hold in the acute conditions during the Depression, and 
was the technical progress of the period notable in any respect 7 The crisis 
had a very great impact on the machine tool branch. Taking 1929 as 100, nelf 
l .American machinist,Vol57,1922,Aug.,p.205. 
2.Mechanical engineering,1936,Jan.,p.2J. 
J ,•agoner ,op cit,pp.28-JO. .. 
4,Brown , ... ,"Innovation in the machine to-:>1 industry ,Quarterl y journal of economics , 
iol .71,1957 ,pp.406-425. 
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orders for !!lachine tools in the USA reached a peak of 142 .0 in February 1929 
and plunged to a low point of 8 . 3 in March 1933 . FozCerrnany the high point was 
attained in June 1929, at 114.7 , and the lowest point of 31 ,0 in January 19331 • 
(The smaller ~all in th case of Ger~any can to a very great extent be explained 
by the impact of Soviet orders) . According to research by Brown the forty 
le~ding US comoanies shipped machtnes to a total value of fo33J million tn 
1928 and 1929; but only fi73 million 1n 1931 and 1932. Yet 1n the two years of 
deepest crisis these firms introduced a total of 74 new models, compared with 
53 1n the last two years of ' prosperity' •2 Undoubtably some firms adopted a 
'wait out the storm' policy, but, as Piterov discovered tn 19,4, many large 
firms Quite deliberately maintained their design forces , or even increased them . 
Cincln ati , for example , pursued a vigorous development programme during the crisis 
years: during the Depres~ion im~rtant new vertical boring and cutter grinding 
models were launched and a new factory establshed in Britaln .J It is possibl e 
that in the German case innovative activity was somewhat less vigorous , if 
co~ments by Soviet snecialists are correct , but in the case of Br t tain there is 
little doubt that progress during the crisis was more rapid than in the period 
preceding it . A l eading Brttish spAc1alist , writing at the end of 1930 , 
observed thata"British tool .makers , with a few noteworthy exceptions , are 
where they were ten years ago , and have made 11 t ~le progress . More change 
.. 4 
has taken place in the last twelve months than in the _previous ten years • 
As noted above, the striking changes in British nachine tools greatly impressed 
Soviet expert s 1n 1934. 
Turning to the qualitative aspect of technical progress during the crisis, 
can the extent and directions of t echnical change after 1929 be determined? 
During the 1920s machine tool design fox basic ~enEral-purpose machines only 
gradually improved;major technical developments occured more in the sphere of 
1.Problemy ekonom1k1 , 19J5,ho .4,p.128 . This article by M.Rozma.n and the later 
book (1940) by the same author are probably the best studies available on 
the impact of the crisis on technical progress in the capitalist countries . 
2.Brown ,oo c1t , p . 414 • 
J.Men of purpose,Cinclnnat1,1964,pp .20-~1 . 
4.Ara1tage,H .C., Institution of Automobile En~ineers ,Proceedin~s , 1930-31,Dec . 1930 , 
p.196. 
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special machines . rlting at the beginning of 1936 ao American engineer , 
Hubbard , noted the ' conservatism' of most machine tools of 1929 . A typical 
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1929 machine had a motor. and belt drive (although the design was still b~slcally 
that appropriate to belt ~rive from an overhead shaft) , plain bearings, pr imitive 
lubrication, mechanical control by levers and knobs, and could be u.sed with 
hlgh· speed steel tools but little more . Pneumatic and hydraulic devices ,if 
available , wer e generally extras . I>tany designs of this t1rne were b .sed on 
improvements generated during the depression of 1920-21 .1 Despite the 
depression ,as Hubbard proceeded to demonstrate • there had been what he termed 
a ' Five year revolution 1n machine tool design ', reachir~ its climax in 1935, 
the year of the Cleveland Exhibition . Individual elements of this 'revolution ' 
were known and in use to a limi.ted extent before the onset of the crisis . The 
primary element was the introduction 1n 192? of extra-hard,wolfram-carbide alloy 
tools, marketed under various names , e .g .'Carboloy ' in the USA , ' Widia' 1n 
Germany , and later , ' Pobedit' in the USSR . The previous major tooldevelopments 
had been high- speed steel at the turn of the century \.replacing carbon steel) 
and , in 190? , a high-sp~ed cutting alloy.stelJite . A second ele~ent was the 
individual electric motor used as a power source; a third was the hydraulic 
drive unit, first employed to drive the table of a milling machine 1n 192? . 
A fourth advance applied in 1929, albeit in a primitive form was tbe Q~it­
construction principlP. of building machine tools , givin~ the possibility of 
Qaking more flexible special machines . 
The crisis posed certain economic demands on technology, stemming from the 
necessity for capital of counteracting the falling profit rate in circumstances 
of considerable unutilised capacit y and a greatly diminished market . The 
difficult financial situation precl uded the introduction of new technology 
requiring large or r isky c~nital investment , and for this reason radical 
innovations founded on new technoloRical principles werefew • The main thrust of 
l .Iron a«e ,2 .1 . )6 , p .221. 
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innovative effort was directed towards cutting costs of production by intensifying 
work, at the same time , in or der to m~ximi~t~e utilisation of equipment still 
in operation , efforts were directed towards flexibility of machine tools, adapting 
them to low production runs without jeopardising the possibility of efficiently 
eaploying them when tbe economic situation improved , The main paths of fulfilling ttu 
" dem~ for the intensification of work were , firstly , raising the speed of direct 
aachining by employing the new super- hard alloy tools and fully adapting 
~achines to t heir use1 second, by reducing the auxiliary time , the proportion 
of which in total working time rose as machining time was cut; third, by 
desk1111ng the use of machine tools, bv simplifying and lightening their control . 
lexibility in terms of adaptability to different types of workp1eces and scales 
of output was achieved by the provision of wide speed and feed ranges , the 
use of fixtures and, for more specialised, high-~roducti~y machines , the adoption 
and development of the unit-construction principle. Finally, a strong influence 
on design was exerted by new military- related demands posed, 1n parttcular, by 
the aircraft industry, which demanded machine tools suitable for machining light 
aetals and alloys (magnesium, aluniinium ,d.uralium,etc , )Such machines had to 
secure a light cut at very high speeds. 
During and after the crisis these elements were combined to create new 
machine to ls in many r espects different from the ' conservative ' types of 1929 . 
Redes ign for the use of new tools involved a major reassessment of past practice, 
and as part of this change machines ~ere for the first time built specifically for 
the use of indt.eidial electric motors which became and integral part of tbe design . 
In order to provide the necessary higher speeds, the power of the motors had 
to be raised, the rigidity of the machines greatly enhanced, ball and roller 
bearings replaced the previous plain bearings , and centrallsed,forced lubrication 
6ystems had to be employed. The de~s of greater rigidity, coupled with the need 
to reduce auxiliary time , led to the wide use of pneumatic and other .quick-action 
chucks and work-holding devices . Auxiliary time was also reduced by improving 
speed selection , and the stopping and starting of machines and,on some models, in 
par·.icular grinders, automatic gaop;ing was introduced, securing work of h~b 
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accuracy wt th a minimW!I disruption of the work rrocess . Smooth operation , ease of 
control and reduced idle movements were secured by the use of hydraulic drive units. 
Machine tool electrification made great strides during the crisis , allowing the 
centralisation , lightening and simplif ication of control. Push button starters 
were widely diffused . These developments ln the sphere of control per~itted the 
use of less skilled labour , while lightening control allowed the wider eaployment 
of female and young workers . Furthermore, the develo ent of automatic control 
allowed the development of multiple machine manning with consequent labour cost 
savings . Many of the outlined changes wer.e introduced on general-purpose types 
and had the result that their productivity and scope of operation were increased 
permitting thelr profitable employment in clrcu stances formerly appropr~e only 
to the use of ore specialised production equip ent. 1th the revival of the 
ootor industry there was extr emely rapid development of unit-construction type 
special machines and t~e introduction of transfer lines for machining cylinder 
blo~e and other large components . Finally, during the crisis and after new 
ethods of machining were further developed and found qultP. wide a~plication 
from the m1d-19JOs .Th~se included surfacP and external broaching , honing, lapping, 
diamond boring , and new gear-cutting techniques . While these changes did 
not perhaps amount to a ' revolution ', they ncverthless added up to a major step 
forward in nach1ne tool design which effectively rendered the products of 1929 
obsolete .1 
Rapid technical develop.eo't was maintained 1n t he second half of the 1930s, 
al t ough s1.gn1f1can tly 1 t was repo::ted early in 1937, when deMnd in the USA 
te porarily exceeded the 1929 level , thatJ" The past year has not beeo 
eignallsed by any outstanding developMents in the machine tool field , mainly 
owing to t~e high pressure of production experienced during the period" · 2 The 
de~ds of military production began to exert n mo~~ting influence , leading to 
further automation tn order to facilitate desk1111ng , the crention of new high-
speed , high-product ivity lathes and turret lathes , and promotion of precision 
chine tool build 1ng . 
1 .~ach1ne tool technical developments of the p~riod are described 1n:I;on age , 
4.1.34: 2 .t .J6 ;Machinerv , t6 .1t . )J , pp .• 202-203J J .lO.JS, pp .26-JO;Prob ... e Y 
ekonomik1 ,193S,No .4 , pp128-1)8; ibid,19J6 ,No .4 ,pp.51-5S. 
2.Kechan1Cai engineering , 19)7 ,Jan . ,p . t97 • 
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In conclusi on, it is clear fromthe above review that the leadership of 
the Soviet machine tool industry had real grounds for concern in the mid- 1930s 
about the technical progress which had taken place in the industry in the 
capitalist countries during and after the economic crisis . The Soviet machine 
tool industry was indeed faced with catching up a quickly moving target 1n the 
pre- war years . 
2. The Evol ution of Instit utions and Mechanisms for Research ,Development and Innovation 
During the Fir st Five- year Plan period the Soviet machine tool industry 
was faced with the task of fundamentally renewing its product range, replacing 
models dating from before the War and the early ' twenties by new models at the 
level of the best world machine tool technology . During the 1930s the product 
range was rapidly expanded with types previously not built in the US~~ and ,at 
the same time, as shown above , it was found necessary to replace and modernise 
aodels assimiLated in the recent past . Therefore , throughout the period t 1e 
question of technical innovation was a central concern of the branch. The 
leadership of the industry was forced to dev~e a structure of institutions 
and procedures appropriate to the conditions of the socialist planned economy 
f or realisin9' the introduction of new mod els and developing an independent 
innovative capacity. Some aspects of this problem are considered in this section . 
The Evolution of the R.&D . Institutional Framework 
Before the Revolution some very limited research into the theory and practice 
of aetal cutting technology was undertaken at polytechnical institutes in hoscow 
and St .Petersburg , where courses on metal cutting were offered. Notable figures 
1 
involved in this work were A.P.Gavrilenko,A.D .Gattsuk and N .N .savvin. After the 
Revolution there was lit+le interest in research into machine building until 
1927,when a group of prominent engineering industry specialis ts , including 
l.See Izvestiya vysshikh uchebnykh zavedenii - mashinostroenie , 1967 ,No.10,pp.119-122; 
and Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev,op cit ,pp123-1J6. Note - Savvin was the f irst 1n 
world machine tool building practice to draw up acceptance standards for metal-
cutting machines (in 1913) - ibid,p. 1J6. 
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N.F.Charnovskii,A.S.Britkin and S.S.Chetver1kov called for the establishment 
of a specialised research body. This was created and started work 1n 1928 as the 
Moscow filial of the Institute of ~letals, and i n January 19)0 gained independence 
as the Institute of ~lachine Building and Hetalworking (NIIMash) under 
~\ashinoob"edinenie , VSNKh. In 1930 this institute was undertaking research into 
methods of testing machine tools and studying the quality of domestically 
built products .
1 
NIIMash remained the leading engineering research institute 
throughout the 1930s and undertook some work on maohine tools and metal cut t.ing . 
Also in the late 1920s the Orgametall demenstration hall undertook coMparative 
testing and study of foreign machine tools in order to investigate their suitability 
for use in Soviet 1ndustry . 2 
The l.dea of creating a specialised R.&D. base f~ the machine tool industry 
arose for the first time in 1930. In the first issue of Stanki i Instrument 
in August Pankin called for the concentration of the des ign forces of t~e branch 
in a sinp;le centre and the creation of a council to oversee the work of this 
d~sign office and an investigations office . In a coaaent on these proposals 
Al'perovich put forward the view that the task of the central design office should 
be to work out the general design ' schema' of machine tools, leaving the factory 
design offices to prepare working drawings . 3 Also early in August 1930 
Al'perovich cal l ed f or the creation in 1930-31 of a 'factory of new designs' in 
t he for/1m of an experimental base for the elaboration and building of first 
\... 
4 examples of new designs on the basis of the lat est a chievements o f world technology . 
In September 1930 these demands were incorporated in a VSNKh order on the machine 
tool industry : a spec ial research institute and central design off ice {hereafter 
TsKB _ tsentral ' noe konstruktorskoe byuro po stankostraeniyu) were to be created 
l!lthin the structure of Stankoob"edinenie, t he latter to have an attached factory 
of new designs . 5 This was a bold and imaginat ive projec t for the time, having 
l .Sli, 1930 ,K o .1-2, p, 7 :H o .)-4,p .4 • 
2 .10 let 0r~<ametalla,1924-34, op cit, pp . 29-30 • 
3 .Sli ,1930 ,No .1-2 ,p. 5. 
h.I2vestiya,9.B.30. 
) ,ZaJ.nd. ,17 .9.30. 
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no equivalent in world practice . In Germany machine tool research was well-developec 
but took place almost entirely in the higher educational sector • lihUe in the 
United States r esearch was generally less developed. ielther branch research 
institutes , nor experimental factories for the production of prototyr:es existed 
at this time 1n other machine tool building countries .1 These proposals were 
supported at the all-Union meeting of workers of the machine tool industry in 
January 1931 in connection with the need to secure a full transition to new 
models 1n 1931- )2 . At the same time it was stressed that the design of~ices at 
the factories would have to be strengthened and production workers retrained to 
carry out design work . 2 
In June 1931 , 1.n accordance with an order of VSNKh of May )rd, the new 
research institute t the Scientific Research Institute for Hachine ... ools and 
'l'ool1ng (hereafter ,NIISTI - nauchno- issledovatel ' skii institut stank! i instrument) 
began work. Its main function was to study and test foreign machine tools and 
assess their suitability for production in the Soviet Union 1n the light of the 
needs of industry . lt was also the bring together the research forces of the 
branch , train cadres , disseminate technical literature , lead the work of 
factory l aboratortes . and elaborate standards.J In November 1931 the machine tool 
indust ry ' s TsKB was created , with the function of elaborating the designs of new 
aachines .4 Construction of the new experimental factory of new designs was 
delayed ; work began in 1932 on a site near the im .Ordzhon1k1dze factory. Project 
capacity was fixed at 275 units a year and the total value of the project at 
5-6mi111on rubles.5 In June this enterprise, ' Stankokonstruktsiya ', was aade 
a • shock project • by NKTP . 6 Its first machining-assembly shop was in operation 
by Nay 1934, , when one hundred.- :workers were employed , drawn froo 'Krasny! 
Proletarli' and the auto- tractor factorles .7 However , although a working 
8 
enterprise , •stankokonstruktslya' had st111 not been completed by 19)6. 
l .See American mach1n1st , Vol.72 ,19JO , pp .462& 757 JV01 .7J ,p . 575 for the state of 
research in-Germany andt he USA . 
2 .S 1I , 19)4, N o ,1 0 , P • 6 • 1 
J,Sii ,1931 ,ho .1 0 , pp.1-2 ; 25 let ENIJ<iS ,H.,t9.58,no paginat on . 
4 .25 let ENIMS , oo cit . 
S.Ek.Zhtzn ~24.1.32 • . 
6.su ,1932 ,No . 7, p .2 . 
1 .25 let ENIMS , oo ctt • J 8 
8-!arodnokhozyais~vennyi plan na 1936 p:od . ~ • •• 19)6,Vol.2 , p. 2 • 
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It is evident that in the years 1931 and 1932 the leadership of the branch 
regarded the TsKB as a more 1m.m.ediately important organisation than NIISTI , and 
the latter seems to have had a somewhat s~dowy existence . In statements and 
articles on policy and t he work of the industry Al'perovich stressed the vital 
role of the TsKB in preparing designs for assimilation in 1931-32 , and 1n laying 
the design foundation for an expansion of the product range during the Second 
1 
iive-year Plan. At the First Conference of ~esigners in July 1932 Al'perovich 
stressed that the immediate t~sk of the industry was not the 
...., 
des1gn£of original 
aach1nes , but the drawing up of d signs based on the best foreign models • He 
was not against invention, he emphasised, but believed that it would develop 
later when a prop1er design and experimental base had been created. NIISTI , he 
added, was 'an extremely young creation', without its own cadres, and it would, 
he believed , be at least two years before it was up to its job. 2 Given the 
nature of the problems faced by the industry in 1932 and the scarcity of resources, 
nothly skilled engineering and design cadres, this attitude is understandable . 
NIISTI 's work was complicated by the lack of proper premises- it was located in 
seven different places! At one point, apparently in 1932, the leadership 
of the branch decided to close down the Institute on the grounds that money 
was lacking for its maintenance , but this decision was reversed after the 
3 
intervention of the Party organisation. At the July 19JJ All-Union Conference 
ae11bers of the Institute (Sbaumyan and Mashnev) claimed that uncertainty about 
its future was an important factor in its unsatisfactory workr Sbaumyan even 
4 
suggested closing it down and trying again! The main positive function served 
by NIISTI appears to have be~n that it gath red together a nucleus of specialists 
• which was to form the core of the future research organisation of the branch. 
On 19th 1-lay 1933 Stankoob"edinenie calJed for the merging of the TsKB and 
H!iSTI to form a new organisation , the Experimental -Scientific Research Institute 
of Metal-cutting Machine Tools (usually known as ENIMS - Eksp~rlmental' nyi 
l.Zalnd., 7.11.31; Sii ,1932 ,No.1 ,p.2. 
2.!g,19J3,No.1 ,p.2. 68 B 1 1nd 
J .Stenogrammy _ pervogo vsesoyuzno12:o soveshchaniya,ou cit,p. • J 1 i ustrlal'nye, 
·M • ,1973, p .160 . 
-.Stenogra.mmy, op cit, pp .62-64 ;68-69 • 
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nauchno- 1ssledovatel ' sk1i institut metallore%hushchikh stankov) with 
'Stankokonstruktsiya ' as its experimental production fac1lities .1 This merger 
apcears to have been realised after the First All-Union Conference in July . At 
the endof June the first director of ENIMS was appointed - E .E .Levin, a close 
colleague of Al 1 perovich in Orgametall in the I twenties and prior to his 
appointment a deputy head of Stankoob"edinenie~ tie was also made director of 
'Stankokonstruktsiya 1 • At the time of its formation ENIMS h~d a staff of 250, 
1ncl uding 125 designers and 50 :nembers of the research sector. Of the designers, 
ten were foreign specialists; there were no foreign specialists tn the research 
sector.J The TsKB component of the institute worked on a khozraschet basis.4 
The new institute grew rapidly. In 1935 it had a staff almost 400, 
including 65 research workerst by the autWIU'l of 1936 tt. had a total staff of 
526.
6 
In 1935 its annual budget amounted to 3.2 million rubles .7 The primary 
functions of ENDlS were as follows • serving the machine tool and tooling lndustry 
with theoretical and experimental research , providing assistance on a consultative 
basis , e.,.t abl ish1ng the tipazh8 , projecting machine tools, developing 
standardisation , and the building of prototypes and special machine tools.9 In 
19)) Al ' perovich observed that it bad a further important functiona 1 attack1ng 
10 conservatism 1 • \1ithin the Institut~1there were three main sectors: research, 
technological and desi~n ; an office of standardisation and normalisation 
and a nwnber of laboratories , .including chemical and metall urgical. The research 
sector was subdivided into a number of sections - for machine tools (further 
subdivided into groups by type of machine) , tooling,machine tool automati on, 
electrification, and hydraulics. The machine tool section studied technical 
developments , tested foreign and Soviet machines, studied macnines in use in 
industry, particioated in the establishment of the t1pazh, and elaborated 1 technical 
1.25 let ENIMS . 
2 .Zaind. ,26 .6 .33 .Many of the · leaning staff appear to have been f ormer Orgametall 
workers - Shaumyan ,Zernov ,Gol ov1n,Besprozvanny1,Gorokhov,etc. 
3.,£5 let ENU,S; Stenogram.m.y , op cit,p .69. 
~ .Industr1al1zatsi a SSSR 1 3- 193{,p .250 . 
5.Armand,A . A. ed . ,Nauchno- issledovatel'skie instituty tyazhelo~promyshlennosti, 
M •-L • ,193 5 I p • 59? • 
6.Zaind . ,29 .9 .36. 
? .Armand ,op cit ,p .597 . 
S.The role of the tipazh is considered below , ~.)tO. 
9 .~.p.591 . 
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pecifications ' (tekhnioheskie zadanie) for new machine tools. The latter was 
arded as the most important work of the section , 'Which also· parU.cipated 
lo approvil\g projects elaborated by enterprise design offices, The technological 
• tor had as its main task the surveying of branches of industry in order to 
s blish an optimal tipazh. When suitable models were not available it recommended 
aodification of an existing machine or proposed that an original design be 
ted . The third , design, sector ~the ~ormer TsKB) , had the task of 
drawing up techni cal projects of new machines • As most project work on normal 
hines was undertaken by enterprises themselves , the design sector concentrated 
projecting machines with new or unusual kinematics or principles of machining, 
~ 1nes with a high de~reP of unification of parts and assemblies , and speeial 
~a unit-construction machines . The sector also studied and approved projects 
wa up by enterprise design offices , plannerl design work for t.he industry as 
1 whole and was responsible for overseeing and assisting the work of factory 
~ offlces.1 
At the beginning of July 1937 after repe11ted attacks on the worK of the 
ltute 1.n the press E .E .Levin was removed from the directorship of ENihS 
'Stankokonstruktsiya' , ostensibly for the a11ure of the latter to fulfil 
1 jar assignment f "'r the production of special machines for the reconstruction 
r th tractor 2 factories . During the Third Five-year Plan per!od-ENIMS was 
• ded ~ I .F .Maslenntkov, while two other young Soviet trained specialists 
k aver the posts of chief designer of ' Sta.nkokonstruktsiya' (v . I.Dikushin, 
~pioneer of unit- construction machine tool building in the branch), and chief 
1neer (S .M • .3h1frin) .J Also dtn'111g the Third Plan , by the SNK decree of 
• Septel!lber 1939 , END~S was removed from Glavstankoprom and subordinated 
:t.ly to NKTyazh.'tash. 
4 
h1le ~i!MS was the leading R.&D. organisation of the machine tool industry 
1M: the 1930s it was by no means the sol e establishment engaged 1n research 
~eaign of machine tools . Apart from the factory facilities , there were a 
Jlan.Khoz , 193J .~o .8-9 , p .49 • 
• "'-~ following account apolies to the situation in 1935 - there appears to have 
ea 8 reorganisation later 1n the decade, 
.~,op cit ,pp. 594-595. 
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number of other interested organisations. In 1932 a filial of the TsXB was 
created in Leningrad, specifically charged with the task of designing heavy 
machine tools . 
5 
In 1936 this office was dissolved and became part of the 
department of heavy machine tool building which it was then proposed to organise 
on the site of the 'Tsentrolit ' works. When this project was abandoned 1n 1937 
the department was reorganised to form the independent Central Design Office 
of Heavy Iliac ine Tool ..i:Suilding (TsBTS) in Leningrad , This design office projected 
many he~vy machine tools for construction at various factories throughout the 
~oviet Union and also helped to organise heavv machine tool building at the 
im.Sverdlova works.
6 
Research into machine tools was also carried out by 
Orgametall . In 1933 a shop of experimental machine tool building was organised 
nnd , to the order of NKTP , it worked out the project for a ce~treless grinding 
machine and three such machines were built at t~e Orgametall factory . This shop 
also designed machine to0l accessorins,7 Some R.&D. was also carried out by 
. 8 9 
NIIMash , and design work was undertaken by the Ukrainian NIIMash in Kiev . 
Throughout the period some of the r,ost original R .&D. work ill machine tool oullding 
was undertaken by the Central Institute of Labour in Moscow under the leadership 
of A .K.C.astev and N .Bakhrakh.1° Finally , theoretical research was carried out 
by members of tht Moscow • Stankin ' , where machine tool industry specialists 
11 
were ed\lcated , and other higher technical institutes and. universities, notabl y 
at the Moscow Higher Technical University , where a kafedr of metal- cutting 
12 
11ach1ne tools was organised 1n 1930 under the leadErship of G .fi • • Golovin . 
i tion of mas~ production of the 'SrZ-NATI' crawler 
2 .Zaind. ,4. 7.37. The organ sa f of the machine tool industry to 
tractor was delayed because of t~P. ail~: Ind 30.5. 37J14.? ,J7;J0.7 .37. deliver vital special machines on time a • 
) .~:ashinostroenie ,4.10.J9;24.11.J9;l5 .2 •40 • 
00 
khozvaistvennym: voorosam,M., 195?, 
4 .Q1rekt1vy KPSS 1 sovetskogo oravi~t~e~lL'~s~t~v~a~~~~~~~~----------~ 
Vo1.2, p .605 . 
5.§.g,1931,No .1, p.7. . proizvodstva,196? ,No.11,p .5 ; Mashinostroenie, 
6 .Avto~ati7.ats~ya 1 mekhanizats~ya 
t? .b.4o . 
7.10 let Orgametall,op cit ,pp.55-56 • was building an original automatic machine 
B.See ,e.g,Zaind . ,17 . 5.36 - the institute 
tool, apparently of Shaumyan design· 
9.~. ,8.5 .34 . 
lO.See Appendix ? • research is reviewed by Acher kan 1n 
11.The development of Soviet theoretical _ mashinostroenie,t96?,No .10,pp . 120-128. 
Izvest1ya vysshikh uchebnikh zavedenii 
12.~, , 1968,No.9 , p.128. 
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Enterpri se R.&D .Facilities 
Prior to the formation of the cent ral research, design and development 
facilit i es described above , individual ent~prises wer e responsiole for their 
own devel opment work 1n introducing new models . As t he 1929 NKRKI survey r evealed, 
there was no coordination of policy and factories often chose backward designs . 
The strengthenin~ of the factory design offices (hereafter ZKBs) began seriously 
in 1930- 31 as enter prises strived to r enew their product ranges . By the end 
of the First Five -year Plan oeri od such enterprises as 'Krasny1 Proletarii' , 
im .Sver~lova , im .Lenina ,Tula and Izhevsk had quite strong ZKBs , and design 
offices were quickly organised at the new enterprises , Gor ' ki i and im .Crdehonikidzf 
At an early dat e the question of the relationship betwe n the ZKBs and the TsKB 
naturally arose , and was a topic for discussion a~ the First Conference of 
Designers in the summer of 1932 . In 1930, as noted above , Al ' perov1cb ~ 
expressed t he view that the pr eparati on of working drawings for new destgns should 
be left to the f a ct ories themselves , leaving the TsKB to draw up the general 
design specification • Thi s v i ew was r eiterated at the Conference1 the task of 
t he TsKB , Al' oerovich stressed , was not to r eplace the ZKBs but to strengthen 
them by wor king out standards , producing guiding mat~rials , helping with the 
exchange of exoilerie flee , ano drawing up individual, original designs . This .......... 
perspective was r eaffirmed at the 1933 All- Union tionfer nce1 ENUIS was to draw 
up t echni cal specifications , whUe the ZKBs would be strenghtened so that t hey 
could as quickly as possible undertake independent work on the elaboration of 
working drawings on the basis of guiding materials producea by the I stitute .2 
Some aspects of the interrelationship betwe n ENIMS and t he enterprise des ign 
offices are considered below. 
Throughout the 1930s t he ZKBs employed in total aore des igners than ENIMS . 
In ear l y 1934 the total design force of' t he machine tool industry nwabered 
400 people) 1 by the beg inning of 1935 1t had r eached 600 , of whom 200 were 
4 
ellpl oyed 1n the design centre of ENIMS and 400 at t he Z!<.Bs. These t otals 
l . ~levertheless , the KB of the • Krasnyi Proletari i ' f actory, pr obably the l argest 
ZKB at the time, had only 19 workers 1n early 1933 , of whom 5 or 6 were highly 
skilled - Stenogra.nuny,op c1t,p.10J. 
2 .Ibid • • nn .?4 ::u1d 241. 
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apparently include designers at the ' planned ' enterprises. For comparison, 
there wer e about three thousand designer s 1n the G ~>-rman machine t ool industry 
in 19)5.
5 ~y t he end of the peri od most of t~e specialised factori es had their 
own design offices , but by no ~eans all of the ' planned' enterpr ises • 
In or der to facilitate the assimil ation of new models it was deci ded, 
apparently in 19JJ , that leading enterprises should organise their own 
experimental shops for building prototypes . Such shops were organised 1n 19JJ at 
a number of factories,includi ng ' Krasnyi Proletarli' and Khar ' kov .6 By 1935 the 
'Krasny! Proletar11' experimental shop had a staff of a hundred and had achieved 
seme n~table successes in building examples of complex new machines in a short 
period of time7 • But throughout the period , despite fre uent conference 
r~solutions , orders and decrees , problems wer e experaienced 1n keeping these 
shops free from current production wort. 8 
The third component of the enterprise R.&D . system was the factory laboratory . 
Such labor atories wereorganised at a number of le~dlng enterprises, one of the 
first and most important being that of the 'Krasny! Prol etarli ' factory,created 
ln1930. A description of the laboratories of this enterprise in 1935 w11: serve 
to indicate the nature and scope of t heir work . The laboratories, formetal-
cutting, metals and measuring , were directly subordinated to the factory technical 
director. The metal s labor~tory bad chemical , heat treatment and metallurgical 
departments whi ch served production by analysing materials and semi-fabricates 
1n orderto raisetheir quality , and also under took more basic research into the 
s t r ucture and hardness of metals .9 With the development of the Stakhanovite 
~oveAent stress on factory r esearch incr eased and was a major concern of the 
t ourth Conference of Designers in April 1936, the resolutions of which outlined 
an ambitious research programme directed towards design improvement and the 
raising of qual1ty .10 In ~eneral , however, the work of the factory laboratories 
vas rarely mentioned in articles and speeches by leaders of the industry. 
) .Za:Ind. ,26 .4.)4 . 
4,1'7em sovetov , op cit,Byulleten ' ,.No .10 ,p.45. 
5 .?la.a .Khoz. , 19J5,No. 7, p . JO . 
c . .:;u ,1934,No .1 , p .J . 
7.Izvesti ya ,5.7 .J5 . 
8 . See below, p .329 . 
9.Araand,A .A. (ed) ,Zavodski e laboratorii tyazbeloi promysblen1ost i ,M.-L. ,1935,pp. 
98-100. 10.S1I , 19)6,No .6 , PP • 3-.5. 
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'!'ne 'Tipazh' 
Be.fore determining the specifications of new machines to be built by the 
Soviet machine tool industry it was necessary to establish the range of types 
and sizes ef machine tools required by industry and other users. This a~pect 
of technical planr~ng, the compiling of the 'tipazh', was the responsibility 
of the tecbnolegical sector of ENIMS , with thP participation of the research 
c~~ and concerned branches of industry. Laterinthe period a specialised OffiQe 
f the Tipazh was organised within ENIMS. 1 During the early 'thirties this 
vork was lead by A.A.Zernov, a former Orgametall worker , and later by 
2 A.I .Ignatenko. From about 1933 or 1934 there was also an Office for the Machine 
Tool Tipazh attached to the production-technical sector of NKTP • This appears 
to have provided a forum for the participation of major usrs,but nothing is known 
bout its operation er relationship to GUSIP.3 
Centralised planning of the product range eff ectively dates from 1932 • .l.he 
usual procedure prior to this was described by Lebyachenko, a Stankoob"ed1nenie 
official, as follows: 
"Factories usuallychose the machine tool most convenient to t hemselves, copied 
it, introduced additiens or changes into the design , revised some assemblies 
using their own design forces and put it into production. Thus the selection 
of models was neither rigorous nor regulated and the demands of customers 
4 
were litt le considered in view of the scarcity of machine tools". 
'i'he 1932 annual plan included a target for the number of new types and sizes 
tc be built by the specialised industry, and in the course of the year mounting 
~ttention was devrted to the question of expanding t he tipazb5 and s ecuring 
rational choice of types and sizes; this concern stom,ing in part from pr obxems 
encountered in assimilating new models and also the controversy provoked by 
•"'e''liF 'lathe • By the NKTP order of June 1932 Stankoob"edinenie was granted 
• right to exercise technical control over machine tool building carried out 
a~ factories of other or~anisations and the authority to name the types and sizes 
to be produced .Furthermore, the drawings of all new !'laChines were to be ap_ roved 
t. U, 194J,No .9- 10,p. 7. 
2 . 1 1d.,p.2. 
they could enter production.6 This measure , which 
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was to be r eaffirmed in the NKTP orrler of the following June? , provided an 
essential precondition for central planning of the product range for the industry 
as a whole . 
The idea of the tinazh was closely linked with that of tipizatslya - the 
reduction of the available range of types and sizes to a rational and acceptable 
minimum. Given the vast range of types and sizes of machine tools on the world 
market the Soviet industry , faced with the demand for a rapid expansion of the 
product range , needed to draw up a minimum nomenclature of machines sufficient 
to satisfy the main requir ements of industry , in particular its high priority 
b~s. The tit>azh itself was evidently not a fixed and binding plan bu; as 
it was described in 1933 , an • or1entat1onal nomenclature' , designed to reconclle 
the interests of both producers and consumers . The first tipaz~ was drawn up 
in the summer of 19'33, incorporated in the 16th June NKTP order , and discussed 
at the subsequent All-Union Conference . The order outlined a prografltrne of 200 
types and sizes to be introduced by both specialised and'planned' factorles,in 
addition to the 40 already 1n pro uction . It is clear that the demands of the 
defence industry took first priority: introducing the tipazE at the ~anference , 
Levin revealed that during the first half of 1933 the ob"edinenie had been 
working with a series of large- scale machine users , including Glavaviaprom and the 
8 
"·11-Union Gun and Arsenal Trust , in order to clarify needs . The order indicated 
that the tipazh would undergo further concretisation in cooperation with the 
glavki of the auto- tractor, alcraft and rail transport machine building industries . 
This first tipazh , ammended and supplemented, provided a general framework 
for annual plans for the assimilation of new models and a basis for planning 
the specialisation of enterprises . 
As a r esult of discus~ion with tne relevant branches a t1pazh for the 
auto-tractor industry was finalised in 19J4. Whereas the ZIS factory alone had 
) .It is mentioned in Zalnd . , 2 .4 .34. 
4,Lebyachenko , op cit ,p .45. 
S.This tern began to be emoloyed regularly in 1932 ,e .g .SU ,1932,No .2 ,p.(Al'perovlch) 
6.SU,1932 . ~~o . 7 ,p .2. 
7 .1 bid • , 1933 ,lf 0 .6 • p . 2. 
e.steno~mmy , op cit , p . 90 . 
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about 500 different types and sizes of machine tools in its stock, the tipazh 
for the branch as a whole was reduced to 240 types and sizes.1 Similar work was 
carried out for the aircraft industry, leading to a tioazh of 250 types and sizes, 
aoreover, the types were unified with those re1uired by the motor industry .2 
At t~e Third Conference of Designers in March 1935 the tipazh of high- productivity 
~achines for the auto-tractor and aircraft industries , together with that for 
the rail-transport equipment branch , were discussed and the allocation of new 
~odels between factories ofthe industry clarified.J It was probably inevitable 
that with the centralisation of deciSbns relating to the product range and the 
choice of specific designs for production in the hands of a relatively inexperienced 
and understaffed organisation working under considerable pressure disagreements 
would arise over the way in which the work was being carried out and the 
final decisions reached. From about 1934 such controversies became a regular 
feature of the development of the i~dustry • lhe most frequent1y voiced criticism 
4 was that users had not been properly consulted in drawing up the tioazh. 
Criticism of ENIMS and th~ Glavk reached its highest Jevel when a draft 
tlpazh for the Third Five-year Plan w~s unveiled in the spring of 1937 . whereas 
the tipazh for the Second Five-year Plan was elaborated after the start of the 
Plan p~iod, work on the tiuazh for the next five years began before the 
start of the new period at a time when directives for the Plan had not been 
issued by ~osplan5 • The draft tipazh as discussed at a meeting of GUSIP 
1n May 1937 , when Al ' perovich revealed that about 1,000 types and sizes would 
be required in 1942 (including specials) compared with the 350 which would be in 
6 production at the end of 1937. This tioazh , prepared by ENIMS , appeared at a 
tlae when the Glavk leadership was under mounting at ack and immediately became 
~~e object of fierce dispute. the main criticism was that user branches had been 
L~ade uately consulted , with the result that it had been compiled by statistical 
1.rzvestiya ,2? . 5.14. 
2.?lan .Khoz., 1935,No. 3 , p. J6 . 
'3 .Zaind . ,22 .3 .)5 ;Sii, 1935 ,1~ o .4, p.1 • 
4.For ex~~ple , ~hifrin,Zalnd ,, 2 .4 .J4 . 
5.S1I,193~,No . 2 , p.5. Directives for the Five-year Plan for GUSIP had not been 
received by February 1938. 
6 .Zaind., S. 5.37 . 
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~ethods rather than by analysis of concrete requirements~ Under new leadership 
the Glavk and ENUlS continued work on refining the tipazh for 1938-42 and eventually 
a final target of 1,021 types and sizes was agreed, of which 814 would be basic model 
as opposed to specials built on a one- off basis .2 The actual Five-year Plan 
incorporated a target of 800 types and sizes to be built in 1942.3 With the 
break up of NKTP central control over the tipazh appears to have weakened , but 
in September 1939 the SNK decree Fave NKTyazhl1ash responsibility for leading the 
work of establishi g the tipazh for all Commissariats, although special machine 
tools were excluded from this ruliag.4 
T~e tipazh , despite its weaknes es , represented a bold attempt , unique 
in world practice , to rationally l'lc.n the product range of the machine tool 
industry . ~twas an important lever of centrally determined technical ?Olley 
and provided a ~ramework for establishing annual plans for new types and sizes, 
for planning factory specialisation, and for drawing up the technical specifications 
for specific models. This latter question will now be considered • 
Th~Procedure for Int'!'orlucinr, New 1•1odels 
From an early d~te the Soviet machine tool industry established a standard 
procedure for 1ntroducin9: new models which V~as to rematn basically unchanged 
throughout the period in question. This procedure was designed to meet the 
circumstances of an acute scarcity of design and technical skills and the need 
to secure a unified technical policy. The basic elements of thepr .-cess were 
lai1 down in 1932- 33 · The vital first stage in preparing the introduction of a 
new model was the compilation of a ' technical specification' (tekhnicheskie 
zadanie) by the research organisation (NIISTI,later ENIHS) . The necessity 
of adopting this approach was outlined at the First Conference of Designers in 
19)2 by V.Morlok in a report on documentation proce~ures for innovation. 
Instructions for the procedure had been drawn up by the TsKB on the basis of 
t:aterials supplied by the German Comnittee for the h.cono111ics of Production
5
• 
Tne technical specification was dr~wn up on the basis of comparative study of 
1 .Zaind ., 10. 5.37; also 12.5.37; 29 .6 . 37. 
2.0"Cherkii razviti a tekhnikl v ss~R- masbinostroenie •. , ~1 ,, 1970,p .78 . 
) .!VIII s"e~d VKP b Sten .otchet .,f' ., 1939, p.65J . 
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available foreign and Soviet machines and assessment of the requirements of 
Soviet indnstry • It laid down the b :::.sic dimensions , technical characteristics , 
and the data needed by the designer in making a full project of the machine . 6 
The reso~utioas of the 19J~ All- Union Conference laid down a procedure or 
technical specifications applicable to both the sNecialised and ' planned' 
n€terprises : "Consideri:ng it impermissible in the future to continue the practice 
of producing machine tools of haphazardly chosen models according neither with 
the needs of the co1mtry, nor with present-day technical demands , it is 
acknowledged as necessary t.o establish henceforth an obligatory procedure 
according to which the design elaboration of no machine tool •.• can be started 
without preli:ninary examination of the t echnical specification by ENINS and its 
approval by Stankoob"edinenie". 7 Only one case during the Second Five- year Plan 
of a ~actory infrinp-ing thls rule and building a machine without the prior 
approval of its technical specification by ENDiS has been traced - the 
im .Maslenni~ova (military) factory in 19351 ENIMS called for a complete redesign 
of themachine. 8 
The procedure for approving new types of machine toolsduring the 1930s was 
not as strict as that for certain other types of machinery. In September 1934 
SNK USSR issue~ a decree ('On t qe procedure for a poroval of new types of machines 
and equipment•) which made STO responsible for the approval of the basio 
vchnical characteristics of a wide range of machines intended for mass production , 
tncluding motor vehicles, turbines , locomo~1ves , aircraft, textile and printing 
oachinery . I'taehine tools were e:xlZluded, indicating that ~pproval ultimately 
rested with NKTP. 9 The splitting up of NKTP from 1936 and the further fragl!lent.atlon 
of ~om!llissariats which took place in the years 1937-39 nust have greatly 
conplicated control over the types of machines built , and measnres taken in the 
4,Dire.Ktivy KPS~. , op cit ,Vol2 , p .605. 
5.SU,1933 ,So .1, p . 13 . 
6.25 let ENIMS . 
?.Stenogra~y,op cit ,o.239· 
S.!li!MS ,Sbornik materlalov po stan~ostroeniyu,M ,1935,p. J2 . 
9 .sz ,46- 364- 1934. 
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autumn of 1939 were clearly intended to tackle this problem. The September 1939 
SNK decree refered to the low quality andObsolete designs of some machines built 
outside NKTyazhMash and laid down that the types and sizes of new machines to 
be built at all factories were to be approved by Ekonomsovet of ~~K USSR , and that 
no new machines could be built without the prior approval of Nh.'Tyazhl'lash . 1 
Given the approval of the technical specification , the next stage of the 
inrovation process was the elaboration of the technical project,which was the 
m~in work of the designer , either at the ZKB or, if the machine was of an unusual 
or special type , at ENIMS itself. While many of the models built during the 
1930s were based on foreign desig.gs , it is evident that the designer's work 
was not restricted to copying, As leaders of the industry stressed on many 
occasions , foreign machines had to be ' translated into the Soviet language', i.e. 
many machines had to converted into metric dimensions, Soviet standards and 
standard parts had to be included and some elements of the machines changed 
to facilitate production or adapt the design to new conditions of work, different 
materials ,etc •• Accordin~ to an American designer ,who worked at END1S in the 
early 'thirties,all contracts for the design of new machines included a clause 
calling for the maximum use of standard items , and standardisation policy 
fol1owed German practice in its thoroughness .2 All projects were checked by 
the design sector of ENIMS before aporoval, partly to ensure that standards had 
1n fact been observed, after which working drawings could be prepared as a basis 
for building the ~t prototype. 
Prototypes of many new models were built by the enterprises which were to 
pronuce them on a batch basis.J For the new entaprises of the First Five- year 
Flan prototypes were built at existing factories with the participation of 
specialists from the new works so that design and production technology were 
4 
clarified and checked before the new factories ,.,ent into operation. Later in 
l .Direktivy KPSS,op cit , Vol.2,pp601-605. 
2.The machinist,193J ,Sept .27,pp.614-615; 1934,Feb.14,p. 148 {wasbauer) . 
J.T~is see~s to have been particularly true of the leading specialised enteTprisesa 
al~ost all the models built by ' Krasnyi rroletarii ' ,im.Ordzhoni~idze , im.Sverdlova, 
and Gor'kii in theperiod were designed and developed by the factories themselves. 
4::hus ,the ' Krasnyi Proletaril ' factory built a prototyoe turret lathe in 1931 for 
t~e im,Ordzhonikidze works {Slavnye traditsii,op cit , p .25) and 'Samotochka' 
oullt a prototype milling machine for the Gor ' kii factory(~ . ,20 . ).J1) . 
the 'thirties models which had been b~ilt on a batch basis at the main specialised 
factories were transfered to the enterprises of the 'planned ' system , presumably 
with appropriate doc~entation permitting more rapid assimilation . The other 
ain procedure was for workings :irawings to be prepared within ENIMS and then 
used by factories in as81m1lating new models, this was thecase ,for eKample, 
with some of the gear-cutting machines built by the 'Komsomolets' factory and 
the series of unified lathes built by the Izhevsk works. But the practice of 
building prototypes of such machines at 'Stankokonstrukts!ya ' does not appear 
1 to have been adopted very often , factories ap arantly prPfering to undertake 
their own development work on models which they were to build on a regular 
basis . It is evident that ' Stankokonstruktsiya' did not in fact perform quite 
tbe role ori@inally foreseen. It did , however, play a very important role in 
buildin~ special machines and types not previously built in the USSR. Thus , it 
built many unit-construction machine tools supplied to the motor,tractor and 
aviation ~actories, vertical and external broaching machines, special milling 
machines for machining the tubin~ of the Metro. and, during the Third F'ive -year 
Plan ,a wide range of specialised , high-productivity equipnent of vital 
importance to the defence industry .2 Betwe~n 1931 and 1943 ' S~Ankokonstruktsiya' 
built a total of 1,000 machine tools, 900 of which were of the unit-construction 
type) 
Before about 1939 it appears to have been the practice to carry out the 
stages of the innovation orocess consecutively,i .~. each stage would be completed 
before preceding to the next . ~his was very time-consuming and was a major 
factor in the delayed introduction of many models . In 1939 a campaign developed 
in the machine tool industry (and other branches) for the rapid assimilation of 
new products. The essence of this new approach was that where possible, the stages 
oi the process were telescoped by ~forl'\in@: them in parallel. This method , 
a primitive eouivalent of modern critical path techniques, was pioneered by 
l.An exceDtion was the '152' vertical turning and boring machine later built at 
the im Sedin works in Krasnodar - serious problems of assimilation were 
aevert~elessaencountered - 501et ~rasnodarsk11 stankostroitel'ny1,Krasnodar ,1961 , 
pp.48049;Zalnd. , 17 , 5 .36 • 
2.25 let ENif.1S1 t~ashinostro1 tel' , 19J9 ,No .1, p.4 • 
) .Onarovskii ,op cit,p .61 . 
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Dikushin, chief engineer of ENIMS and quickly taken up by the factories, notably 
lm.Lenina and 'Krasnyi Proletarii'. Some very significant successes were claimed 
in reducing lead times and the movement was associated with a notable development 
in the use of standard parts and assemblies, 1 
Finan~ing and Stimulating Innovation 
Little evidence is ava ilable on the procedures for financing innovation 
in t he machine tool industry during the period, but an insight into the normal 
practice can be gain.ed from critical comments at variaas ti ~es by machinehsers. 
1hus in 1936 two engineers of the ZIS factory complained that customers were 
being obliged to pay very high prices for machines in order to cov er the costs 
of R.&D. and other overheads associated wi ~ h their assimilation or mod1f1cation.2 
At about the same time there were complaints by customers that when only 
3 insignificant changes were introduced in machines their prices rose sharply. It 
appears, therefore, that innovation costs were recouped largely through the 
high initial prices of new nachines. 
The Glavk did have some provision for covering in ~ovation costs. In the 
financial plans of enterprises there was provision for special allocations for 
exoenditure on assimilation of new machines; these covered costs involved in 
design work, producing technological projects, making prototypes and also t ools 
and f ixtures. Means for these outlays accounted for a significant share of total 
Glavk financial al l ocations to the enterprises ,e .. g according to the 1936 
GUSIP financial plan expenditure on the assimilation of new machines was to 
be 28,0 million rubles, or 42 per cent of total f inancial allocations. But this 
allocation for innovation entered the general account of th~ ent erprise,i.e.it 
vas not an earmarKed grant. ~nterprises frequently found theflselves short of 
~orking capital be~se of the ~allure of customers to pay on time , with the 
~evitable result that the allocation for i nnovation was not spent as intended. 
I n descrlbL~g this practice, the ~ead of the financial sector of the Glavk, 
Stepanov, called for the formation of a special earmarked grant for the finance 
4 
of t~e as~imilation of new products. There is no evidence that this proposal 
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was accepted at the time, but the September 1939 decree of SNK laid down that from 
the beginning of 1940 the financing of design and assimilation of new machines 
would be achieved through earmarked funds at each enterprise .5 
The difficulties encountered in as~imilating new models during the First 
Five- year Plan led to some consideration of providing material ~1centives for the 
introduction of new models . There does appear to have been an ad hoc system 
of rewarding good innovation performance from an early date : by an order of NKTP 
in April 1932 Stankoob" edinenie was .~Z;ra.nted 25,000 rub] es to pay bonuses to 
designers , technical personnel and workers of the im.Sverdlova factory for the 
creation and production of the first Soviet heavy machine tools. 6 At the 1932 
conference of designers Al ' perovich . stressed the need to enhance the status 
of designers by creating a degree of material self-interest7 ; and the July 1935 
lH.TP order on the position of designers provided for t he payment of bonuses for 
rapiG completion ~f work . 8 The resolutions of the Fourth Conference of ~esigners 
in April 1936 also outlined a series of measures for raising the status of 
designers, including an elaborate system of bonuses intended to stimulate the 
design of new products of a high technical level . ~or the desigu of an original, 
high-productivity machine at t~e level of American technology a bonus of 35,000 
rubles wa.s proposed. 9 From later conunents it se ms unlikely that incentive schemes 
for designers were generally adopted at this time, but. 3. successful bonus system 
for t~e assimilation of new models 
10 out for praise . 
at the ' Samotochka ' factory was singled 
In September 1936 Stepanov , the financial head of GuSIP, put forward a 
radical scheme for stimulating innov~tion.Material incentives were neces~ary 
hP believed because it was easier to produce established models and f inancial 
ft When Changing to new designs . It would be wrong to provide problems o en arose 
raisin~ t~e prices of new machL~es, he believed , becaQse incentives sirnply by C' ·1 
this hindered their introduction at customer enterprhses . Instead , Stepanov 
l .Kashinostroenie,24.11 . )9 ; Mashinostroitel• , 1940 ,No .3 , pp.t- 11 . 
2.Zaind . ,22 . 10 .36 . 
) .ibid . ,28 . 9. 36. 
4. ibid . , 2~ . 7 • 36 • 
5 .fuektivy KPSS, op cit , Vol. 2 , P .604 • 
6.Eorisov and i'asil'ev , op ctt ,p.1J8 . 
7 .SH , 1933 ,No .1 , p .1 • 
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proposed that some of the savings obtained by user factories from reduced costs 
a~ a result of the use of the new machine should be returned to the maker 
an 
""actory to provide/ incentive fund. The rate of refund would be deter1nined by 
agreement between the two parties . This arrangement would ap l y only for the 
flrst examples of t~e new machine ; with t~e assimilation of batch production 
normal prices would apply . This interesting proposal , foreshadowing ideas put 
forward 1n the 1960s , was not taken up .1 
During the Third Five-year Plan quite wide use ap~e:;.rs to have been made 
of incentive schemes for design and development work, and such schemes were 
~regular component of rapid assimilation methods .2 The September 1939 decree 
orovided for a broadeP system of incentives for designers and production 
en~ineers for good performance in producing new machines 3 , and the December 
1940 SNK and '-'entral Commit tee decree also laid down conditionsof paymetlt of 
bonuses to personnel involved in successful innovation work. This decref: permitted 
the naming of new machines after their designers 1 and provided f or the establishment 
or a scale of bonuses of from 10,000 to 50 , 000 rubles for the creation of 
4 
high- productivity machines , 
It is clear that the pr inciple of providing material incentives for designers 
and other specialists engaged in the creation and assimilation of new machine 
tl)ols was accepted by the Party , government and 1 eaders of the industry from an 
early date , It is not clear, however, that incentive schemes were generally 
adopted at the machine tool factoriest the fact that provision for bonuses had 
to be reaffirmed 1n successive decrees and resolutions sugge sts that they were 
not adopted by all enteprises, but the reasons for this are never indicated. 
0 .Zaind. 1 18 .5 .35. 
~ .Sii, 1936 ,No .6 1 pp . 3-4. 
10-:Plan .Khoz . ,1938 ,No .9 , p .47 • 
.1 .Zaind . ,28. 7 . 36 . 8 9 
Z.lor exa~ple , at ~enina ,Mashinostroitel ' ,1940,~o .3,pp. - • 
) .Dtrektivy KPSS , oo cit,pp604-605. 
4.0marovskii,op cit ., p.86 . 
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Some Problems of Innovation 
Havin~ considered a nu~ber of features of the research and development 
svstem, we now turn to some of the problems of assimilating new models 13 the 
period 1932-1941 , including the question of the relationship between the 
central R.&D .organisation and the enterprises, and the functioning of END1S 
itself . 
During the second phase of the branch's development , when the introduction 
of a limited number of new, modern models r eplacing designs dating from long 
before was the main priority , the ob"ednenie did not possess a serious R.&D . 
infrastructure. The problems of assimilating the complex new models and mastering 
the ne~ production technology fell on the factories themselves and , not surprisingly 
some serious difficulties were encountered. In 1931 a number of factories were 
quite successful 1n building prototypes of new models and this may have helped 
to create a mood of excessive optimism about the oosslbility of very rapidly 
assimil~ting new products ; an optimism expressed in the plan for 1932 , which 
c.ctlled for the full replacement of old models during the year such that new 
pro-tucts would account for 43 per cent of total output in value terms. 1 But even 
at the beginning of 1932 Al ' perovich was warning that t" As a rule , under. 
pressure of a fixed programme of quantitative output of old models , factories 
lag very greatly indesign work and to a still greater degree l.n the technological 
preparation of machine tools of new design". 2 Problems of assimilating batch 
production of new models were high on the ag~nda of thQ session of the NKTP 
collegium on 5th April 1932 at which problems of the industry were discussed . 
Al'nero~ich here stressed the need to strengthen design forces, and Ordzhonlkidze 
nade it absolutely clear that the first priority of the branch was to be the 
replacement of olQ models even at the cost of a possible temporary fall in 
out:out . J 
1.SU , 1932 ,No . 1 , p .1; No .2 , p .2 . 
2.Sli,19'32,No , t , p.1. 
3,Zaind .,6 .4 . )2 Recalling this ocrasion later,Al'p~rovich quoted Ordzhonikidze as 
h1ving said th~t c n A modern army will never be battleworthy if it only has a 
large quantity of munit1ons .fhe battleworthiness of a modern army is determined 
not. only by the quantity of munitions , but in the .first instance by their 
technical level. "hat do you want to do - arm our growing and developing country 
with backward technology, albeit in a large number of units? That is not what 
we need, ~hatever happens you must force all the factories to overcome this 
con+ rtP ~ ,.. 
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The problems of assimil~ting new machines at this time were legion: skilled 
workers and specialists were lacking , the production technology was new , quality 
standards were much higher than before , the problems of preparing jigs and 
fixtures were much greater than envisaged . !n some cases designs had to be 
"Oiiified in order to facilitate their batch production ,e.g, the ' ~iarner and 
Swasey' turret lathe introduced at the im.Ordzhonikidze factory . 1 Output did 
fall , and would have fallen much further if factories had not maintained 
a high level of output of olo models. Nevertheless , in 1933 reguJar batch 
oro•uctton of a number of complex new models was established and much valuable 
experience gained . One o£ the les~ons , as Al ' perovich indicated at the First 
Con~erence of Designe~s ~ that the designer was the crucial figure in the 
a:achine tool industry t his status had to be improved and managers and production 
engineers educaten to appreciate his importance . As noted above , at this 
conference Al ' perovich attempted to build up the professional pride of the then 
very weak design cadres as a progressive force countering the conservatism of 
t.he production men. 2 
The transition to the third phase of development of the industry with 
primary emphasis on ra~idly expanding the product range had the implication that 
innovation was now a permanent and central concern of the industry , perhaps 
to a greater extent than in any other branch of civilian engineering . ENIMS had 
just been created and was expected to immediately lead a massive design and 
develonment programme. In the first half of 1934 the Glavk appears to have 
pursued a policy of highly centralising design work , and as a consequence became 
~~ target of much criticism as plans for the as~imilation of new types were not 
fu1fill ed.J In response to criticism t~e director of EN~B,E .E .Levin , argued 
that the main problem was t"le lack of designers in E:NIMS and at the factories . 
There was little incentive for the best production workers to become designers, 
tnertia and conservatism and, regardless of the sacrifice , embark on t~e creation 
of new, modern machines . Uon ' t worry if for some time this or that factory 
doesn •t make any machine tools at al1 . Very well , for a time certain factories 
will not turn out machine tools at all , but it is essential to put the factories 
1n such conditions that t~ey cannot but embark on a new path".(Sii,1937,No .8 ,p .1) 
1.Zalnd . ,29 .10 .32 . 
2 ,Sii,193J,No.t,p.1. 
) .3ee, for e·,ample ,~rl. , 22 ,J .34 ;29 .3 . J4r2 .4 . J4. 
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he added, because wages lagged behind those of engineers and shop production men, 
and the general status of the profession was low. Levin conceded that ENIJvfS was 
not yet fully up to its job , adding the unfortunate comment (later to be used 
against him) that , .. It would have been necessary to have sha.lg'lfly ell[panded the 
design force two or three years ago and in advance gone to the expence of 
training the neces~ary cadres , for the machine tool industry to be able now to 
cope with the tasks which have been entrusted to it" •1 This simply indicated , 
a ·~ritic responded , that Levin doubted the reality of the industry ' s plans . 2 
This skirmish over the problems of introducing new models foreshadowed a 
much more serious conflict which broke out in late May 1934; a controversy which 
raised many central policy issues in an acute form . The opening shot was fired 
by Berzin , deputy chief engineer of the khar ' kov factory , who attacked the policy 
of the Glavk and ENIMS in selecting tyoes of new machines for Soviet production. 
There was a widely held belief,he claimed, that the choice of types had already 
been determined by foreign machine tool builders and that a programme could be 
drawn up simply by looking at foreign catalogues. A model chosen for production 
at Khar ' kov exemplified this aporoach, Berzin claimeds the ' 256 ' radial-drilling 
machine was highly universal, had a complex gear train making production difficult, 
and had an elaborate systeM of controls. Furthermore, it was quite unsuitable as 
a basis for a range of types and sizes. It emerged that th i s model was a 1929-30 
'Ciocinnati- Bickford' mac~ine, which in America had since undergone modernisation, 
although the nature of this modernisation was unknown to EN D1S. Berzin called 
for action by Al ' perovich including the transference of all practical project 
work on new machines directly to the ZKBs, leaving ENTI-1S with the job 
of aporoving technical s necifications and technica l projects .3 
In response to this criticism Levin stated that t he '256' had been projected 
at t ile beginning of the .First Five-year Plan (i.e .over :four years earlier) by 
Sovi et designers with forei~n technical a s s istance. It would be difficult to 
l .Zai nd • , 29 .3. 34 . 
2 . ibid. 
) .Zaind, ,24.5.34. 
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change the model , he added , because it t~ok about a year to design a machine 
of this type. As for creating an original Soviet type of radial-drill (which 
was clearly what Berzin had in Mind) Levin rejected this ~ossibility on the 
grounds that it was better to master the pro~uction of an existing type first, 
i.e.," to achieve the level of foreign technology, and then set about improving 
tt" . 
1 
"But , in so far as world technolo& d·-.es not stand still ", a Za Industrial-
izatsiyu writer sarcastically , but not unfairly ,observed ,"comrade tevin 
risks repeating old models all the time". One of the designers involved in the 
' 256 ' project also noted that technology was moving forward,"de~te the crisis 
in the West" , but favoured the building of the model precisely because of its 
complexity . 1he~perience of the 'DIP' had shown , he claimed , that after assimilatin 
one of the most complex types a factory 2 had no trouble with the rest . This 
position, 'the most complex first ' was supported by an engineer of the 
im.Ordzhonik1dze factory having long experience working in Germany .3 
A month after Berzin's contribution another ~har ' kov worker , Penkov , 
entered the Mispute ; this time focusing on END'tS's choice of grinding machines for 
p ... o~uction at the factory . The model , ' 3A-12 ' cjlinrlrica.l grinding machine , was 
considered dated by the factory ,which had had to struggle with ENTI1S for the right 
•o 1morove it. In PenkoV<' s opinion it was neces..cary to take gr~ater technical 
4 risks if foreign technology was to be caught up • 
The Khar'kov case raised a number of central policy is6ues: first,the 
desirable degree of universality of Soviet machine tools ; second, the question 
of whether foreign de~igns shouli'i be copied or original models created; third , 
t.he problem of • catching up and surpassing' in circumstances where the target 
was m(lving forward ; and , finally, the question of the relationship between ENlltS 
and factory desi~n and de elopment forces . The first question is considered 
elsewhere,5 The problem of copying versus original desi gn was ·~ relatively new 
one for the branch, but one which was to become more prominent from this tine on 
1.1b1d . 
2 . ibtd . 
3 .Zaind., 22 .6 . 34 . 
4 , ibid . 
5.~ Ch~p+er 7 . 
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as new, young designers and engineers strived to break away from the practices of 
capitalist machine tool building . There was a r"'al dilemma here for BND-IS and the 
Glavk - should such initiative be encouraged at ~he risk of jeopardising 
t'"le output plans of the industry ,and maintaining import dependence , in the •tevent 
of failure of the pr oject.In the case of the new Khar ' kov works ,which had only 
just started regular production ,ENii•IS caution is understandable • 'Ihe strength 
of the designers and engineers arguing for change at Khar'kov must 1n part have 
stemmed from the fact that the experimental shop of this enterprise had be~n 
created some time before production had been assimilated , so that the vested 
inter ests of current production were as yet weakly developed . The subsequent 
experience of the fact ory • which won the bat~le to design its own new models , 
sngq;ests that ENIMS should perhaps have been firrner in insisting t.hat the ' old' 
models be successfully produced on a batch basis before the path of original 
dP.sign was t~ken . 1 
On the third point , this was probably t he first case in which the problem 
of technical progress during the crisis arose in a practical way . 'l'he dilemma 
was sumned up by a journalist ,Peshkin , in a com:nent on the case 1" EN Il-lS proposes 
th~t we achieve the l evel of foreign technology ani then stQrt improving it . As a 
r esult we find ourselves in the situation of Achilles and the tortoise ; if not 
even worse , because we shall lag at t he time of research , design and production" •
2 
There was no easy answer for ENll1S . Design work would have to be greatly speeded 
up, the most recent models copied and procedures adopted enabling modernisation 
to take place as a regular ohenomenon. n11 t~ese were dif icult to achieve at a 
time when design forces were few and inexperienced and _~essure for current 
output was so strong . On the f inal point, the instructive feature of t he case is 
~,at the enter prise , altho~h inexperienced , was able to get its way .Possibly 
as a consequence of the !{har' kov dispute , there was 2. change of policy later in 
tnF year and the trend towards maxi mum centralisation of design work reversed, 
3 
c. greater rol e beinggiven to t he ZKBs . 
1 ~ew original models were successfully des.igrred ( the'ZR56 ' radial drill a very 
•go~d ' machine by contemporary and later assessments, and the ' 316 ' grinding 
machine wi t h hydraulic drive) .ENTI•lS af'ter raising objections finally approved 
the • 2A56 • desi at the end of 1934 and the prototy...R.e was bull t in the summer 
of 1935, tl-te pr~otyoe • 316 ' was built in January 1~:J.5· A few examples of the 
cont .next page • •• 
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In 1935 pressure on the industry for innovation further intensified , The 
Third Conference of Designers in March discussed a large program~e of assimildtion 
of specialised, hl~h-productivtty ~achines , while the sudden awakening of industry 
leaders to the extent of technical progressin th~ cap1.talist countries during 
the crisis lead to precipitate action to replace baslc models introduced only 
t~eo years ear lier , notably the 'DIP ' lathe and the ' 136' turret lathe . This 
decision had serious negative consequences for the · ~rasnyi Proletarli ' factory . 
llork began on th~ :tssimilation of a new model based on American ,'Nonarch ' design . 
This was a h1ghl v electrified machine with a maximum speed of 750 r . p .m. compared 
with the ' DIP's 600 .1 Lar£e serial production was planned with a programme of 
5,000 units ayear , Lnvolvl~ very great use of fixturesand special tooling , a 
large quantity of which was produced . Output was to begin 1n October 1936, 
reaching 400 units a month by November 1937 - a b~hly optimistic plan!. 2 'l'he 
achine was put into production in 1937 , but the scale of production was very 
substantially less than envi saged a.t'l.d , in fact , the ' DIP ' , unchanged , remained 
the factory ' s basic model : plans for its withdrawal were delayed from year to year . 
From early 19J7 the new ' type 26 ' (also kLo~n as the '162K ' ) ca~e under fierce 
critici sm for alleged design l·reaknesses ,Jand the decl.aton to build this particular 
model began to be characterised as a ' wrecking ' action . Thus , Shekvlts claimed 
that 'wreckers ' had delayed the production of the Type 26 for three years and 
had finally tL~ned out a lathe of obsolete design 1~ some respects inferior to 
the 'DIP '. "Several million rubles" had been "thrown to the wind" ,he added •4 
The Tvpe 26 was bunt during the Third F .i.ve-year Plan , but 1n relatively small 
nunbers , and work began on a new r eplacement for the DIP , the Ty~ 28 , of much 
higher spe~d , allowing full use of harrl alloy tools . This model was to form the 
'316' were built 1n 1936 , but the model was not a success - its hydraulic units 
were too elaborate for most nor mal purposes , and it appears to have been 
wlth1r awn before 1941 work on an 1mprovet4 ,odel beginning in 1939 . In the spring 
of 1937 .·1 • peroviC":h n~ted dryl y that the 1 2A')6 ' , admittedly a good design , was stil 
not in pr oduction · output eventually began later tn the year . As a result the 
Khar 1 kov factory '~ programme between 1934 and 1938 was fulfilled predominantly 
by build ing the despised older 1nodels! (,\.har 1 kovskii stankostro1tel ' nyi , pp .16-17: 
29-36; Zaind ., 10 . 1 .35;5 . 11 . J6 ;3 . 9 .36 ;!1ash1nostroitel 1 , 1939 ,No . 1 , p.4;1940 , .• o .3 , p.14; 
51I, l93? ,No .8 ,p .2) 
2 .Zalnd . , 14.7 .J4 . 
) .Frednr1vat1e ,1934,lio .19 , p .? • 
1 .~. ,20 .5. 36. 
2.Sii ,1936 ,No .8 , p .44. 
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basis for a series of variants , including hi h d h f a g -spee mac ine o up to 3,000 r.p.m, 
In May 1940 prototypes were accepted. by a state commission but the "ar prevented 
its assimilation.5 
This experience of the 'Rrasnyi Proletari1' factory reveals clearly that 
the decision in 1935 to replace the ' DIP' was an expensive mistake. It would 
have been much more expedient for the Soviet industry to have followed the 
"' pract ice of the German ~ers of the 'VDF' lathe (on which the ' DIP ' was based) 
an·i modernised the design in 1935- 36, thereby providing Soviet industry with 
a modern machine suitable for use with hard aJloy tools, which could have been 
produced on a large-serial basi~ for a numbPr of years tiefore requiring replacement, 
A substantially modernised ' VDF ' was produced from 1934, providing greater 
ri~idity and higher speedss the basic version had a maximum speed of 1,050 r . p .m. 
and a sr€cial fine-turning variant 2,350 r.p.m. , compared with the 600 r.p.m. 
6 of the original modelw The case of the '136 ' turret lathe of the im.Ordzhonikidze 
factory is not so well documented, but this model had certainly not been replaced 
or modernised by 1938.7 In 1937 the realisation of this model replacement 
policy was sharply attacked and t he GUSIP leadership blamed (although direct 
responsibility probably lay with NKTF and Kaganovich in particular).8 
Despite the stress on design modernisation as a primary path of technical 
progress at the Fourth Conference of Designei·s in 1936 , successes at the time 
were meagre . There was clearly powerful resistance to changing production 
technology to accomodate suc"l design modificationst "We hardly angage at all 
tn current changes in existing designs" ,one commentator <!>bserved in 1936," Attempts 
by designers to introduce even t~e smallest changes in design frequently meet 
strong resistance from u.roduction men and senior management .This phenomenon , 
shameful for any machine tool factory worthy of the name , becomes completely 
intolerable in the stakhanovi te year, 1936" . 9 This problem was closely related 
to the main difficulty of innovation at t his time - securing the transition from 
prototype to regular batch production , 
3.For example ,Zaind.,30.5.37. 
4 .Plan .Khoz., 1937 ,No . 7 ,p.42. 
5 .Sii ,1940,N o .10 , pp .18-25. 
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Fr om as early as 1932 it had been recongnised that building Qrototypes 
was one thing , and ass imilating batch production of new models another . In 
the years 1931 and 1934 a numb~r of factories achieved notable successes in 
bull ding prototypes of new machines 1n a short time , e . g • Krasnyl 1-'roletarH' 
built examples of the ' Sandstrand' multi-tool lathe in 6- 7 months from the start 
of design work.1 Once the prototype had been built tbe new model then entered 
the list of ' new types and sizes mastered in the year', and therefore counted 
towards the fulfilment. of the annual new models progranune . At this time it 
was certainly the case , as a Za In~strializatsiyu commentator observed , 
that , " By the concept ' assiMilation ' (osvoenie) the Glavk understands the 
production of t he f"trst prototypes"~ and Shaumyan and Agapov were right when they 
declared 1n 1935 that targets for new types and sizes were even being overfulfllled, 
but partly because many prototypes were betng lncluded . 3 In one of his last 
major speeches Al ' perovlch himself self-critically condemned the practice of 
'formal assimil a t ion ' of new models •"For a number of years many of us have 
formally fulfilled the slogan of the Party with respect to the assi. lil~tion of ........ 
new roacf'\ines. ••e~o~ models were produced , but the country did not receive new 
machines ••• This means that assimilCit ion of a new machine ia not:. just a mutter 
4 of makiljg a prototype , but the technological ass1.m1latioe\ of serial produc·t.1on" . 
6. ,achinery , t.3 .J4,p .650 . VUF advert~sed t.his new version in the pages of Stanki 
t Instrument from 1934 .This i'rJi' moderr.isatton was later praised by a Soviet 
special ist , Shekvits, in 1937 - Plan .Kho~• , 19J7 ,No . 7 , p . 43 . 
7 .Plan. Khoz . , 1938 ,N o . 9 , p . 47 . 
S.See , f or eX<'!II\ple , Sil ,1937 ,No . 19 , p . 1 • 
9 .Sii ' 1936 ,N 0 . 1 I p .1 • 
1 , i.bld . , 1934 ,No.1 , p. J . 
2.Zalnd ,, 5 .7 . '35 • 
3 • $1I, 1937 ,No .8, p. 2 . 
4 . ~tt the time of the f'iercest attacks on the Glavk ' s leadPrshlp some viv1d,1f 
partial , descriptions of the practice of 'assimilating new models' appeared 1n 
the press , e.g . refering to the ' Krasny i froletaril' factory~ " '-'Omrade ~hba:kov 
( t.he cl lrector) rushed to report the 'victory' of a rapidly assimilated 
na6bine tool to the NK and the Glavk without awaiting the conclusions of 
the correspo 4ding acceptance commission . Moreover , the reports of the director 
were accompanied by roustn~ speeches and endless noisy parades at tbe factory . 
The 'aso1n1lated • machine tool was entered into the records of programme 
fulfilment, an invoice was filled in and lt was sent to the finished products 
store Several =lays l ater "•hen t he • tbunder of victory ' had subsided , the 
Mchi~ was quietly sl1pp~d back to the shop for 'corrections ' " tZa.Ind. ,30 . 3 . 37) . 
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The basic cause of the problem was also recognised& pressure for current 
oroduction took first priority. Thus , as a Stanki i Instrument editorial 
noted in 1936, directors ani managers strived for maximum output in va~e terms: 
.. they do not hinder ... . the fulfilment of plans for desl~n work , because of 
course the making of drawings 1n itself does not tmpeae plan fulfilment. lhey 
do not raise objections against making prototypes in the experimental shop 
either , provided there are machine tools and workers in it free from wor~ing on 
fulfilling the current programme for, as is well known, experimental shops at 
the majority of factories serve as a reserve for easing bottle necks in plan 
fulfilment" •1 The problem was one of overcoming the resista'lce to new models 
put up by those concerned with c~rertt production. It was also acknowledged by 
Berri that the sellers' market created unfavourable circUMstances for innovation 
and that the Soviet economy lacked the forces promoting technical progress which 
existed in the capitalist economn" Our machine tool builders have not yet 
become real pusners ( tolkachi) of new technology" ,he wrote in 1938," We do not 
h:we the fierce competition and thP narrowness of the market forcing machine tool 
factories of capitalist countries to create new types of machines. Our machine 
tool building is secured a firm and wide ' sales market', but this does not 
mean that it may give our industry machine tools of obsolete design" . 2 As noted 
in the first part of the chapter , machine tool builders in the capitalist 
countries tended to cut down their innovative activity when current demand was 
at a high level s in the Soviet case high current demand was a permanent state 
of affairs and a fact which the machine tool industry itself had to accept 
as ~iven ; all it could do was attempt to create conditions reinforcing the 
position of those reprP~enting the interests of change,in ord~that they might 
exert greater pressure on the stronqer conservative force of those concerned 
pri.Jna.rily with current production. 
1. Sii, 1936 ,No.6, p.L 
2 .Plail .Khoz ., 1938 ,No.9 ,p.47. 
-
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Strengthening the position of +hose concerned with change eant , 1n the 
first instance, enhancing the prestige of the design r and other workers directly 
concern d with innovation . This problem was discussed at the confe~~ces of 
designers of the period, notably the third and fourth 1n 19)5 and 19)6. It was 
agreed that it was essenti~l to overcome the tendency for de igners to remain 
aloof fro~ practical problems of building their own designs, and that they should 
follow their models from the drawing borad to the time when they were withdr wn 
from prodnct.lon , work1np- closely with production engtneere . 1 'I'he questton of 
tncent1.ves for. design staff has alreads been mentioned • The September 1939 
decree revealed that many of the pr&blems discus ed during the becond Five-year 
Plan recained c designers were poorly acquaint d with the technology of machine 
buUdi.ng , inc .n.t1ves were inadequate , and experlmen 1 sh ps were divorced fro 
the design offices and used for current production. Enh nc1ng the role of the 
designer was one direction of action .Throughout the period another source 
of pressure for change was the strong moral influence brought to bear on enterprise 
directors and managers by the Party, industrial leaders lnotably Ordzhonlkidze) 
2 
and t.he press , t he latter playin~ a particularly acttve role. Nass ca111paigns 
also promoted tochn teal change , notably the t)t akhanov1..te movement , but also 
campaigns for higher quality, raaonalisat!on and 1nvenlions , ~tc . , and an active 
role was played by a numb~r of vo, untary organisations such as VAJUlrrS<Yand 
VNITOMASH .4 These diverse pressures helped to cr te climate 1n whicb 
neglect of change and technical progress becane unacceptable , thereby providing 
a counterwcl ht to the relentless pressure for output. 
The intense pressure on the branch for the introduction of new models , 
f ass1 ... ilation at t he enterprise level , led to coupled with the problems o ~
t ~hich tended to be focused on ENIMS as the considerable frustration and disconten " 
he 19~4 problems with the Ahar ' kov factory were central R .&D . body of the branch • .J 
b a prolonged batLlG between the Institute t~e fi.rat r.ound in whR t was to e 
1.!!!!!d .,27 .3 . )51 6 .4 . ;6,S1I , 19J6 ,~•o · 6 ~·~;bruary 19)7 th t,"The struggle for 
2.Pravda bluntly rem.tned the industry 1 not neutral field far from tbe 
new technology, for tectmical prog~esst, fs th strugu.lc against fascism" (14 2 J7) 
fro t f 1 t ge::le from the _ron o • • • • 
n o c ass s ru • _ ;.. d t echnical wor~ers for ass1stin'l' the 
}.AU-Union asaoc1a.t1on of sctentif" ... can -
£OC1al1st construction of the US~ • :lmi 1 60 1~{Y of nacb1ne builders . 
·s~e .~l:V~i~~&c~~~~if~~r~;;~I~~~~tf:~9;5, ~o . fB,pp.~- for its activities . 
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leadership and a range of critics , including disaf~ected members of its own staff, 
and representatives of both t~e machine tool building factories and machine 
tool using branches. Many is~ues were raised , but one of the main allegations 
was that the Institute was divorced from practice . Shumyan ,oneof the most 
persistent critics ( he later claimed t~t he had five times created an office 
of automatics in ENIMS - which the l eadership had five times closed down!)1 
declared in 1935 that,"Up to now ENU.lS has represented only an establishment, 
an office , and not the livin&>: brain of machine tool building" . 2 Some designers 
had never set foot beyond its walls for years, he alleged on another occasion.3 
Kaganovich also expressed concern in 1935 that ,"The !.solation of ENIMS from the 
4 factories wi l l transform it into a scholastic organisation". This danger 
was also noted by the eminent German specialist ,Schleenger , after a visit to 
the Institute in 1936 . ENIMS, he wrote, already had an experimental apparatus 
5 "having no equal in the world" ; the general concept of research, design 
and experimental production within a single organisation was ideal, but only 
onthe condit.ion that the research and design staff were deeply immersed in 
t~e practical experience of machine tool builders and users , otherwise there 
was a real danger of the research becoming too theoretical . ge clearly believed 
that ENIMS was in danger of such isolation fror.J practice , and stressed the 
necessity of regular meetings between design groups and leaders of factories 
for which designs were intended . This l~st point was highly relevant because , 
as another critic noted l ater , ENIMS bad a scientific and technical council which 
at one time had been a forum for technical debate with factory representatives, 
but by late 1936 this council had al~ost expired because , it was claimed, the 
6 
factories found the discussion too academic . 
Representatives of the factories frequently criticised ENTI1S 's policy in 
s~lPctlng new models , tn par~icular when models base~ on the~roducts of 
·:~ferent foreign firms were c~osen for a single enterprise . ~uch proliferation 
~ • Zaind • , 29 .6 • 37 . 
2.Ir.vest1Ia,5.7.35· 
) • Zaind • , 17 • 5. 36 • 
4 . ibid • , 1 • 8. 3 5. 
5. 5.. bid • , 26 • 9 • 36 • 
6 .l bid • , 29 .9 • 36 • 
I 
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of different desi gns made standardisation difficult and slowed down assimil ation 
because a l arge n umber of or iginal parts was required for each model . 1 Ot~ers , 
notabl y Shaumyan , criti cised t he I nstitute for an alleged lack of act ivity in 
developing ori ginal aesigns . One critic in 1937 claimed t hat ENIMS had not 
given a singl e new machine tool design in its four years of existence •2 
' Stankokonstruktsiya• wa.s also cr iticised on similar grounds • Shawnyan and 
Agapov cl aimed in 1935 that during its existence i t had produced only three 
surface grinders of a German model of the 1920s anrl a tool and cut ter grinder 
of obsolete design . 3 Some of these critici sms were clearly exaggerated and , in 
Shaumyan ' s case at least , ~ppear to have been part of a prolonged vendetta against 
the leadership of the Institute . 
Evi dence on the work of ENIMS an rl ' Stankokonstruktsiya ' ~uring the Third Five 
Plan is sparee • In the aut11mn of 1q39 i t was reported th~ t t he experimental 
enterprise was working much better than ever before a whereas only two or four 
cachines used to be b uilt a month it was then producing sixteen , with greatly 
4 reduced lead times . The new dir ector ,Haslennikov , claimed in early 1940 that 
the Insti tute ' s wor k had improved since it had been transfered from Glavst ankoprom 
to NKTyazhMash ; formerly it had been unable t.o r esolve technical pol \.cy questions 
satisfactoril y because it had been perrnanP.ntly submerged , " in a sea of countless 
current mat ters" .5 
I n thepr<>ss of the time the negative aspects of the work of ENINS tended 
t o be highlighted and its achievements passed over . Despite the many problems 
and weaknes,es , l argely stem ing from t he fact th~t such large tasks were posed 
for. solution in an ext remely brief period of time , the Institute and ' Stankokonstr-
the 
tiktsiya• un~oubtably made a major contribution to the develo~ent of/machine 
tool industry . At t he beginning of the Second Five- y ar Plan design des ign and 
develop~ent forces were few, the• possibility of creating original designs extremely 
'1.~ . ,4.2 . )5 ; 24 . 3 . )5 . 
2.~. ,29 .6 . )7 . 
}.lzvestiya , 5.7 . )5 . Jater Shaumyan claimed th~t ' Stankokonstruktsiya ' was taking 
orders for all types of parts , including spares for Glavzoloto .This was 
done, apparently , because such orders were more pr ofitable than the factory's 
basic activity . (Zaind ., 17 .5 . )6 ;30 .8 .35) • 
4.Mashinostr oenie , 9 .2 .40 . 
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limited , and specialised , high- productivity ach1nes could only be built with 
very gre t difficulty · By thP ~r the industry was able to build any type of 
r.-chine tool (even 1f probleu:s of r egular batch pro uct.ion wer not completely 
resolved) , and was fully capable of independent d 1Pn tho~ht. !he coMbination of 
a central Inst1 tut.e for securing a unified technical. ol1cy an solving the nost 
complex problems , and local design and 1nnov tion initiative at the enterprises, 
was on the whole uccessfuJ • J3y t.,e end of t riod the esigners were certainly 
a much more powerful .for.cc , <mil inc en ttvl;)s for tnnovA.tion wer~ better but , 
nevertheles , the pr.oblem of securing t~e regular as 1m11 tton of new products 
and re~ular design improvements had not been fully solved : th relentle s drive 
'"o cu • ·ent output remained a powerful force pro oting t chnical conservatism. 
T"te tension between current demands "for quantity and the de nds of technical 
progress had no easy solution , but tt is notable t t lhe intensive innovative 
ctivity of the t'u-ee imnediate pre- r.ar years was associateti with a reduct-ion of 
t rate of growth of output in the branch, whUe qu!!Jltity d s were met 
so e 
to n greater extent than be~ore by transfer! the production of/basic general-
purpose machines from the main specialised cnterpri es to econdary , often 
non-specialtsen , pr.oducers . 
Returning t.o the questiorts raised in Part I of this chapter , how successful 
· s t~ Soviet machine tnol industry in ' catchln up an aur ssing ' capitalist 
cMne to~l build in in a tecl"'-'lica.l respect 7 This cannot be answered properly 
ith~ut cans1derlng the relative technical level of th Sovi l industry at various 
OlOints ln tl.me, and this is difficult because th neces ry dat.n are lacking . 
opting the st tic viewpoint widespread during the irst. Flve- year Plan , there is 
o doubt t"lat the industry did i.ndeed catch up and surpas the capitalis t !!laChine 
tool building of 1929 , and this L'l ltseli vas a very considerabl achievement . 
ut t"e target moved ahead , il'lposing ever 1nten e pressures on the young 
, t 1 editorial declared thAt hP ~sk o 
• • In early 1935 a ~Rindustri~l ... 7 a 5 vu e.chin tool building would h~ve to be fulf1lle 
uaUtatively c tching up American n ) Others were 1 rash in their de.:1ands 
1n "one or t..:o years" (Zaind . ,Z7.;_~351~ tay l9J7 Al ' perov1ch was asked ," ill we and expect.at1ons • .fit a CUSIP ee f! onl CarmanY? . . • •g answer ~a:; g1ven 
cat.eh up America ln tl)c Third ~aXp.e~~~v~~h ne~er n.nswbrs sue queries • 
i~ th1fl q•1est1on,because coora _ _________________ _ ___ ....-.;i~d~. ,l 0i.) .;7 . -
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Chapter 9 
THE ROIE OF FOREIGN TECHNICAL ASSisrANCE AND 
THE TRANSFER OF FOREIGN TECHNOLOGY 
Given the b ckwardness of rrachlne tool building 1n the Soviet Union 
before the Firat Five-year Plan • the complexity of the technology and 
the importance of the industry in securing technical and economic independence 
it is not surprising that interest was shown 1n the possibility of obtaining 
foreign tecbical assistance. Such assis tance rl ayed an impor tant role 1n 
the development of a number o£ key branches of engineering both before 
and during the Firat Plan • notably 1n the motor industry ,diesel building, 
the electrical equipment \.ndustry and the bea.rin.gs industry. Assessments of 
the extent to which the Soviet machine tool industry r esorted to foreign 
assistance vary widely . One of the best Soviet histories of thts industry 
states that s " Tbe machine tool buildillg industry of the US.:lR took its 
own course • It was unable to obtain assistance f r om f oreign machine tool 
firMB•.1 A leading Soviet authority on pre-War foreiPn economic relations 
is even more emphatic'" In "1Xoduc1ng new machine tools the Soviet machine 
tool building industry had absolutely no recourse to f oreign technical 
assistance" •2 Yet it has been cla imed by one r ecent Western wor K that 
tbe achievements of the Soviet machine tool industry up to 1945 were almost 
entirely due to foreign ass istance. On a scale of one to ten , sup~osedly 
measuring the 'degree of technical assistance' , t h9 machine tool industry 
is given a rating of nine.J Discussion of this important and interesting 
aspect of t~e development of the Soviet machine tool industry is hampered 
by t he inadequacy of publ i shed material on t he subj ect , both Western 
and Soviet. This section -will examine the available evidence and it will 
be shown th t , while such foreign technical assistance played a limited but 
important role during the First Five-year Plan period • it was by no means 
of the industry. 
and Soviet economic develop nent , 1930 to 1942, 
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There is a wide range of possible f orms of forei•n 
~ technical assistance 
whi ch for our purposes •~Y be 1 if c ass led by the de;?ree of directness of the 
aid provided. The most direct form is t h• conce••ion 
g QQ agreement,under which 
foreign capital and te hni"' - , d c ~ an lll&.nager\al s k ill s a.re engaged to develop 
an enterprise or branch of pro uction. Secondly, t here are technical 
assistance agreements under which fore~ firms or organiaat1ons undertake 
to f ulfil certain specif ied obligations ,e.g. to assist 1n t he planni g
1 
construction and ass imilation of new production capacity , or to assist 1n 
the projection , intro~uction andassimilation of products or processes. Such 
asqistance frequently involves the t r ansf er of blueprints and other necessary 
documentation, t he t .,.ain 1n! of specialist s and wor kP.rs, and t he supply ct 
certain materials and compo ~ents • Thirdly . t here can be licence agreement s 
under which documentation 1s supplied f or the transfer of products and 
processes develope d by foretgn fimDs.S uch agreements may not involve any 
direct ass istance in the assimilation of the object s concerned . A fourth 
form of ass istance i s the trainin~ of person nel by f or eign f irms and 
organisations , either abroad or in t ho recipient country . Finally , individual 
foreign special i sts may be engaged as consultants . 
In addition to the abovementioned d i rect f orms of fore~ techni~al 
a&~istance there are a n~ber of other,1nd1rect, channela f or the tr31lsfer of 
fore~ technolos y and technical knowledge . Firstl y , exa plea of f oreign 
products may be ac u ired and copied without any direct fo:re \gn participation . 
Secondly, knowledge of f oreign technol ogy JllY be obt ained by visits to 
f or ei n factori es , res earch establ ishments, exhibitions,etc . Thirdly, 
1nforaat1on may be o ct a1ned from fore~n techni c:U j ournals, catalogues and 
other printed materials. I n the case of t he development of the Soviet 
~:~achine tool industry all the main f orms of forei~ 
technical assistance 
and transfer of technology were either adopted o~ ser iously considered during 
•he od d !deration The ma.in forcr.s of aas latance , both direct 
~ peri ~~ er cons • 
be dis cussed The i r.tportat1on of aacbine tools, a and indirect, wlll now • 
ujor channel for technology trans:fer ' will be cons1dered1n the b lloving chapter. 
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Concessions 
In July 1928 Sovnarkom, on the basis of a. report presented by the 
concessions committee ,Glavkontsesskom, adopted a decree on the activisation 
of concess ions policy.
1 
On the basis of this decree a list of possible 
concession objects was drawn up , this included the building of a general 
machine tool f actory ~ ith a cost of construction of 9- 10 mil lion rubles, 
to be located 1n either the central industrial region or the Soutb .2 Nothing 
came of this offer. In July 1929 the construction of a machine tool factory 
in the Urals was being offered as a conces~ion o~jPct , with possible 
alternative locations 1n the Ukraine or the central region.3 But by this 
time Soviet policy with respect to concess ions was changing and greater 
emphasis began to be placed on technical assistance agreemente .Nevertheless , 
1n a semi-off icial work published 1n the United States in t930 a aaohine 
tool factory was still being offered as a possible concession~There was 
probably little expectation of success , however, as there was no mention 
of resort to concess ions in Soviet comment and machine tool building 
policy after 1929. 
'Orgametall ' and German Technical Assistance 
When the de~sion was t aken at the end of t he Restoration per iod to embark 
on the construction of new engineering f actories VSNKh , and Glavmetall in 
particular , was faced with the problem of projecting these new wo1.•ks , L e . 
designing the factories and pl~nning the bas ic production processes . Initially, 
from 1926 , this work was undertaken for both t he metall ur~ical and engineering 
industries by Gipromez J l~ter t he engineering industry section split off to 
f DTm a specialised organisation , Glpromash. But project work lias also 
undertaken by the r ationalisation organisation , ' Orgametall' , f ounded and 
beaded by E.M.Al ' perovich . In the late 'twenties this cody was an la or tant 
channel of foreign technology transfer to the USSR , both with regard to 
1.Yufereva.,E.V. ,Leninskot: uchenie o goakapitalizme v oereldiodny1 period k 
sots1a11zmu,M.,1969 ,p85 . 
2.Torg .Prom.Gaz. , 12- lQ-28 (other conces ion ob .,iects included t he Stal.ingrad 
tractor factory and an aircraft engine factory in the Urals) 
) .Ek.Zhi zn, 17-7-29 (supple~ent on economic relations with t he USA) 
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the supply of equipment and the drawing up of projects f or new factories and 
those undergoing reconstruction , 
In April 1926 Orgametall reached agreement with the Union of German 
Machine Tool Builders ( Verband Deutscher Werkzeugmaschinfabrik Ausfuhr 
Gemeinschaft), usually known as 'Faudewag' , for t he creation in Berlin of a 
joint German-Soviet Technical Bureau.1 This Bureau started work in 1927 
with a staff of threea by 1930 it employed over one hundred workers~ It was 
disbahded in 1931 with the termination of the agreement~ On a consultancy 
basis the Berlin Tect:mical Bureau drew on the knowledee and experience of 
German machine tool and other engineering firms (e.g . Fritz Werner ,KrupP, 
Borsig and Demag), and also individual specialists, notably the eminent 
4 machine tool engineer, Prof. G .Schlesinger. It is claimed th1t fir JS were 
willing t c participate in anticipation of securing large orders for equiprtent 
for the new enter prises . Between 1927 and 1931 projects drawn up by the 
Orgametall Berlin Bureau included the Toretsk bolt factory, a bicycle 
factory in Moscow , several shops of t he Kranatorsk heavy engineerin~ works, 
a shop of automatic machine tools at the Pod<U' sk sewing machine f actory 
and an expansion of the Lugansk locomotive wor ~s .5 Subsequently,tbe 
project side of Orgametal l 's work appears to have been taken over by 
Gipromasb . But most important from our point of view is the ~act that the 
Bureau also drew ur the outline projects ( eskiznye proekty) for the three 
new machine tool f actori es built during the First Five-year Pl ~n period, and 
also for the two large new tools and measuring instrume'lts works, 'Frezer' 
and 'Kalibr' • 6 
The decision to project the three new factories (turret lath: s and semi-
automatics (Moscow) ,milling machines (N izbnii Novgorod), and drilling 
machines (Khar ' kov)) 1n Berlin must have been taken in the autumn of 1929. 
In September 1929 Orgametall was ~iven the responsibility of organising work 
on the new enterprises 7 and at the time of ere tion of Stankotrest the 
4.Bron ,S .G.,Sov1et economic ~evelopment and Americ~ business,New York ,1930,p139 
1.Torg.Prom.Gaz .,2S-4-28 . 
2.10 let Orgametal]A,M . , 1935,p1S1 · 
3.ib1d,p152. 
4.~, pptS1-152. 
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construction organisation,'Stankostroi' was subordinated to Orgametal.l and 
not the trust. In Janaary 1930 the project c apacities of the thme new 
factories were raised quite substantially necessitating revision of the 
. t 1 prOJeC 8. Nevertheless the projects for the Moscow and Nizhnii·Novgorod 
factories were received from Berlin on 27th March 1930 and for the Khar'kov 
works on 2nd May · These projects prepared 1n Berlin were not fully elaborated 
blueprints but outline plans . DetaU elaboration of the projects and the 
making of working drawings was Wldertaken 1n Moscow by 'Sta.nkostro1 ' . The 
completed projects were approved by the Scientif ic and Technical Council 
for machine building and met~ working of VSNKh at the end of March for 
the turret lathe and mU11ng machine factor ies , and the beginning of June 
for the drilling machine factory. 
German specialists participated 1n the elaboration of th projects 
for tbe new factories , whi h were conceived as assembly-machining units 
without preparatory shops. Thus it seems likely tb t Schlesinger was 
involved in this work and that German machine tool firms were consulted.2 
The method of d~ing up the project was as followsf an example of t he basic 
model to be built was acquired , working drawings of it made and , on the 
basis of an analysis of the parts required , an approximate estimate of 
the necessary production area and equipm:ant derived . Pro uction was 
projected to be of a bate~ type , with a batch size of up to fifty units in 
the case of t he mill ing and turret lathe facto:ties . Considerable reserves 
of capacity were provided, partly stemamng from an assumption t hat t ne 
machining s hops would work on a leas than two shifts basis ( this was later 
r evised) and partly because l arg! reserves of equipment ana area were 
provided. Bquipment was to be of a univers al type and , with few exceptions, 
111acbines were to use ordina:cy cutting tools at average cutting speeds , and 
5.1bid, p152 1 Kolomenskii,A.,Kak mY ispol 'zuem zagranichu>~ tekhniku,h.,19JO,p34 . 
6.10 let Orgametal.la,op cit,p152; Vestnik metal l opro!Rysble.n ost1,1931,No8,p65 . 
7 .Izvestiya,19- 5-30. 
1 . 1bld . 
2 .so;; of the broader i mpl ic"' tions of t his German involvement are discueeed 
1n Chapter 4 • 
) .See Vestnik mo:-talloproJYs"'llennost1., 191 1 ,No8 ,pp64-75 for a detailed review 
of the urojects for the new ~actories . 
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not the new hard-allvy tools then just entering into use . Later in the 
'thirt es there were to be accusations that German specialists deliberately 
incorporated an assumption that Russian workers would not be able to ach ieve 
the machine utilisation rates typical of Germany at the time the projects 
were drawn up. 1 It does seem quite possible that such an allowance was ~e2 , 
but this allowance ' "f'or Russian backwardness •, although an affront to the 
pride of Soviet workers and specialists , 1n practice provided a reserve 
of capacity _ which was to prove o:f great value later in the decade. No 
evidence of foreign technical assistance in projectinv. other new factories 
( in particu,ar , the Kiev automatics factory and the Saratov gear-cutting 
machine works) bas been traced ' and 1 t also ~ppears that the projects f or 
the reconstruction of a number of old machine tool tuildine enterprises 
were drawn up by Soviet organisations , although t t is possiole th~t 
individual foreign oonsultants were involved . 
American Technical Assistance 
While al l three new factories were projected in Germany they were 
planned for the building of American machine tool models . J This was probably 
a consequence of what appears to have bPwen a quite general 'turn to America' 
from the s pring of 1929 and , 1n the course of the year , t his interest 1n 
A~erican technology led to efforts to secure Americ~n technical assistance 
in many br"nches of 1n1ustry . One of the lea ling advocates of American 
tec ~-nical assistance was M .Gurevich , deputy chairman of Am.torg , the Soviet 
trade organisation in the United Stat.es. In a r eport to t nP board of 
Glavmashinstroi J:t t the end of May 1929 Gurevich argued the case .for securing 
American ass istance , but was very critical of the practice of Soviet 
ordering of machine tools frolll American machine tool · irma : American 
firms were unwilling to enter into talks on technical as s istance because 
tbey saw no guarantee of receiving bxge orders for their own pro 'ucts • 
~~cor11ng to Gurevich it was then norm~ practice for Soviet aacbine to~l 
orders to be placed with many firms 1n ver y small quantities , say three 
1 This accusati on w-.s made with rega.:·d to the im .Or dzhontkidze factory in ·l b- ! ostro1tel ', 19J7 ,No17 ,p3.asee alsoGudov .I ,Sud'ba raboche~ro,r· . • , 
-
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1 
to four at a time • In J\Ule Gurevich propagated the merits of American 
technolo y and assistance in the press~ and ~xm"rO¥ presented a. report 
to the VSNKh Pres1d1wa
3 • In his contributions Gurevich str s sed that &:any 
Aa dean mac hine tool firms were w1.lling to project machine shops in which 
their equipment was to be installed and that this fora of aid had already 
bten e11ployed at the Futllov works and at the Sto.ling.rad t r actor factory , 
then under construction .Furthermore ,Amtorg had already opened a project 
bureau 1n Cincinnati at which Soviet and American engineers were jotntly 
elaborating projects. But , ~urevich a gain emph~sised, this f ora of assistance 
\.Duld only be forthcorung if large orders for machine tools were placed with 
the fir s concerned . 4 
This campaign for American technic 1 assistance does appear to have 
had soae impact. VSNKh recom.rnended th t a co les ion s hould visit Gernany 
and America to discuss technical a s s i s t · nee f or t h machin tool industry 
with fir•s which had been given large orders , 5 and at some tlme early 1n 19JO 
the board of Stankotres t discussed the possibll t ty of projecting the three 
nev factories in the USA . 6 This change of policy wa s probably influenced 
by NKRKI critic\sm of Stankotrest on the grounds that it had not secured 
sufficiently modern consultation ; i.e assistance was e1n obtained fro• Germany 
rath~r than Amer1ca .7 It is evident that serious d 1ecuss1ona d i take place 
1n 1930 betwePn the Soviet industry and and at le at two leading Aaeric n 
ftrna. The content of the technical assistance in question is not k:no;m , but 
probably related to the projection and organisation of production processes ancl 
help 1n the assiailation of new aodels. The'Cinc1n ti'a1111ng machi.::le 
coa~y was approached with regard to the poss ibility of providing technical 
&as1stance for the N tzhnii ~ovgorod all ling machine factory . According to 
Sovtet accounts'Cinclnnati'were unwilling to cooperate when t hey learnt of 
the scale of the new enterprise .The President of the American f1ra visited 
the USSI for talks on the project and is quoted a s having expressed the vlev 
2.Tbe first director of the Stal.ingrad trac tor factory,Ivanov, 1n a work 
PUblished 1n 19J4,admitted without com ent that at the fa~tory( Aaerican 
rates had been reduced ~ zo per cent 'by way of reserve . Ily1n,Y;Cal1n,B, 
!hose who bull t Sta.lingrad ,New York , 1934 • pJ7 •) 
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that it would be impossible to transfer the experience of 'C1nc1nnati ' to 
the new Soviet factory because Soviet conditions and the envisaged scale 
would require a quite d1.f' . erent apnroach to production organisation and 
methods. Doubts were apparently expressed about the ability of ~oviet workers 
to build aachine tools using the methods applied in America. 8 The second 
known case involved the related firm of 'C1nc1nnatl-Bickford', specialised 
bulldere of drUl lng machines , including a widely used type of radial drill. 
A aodern Soviet history of the Khar 1 kov drilling machine factory states that 
technical ass istancewa s discussed with the American firm , but was not taken 
up recause it" •• demanded the colloseal sum of one million gold rubles 
for consultation • We had to reject such expensive 'aid'". 9 It is therefore 
possible that 'Cininnati' also offered to provide ass istance to the ail l ing 
lll&cbine works but at a price which the Soviet side felt unable to accept. 
Despite the failure of the Soviet industry to enp-age an American fira 
as a major consultant , it is clear that some ass istance was prov14ed • 
Vriting on the occasion of the establishment of d i pl omatic relations between 
the USSR and the USA 1n the autumn of 19JJ , P .Stepanov , deputy head of the 
uchine tool building ~rlavk , noted that the Soviet industry had special 
interest 1n the firm of 'Cincinnati 1 , especially with regard to 111lling 
aachinee and centrelees grinders , and that there b .,d been long-standing links 
'11th the firm from the days of the foundation of Orgametall. Furt.berl!\ore , 
the semoes of the f irm had been employed 1n a es1m1lat1ng several t ypes of 
tachines at the Gor' ki 1 factory . Stepanov added that there bad been technical 
links w1tb a number of other American firms •1 0 This t echni cal assistance 
aay well have taken the fo .. m of permission to copy f oreign :uod.els and supply 
o.c- the necessary documentation . 
J.MizbnH Rovgorod for 'Cincinnati' milling mach~es ( ,•estni.k Hetallopro::~. ., 
1931lio8 p65) ;Kbar' kov for 'C1nc inna ti-B ickord radial drilling aac~'es 
(t"·-~ ' KB 'k v 196S p ?) •!tioscow for ' warner & ~·kovskii stankostroitel'n i, ar 0 d t ' ~trst. 'Potter & Johnston' 
Swasey'turret lathes Zalnd.,29-1°-J2) an :; ~ typ; (Ek .Zhizo' 22-1 1-32) , 
sen- autos .(JJW1,14-4-J 1) ,later changed to a.y ' 
1 •!!s..Zhizn' ,25-5-29 1Torg.Prom.Gaz • ,25-5-29 • 2.aeeTorS.Prom.Gaz .,t2".:6_29 for machine tool industry technic':ll assistance, 
~ ·!2.rs.Prom.Gaz .,8-6-29· 
·.1hli. '12-6-29. 
So111e 1-roblems of Foreign Technical Assist nee 
A review of changing attitudes towards foreign technical assistance to 
the machine tool industry during 1930 and 1931 reveals some of the obstacles 
encountered and the probable forms of assistance that were obtained , One 
of the first policy statements on the question was the decree which followed 
the January 11th VSNKh Presidium on the machine to ~"~l industry, This meeting 
recouended that Glavmashlnstroi secure Stankotr ~ st wi th the necessary 
means for sending spectalists and workers abroad to study foreign machine 
t ool technology and aleo for employing foreign specialists lnthe Soviet Union~ 
The significance attached to this measure was \.nd ,cat,ed by an Izvesti ra 
editorial in May 1 this considered that the 'basic path' of solving the 
industry's proble111s was tbe training abroad of 'several tundre:d young skilled 
workers' to provide the design forces and setters f or the new factories , 
coupled with the inviting of a substa~tlal number of foreign specialists , 
1n particular 6es1gners , in order to create a. powe.t•ful central design bureau 
in t1e newly formed m1chine tool ob"edlnenie. 12 In August 1930, M.K~anovich, 
refering to the acute shortage of skilled workers in the industry , called for 
foreign technic 1 assistance and ad~ed th~t any expenditu e on 1t would be 
rapidly recouped . 13 This view was reiterated with considerable force by 
Al'perovicb at a sess ion of the VSNKh Presidium devoted to the machine tool 
industry at the beginning of September. After cataloguing the acute problems 
facing the industry , Al' perovicb pessimistically concluded that t"It is 
quite obvious that large successes 1n the technical restructuring of all the 
factoties a.nd the creation of a really firm base of machine tool building can 
14 
be achieved only on the condition of obtaining f oreign technical assistance". 
5.Zhibarev 
1
p .B . , Industrializatsiya SSSR - veliki. podvig sovetskogo n~roda,~., 
1969 ,p277. 4 ) 9 0 p69 
6.Induatrializats1ya 1 stankostroenie (Byulleten Stankotrest ,1 J .~o2-), • 
7 .Sots1allsticbesk::a. a ratsionalizatsi a v oor' be s te SJ!li ,lol. • 19)0, p177 · 
S.Omarovskii ,op cit,p.56 ,za Ind., 7-2-31 Sorokln .The US 'Cincinnati' c?::tpany 
had a maximum armual output of 2,200-2,400; at the time of the t alKS tne 
v.roject capacity of the new factor y was put at up to 4,000 units a year 
{Zalnd.,?-2-Jl) . The head of ' Cincinnati' agatn v1si~ed the USSR 1n 1932 and 
siWthe new factory.H~ is reported as h~v1ng told Al perovich that it wa s 
the best enterprise he bad se n 1n the ~oviet Union and that froa the po1nt 
or view of the scope of its production and conditions of work it was the 
best aacblne tool fa!"tJT.ry 1n the world - (.~ashi dosti~heniya,19J2,No6,p96), 
Atte11pts to confirm tht>se events with the Cincinnati collpany h .ve _proved 
unsuccessful . 
9.1\bar'kovskli stankostroitel'nyi , op c1t,p12. 
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TM Presidium resolved tha t foreign technical asg16tance had to be dev · loped. 15 
It is possible that the diecussions with 'Cincinnati' were a product of thl s 
decision. 
hknowledgement of the necess ity of obtaining foreign a ssistance was not 
alone sufficient to secure 1 t : this required gcod working r elations with 
the appropz:iate foreign firms . These relations d td exist , but not so lllUch 
between the machine tool industry and the fore~ firms , but between these 
firllls and the import organisation , ' Stankoilllport' •16 This !aport organisation 
was an ob"edinenie , operating on a khozraschet basis under Narkomtorg ( from 
November 1930 - Narkomvneshtorg) with the right t o plan some aspects of the 
i!Dport of machine tools •17 The main function of Stanko import was the buying 
of machine tools from foreign firms to the order of Soviet industry for a 
minimum outlay of foreign exchanp;e ' it was not directly concerned with the 
fate of the domestic machine tool building indus try. This conflict of 
interests emerged publ1.cly 1n late 1930 and early 1931 • In August 1930 
Al 'perovich called for the transfer of r espons ibil ity for handling import 
18 
cla1ms for machine tools from Stankoimport to Soyuzs ta.nkoinstrument. A month 
later at the VSNKh Presidium this demand was res tated. SoyuzstankoinstrW!lent 
had already outlined various approaches for the use of fore ign experience, 
he claimed , but a basic condition for t heir realisation was t.be granting b t he 
ob"edinenie of the rie,ht to influence the plaM.ng of orders for imported 
equipment •19 This demand was not gran t_e_d_._:_ ____ _:_ __ s_t_an_ko_a_ p_o_rt __ _ 
---
10.~. , 20-11-33 . 
11.Zb1barev,op cit , p278 . 
12 .Izvesti;ya, 10-5-30. 
13.~. ,24-7- JO. 
14.~,12-9-30. 
15.llid.,20-9-30. 1n 1930 t h 
16.Stankoimport was ap-oarently created from Metall oimport l a t e - e 
f ti has not been tra ced. exact date of its orrna on " 1 a and the i .,.. funct i ons see 
17.0n the creation o£ foreign trade ob e~~nMishust1n.D .D . } ,M •• 1938,pp66-67 . 
Vneshnya;ya torgovlya Sovetskogo Sovuza, e • 
1 S.Izvestiya • 9-8-30 . 
19.~Indo ,1 2-9-30 I 
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claimed that it was 1n fact making the contacts necessary for engaging 
foreign assistance , but that the opportuniti s were not being taken up. 
Writing 1n February 1931 , the chairman ,M . Sorokin , stated that,''We know 
that some American machine tool ~irms are ready to grant technical assistance 
for tbe organisation of produ~tion of machines of t heir designs 1n t be Soviet 
Un1on~1 Sorokin himself had spoken to representatives of these firmss their 
usual response was, "\ole are ready to conclude an agreement or t echnical 
assistance with a Soviet organisation and to give you the rights, drawings 
and our experience for the production of our machines . We appreciate that 
if we do not ~ive you the r~bt you can i f you wish copy the .aachine tool 
yourself and start to produce it. I t is better to help you get production 
started properly t han to let you make mistakes and ruin the reputation of 
our trademark'!2 Sorokin also believed that it would be shortsighted 1f 
aceount 1e:re not taken of the desire of certain German machine tool fir~ 
with long- standing links with Soviet indus try to assist the development of 
Soviet machine to -·1 building . Soroki.n concluded with a controversial 
conclusion a 1n view of the acute shortage of machine tools andthe limitations 
of the domestic production base why not , Sorokin asked , citing f oreign 
practice, adopt a policy of importing the more complex elements of machine 
tools and assemble them with Soviet-made simpler elementsf Meanwhile , t he 
Soviet industry would strive t o replace the imported items ,e .g spindle 
beads for dr11lin4t machines. For Sorokin there was no doubt that .''The 
sormer the Soviet machine tool industry is reorganised for production 
co~peration with forei~ factories , t he more rapidly will it stand on its 
own feet" .3 
Sorokin ' s proposal drew t r e inevitable response 1 he was aceused of 
ustng the ar~uments of •w eckers' who liked to air their knowledge of ' the 
experience of all advanced countries' , ~orge tting that these 'advanced 
countries' were capitalist• and hostile to the Soviet Union. Production 
~:~~i:~;;;2~~~\~ach1nnl ,16-7-31,p490 - "tf.Sorokin refers to the vis it of a 
USA machine tool builder to ~oscow who had been inforaed of the desire of 
a USSR factory to a ~tempt to produce a machine following closely his owo line . 
- (cont .p12) 
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cooperation could not be adopted by the Soviet machine tool industry claimed 
one S,Botner , because it would increase dependence on capitalist countries 
and this was unacceptable for strategic reasons.4 A month l ater Al'perovich 
himself r ejected Sork~~·s sugge s tion on the grounds that it would enta il 
enor mous dangers of increased dependence for a lono per iod : t he basic task 
of the machine tool industry was precis~ly to eliminate foreign dependence 
in the shortest possible time. So)luzstanko1nstru~ent was interested in obtaining 
assistance from abroad ,he added , but only in so far as it facilitated the 
most r apid assimilation of new models . Furthermore , for t he previous six 
months or more the boazd of the ob"ed inenie had been e~aged in practical 
talks with a numb~"r of f oreign firms on the subject of assistance in the 
making of new models but , Al ' perovich charged , Staakoimport bad given no 
r eal help and the lar5est deals with foreign firms continued to be conducted 
on a narrowly commercial basis without considera tion for the i 11terest:'l of 
the Soviet machine tool industry • .5 Relations between the two organisations 
and t heir heads were evidently very poor and not improved by Sorokin' a 
persistent criticisms of otberaspects of the policy and management of Soyuz-
stankoinstrunent. 
Shortly after this publi c clash on technical assistance policy Soviet 
attitudes to foreign technical assistance in gener al also began to ch~e. 
Two stages 1n policy with r egard to tec'mical a s s istance during t he First 
Five-year Plan can be distingui shed . During the first st ge from about the 
autumn of 1929 to the end of 1930 there appears to have been a positive 
approach and a definite willingness to enter into agreements • An important 
factor at this time was the willingness of capitalist firms to provide 
assistance with the prospect of large export orders at a time when the 
Depress ion was deepening. The maximum number of foreign tech ci-ll agreements 
was a total of 1Z4 attained at the end of 19)0, to a to tal value of 83 mU11on 
rubles.6 From this time on soviet attitudes seem to have hardened. Fear of 
A clear cut and immediate offer of assistance was made s 'Pay me a s:nall 
royaJ.t and I will send you blue prints and render you full assistance .This 
shoul/' 
1 
better than atteJilpting a risky cooy of ray machine with 
"'" iblsu t your prupose tation"' Perhaps this was ' Cincinnati '? 
yvss e damage to my repu • 
) . alnd . ,_ - 1. 
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gro~ing dependence was probably a factor and unfortunate experience ~ith a 
number of agreements may have led to greater caution .? But the main factor 
was probably the shortage of foreign exchange. The 1Jlportation of machines 
and equiplli.Bnt could be read.Uy justified and accounted for , but the intangible 
and uncerrta1n benefits of tecbni ·"'al assistance were more difficult to 
quantify • In December 1930 concessions policy was reviewed,anJ 1n May 1931 
the Party Central Committee and STO adopted a decree on foreign technical 
assistance agreements. The projecting of factories abroad was forbidden and 
some agreements were terminated .8 Between 1931 and 1933 78 agreements were 
ended.9 Thus the climate changed and from May 1931 it beca,ne difficult 
to eater into new foreign technical assistance agreements. Taking account 
of th,. strategic importance of the machine tool industry, 1t seems unlikely 
that it would have bem1 allowed to enter into any substantial assistance 
agreement after t~ay 1931 and th.1s supposition is supported by the absence 
of any further public discussion of the quest1on . 10 
Before the change of attitude one foreign technical assistance agreement 
was established, but never activated. This agreement , siuned in December 
19)0 , was between Stankotmport and tbe Association of Brtt1sh :1ach1ne Tool 
Makers and provided for the supply of British machine tools worth seven 
million ~old rubles during 19J1,with a clause stating AB~'s willingness 
11 1n principle to supply technical ald. lf required. No applications for 
12 
asUstance under this contract were made before July 1931. Soon after this 
the credit situation for British trade with the US~ worsened and this , 
coupled with t~e new cautious Soviet attitude , probably accounts for the fact 
13 
that no assistance was orovided under this agreement. 
4.~.,14-J-31. 
5JJU,d,14-4-31. 
6.Kas'yanenko , V .I.,Zavoe~an1e ekonomicheskoi nezavisimosti SSSR (191?-1940gg~, 
1'1. ,1972, p184. 
7 .1bid ,pp185-187. 
B.It was presumably this decree which led to the termination of the Orgametall -
Faudewag agreement . 
9.Kas'yanenko ,op cit,pp188-t89 . • 
tO.A curious footnote to the discussion on technical assistance and Sorokin s 
proposal for production cooperation was the revival of the idea of 
as sembling machine tools from imported components 1n November 19JJ.In an 
article on the problem of supplying machine tools to the motor industry 
M 0 tlikh then a member of the production-technical sector of Nt.TP, 
•• ren er ' (cont . ,p14) 
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Tbe Role of Foreign Specialists and Workers 
ie have so far cons~dered two direct forms of foreign technical assistance -
for the projection of new factories and the aes1rnUat1.on of new machine tool 
aodels. A third form of aid , the employment of foreign specialists and 
skilled workers , may in practice have been more important. The J a.nuary 
1930 VSNKb Presidium called for the recruitment of fore~ specialists and 
throughout 1930 this call was reiterated by Al' perovich and others . In 
~icular there were demands for the employment of foreign designers to man 
1932 
the new Central Design Bureau of the industry ,e.g. the 1st JW'le/NKTP Order 
called on the foreign department of NK'fP to invite 15-20 experienced designers 
from abroad to assist Stankoob" edinenie •1 It is clear that a nWIIber of 
foreign specialists were r r cruited and that they played a significant role 
during the difficult initial period of the industry's development when the 
lack of skilled cadres was one of the major bottlenecks. Early 1n 1933 the 
Central Design Bureau had a staff of about twenty-five Sovtet designers , 
working aloD8s1de ten from nestern Europe and a single American. The Aaerican 
designer ,Alfred Vasbauer , supervised the design of heavy machine tools and 
locomotive shop equipment. The high Soviet evaluation of his contribution 
is indicated by the fact that while the highest salary of a Russian des igner 
was 450 rubles a month and of a Qerman ,600 rubl es , Wasba.uer received 
2 
1,400 rubles and part of his salary was paid in foreign currency. There were 
~lso foreign specialists working for the administration of the Ob" edintnie 
and Stankostro1 .J At the factory level f oreign per sonnel held key posts at 
a ti.ae when the industry was struggling to master llodern pro-1uction technology 
with a largely unskil l ed labour force. The technical director of the new 
- --- t,., ...... ,( 
suggested this path as a means of s aving foreign L spent on laports , whUe new 
factories for bulldin4!; automatics , grinders an..1 special macb.ine tools were 
under construction. (Zaind. , 12- 11-33) On this occasion the proposal 11et with 
no response , either in the form of nuolic criticisa or practical measures 
for 1ts rea.ltaation. 
11.Hach1nery , 20- 11-30;Izvest1ya ,12-12-JO,Zaind . , 11-1-31. 
12.~ach1nery , 16- 7- :31, p494. 
1J.~utton,op cit , pr140-143 , discusses • technical assistance to aachine tool 
plants ' .He does not refer to the projection of the ~hree new factories 1n 
Ge~y or to the assistance provided by 'Cincinnatl or any other ~erican 
firm of machine tool builders.He does refer ,however , to the Podol sk 
factory and to the ' tlytch ' (sic) works of Leningrad ,implying tha(t the 
coot . , p15) 
' 
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1a.Ordzhoniki dze f act ory in Moscow at the time of ita construction was a 
Gerann engineer ,Dreigaut. 4 There was also a foreign specialist (American 7) 
acting as a consultant at the 'Krasny! Proletaril' factory at the tl.me of 
1t reconstruct1on .5 One of the aost acute problema during the years of t~.e 
1rat Five-year Plan and the beginning of the Second was the lack of skilled 
• chine setters and toolmaker s , especiall y at the new machine tool factories • 
It la evident that many r epresentatives of foreign machine tool firms and 
other foreign worker s acted as set ters and trainers for ooviet workers . This 
was the case at the 1m.Ordzhon1kidze factory .6 Ae Soviet workers and 
cia)iats acquired the skills of machine tool building,the need for such 
foretsn advisors diminished and at the same time hostility towardsthea 
Pears to have develope~ , so that by the mid-)Os the nuaber employed was 
probably greatly reduced .? 
Soviet Visits Abroad 
A less direct , but very ilaportant , n~eana of acquiring knowledge of 
foreign machine tool building practice was through visits abroad by 
representatives of the Soviet inudst.-y . Such komandtrovki were conducted 
at various levels. At the top , there were occasional visits abroad by the 
l eading figures of the industry . Al"perovich himself , when head of Orgametall , 
visited Germany and studied the machine to· 1 industry and also went to the 
United o:.tates 1n 1927. As head of the mech1ne tool industry he vistted 
Br1t.a1n , together with M.Kaganovicb , the director of ENIMS ,E .Lev1n , and 
other leading representatiltes for the November1934 Olyap1a Kachine Tool 
xh1 b1 t1on . 8 In tbe autumn of 193 5 , together w 1 th Sorokin , Al ' perovich 
a~a1n visited the USA and toured a number of machine tool factories .9 A 
delegation of specialists visited the USA in the fol l owing year to study 
10 
chine tool buildin~ , incl uding the leading designer ,V.Dlkusbin . 
f ormer received technical as sistance from Frank D.Chase Inc . ,USA ,and t ~e 
1 tter after an earlier agreement with ' Yerelnigte Carborundum und Elekt-
rlkwe:rk~ A .G. • , undertook an expansion at a cost of over JO 111.r . to ~oduce 
Lvo models of the German 'Stock' tool grinders , 'after the expropriation of 
t. e Stock concession • ( p143) • The Podol ' sk factory , primarily a producer of 
an log aaachines ( t he forlller • Singer' works) ,did build small , bench- type 
~t lathes 1n the mid- 19JOs as a sideline, but there ls no evidence that 
the Chase technical assistance ( which would have been related to foundry work) 
(cent . ,pt6j 
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Orgametall representatives regularly travelled abroad both before and after 
the formation of Stankotrest,e.g . E.Babich studied the ~erman and ~ritish 
industries ; the latter was also inve '3tigated by a prominent engineer, 
11 
G.Golovin. In 1934 the then head of Orgametall , V.Piterov , visited 
A 12 merican machine tool factories. Another prominent representative~ of the 
industry who studied fnreign practice • t 7 7 was V .F .Oborin, who made 
an extremely thorough tour of thirty-four British machine tool factories 
13 
in the autumn of 1931 • Engineers and, other specialists at the factory 
level also went on komandirovki to study foreign practice , although there 
were complaints that such visits were inadequate in number and that t he 
knowledge acquired could not be applied properly on returning to the USSR . 
Thus, it was reported in 1934 that anly two engineers ~t the new Gor'kii 
factory had been abroad and that in general leading fi~ures of the works 
14 had a very poor appreciation of foreign practice, while 1n 19J6 the head 
of the experimental shop of the im.Lenina factory reported t hat four months 
spent at British machine tool f actories (Asqu1th ,Herbert and Pollard) were 
being wasted because his shop was being used for regular production and not 
experimental work. 15 Problems of foreign exchange availability were probably 
the main obstacle to the extension of such foreign study visits-· 
From the mid-1930s an additional channel of information about foreign 
practice was created,ia the form of a team of inspectors who visited factories 
building machine tools to Soviet orders in order t o check quality and standards 
of production and ensure that machines supplied to the USSR aet the specified 
acceptance conditions. This work was handled by the Techn 'cal Bureau of 
was directly connected with the .machine tool building. In the case of t •e 
Leningrad factory this was in fact two related enterprises : the 'Il'ich' 
works made abrasives and grinding wheels and !or this activity had technical 
aid from the German firm Carborundum Werke (Aralov & Shatkhan ,op c1t,p162). 
The 1m,Il ' icha works, created from the mac~ine tool building sh?p of :he 'Il'ich' 
factory in 1934 did build tool and cutter grinders ,including Stock and 
'Cincinnati' models, but there is no evidence that 30 m.r. was spent on ~ts 
expansion (according to the Second FYP ,12.3 m.r.were to be spent on cap tal 
work for the whole enterpr1se),wh1le the Stock concess ion to which ~utton 
refers existed between 1925 and 1932 for the production and sale of haberdashery 
(Yufereva,op cit,p222)(Sutton,h1mse~f ,Vol1,p233,describes the concession 
as being for button making) • 
l.su ,1932 ,No? , p2 
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Stankoimport , which also acted as a consultancy service on foreign products 
and methods for Soviet industry •16 In 1940 alone Stanko1mport gathered 
eighty reports from its inspectors abroad and some of these were reproduced 
and diesemi.nXated throughout industry , whUe material on the accuracy 
standards of foreign machines was passed on to the Committee of Standards 
for use in elaborating domestic machine tool stand.uds •17 
Other Channels for the Transfer of Foreign Technical Knowled8e 
Komandirovki were a means of acquainting a comparatively small number of 
Soviet specialists and workers with foreign machine tools and their production . 
An alternative means of disseminating information and training personnel on 
a wider basis lolas through working displays of foreign machine tools 1n the 
Soviet Onion . This was one of the most significant contributions to Sovtet 
industry of Orgametall and was made possible by its agreement with Faudewag. 
The selection of machine tools for display at a special demonstration hall 
1n Moscow was one of the pr1 Tl'ary functions of the Gerraan-Soviet ~eement. IJew 
premises f or this demonstration hall were opened by Tolokonteev aod Mezhl~ 
in November 1928 a at the time of opening 157 German machines were on display 
and 42 American, all the exhibits being tn working order.
18 
Between 1929 
and 19J4 a total of 1,200 different machine tools were shown , built by 
150 f1rms . 19 The demo stratton hall served as a means of acquainting Soviet 
engineers , technicians and designers with the lates t foreign technology • 
as a base for undertaking the comparative testing of foreign models in order 
to select those to be installed in Sov let industry and built by the domestic 
machine tool industry ( later ,in the thirties .~iiMS took over auch of this 
work) , and as a centre for training machine installers ,setters and other 
workers. This experience of fore 1gn machines allowed Orgametall to develop 
2.see Wasbauer,A.N ., "Surpass America" ,Hachinist, Vo1.77 ,27-9-JJ, L.Jp61J-615 (a 
detailed accoUtlt of the work of the Central Deslgrr .BurM.u) • 
3 .e .g. see Front nauka i tekhn1ka,193J ,No?-8 . 
4.~. , 20- 5- )1. 
5.Slavnye tradltsli,op c1t , p111 . 
6 .Gudov ,.on c1t , j)60 .This practice was widely adopted in the engineer~ industryJ 
e.g . at- the Chelyabinsk Tractor t'a tory "l.t the tine of its couission~ 
1n June 19.3J there were about fifty s~ec1alists and setters of fore~n firas 
supulying machine tools to thP works. u.eto'OiS I Cbelyabinskogo traktornosro, 
1929- 1945gg ,M.,1972 ,p124). 
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a specialised machine tool installation service , this betng an activity 
which ha d previously been carried out by representatives of the supplying 
firms. By t~e end of 1934 the special 1ns%tallation shop of Orgametall, 
created 1n the previous year , had a staff of 450 , i ncluding 250 skilled 
inst.allers . 20 
A final chan 1el for the transfer of information about foreign machine tools 
~nd their production was the publication i n the Soviet Union of foreign 
technical- economic literature. l1any of the articles in the early issues of the 
Stank! i Instrument (founded in the summer of 1930) 
industry journal ,/were translations of material previously published abroad, 
usually 1n Germany. Foreign textbooks were translated , and collections of 
articles from foreign journal published in book form • During the 1920s the 
staff of Orgametall produced a number of rJ.ery detail ed studies of German 
machine tool pract1c~1 ; during the 1930s American machine tool technology 
was widely propagated , with particular em?hasis on btgh-product1v1ty and 
unit-construction equipment and the Denefits to be derived from the specialised 
production of co ~ponents and assemblies . Many technical journals of the 
1 t hirties included reviews of the contents of recent foreign publications, 
•any of which were available at factory libraries. 
7 .The deterioration o! relations with foreign specialists at the im.Ordzhonikidzc 
is desaibed by Cudov,op c1t,p41. 
8.Zai.nd . ,6- 1- 35. 
9.1bid 123-10-35 . 
10,Kas1yanenko , op cit,p301JZaind. ,6-8-36. 
11.Torg .Prom. "az. , 22- 3-28. 
12 .Zaind. , 23-6- )4. A1 c:~ -1., 4 l).Vestntk metall opromyshlennosti, 1932,N o10,po~-64r o11.pp53-.JV Jiio12 ,p~?- 9 • 
14,Predpriatie ,1934,No19 , p7 • 
15.Zalnd , ,27- 10-36. 
16.vneshnyaya torgovlya ,1937,No2. 
17 .Kasyanenko , op c1t , p302 . 
18.~org,Prom .Gaz. ,4-11- 2816-11- 28. 
19.10 let Orgametall , op cit,p29 . all lth 
20.1b1d ,ppJ5-38 . There is a detaUed account of the work of Orgamet ,w ill M b1 Vol J8 16-7- 31,pp485-490. ustrations, 1n ac nery' • , M 1927(edited by AlI perovtcb) ;and 
2t.e.g,Novost1 sta.nkostroeniya v Germani! , •' od . 1928 ( a very det"'Ued Al'perovtch ,E.M. ,Levin,E.E .,Obraztsovyi zav ,r . • , ) 
study of the practice of the German Fritz erner factoL~ • 
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CEQYing Foreign Designs 
The most important form of indirect foreign assistance was undoubtably the 
copying of foreign machine tool designs for Soviet production • As noted above 
there may have been some direct aid in the form of provision of drawings in some 
cases , but as a rule the copying appears to have been undertaken independently 
by Soviet designers and engineers. It was always stressed in contemporary literature 
that foreign designs were never copied exactly; they were 'translated into Soviet 
language ' as writers termed the process. This translation involved conversion into 
aetric 1f necessary and the intr oduction of Soviet standards where appropriate . It 
is possible that there was also some design simpliflcation to facilitate production, 
but there is no direct evidence of this. An American specialist, Wasbauer , who 
worked at the Central Design Bureau 1n the early 'thirties testifies to the 
thoroughness with which standards were applied ; contracts drawn up between 
foreign designers and the Bureau specified that a maximum application of standard 
details was a requirement , and he observed that a conscientious designer spent 
1 
"fully half his time poring into thick volumes of standards". Until the Third 
Five-year Plan at least a very high proportion of all models built by the Soviet 
industry were based on foreign designsa the origin of some of the main types of 
machine tools produced 1n the • thirties is indicated in Table SA . J...V • This 
shows that the designs copied were almost always of the leading .lestern firms 
engaged in the production of each specific type. The policy of copying foreign 
designs came to be challenged increasingly in the Second Five-year Plan period, 
usually by young designers and engineers eager to create original new machines, 
but the leadership of the Glavk and ENIMS generally resisted this pressure, not 
always with success. In the Third Five-year Plan this constraint appears to have 
weakened under the new leadership , and a recent work complained th~t at this 
ibte some designers and managers showed excessive self'-con.f'idence , manifesting 
a disregard for the experience of advanced ! oreign machine tool fir!lts. As a result , 
1n 1940 of new models introduced only 25 took foreign models as prototypes, and 
l.The machinist , 27 . 9.1933, p . 614; 13.2 .1934,p .148 • 
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i. f urther 12 were modifications of foreign designs; the total nwaber of new types 
and sizes introduced in the year was 94.1 This negative attitude towards foreign 
designs may well have been a factor 1n the poor fulfU-,ent of the plans for new 
aodels at this time . Copying foreign designs was e valuable means of acquiring 
design and engineering knowledge and experience, provided the economy with the 
best available types of machines and , ~bove all, saved the tiJ!Ie and cost wh1cb 
would have been involved if the industry had attempted to follow an independent 
design policy from an early date. 
Conclusion 
This review of the r ole of foreign technical assistance 1n the development 
of the Soviet machine tool industry suggests that the interpretations of neither 
Sutton, nor Kas'yanenko,are correct. Foreign assistance was predominantly of an 
Lndirect type , the most valuable being the copying of foreign designs, generally 
~~dertaken independently by Soviet specialists. It is clear that there was al~ays 
an ambivalent attitude tow2rds more direct forms of ass istance• it was recognised 
t~at such aid could accelerate the development of the branch, but at the same time 
' here was an evident reluctance to increase foreign dependence even in the 
short run. Attitudes were most positive 1n 1930, and while there were bureaucratic 
obshcles because of the division of responsibility bet•u=en the specialised 
chine tool administration and 'Stankoimport • ; it does appear that foreign firliS 
would have been willing to cooperate 1f the Soviet industry had made greater 
ef,..orts to reacb agreement, Given that some ot,her branches of engineering of' 
equal , if not greater, strategic importance did enter into quite comprehensive 
technical assistance contracts at this ti.Jile, it would probably have been a wise 
policy to have secrured. direct technical ass istance in the construction of one or 
t.'ilo aachine tool factories, thereby accelerating their ass imUation and fac111tatlri! 
t~e general learning process. Such a policy could have le:i to a faster reeuction 
of f oreign dependence than was 1n fa-ct the case. In this respect the ideas of the 
l!Cond phase of the industry's development may have played a role in f ostering 
a n~ative attitude to foreign rr&achine tool building practice, which could have 
1. as'yanenko,Zavoevanie , .,op cit , p.t9S . 
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reduced the commitment to securing :foreign technical aid . Thus we ca.n conclude 
that direct foreign technical assistance to the machine tool industry was much 
stiUler than in some other importan~ br~nches of machine building, notably 
the building of vehicles and tractors, ano this makes the Soviet achievement all 
the more creditable. But in retrospect it can also be concluded that the industry 
should have made greater use o~ such assistance ; and that it dtd not do so 1n 
put reflects the fact that the crucial importance of machine tool building had 
~ot beP.n fully appreciated at tha time when foreign technical assistance could 
have been obtained. 
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Chapter 10 
MCHINE TOOL DlPORTS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR ECONO~liC AND TECHNICAL INDEPENDENCE 
The role of uchiae tool imports before 1914 has already beea coasidered a 
aucb 1.aports accouated for over four :fifths of total machi11e tool supply ud 
& very substantial proportion of the forelga 11.achlnes were of Gerllall origia . 
Duriag the years of the War the heavy reliance on 111.ports was retained but the 
pattera o+' supply altered, the USA aad Britain aow playiAg a larger role. Ia 
the pre-Revolut i oaary period a pat ~ern of trading relationships &Ad 
institutions was established , an important position 1D which was occupied 
by a nuaber of agencies acting as intermediaries betweeA foreig:D firas and 
he Russian enginePring industry. One of the roost pro11i.aeat age•cios was 
S.G .Martia of St.Petersburg and Moscow , a British firm which handled the trade 
of aost Britieh machine tool fir ~s and also sold German mach1nery.1 The share 
of Allerican machilte teol imports rose 1n the iuediate pre-War period, althou,;b 
•ucb of this trade was handled by Germaa firms. 2 The October Revolution a..nd 
the subsequent Civil War led te the break up of these institutioaal a.rra.ngeaente 
an1 teaperarlly disrupted the pattera of Russian machiJle tool i.Jlports. 
Machiae Teol Iaports before 1929 
There were virtually no machine to~l iaports before 19253 a the low 
level of capacity utilisation, coupled with the existence of stocks of 
equip"l!ent at unused enterprises and un.installed aachines froJil the War years 
eant that demand for aporte« machine tools was extreaely small. As capac1 ty 
vas taken up and reconstruction and expaAs1on began 1n a nuaber of branches 
1 ports gradually revived , reachillg one quarter of the 1913 level (by weigl'\t) 
ta 1926/27 . This iaport trade was conducted under new institutional arrangeauts. 
fhe old ~ency systea and direct contacts between Soviet enterprises an t foreign 
aup?liers was replaced by the 15tate llo.nopoly of foreign trade eff ected through 
i..Saul,S.B . ,"The rnachlne tool industry 1n Britain te 1914" ,Business history, 
Vtl.X ,No . 1 ,Jan. , t968,p .)7 • 
2.Iron a«e, Vol . 85 , 16 .6 . 1910, p.t462 • 
) .See table SA .XV !fer volWile of imports • 
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the aediurn ef state trading corporations established under a decree ef October 
1925. For aach1nery i11.ports, including machine tools, the relevant organisation 
was Metall~impert , & joint stock company with state capital. Abroad the 
state monopoly was represented by organisations directly handling negotiations 
with foreign firms, notably Arcos 1n Britain and Aatorg in the USA . 
IA the year 1925/26 Germany again res umed its position as the major 
supplier of foreign machine tools, displacing Britain ~which had 
r: 
teaporap.ly gained this position after the Civil War . As demand revived the 
dominar t consideration determining the scale and direction of Soviet Jllachine 
teol imports became the possibility of ebtaining or •dit in a situation of 
acute shortage of f oreign exchange. The first major credit agreement was 
signed in April 1926 with Germany 1 the German government tmdertoolll to 
~~antee 60 percent of pay~ents for goods supplied to the USSR to a total sun 
of 300 million aarks. Over half' this credit was used for the iaportation of 
aacbinery and equipment ~ This credit agreeme l"t len to a very substantial 
1Jlcrease in machine tool impor+s in 1926/27 . Contact with the Geri•'A.n machine 
teol industry was facilitated by the agreement between Orgaaetall and Faudewag, 
Tbe raid on the London offi es of Arcos in May 1927 effectively halted the 
aale of British machine tools to the USSR for a period and helped the German 
industry to obtain a two-thirds share of total Soviet machine tocl iaports 
u 1926/27 and 1927/28. 2 American machine tool builders appear to have been 
rather cautious in their approach to sales to t'le Soviet Union, largely as 
i r esult of t he discouraging stand taken by the US Depart:nent of Coamerce • 
The Department urged great caution in accepting invitations to exhibit at 
!.~!" Orgametall demonstration hall, partly on the grounri s tl-t <> t there was no 
protection of patents, trademarks and copyrights) Some American f irms 
did take the initiative, however , and trade stea"~ ily i.ncreased in t he course 
of t ' e 'twenties. At the time of t ne opening of the Orgameta ~ hall in 1928 
l.!crgovye otnoshen ie SSSR s kapi talisticheskim1 strana.JDi,M. , 1938, P .136 . 
2.3ee Table SA .XX. 
).i'a.goner, pp c1t,pp.210-214. 
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forty twe American .machines were on display , compared with 157 German •1 Of the 
other main supplying co lllltries pr ior to 1929 , Austria occupied fourth place 
after the three leading supplying countries . 
In the l ate 1920s the pos "'ibility of acquiring second- hand f'oreign machines 
was raised in the Soviet press on a number of occasions . In March 1927 ~l .Sorokin 
(then as>istant director of Arcos 1n London) stressed the possibilities arising 
from the second-band market $n which virtually new machine tools could , he 
clailled, be purc hased for up to forty percent llllder the usual price . He 
believed that it ~ould be sensible to adopt a policy of buying sucn second-
band machines for Sovie t industry , "in view of our poverty", until the latest 
technology could be afforded.2 A year later Al ' perovich of Orga•etall , after 
a visit to the USA, observe d that there were large possibili tes for Soviet 
indust ry of acquiring almost new , second-hand ma ~hines , especially f or the 
aotor indus t ry .J The manner 1n which the question was rai sed i ndicates that 
it was not t hen nor mal practiee t o purchase second-hand equipment and , in 
fact , at no time was this policy adopted on any scale , a.lthougfl during the 
.Jeptesslon some used equipment was obtained from bankrupt for1gn firms .4 Apart 
from an understandable reluctance to install used equipaent at a time w~en the 
country was industrialis~ to the last wore of modern technology, there was 
probably an important p:·-actical obstacle, in that new machines purchased 
abroad by the soviet Union were generally required to have a f ull complement 
of spares and f ixtures and this would 11ave been difficult in the case of second-
!land machines .5 
LTorg .Prom.Gaz . ,4.11.28 . 
2.lli.9_. f 7 .4.27. 
).~. ,17 . J . 28. 
4,,-or examol e t he Murom ' Stankopatron• factory was equi -ped with nacbines 
from the -bailiupt German f irm 'Samsen Werke' - Lebyachenko , op cit, p .JJ . 
5.Before 1932 spares fixtures and t ools accounted for 20-30 per ce~t ~~ 
•ore of the value ~f imported machine tools - K vopro~u 0 te ,Jmic es 
Mvigakh vo vtoroi pyatiletke ,M ., 193~ , p .11 0 ; E:ctz:~~1 ·!~~~~3~ · sT~~so iflpoz:tance of supplying a f ull set o · sp;rres a 
stressed later i n the 'thirt ies - Machin1st ,14. 2.1934 , P · 148 • 
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The availability of the German credit led t o a rapid and marked increase 
1n the proportion of machine tools in total imports of machinery and equip1 ..ent, 
the share rising from 4.1 per cent 1n 192.5/26 to 12.4 per cent in 1926'/27~ But 
the exhaustion of this credit and the inability of the Soviet governmeot t• 
obtain an extensien of the a-greement led to a decline in bot h t he relative 
and absolute scale of machine tool purchases a h oad . r he statistics normally 
presented tend to conceal the impact of the Ger11an credl t . Alternative data 
tor t he calendar year , as opposed to the econe 1ic year, reveal the except1~~1 
nature of the import c.; of 1927a 
Tabl e lO.I 
1926 7,294 
1927 22 , 929 
1928 17,38.5 
1929 19,938 
Sourcet Anders ,R.Ia,Krizis kap1tal1stichesko!o mashinostroeniya 1 i mport 
mashin v SSSR, M. ,1934 ,pp.188-189. 
The large imports of 1927 teok place at a time when plans for industrialisation 
were unclear and when there was no coherPnt technical policy fer the engineering 
industry. It was lcrter admit te•~ thA- t mistakes had been made 1n thE' use of t he 
9~ credits,leading to a significant reduction in t r.e eff ectiveness of the 
equip~ent purchased •2 There were add itional factors reduc1ag t he ef ~ectiveness 
of imported machines at thie tiae. The greater power and higher speeds of 
11ported machine tool s could not be ful l y exploited because Soviet cutting 
tools of the period were of an insuff iciently high quality. Furthercor e, the 
low level of technical culture was such that expensive fixtures were .ot used and 
•orkers were not able to take advantage of t he gearboxes fitted to iJilported 
achinesa most of the machine tools previously employed and al::ost alJ t~ose 
then bull t 1n the USf!R were then driven by a stepped pulley from overhead shafte 
w belts . 
1.See Tabl e SA .XVII . 
2.L~ov,S.I .; Shatkhan,A .S . ( ~1s.) ,Promvshlennyi import- itogi 1 perspeKtivy, 
!L-L . ,1930, p.24. 
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~hue ted ltiJ?!rts duri.Ag t he F i rst Five-year Plan. 192.9 - 1932 
The Five-year Plan of m.a.c:h.ine te ·1 building as seen in 1927 bad envisaged 
a aodest rise ef illlperts from 192.7/28 te a peak in 1929/30. fellewed by a 
sbarp decline in 1930/31. But as indicated above , this pattern of imports was 
ntt w fact achieved because the large German credit led to an abrupt rise 
1.n 192? fellowed by a fall 1n 1928 and a gradual rise 1n 1929, when machine 
tltl imports failed to reach the 1927 peak. The exact pattern Gf ilaperts 
provided for in the Plan as approved in May 1929 is not known, but it is 
clear that imperts were expected to rise again quite strongl y before falling 
t.twards the end of the Pl~n peried as new dctl!\es tic capacity came into 
operation. As the Plan targets for machine building 1n general were lp.sed 
14 the course ef 1929 it became increasingly apparent that aacb1ne teol 
ilports and the degree of foreign dependence were destined to increase even 
aore , and,as related above 1this pressure led to a nUIIlbe.r ef revlsicms of the 
aachine tonl industry• s Plan 1n order to raise the domet.ic contribution. 
Cancern over the extent of the expected increase in aachine t ool iaper ts was 
heuhtened by the claims submit ted by 1nd us try and other sectorf? 1 for the 
ye~ 1920/30 these tot81led 50 million rubles1 , or two and a half times the 
actual imports of 1929. By t '1e end of 1929 fears were beln raised of an 
ever widening gap between machine demand and supply with consequent aassive 
aoert requirements~ and it was this concern which led tG revisions in the 
Plans for the en!lneering industry, including machine tool buildin!, early in 
1930. 
The r~vised Five-Yea.r Plan f or machine tool bui lding adopted after tb.e 
·a.n'.la.IJ' 1930 VSNKh discussion on the branch envisaged a. 64 per cent rise ef' 
!tpn-ts between 1928/29 and 1929/30 ; a further )6 per cent rise 1.a the 
hUowing year , but a very small absolute decline 1n 1931/32. ilhile the fi.na.l 
J!<Lr import target is not knaw:n , it was probably at a hi her level than that 
t ! the initial year ) Thus the peak year f or machine tool 1m ports was to be 1930/31. 
l.~sialistlches'ka a ratsionalizatsl a !__bor ' be s .eoteryalfd, toi . ,1930 ,pl?? • 
2·hr example , Torg. r em.Gaz . , Z . 11.29;{'Gurevich) • 
).See P· 450 , imports taken as needs less output · 
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!luring the years 1929 to 1931 there ;.;a.s a ce ··tain ambivalence in attitudes 
to machine tool imports and their gmwth • Wi tb the onset of t he economic crisis 
1t became easier tc place orders abroad and machine tool imports steadily rose 
absorbing a m.ounting share of total f oreign exchange outlays. At the saJie time 
the proportion of imported machines in total mach.pine tool sales remained 
exUeemely unfavourable. While it was recognised that ,as the Plan indicated, 
aachine tool iaports would have to increase in the short run, t here was also 
concern at the high degree of foreign dependence and this was translated int~ 
demands f or a more vigorous expansion of the domestic machine. tool industry. 
Leaders o~ the ind ustry acknowledged, however, that any premature attempt to 
fo rce Soviet industry to accept domestically built products of inferior quality 
would have deleterious consequences for industrial productivity . Thus,in July 
1930 Al' perovich admitted that the bias of managers 1n industry towards imported 
uchine tools was in most cases fully justified in view of the i:nportance 
of quality and this position was echoed by Kaganovieh at the Sixteenth Party 
1 vongress. But while acknowledging t he necessity of a temporary increase of 
lmports , Al'perovich attacked those who used the t~en current favourable import 
situation as ground s for delaying the development of the domestic machine 
teol in "!ustry. Machine t~ol building, Al' perovich stressed, was not simply a 
aat er of supplying individual machines to customers, but a matter of providing 
fully tooled technological processes for specif ic components: the lack of a 
domestic machine tool in 4 ustry of a sufficiently high level of development 
accounted for the fact that many projects for new factories had been elaborat ~d 
by "oreign firms. Thus f oreign de pendence in the machine tool seciltr was not 
siaply a question •f the import of machines as such , but one of the knowledge, 
2 
skUls and experience associated ~ith machine t c.ol technology. 
The true extent of import dependence in 1930 - 1931 was dif icult to 
determine with any accuracy at the time because of the highly unsatisfactory 
S"'stem of ordering i mpor ted machines. In September 1930 it was announced tbat. 
!.n the year 1930/31 impor t s would ac r·cunt for eighty per cent. of total machine 
tatl supply1 but examination of claims submitted by mana ers revealed a very 
LXVI s"ezd VK.P(bb,sten .otchet,p.520. 
2.1ZVestiya,9.9.J • 3·~· ,20.9.30. 
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widespread practice of nverordering as manager sstrived to ensure that t heir 
requirei!U[ents would be met in full. This practice was condemned in a Central 
Committee appeal on the third yea:r of the Fi'Te-year Plan in September 1930 and 
criticised by a number of speakers at t~e First All-Union Conference of Industrial 
managers 1n early 1931 . Criticism of this phenomenon was coupled with mounting 
pressure for the better utilisation of existing f'oreign equipment so as to minimise 
demands for new i mports. 
Machine tool imports in 1930 ammounted to 41.5 million r ubles, over twice 
the previous highest level of 1927/28 and almost 4 per cent of total ~oviet 
imports in 1930,compared with 1.9 per cent in 1929.1 Despite the non-renewal 
of the 1927 credit agreement Cermany remained the l eading surpl ier , with the 
USA second and .l:lritain third. The following year, 1931, was the peak year of 
machi ne t ool imports in both value and unit t.erms • A total of 14,000 units 
was imported and. machine tool imports accounted for 7. 7 per cent of total imports . 
Imports from Germany recetvei a boost f r om t he conclusion of a major new credit 
agreement in April, which granted the USSR special credit facil ities t o the 
value of RM 300 mill ion, with up to 29 months for payment . T~ere .. as also 
heightened interest in Britain as a machine tool supplier . Neverthel ess , 
machine tool impo ~ts in 1931 were substantial ly less than even the revised 
acceunt of needs for the year had indicated 
2 and it became evident during the 
course of t he year t hat t he mounting foreign indebtedness of the Soviet Union 
was placing increasingl y strict l i mits on the ability of the country to i mport 
machinery . The year ended with a substantial foreign trad~ deficit and a total 
indebtedness of 1,400 million rubles .J 
In tbe autumn of 1931 a campaign for the better utilisation of imported equipment 
was instigated by TsKK .. NKRKI, a component of which was a surv=:y on the actual 
situation the results of which were submitted to Sovnarkom at the beginning cf 
~ober • The main f inding of this survey was that at many enterprises expensive 
l.See Tables SA .XVI and XVII· 
2 . ~t the All-Uni on Conference of Industrial l'ian gers M. Kagoanovich noted that total 
claims for 1931 had been 85,000 units,whic h after critic~l examinat1o:O ~ rt 
been cut by half .Domestic uroduction was to be 16,000 units.l'llpl ying po it 22 
requirement of about 26,ooo units - Pervaya vsesoyuzn~~onf~entsiya . • ,op c ,p 
) .6:ae' ane.nko VI. Zavoevanie.,op cit,p.172 , citing Pravda, .1. • 
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ported equipment was lying idle , auch of it not even installed & at 133 
t rpriaes surveyed there was unused aach1Aery to the value of 9 ,9 .million 
rubl s , and surplus equipment worth 4 .4 ailllon gold rubles.1 This survey 
resulted in the adoption by Sovnarko11 USSR of a decree on the utU1sation of 
ulp ent,but vigorous action was not seen until January of the following year. 
A deterioration of the terms of trade of Soviet exports was one consequence 
of the Depression , but 1n November 1931 Al'nerov1ch voiced concern over another 
aapect of the capitalist crisis which was beg1.nn11'lg to ir,~quence machine tool 
1 ports 1n a manner necessitating more vigorous devel"pment of the Soviet industry! 
Considerable dif~1culties had been exner ienced in recent ti~es in placing 
Sovi t orders, he wrote, because the production base of the ~eate n industry 
being re3uced as firms found thecselves unable to finance production on a 
calP- necessary 1n order to fulfil Soviet orders . Further ore , aany leading 
~ and British firma were already fully loaded for a year ahead witn ~oviet 
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number of special machine tools required by the factory.6 This campaign ,taken 
up by many enterprises, •as also supforted by import organisations . 'Stankoimport' 
issued an appeal to the machine t0ol and tooling industry call ing for an end 
to the importation of a range of simpler ty pes including hand-fed vertical 
drilling machines, lathes with stepped pul _ey drive and machines f or sharpening 
tools. There was a l so an appeal for a substantial re 'u~tion i n the volume of 
spares and f ixtures imported: such items accounted for from 20 to 50 per cent 
of total machine tool imports . Finally, Stankoimpor t caJled £or the construction 
of a range of complex, high- productivity machine t ools in t he Soviet Union 
as the only means of securing rea~ independence from imports , and pledged to 
provide maximum assistance 1n securing equipment necessary to achieve this aim, 7 
Achievement of the aim of reducing machine tool imports in 1932 was a ided 
by external factors. In 1931 the new ~erman cridit and i.m~ed trading relations 
with both Britain and America had created a favourable situation for ~ovlet orders. 
It appears that it had been the Soviet intention to buy a large number of 
machines from Britain in 1932 ( according to a British source , at least half 
the total), because orders W'ere provtng increasingly difficult to place in 
uermany as the credit was exhausted. But the desired scaleof imports from Britain 
was not attained, a p·ain because of credit problemst the Soviet authorities 
required 20 months credit, but t he British Advisory Committee on Export Credits 
felt unable t~ allow more than 12 months , despite press ure from the British 
aachine tool industry lobby.8 Problems which had complicated trade r elations 
with Germany were resolved 1n tb.e summer of1932 l eading to a new credit agreement 
in June. In 1932 Soviet purchases from the United i:)tates were cut back because 
of foreign exbhange and credit p '0 blems , again in the face of sustained 
lobbying of the Department of Commerce by the machine tool industry which was at 
the forefront of a campaign for recognition of the USSR and improved credit 
support. 9 The outcome of all these problems was that the German share ef total 
),Voprosy istllrii KPSS, 1964,No.11 ,p.40. 
4.Anders,op cit ,p .169. 
s.za..Ind •• 9 and 11.1. 32 . 
6.za .Ind. ,11.1.32. 
7 .Ek.Zhizn' , 11.2.32. 
8.Macbiner;y,21.4.32 ,p. 72. 
9.Vagoner ,op ci t,pp.208-224. 
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aacb1nery and equipment imports rose to 70 per cent , ce~pared with 47 per cent 
in the previ~us year, while the American share fell from 43 per cent 1n 1931 
to 9 per cent in 1932.
1 
Total machine tool imperts fell 1n both value and unit 
terms 1n 1932 , although rising somewhat in terms of weight, and 1n value terms 
represented over ene fifth of total machinery and equipment i mports. 
Taking t he First Five-year Plan as a whol e t he pattern of 11ach1ne to 1 
imports was broadly similar to that outlined in the Plan itself and later 
variants a imports rose to reach a peak in 1931 and then began to decline. Imperted 
aach1nes in tetal machine tool supply (domestic production plus imports) 
1n unit terms 
represented a declining share , falling from about 50 per cent/in 1929 te 
38 per cent in 1932, 2a1 though the proportion of imported uch1nes in total 
industrial install ations was presUIIably 11uch greater 1n so far as 1aperted 
equipment was directed towards higl-prior1ty industr ial branches. Seme specific 
problems ef machine teol imports durin~ the First Five-year Plan period are 
considered later 1n the chapter, i ncluding the i mpact of the Depression and 
the structure of machines purchased frotll fore~n machine tool f irt1s. 
Machine Tool I mports during the Second ~ ive-year Plan , 1933-193? 
The sltuati•n with respect to aachine tool imports at the beginnin~ of 
1933 was very different from that of only four years earlier. Domestic production 
ot machine tools had risen almost three-fold 1n quantity ter11s and five-fold 
in value terms; p oduction at two large, modern factories was being as i.ailllated 
new metiels were being introduced, including lathes , tur1·et lathes, m1111Llg 
aacl)lnes, boring machines and planing machl.nes of modern des~n 1 an adainist.rat-
be structure had been created; and, most 1.mpcr tao t of all, a f orce of wcrkers, 
llalli!ers , technicians and designers had been created and was rapidly aco1uiring 
t he skills of machine to 11 building. During the previous three-four yeaxs a 
nu;ber of very large new en~1neering enterprises had been construct~ , but not 
Ytt aas1.ailated , so that the first priority in 193...~ and 1934 was not the 
l.See Tabl e SA . XX. 
2.See Table SA .XVII, 
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introduction ef new capac! ty but the bring~ up to full use of already 
installed equip ent • Hewever, it was not pesslbly to iuediately curtail 
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aachine tool imports. Dt:!spi te the considerable progress of t he do ... estic industry 
the range of products was stil ~ extremely limited and a nuaoer of essential 
types were not built at all , notably semi-automatic and automatic lathes, 
gear-cutting machines, radial drilling machines, plano-milling machines, broaching 
aachines , vertical turning and boring machines, most types of grinding machines 
a.nd a wide range of specialised and sped.tal "B.chines used in large-batch and 
aass product1on , and precision and heavy engineering . There were also new factories 
which had not yet been fully equipped, one of the large t being the Chelyabinsk 
tractor facto~. 
This contradictory st;tuation accounts rm: t he f<lct. that 1..a19)J machine 
~r 
teo] i.Jiports did not fall as sharply as tether categor ies of machinery , while 
the proportien of total 1mports represented by aach1ne tools reaained almost 
at the 1932 level and the shar~'> of machine tools in total machinery i.Jaports 
rose to a quarter.1 Nevertheles s , in value terms machl.ne tool imports in 1933 
were Jess than half those of the preceding year . On 24th February 1933 NKTP 
issued an order forbi 1ng the import of machinery to the value of 21 mill ion 
rubles , includ lng such categories as transformers, turbines , boilers, pw:tps and 
2 
other i ndustrial machinery, but not machine t eols. Despite this o~ss1on , 
Al'p~rov1ch claimed that the industry was taking it i nto account in deciding 
te domesticall y produce a number of types not oris1nally provided for in the 
annual plan , in particular pipe and coupling machine t•els, multi- tool lathes 
and lar~e 11Uling uchines. J 
By 1935 it appeared that the Soviet planners' strategy for technical-econoa1c 
independence had achieved its aim. In 1934 total imports and machinery and 
equipment imports both fell to the level of the mid-'twenties, while machine 
tool imports 1n both value and weight tP.rms fell to celow the level of 1926/27. 
This pro!Z'esa was maintained in 1935, when only 3,374 units were aported ' 
1.See Table SA .XVII . 
2.Za .Ind.,26.2.JJ. 
) .Za .Ind. ,1 .J .JJ. 
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representing a mere 9 per cent of total annual supply . Problems were now 
arising, however , which tl-tteatened to upset this favoura ble course of development 
and force t he Soviet Union te resort to a higher l evel of machine tool imports. 
The expansien of the main vehicle factories and the buil ding ef a major new 
bearings factory in ilaratov, coupled with t he expansion of the First btate 
Bearings Factory in lofoscew presented a substantial demand for hig-preductivity 
machine tools , many of a specialised nature . These pro jects received considerable 
publicity from the end of 1934 but, at the same time, there must al s o have been 
aany less advertised construction projects relating to t he aircraft and 
armaments sectors which requ.ired similarly advanced machines in large numbers. 
c 
The decision t• meet a lar~e share of this new demand fro.11 domestic pro;l ufion 
posed a formidable task before the immature Soviet machl ·e toel industry voth 
in terms of quantity , but more imp•rtantly in terms of quality, and the very 
tight schedules fixed by the .l.arty and government proved teo difficult to 
ful.rn . Thus, in 1936 the govern111elrl: was forced to author ise substantial i mports 
and a delegation , which included ~l'perovich and Sorokin, was sent to t he USA 
to supervise the ordering of the necess ary equipm '"'nt. In 1936 a total of 
8,157 units was imported to a valu~ of over 40 million rubles, while t he s hare 
of' machine t ool imports in a l l machinery and equipmant imports r ose to one third , 
1 
and in total tmports to 13 per cent : t he highest proportion yet reached. In 
1937 the level of imports fell again , but not t o the low point of 1935. 
A feature of the machine tool imports of the Second and Third Five-year 
Plan per iods was the inst ability of t he pattern of supply from different countries 
induced by the complexities of the international situatien which characterised 
t he nineteen thirties. The rise to power of Hitler led to a temporary decline in 
Soviet-German trade which lasted until a new credit agreement was siuned in 
1\pril 1935 . This provided for RM 200 mill i on bank credit for five years. This 
Soviet 
nn credit did not prevent the German share of/ machine tool i mports f alling to 
its lowest level since 1924' 25 - only JO per cent of total imports in 1935· 
l.See TablesSA .XVI aad XVII. 
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Tbe 1 ~P1 was f Uled to a l arge e xtent by an increase 1n the share of .dritish 
aach1ne tool imports . The recognition by t he USA of the USSR 1n December 1931 
led to no i.Jilmed iate substantial change 1n trading r elations despite Soviet hopes 
at the tlae, but in 1936 the American share roseto one third. During 1936 and 
1937 problems of credit led to avery l ow level of ordering frO!!I Britain. The 
1935 German credi t , however , was devoted to purchasing machine tools to 
the extent of 43 per cent of its total value1 , leading to a very marked rise 
1.n the German share,which reached 72 per cent 1n 1937 . From about 1935 a 
new factor began to exert an influence on Soviet ability to buy foreign machine 
tools , namely the len~then~ of delivery times as the industries of the aajor 
pro1ucing countries recovered from the Depression and began tn undertake large 
erders associated with rearmament programrres. With lengthening delivery times, 
conditions of payment also tended to deteriorate . These new problems were stressed 
by l!.aganovich 1n August 1935 and led to a ca11 for one hundred percent freedom 
!roa foreign dependence. 2 Concern over the extension of deltvery tlllles became 
especially acute from the begin--.!ng of 1937• 1n Janaary it waz reported that 
American delivery times had reached 8 months, whereas two or three years earlier 
aach1nea could be supplied 1n only two months .3 By May delivery times for ~ritis~ 
chines reached 9-12 months and for German machines from 18 months to two yens.4 
The Second Five-year Plan peried. saw the f irst Soviet JDachille tool exports , 
ada1ttedly on a very small scale • In 1934 a nUIIber of uch1nes,1nclud1ag 'Udllurt' 
lathes, were sent to Turkey5 , and in subsequent years a small quantity of 
nachine tools was exported to Ch1na,Mongol1a,Holland,Iran and Turkey .
6 
In the 
awa er ef 1935 the spectre of Soviet competition was raised f or the first time 
1n Bri tain. Soviet small tools had be~un to reach the Baltic 111arkets and , later 
ln the year 
1 
France. One observer was quite certain that cheap uchine tools 
Wtuld eoon follow 1 "lt 1s certain that bef ore the next twelve months are -ast 
Bn~lish machine tool manufacturers will be faced with new and formidable competi t1c 
1n u.ny markets , such as Italy, France and Holland". 7 It i s doubtful whether 
the Soviet industry shared this confidence at this time! 
1.Edelu.n,M. ,How Rus s ia preparedsUSSR beyond the Urals ,H&.rlllond!ilf• rth ,1942 ,p.45 . 
2.Zaind . ,1.8 .35 . 
3 .1b~ . ,12 .1.3? . 
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In the final year of the Secood Five-year Plan imported machine t ool s 
represented only 7.5 per cent of total supply, but this overall share gi ves 
an inaccurat e impression of t he real l evel of import dependence for two main 
reasons. First , imported machines went predominantly to heavy industry a 1n 1936 
three quarters of a l l imported metal cutting machine tools were installed in 
heavy industry , and a further one fifth in the rail transport sector~ Therefore,it 
is probabl e that the role of imported machines in the engineering industry 
was substant ial ly great er than indicated, especially in high-priority branches. 
Second, the overall figure C()nceals considerable variation in the extent of 
dependence f or d if.&-erent types of machine tools .Table3 MJXprov1des an approxilllate 
scale of import dependence at the end of the Second Five-year Plan period, the 
scale refl ecting quite accurately the degree of complexity of production of 
var ious types? Thus , imports played t he largest role in the case of gear-cutting, 
grinding, broaching machines ,and radial drilling machines, but an 
extremely small role in the case of shaping, vertical drilling , tool and cutter 
grinding machines and l athes . This tabl e also reveals the consider able So 11et 
success in mastering the production of tur:retlathes,milling, planing and l!Joring 
aachines and , above all , automatic and semi- automatic lathes . 
Machine Tool Imports During t he Third Five-Year Plan , 1938 - 1940 
Despi te the considerable progresb made by Soviet machine tocl building 
tlfi nkt<J during the second Five- year Pl an toe domestic industry was still 
not able to meet a l l the requirements of industry, in particular for specialised 
high-productivity equipment required ~ the aircra.:ft and motor industry and in 
the areas of heavy and precision machine tools, both vital for military production 
The demands of the expans1en of the defence industries during the pre-' ar 
years could not be met by the domestic industry alone , forcing the Soviet 
Union to resort to substantial imports trhich accounted for a very high proportien 
~Za!nd ., 12.1 .)7 ; 26 . 5 . 37· 
5.~. ,14.6 . )4. 
~ .See Tabl e SA .XXV . 
7.Varwick ,A .J . ,The Machin i st ,15.6 . J5, p.297 • 
~.!_neshnyaya torgovlya , 19J~ ,No .2 ,p . 6 • 
9.See p. 567 . 
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imports 
tf total machinery and equiprrent/( reach1.ng 47 per cent 1n 1939) and the hiahest 
,proportien ef tot al imperte ( 18 per cent in 1939) in Soviet history. The 
ehare of illported machine tools 1n total 1nstallatiens nevertheless remained 
at the low level of 1937• j_mports as a percentage of total supplyin 1938-40 
averaged only 7 . 7 c:ompared with 13.7 in the Secend Five-year Plan . 
In the Third Five- year Pl an per1od,as before , the general state of relations 
between the Soviet Uni on and the three main machine tool supplying countries 
exerted a major infl uence on the pat tern of trade . In 1938 and 1939 tlo)e British 
uchine tool industry made a substantial contribution under a .£10 million credit 
agreement , almost half of which was used for buying machine tools,pr1aarily 
for the defence industries . 1 Exports from the United 'States reach·ed their 
highest level 1.n the pre-\~ar years : in 1938 when they accounted f or over sixty 
percent of total Soviet imports in value terms, and a high level was 111ainta1ried 
1.n 1939. The Soviet Union was thus fortunate in being able to obtain large 
quantities of American high-productivity equipment at the very time when a 
major aircraft industry develop,.ent progrBJ!lllle was oeing executed . The German 
share in Soviet imports d eo lined sharply , reaching 1 ts lowest 1 evel 1n the pre-
• ar oeriod in 1938. A feR ture of the immediate pre-War years was the large import 
of precision Ma~hine tools from Switzerl~nd, especially in 1935 and 1940. 
After the conclusion of the Soviet~erman non-agreas ion pact of August 
1939 tbe situation changed abruptly. An a~eement of 19th August provid ed f o 1 the 
supply of RM 200 million worth of machinery and equipment to the US R. But wblie 
aachine tool imports frem Germany rose in 1940 they did not do so to the extent 
ctesired by Soviet industry . The German machine tonl 1.ndust:ty was slow in 
!Wiilling Soviet orders J part of t~e supply derived from Czechoslovakia and 
c.Jt Cermany .2 One recent Soviet work claims that the USSR purchased 9,274 units 
of metal cutting machine tools 1n 1940 , compared with a total of 4,589 usually 
ctt~ and confirmed by the offical trade statistics •3 A pos sible explanation 
~~delman,op cit , p . 46 . 
2.Sutton,A .C. ,Western technoloey and soviet econo!ll1C develoo.::ent, ol .2 ,p.J4j . 
3.A.as ' yanenko, V.I. ,Zavoevanie.top cit , p.299 • 
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is that the larger total includes machines purchased out !'\Ot in fact delivered 
in 1940 . With the outbreak of the Second korld ~ar the .6:.titish and French 
aa.rkets were closed to Soviet industry and in the summer of 1940 the American 
gove\}Anent imposed an embargo on ma·~hine tool e "<ports to Russia and "a pan. 
"achtnes ordered by the Soviet Union aocumlated 1n stores until released after 
the German attack in June 1941 . 1 No information is available on Boviet 
aachine to"'l imports in 1941 . Machine tool supply uncertatntJ nust have created 
,!onsiderable problems for Soviet industry in the three pre-War years and , i f 
circumstances had been ~ore favourable.it is reasonable to as~ume that imports 
would have been at a rather higher level . 
Having examined the general developme~t of Soviet machine tool iMports 
in the pre-war years we turn to two questions requiring more detaUed consideration 
first, the influence of the Dep~ession and ,second , the structure of Soviet 
machine tool i JIIports during the pre-War Five-year Plans. 
The ~epression and Soviet Hachine Tool Imports 
It is usually assumed that the Depression led to a reduction of machinery 
prices which to some extent compensated for the sharp fa.ll in the prices of 
primary products that had such a dam~ing influence on ::,oviet foreign trade of the 
First Five-year Plan period . It is extremely dif:ftcult to analyse the pattern 
of tli'ice movements for machine tools because of the changing structure of such 
~ports , in particular the varying shares of expenstve,high-productivity 
~chinery and of heavy machine tools. Price movements mus\f~g seen in the 
cootext of the credit terms available at any given tt~e . But on the bads of 
tne available (limited) evidence , it ap:cears that • 1n the case of machine 
~ools, no real benefit was secured in the years of peak i!llports , 1930 to 
19)2 1 price reductions of a ny real consequences only occu:red during and 
~t~ 1932 ,until the market revived f~oM 1935, i . e . during the years when Sovtet 
!.a;10rts were at their lowest point . This does not mean that tbere were not 
eru 1 1 to be secured durin~ the crisis yeas, notably in _ c a. non-price advantages 
i. .Vagoner , op cit , pp . 279- 280 ; Stettinius,E.R . ,Lend- lease ,Rarmoadsworth, 1944,p ,111. 
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relation to ease of placing orders, short delivery times and the willingness 
of capitalist firms to trade with the Soviet Linion even in cases in which 
!;OVernments attempted to discourage such trade . 
Seme evidence on price movements is presented in the following table. 
This shows the value per unit weight of total Soviet metal-cutting machine tool 
and 
1•ports,/the equivalent indicator for British and German exports to the USSR • 
'hole 10.II 
Il'\<ilces of Value per Unit Weight of Soviet Machine T•ol 
r 
Soviet Imports(total) 
German Exp~rts to USSR2 
British Exports 
, not available 
1. 1927/28 
to USSR 
1928 
?21 
?3 
• 
1929 - 100 
1929 1930 
100 106 
100 89 
100 86 
2.Includ1ng metal- forming machines 
Source • USSR - calculated from Table S A . 'l< v l · 
1931 1932 
96 80 
81 73 
78 68 
Imports 
1933 1934 1935 
58 73 59 
60 49 79 
72 71 54 
Germany - Statistischee Jahrbuch fUr das deutsche Reich, vario l~ years . 
Britain- Annual statement of the trade of the United Kingdom,.,various 
years . 
SiaUa.r evidence is not available for the United States, but the value per 
unit of metal-cutting machine tools built 1n the USA during the crisis years 
1 
actually rose , falling below the1929 level only 1n 1935· As the above table 
re·,eal.s, prices in 1929 were exceptionally high because of the tense market 
aitua.tion of that year, and if this is taken into account 1 t is apparent that 
t he Depression gave the USSR litt.le benefit 1n terms of lower prices in the 
J"ars of peak imports. One reason for this phenomenon is no doubt the fact that 
!a.r from falling in the Depression, total world machine tool exports actually 
ttae under the influence of Soviet purchases , only declining from 1932 as Soviet 
Cl!!\i.Qd slackened to reach a lew point 1n 1934.
2 
- I 
!. lalue per unit of machine teols built in the USA rose as follows ( 1929-100) 1 
1930 - 110;1931 - 114, 19)2 - 112 ; 1933 - 108; 1934 - 100 ' 1935 - 99 
Calculated frem 'Wagoner , op cit,pp .362-363. ,... 
2 • .See Mishustin ,D.D. ,yneshnyaya torgovlya 1 industrializatsiya S;:; -.R,M. ,1938,p.1_56. 
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It appears that relative price differentials between supplying countries 
did exert an influence on Soviet ptn'chasing pelioy a.ndthat serious efforts were 
aade to minimise foreign exhange expenditures. On a number of occasiens throughout 
the period it was claimed that British machine tools were over-priced 1n relation 
to those of other countries. This point was ~e by SorCI.kin of :::itanko1mport 1n 
19)1 and by representatives of the Soviet industry at the London Machine Tool 
Exhibition 1n 1934J on both occasions the high prices were regarded as an 
1 obstacle to baw1ng 1n .oritain . These high British prices partly arose because 
d the exceptionally high interest and -ther charges imposed by the Exports Credit 
Guarantee Department and the banks.In 1932 it was admitted that excess insurance and 
interest charges inflated the price of machine teols exported to the ossa by 
up to 20 per cent above normal levels. 2 American machines were also considered 
highly pricedJ, but the higher pro·luctivity usually obtained was regarded ~s 
adequate compensation. The Soviet side had some countervailing power, however, 
ste!Mling from the monopoly ef foretgn trade. It appears t hat Stankoimport 
regularly used its monopoly buying power to promote competition between foreign 
firms for securing Soviet orders. Competition between foreign machine to 1 
firJts was explicitly cited as a mechanism enabling S.viet industry to obtain 
l!lacbines for the Gor' kli automobile f actory and the Chelyabinsk tractor f~ctory 
at lower prices than would otherwise have been possible , g iving large f oreign 
excbange savin~s.4 
In considering the influence of the Depression of Soviet machine tool imports 
1t is of some interest to cansider the reverse influence,Le.the impact of the 
Soviet market on the machine tool industries of Germany, the USA and Britain 
during the cr isis years. There is no doubt that exports to the USSlt played a 
very significant role during the years 1930 to 1933, as the follewing table 
demonstrates. This shows that in 1932 82 per cent of British machine tool exports 
went to the USSR and 75 per cent of German exports. Many Western machine tool t•r,..J 
1.~.,11.1.31JMach1nery,16.7.31,p .490; Engineering,1 5 . 2 . 35 ,p.164. 
2 .Machinery, 24.11 • 32 p. 234. 
) .For example Torg}rero.Gaz . ,31.12.27 (Al'pP.rovich) · 
4.!:£11 indust;iaf'.r:ye, M.,1973(2nd edn.),p.81;Letoois 'Chelyabinske(O trak.tornogo, 
.1229-1945 ,6!. ,M. , 1972, P • 79 • 
. 
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!able tO.III 
Exports to the USSR as a ~o rtion of total machine tool ex rts 
(per cent of exports by value 
Country 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
Geruny 10. 6 22.8 51.1 74 .6 6) .1 27.) 
USA 6.) 40.0 64.? 25.0 10.2 14.4 
United Kin!ttolll 4.9 15 . 1 6?.0 81.7 51.6 )6.4 
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Source s Germany - calculated from Statistisches Jahrbuch f~as deutsdle aeich, 
various years . -
USA -Handbook of the Soviet Union,N .Y.,19J6 , ppJ6J-365. 
UK - Calculated from Annual statement of the trade of the United 
Kingdom, various years. 
owei their survival during the Depression to Soviet orders and this fact was 
frankly ada1tted at the time.1 As a result, many thousands of skilled workers 
and apecialista were retained in elllployment and a basis maintained for furthering 
~echnical progreas and supplying equipaent when the economies revived in the 
1d-' thirties. 
There were also other less obvious consequences of the Soviet orders . First, 
the Soviet industry specified high standards of accuracy and workmanship . A 
British expert , writing 1n 1948, observed thRt; "Russia is a vezy discriminating 
buyer and will insist on the highest quality machines at the lowest possible 
~ice . Russian quAlity re1uirements should not be lightly dismissed as capricious. 
If the effect of Russian orders on the German machine teol i ndustry between 
1925 and 1940 mAy be taken as an exaaple , lar!e uosian orders may be benefic1al 
to our u.ch1ne tool trade 1n the long run by improving design and accu..."Acy 
2 or i)erforaance L'ld forcing rational. production on our ID&llufacturers" . The Soviet 
laport organisations appear to have been thorough 1n enforcing quality standards; 
1n 1931 and 19)2 alone 617 official cla1.Jas were flied &£&U1at foreign fir1ls 
!or breach of &!Teed standards, al.aost two-thirds of these relating to the 
Cer~ 1nduetry.J soviet representatives visited supplying firms to check quality 
l.The following comments are typicala on Soviet orders to the Cleveland (USA) 
lachine tool industry in 1930 -"Had it not been for these orders, IIWlY Cleveland 
factories would have shut down when automobile orders temporarily stooped" 
(Ql!veland plain dealer ,2 . 1 .30, cited by Bron ,S .C. ,~et economic develop~ 
and Aiierican busineas ,N .Y. ,19JO,p.53) ; the annual report of a leading GeTIWl firll, 
Reinecker,in 1931 -"The future of out enterprisedepends exclusively on t he 
dnelon.ent of business with Russia" (Cited by Anders ,t&Ind. ,29.10.32) HUser, 
r- ceat. .next ~e. 
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and in soae cases an informal quality check was provided by foreign Communists 
&nd other sympathetic workers who strived to ensure that the Soviet Union 
4 
received high-quality products. It appears that 1n the early 'thirties 
inspection procedures abroad were run down with the decline of Soviet 11\pmrts , 
but 1n April 1935 a meeting of interested parties was organised by the Commissariat 
of Foreign Trade to discuss methods of improving the situation. Following this, 
a system of inspectors was organised - machines being built fer Soviet industry 
were checked in the course of construction directly at the sup ,lying factories 
by Soviet representatives • This work was the responsibility of Stankoimport 
and ,later, the machine tool building g1avk.s 
A second major consequence of the Soviet machine to~l imports of the 
OPpression period and after was that it helped to foster the production of 
Aaer1can-type, high-productivity machines in ~'iestern Eurepe, many of these 
being copies (with agreement) of American models which the Soviet Uaion was 
buying in quantity. 6 This practice allewed the USSR te buy American machines 
~ Europe at lower prices and on easier credit terms than would otherwise have 
b~eo possible . Thus, while Soviet industry greatly benefited from the importatien 
of a large quantity of modern machine tools during the First Five-year Plan 
years,th1s ~ads ~qually benefited the machine tool industries of tbe capitalist 
countries by keeping firms in business , maintaining a heal thy export ~ket, 
I2!s1ng quality standards and fostering the productian of products of a bigb 
tecllnical level. 
the economic attache of the "'erman eM.bassy in Noscow throughoutthe 1930s, was 
quite emphatic that, .. If several important German manufacturing firms,particularly 
.1n the field of machine tools, weathered the Depress ion and could be put to work 
by Hitler in his reama.ment efforts after 19)3, it was due exclusively to 
Soviet orders which kept thef!l in businessn • 
{H1.1ger,G,The incomoatible allies,N .Y. ,195J,p.240 . ) 
~J'earney ,L.A., The engineer, Vo1.186 ,17 .12 .48, p.627 • 
J .Kds 'yanenko,V,I.,How Sovi~t e~ooomy won t~chnical 1ndepeodence,M. ,1966,p.122 
( io English). 
4,Kas'yanenko ,V.I.,Zavoevanie •• ,op cit,p.1701 Byli industr1al'nye,M.,1973,pp82-83.o~ 
5.Yneshnyaya torgovlya,1937,No.2,p.7 J Kas 'yanenko,V .I.,Zavoevanie,op cit,pp.284-2~ 
' .This influence was observed by a Soviet corrunentator in 1933 - Za!nd • ,21.11.:33 • 
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The Structure of Machine Teol Imports 
Given the we~kness of t he Soviet aachine tool industry , the acute sho~e 
of fore~ exchange and the !Oal of technical and ecenomic independence froa 
the capi~liat economies it is of interest to examine the structure of imported. 
uch1ne tools 1n order t o determine the role played by imports and t he 
way 1n which the scarce valuta was spent . Evidence is far from complete, but 
1t. is possible to approximately determine the changing averf.lge weight of imported 
machines , the structure by basic t ypes , and the relative technical level of 
11aported uchines compared with those produced domestically. According to 
the AprU 1932 Censt.s of metal-working equipment, !aported machines during the 
First Five-year Plan years were installed predominantly in the aacb1ne build~ 
and aetal-werkirig sector , 64 per cent of the total •nstallatlons 1n this 
aector between 1929 and Aprll 1932 were of foreJ.ct erigin. 1 Soae of the new 
branches created at this ti.Jile were equipped al~nost entirely with i11ported 
•achi nes l notably t he tractor and vehicle building branchee,the stocks of which 
1n April 1932 2 consisted of ninety per cent or more fore .1gn machine teols. 
T&bleSA.»Y.r indicates the branches of the engtne ring industry heavily dependent 
on imported machines during the First Five-year Plan J these branches including 
the machine teol industry itself'. 
The structure of imported machine teols by basic types is indicated 
by Table SA;I..V 3. This information i s not d irectly ceapatible Jrlth data presented 
6l~where on the structure of domestic output because some categories (notably 
~~-cuttin~ ~achines) nave been excluded 1n order to obtain a consistent series, 
and the structure is shown in value terms rather t han physical units . However, 
t.he latter difference is not serious • data on the structure of 1Jilports 1n unit 
tens available for 1936-1938 indicates that the value structure provides a 
~t:-d approximation. Two features stand out; first , the rising share of automatic 
and seal-automatic lathes ,which gradually displaced tur..x:et lathes as the Soviet 
l.ndnstry succeaafull.y assliiUated t he latter, and,second, the rising prop.cction of 
l.Se~ Appendix 3, p.461 . 
2 .See Table SA .M.VI , p . 5?4 . 
).See p. 569 . 
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srwding machines, reaching almost 30 per cent of total i~ports in 1938. If 
the import structure is compared with the structure of domestic production 
(TableSAY::I).t can be s een that lathes and drilling machines represented a m11ch 
lewer preportion of tetal imports, while autos ann semiautos and grinding machines 
and Third 
represented a much higher proportion. The situation in the Second/Five- year 
Plan changed to some extent because the Soviet U.nion was forced to import a 
wide range of heavy types of machine tools, in particular special lathes, becallSe 
t f the weakness of the domestic heavy machine tool building branch. The shift 
towards heavier imported machines can be s een clearly from data on the average 
weight per unit machine teol imported , which reveal that the average weight 
rose sharply in the course of the First Five-year Plan , fell in the early years 
of the Second, and then r ose strongly, reaching a very high level in 1939: 
Table 10.IV The Aver!!e Unit Weight of Iaported Machine Tools 
{tonnes) 
1929 1.92 1933 5.10 1937 6.48 
1930 2.5? 1934 2.61 19)8 5.57 
1931 3.?4 1935 4.02 1939 11.62 
1932 5.08 1936 4.33 1940 4.84 
Source a Calculated f rom TableSA.XVI. 
The general categories presented in TableSA.x.<Iconceal progressive changes 
taking place within each type group . As t he Soviet industry assiJBllated the 
pro1uction of ever more complex types the structure of 111ports correspondingly 
changed. This can be seen clearly in the case of the lathe group (Table SA .XL..!)· 
The share of single tool standard machines fell, as did the share of turret 
l athes with the ass1milation of the im.Ordzhonikidze factory. The share of 
automatics and such specialised types as wheel lathes and crankshaft lathes 
rose, however, as did the category 'other types' , which embraced primarily 
speouu 1 1 tptalnl and specialised models. This shift of emphasis from 
pr~domina..ntly general purpose types to special and specialised machines , within 
a period of only about five years, clearly shows the success of the Soviet !.aport 
.!!ubstitution policy. 
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Additional evidence on the structure of imported machine tools compared 
with domestically produced machines is presented in TableSSA .lllll .The very 
considerable difference in the structure of installations of Soviet and foreign 
origin is clearly apparent, the imported equipment showing a marked bias towards 
such progressive t ypes as automatics, milling and grinding machines . But no 
less 1Jilportant is t he very substantial diff erence in the ~echn1cal. level 
of foreign and Soviet machine tools at the time of the First Five-year Plan . 
shown in fableSA~~he parameters of the Soviet machines refer mainly t o the 
old models built prior to 1932 . This table reveals t hat the average power 
of Soviet built machines was consistentl y lower than for imported machines of 
the same type, while the overwhelming majority of ~oviet machines were fitted 
with stepped pulley drive ,rather than a gearbox, and many had no Pker feed -
aechanism . But a further important fact emerges from this table J the technical 
level of imported machines rose sharply 1n the course of the Plan period , as 
can be seen from the averase po~er and the share of machines fitted with gearboxes . 
Tt}is was a ti.Jile when machine tool technology was moving forward as designs were 
changed to permit the full use of new hard alloy tools • 1he new machines were 
generally of greater weight and power and driven through a gearbox f rom an 
11\d ~vidual electric mot or . This ev~ence suggests that the Soviet Union was 
indeed importing the last word of technology available in the capitalist 
countries. 
The role of imported machine tools in raising the t echnical level of 
the Soviet engineering industry during the F'irst Five-year Plan period is 
1 revealed by Table SA. JOtll:r'hos e branches experiencing rapi d growth with a very 
high proportion of imported machines had a stock in April 1932 characterised 
by a very high proportion of special and speci<tlised machines, a rel .a.tlvel y 
h~h share of a utomatic a nd semi-automatic mac , ines , a low proportion of lathes 
and planing machines And a relatively high proportion of machines 1nstal1 ed in 
a flow-type arrangement. In general, t he higher the share of imported equipment, 
the more progressive the structure of the stock. This evidence , together with 
t.Table SA .XXVI, p. 57 5. 
10.24 
377 
further evidence on the transition from highly universal to more specialised 
nachines during the First Five-year Plan( presented in Apnendix 3 ) , suggests 
tut Granick is incorrect in his assertion that a"General purpose machine 
tools completely dominated the machine tool imports of the First Five-year 
Plan" •1 
Conclusion 
It bas been asserted by one Western writer that;" The depe1\dence ctf the 
Soviet Union on the 'til est was as great in 1945, as far as machille tools were 
concerned , as in 1932" , and furthe th t n f th h 1 i d d , r , a , • • • or e w o e per o un er 
consideration (1930-45) the Soviets ~epended entirely on more advanced countries 
for imports of machine toole beyond the two simplest types'' •2 (The' simplest types' 
being lathes and vertical drilling machines) . The evidence presented here 
demonstrates the absurdity of these claimsa by 1940 the Soviet Union had made 
very considerable progress in freeing herself from foreign dependence with 
respect to machine toolsa the domestic industry could build all but the most 
complex , special and specialised t ypes and , despite immense demands imposed 
by defence considerations, imported machines accounted for less than ten per cent 
of total sup'>ly during the years of the Third Five-year Plan. 
On t~e whole the machine tool import strategy pursued from the beginning 
of t"'e First Five-year Plan was very successful. During t"le initial period, 
taking advantage of t1e f avourable circWilStances created by the Depress ion, 
aachine tools were imported on a substantial scale and made a major contribution 
to the creation of a modern engineering industry during the early 'thirties, 
providing a basis for rapidly reducing imports of m-achinery and equipment of all 
types. Largely on the basis of imported machinery, a base for the domestic 
~oduction of machine tools was created during the First and Second Five- year 
Lguar+.erly journal of economics,Vol.?1,No.2,p.21?,f.n.4. 
2.Sutton ,A ,C, ,Western techn('logy and Soviet economic development ,1930 to 194.5, 
Stanford, 1971,pp.140 & 144. 
10.25 378 
Plans , permitting a sharp reduction of iJI.ports by 19341 .By strictly limiting 
!.aport poss ibilities, the government forced the domestic industry to build ever 
aore complex t ypes . This import substitution policy meant that foreign exchange 
resources were devoted to purchasing an ever narr ower tan ge of types not yet 
covered by the domestic industry notably, in the second half of the decade, 
heavy and ?recision machine tools, and special and nighly specialised models, 
~ particular those required by the defence industries. This strategy led to 
machine tools forming an increasing share of total machinery and equipment imports , 
at the same time as the volume of such imports steadily declined , 
The realisation of this im~ort policy was seriously complicated by the 
tnternational relations of the period and by problems of securin~ adequate 
credit. These difficulties imposed constraints on the choice of suppliers and 
heightened uncertainty1 these factors probably helping to intensify pressure 
to reduce machinery imports to a minimum as rapidly as possible . A crucial 
factor 1n import policy and practice in th~se conditions was the monopoly 
of foreign trade , which allowed tbe Soviet government to exert strict control 
over machine tool imports and provided the basis -for a strong bargaining 
position 1n dealings with foreign firms, to some extent countering the unfavourable 
trading conditions facing the Soviet Union because of t he suspicion and hostlli ty 
of ~overnments of capitalist countries at this time. l.o inally, while some 
Vestern writers (e.g .Sutton) stress the importance of "estern exports and 
assistance to the USSR as a major factor in industrialisatio,n , in the case of the 
II&Chine tool industry there was a very definite r everse influence: tne Soviet 
trade of the First Five-year Plan period was instrwaental 1.n securing the 
amvlval o~ many machine tonl building firms in Geraany, Britain and t he USA 
during the years of the Depression - the machine tool branch by its very nature 
being especially vulnerable in conditions of economic crisis. 
1.Th1s reduction was perhaps excessively sharp& a more gradual reduction of 
11achine tool imPOrts 1n 1933 - 1935 , taking advantage of the exceptiona~ly 
low prices :prev~U 1ng at the t1Jfte ( 1n part, of coll!:se, a ,PI'Oduct of the ~ov 1et. 
withdrawal from the market), could have eased the pressure on the do~estic 
industry during the complex period of the transition to new models and tne 
widening of the tipazh . 
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Chapter 11 
THE LABOUR FORCE AND THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE loiACHTh"E TOOL INDUSTRY 
Macn1ne tool building in western Europe and tne United States has 
traditionally been regarded as an activity the success of which is cru.c1ally 
dependent on tne existence of a hisJly skUlrJ.force of workers and engineering 
and design specialists. As Sov1et obser.vers frequently pointed out, these skills, 
eoupled with accumulated experience , enabled machine tool firms to build nigh 
quality , technically advanced machines even though the machinery and equipment 
~xploited was often old and worn as a res\ll.t of prolonged under-investaent. Most 
of the leading Vestem machine tool firms had by the end of the 1920s several 
decades of practical experience and possessed abody of specialised knowledge 
frequently relat~ to a limited range of tvpes of machine tools, or even a single 
type. When 1t embarked on the formation of a modern machine tool industry the 
Soviet Union possessed almost no such body of skills and experience 1 the early 
atteapts at aach1ne teol building which took place beeJtre the Hevolution left 
~y any legacy in terms of a skilled force of workers and apec~lists . In 
this chapter we examine how the Soviet industry tackled the formidable problern 
of bu11d1n! up a skilled labour force , and the impact of the acute snortage of 
s1tllls on the path of development of the branch . 
The Formation of a new Labour For ce - The First Five-year Plan 
The only factory with an unbroken tradition of aachlne tool building in 
1929 was the '1frasny1 Proletarii ' works, but. even here machine tools were not 
th,. sole product , many workers being engaged in diesel engine building . At the 
le:tin!rad 1J! .Sverdlova factory continuity was broken by a period of conservation , 
although a nWlber of experienced workers did return and played a va.lua'ble role 
1n training new cadres during the 1920s.1 The number of wori<ers
2
engaged in 
aachlne t ool buUding at the main enterprises (later entering into the specialised 
branch) 1n 1928 totalled a mere 4, 170~ while in 1930 there were only 
4 
two ht~ndred engineers involved 1n machine tool building in the USSR . By 19)1 
1.Borisov and v as11 ' ev op ci t,pp.t0)-104. 
2.Follow1ng the Soviet ' terminology •workers ' refers here to production wo..ckers only . 
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the quality of t he intake of new workers in terms of skUl, age and experience 
'I -began to decline • he 'lfrasnyi ..l:'roletarii 1 factory complained about the unsui ta bU1 ty 
oi new recruits in July 1930; and as an alternative it contracted for the transfer 
of 150 demobll1sed Red Army men as a source of potential skilled workers - these 
en were fo\Uld to be highly suitable because they were disciplined and a high 
proportion were Party members.5 But, as the Five-year Plan progressed, the 
ma~ source of new recruits for both existing and newly constructed enterprises 
recame the rural youth . These workers f rom the country generally lacked any 
industrial experience, were not acc ustomed to factory discipline , and a high 
prooortion were ill iterate and of a. very low general educational standard. The 
enterprises were suddenly faced with the difficult task of training hundreds 
of new workers , while at the same time production was being expanded and the 
transition to new models undertaken . 
The nature lSf the intake of new workers made the problems of the new 
eoteDprises particularly acute. At t he Gor ' kii milling machine factory ,for 
6 
e ~mple, in 1932 45 per cent of the workers were from the peasantry , and at 
the im.Ordahon1kidze works at the end of 1932 half the collective consisted 
of youths and young girls of between 18 and 23 years of age and only a few months , 
if a.ny, industrial experience.? Even at the beg inning of 1931, i.e. before the 
real influx of new workers began , 35.7 per cent of all the wor kers 1n the branch 
were under 23 years of age. The nW'lber of womea in thelabour f 6rce also rose 
~ticlly t their share of the total increased from 4.4 per cent at the 
8 
beginning of 1931 to 26 .8 per cent by the end of the year . /.lt"lougb firm 
f"w'1 ~ence i.s lacking there is little doubt tba t the average skill level of the 
labour force declined 
grade of machine tool 
sharply between 1929 and 1932. In April 1932 the average 
9 operators 1n tbe branch was 3 .1 , and the overall a.vera~e 
).Ku~netaova,N ,V. ,Bor'ba rabochep;o klassa za sozdan te no kh otraslei 
l?!omyshlennosti v p;ody pervoi pYatiletki Aftorefera.t ,M. ,1973,p .10. 
t ,Pucbko ,A .A. ,Razvl tie stankostroitel ' nol promysh!.ennost1 na Ukraine v dovoenny1 
1e_t:1od , 1917- 1940gg, (Aftoreferat) ,Kiev ,1970 , p.18 . 
5.Zaind. ,5 .7 . JO . t ' K 
6,Kuznetsova,oo cit , p . ll.The proportion at the new Moscow tooling fac ory , alibr', 
·as very s i milar , 47 per cent , suggestinP" t hat t his was a general phenomenon -
7 s"ezd Sovetov ~~1 . ,19J5 ,Byullet en ' No . 5 , p .27 • 
7 .Pravda ,20 . 12 • 32 • 
,J:uznetsova . oo cit , p.11 . 
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grade for leading factories 1n 1932 was at about the same low level, e • • g. 
'Krasnyi Proletarii' had an average grade of ) .1 , workers of the lowest grades, 
1 and 2 , together with trainees , accounting for 53 .4 per cent of t he ,.-erk force} 
and at the 1m.Sverdlova factory the averagegrade was 3.08 in 1931.2 Evidence 
for a deterioration of skill levels can be found in the fact that otber lxranches 
of a not dissimilar nature which grew more slowly during the years 1929-1932 had 
a higher average skill level 1n the final year . Thus, for example, while the 
average grade of machine tool operators 1n the machine tool industry 1n April 1932 
was 3 . 1 (64.0 per cent of the stock having been installed since 1929) ; in tbe 
locomotive-wagon branch the average grade was ).5 (17 .6 per cent of machines 
installed since 1929) and 1n the branch producing equipment for the fuel and 
ore extraction industry the average grade was 3 . 6 ()6 . 4 per cent installed since 
1929) .3 The sho tage of worker s of the highest skills was extremely acute . In 
.. prU 1932 only 89 machine tools of the industry's total stock of 4,849 units 
were being manned by workers of grades 7 and 8 (i.e . 1 . 8 per cent), whereas 
4 one third ofi the stock was being manned by workers of grades 1 and 2. 
The influx of new workers lacking industr ial experience demanded a major 
training ef~ort, both at the established and new enterprises . Between 1928 and 
1932 t he number o~ workers increased by over 9,000 , or 3.2 times.5 Clearly, 
thorough training of all these recruits 1.n order to produce skill ed workers 
llas out of the question 1n the short run 1 resources were lacking and the workers 
were required immedia tely for the expansion of current production. two main 
foras of labour training were adopted ; first, training in factory schools, the 
so-called FZU schools6 : second , training on the job . In addition, some trainlng 
9.0n the eight grade scale. During the 19J0s skills 1n the engineering industry 
were rated as folJ ows 1 Grade 1 - unskilled; Gr ades 2 and 3 - semi-skilled t 
Grade 4 and over _ skilled (Industrializatsiya SS5R,19J3-37,p.475)( occasionally , 
1
: highly skil l ed ' was used, generally meaning Grades 6 • 7 and 8) 
2.Bor1sov and Vasil' ev , op cit,p . 147 • 
3.0borudovanie metalloobrabat a ushchei orom shlennosti,op c1t,vyp.2,pp1J0-133t 
vypJi,p 8- 9 . For the tractor industry 39 . ~ per cent i nstalled since 1929) 
the average grade was only 2 • 9 • 
4.1bid 4 p6B 69 In the fuel and ore equipment ~!laking branch , for comparison, SJt;;~~~ntoof ~he .stock was manned by workers of grades 7 and 8, and 25. 5 
per cent by workers of grades 1 and 2 • 
~·For 1932 , see Table 11.I, p .J94 • 
.. '2u - l'abrichno-zavodskoe uchenie. 
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work for the branch was undertaken by the Central Institute of Labour. Training 
in the machine tool industry appears to have been planned and organised more 
thoroughly than in other branches of the engineering industry. Planned training 
began in the branch in 1929-30,when Stankotrest allocated 1 .4 million rubles 
for worker training activities. 1 At the First All-Union Conference of Industrial 
~'~anagers at t he beginning of 1931 , Kraval ' ,the deputy commissar of lab "'ur, 
noted that the machine tool ob" edinenie was the only one to have a plan for 
the suppl y of cadres to new enterprises. 2 
The basic means of raising the general educational and technical level 
of worker s was the FZU school. By 1930 these schools existed at 'Krasnyi Proletarii' 
and ' Dvigatel' Revolyutsii ' and another was created during the year at im .Sverdlova. 
In 1931 a total of 1,737 workers was studying in FZU schools of Stankoob"edinenie, 
rising to 3 , 361 in 1932.3 At these schools the students received the elements 
of basic general education and literacy, coupled with training for specific 
jobs, much of the latter taking a practical form,e.g.the im.Sverdlova school 
built five lathes during 1932.4 As the schools developed some also trained 
technical workers & in 1932-33 eight designers and twenty-four draughtsmen 
graduated from the im .Sverdlova school . 5 Both im.Lenina and 'Samotochka' has 
a higher form of training centre in the form of school-VTUZy. These centres trained 
not only highly skilled workers ( a three year course at im.Lenina), but also 
6 
senior managerial cadres who underwent a course of up to seven years . The 
'Ko~somolets' factory was again in a different position because it had always 
been a factory-educational establishment, having been founded in 1909 as an 
electrical engineering school for training middle-range technical and managerial 
personnel ; machine tool building was at first simply introduced as a means of 
providing practical experience, and for providing financial support for the school's 
activities. In the First Five-year Plan 'Komsomolets' trained many technicians 
and foremen for the branch . 
l .~Yul.leten ' stankotrest, 1930 ,No • 2-3, P .49 • 
2~~aya vsesoyuznaya konferentsiya, op cit,p.245 . 
3.Vedushcha a rol ' raboche 0 klass v rekonstruktsii om shlennesti SSSR,I-1.,1973, 
tChapter by N .v .Kuznetsova , p.140 . 
4.Borisov and Vasil ' ev,op cit,p.146. 
5.1bid . 
6 ·~1 dostizheniya , 1931 ,No.1 ,p.33· 
The new factories built during the First Five- year Plan period in Gor'kii, 
~oscow and Khar ' kov were i n a particularly difficult situation because they 
lacked a core of at least a few highly skilled wor kers • Furt~ermore, in order 
to start work on completion of construction, workers had to be trained beforehand 
while on-site facilities were absent.These problems were tackled by gathering 
together a number of skill ed workers f rom existing factories to provide a nucleus 
of experienced cadres, and by training the initial intake of workers at the FZU 
schools of other neighbouring enter prises. Thus a school FZU for 600 students 
was organised at the ' Krasnyi Pr oletarii' factory for training workers for the 
new im.Ordzhonikidze works; and at 'Dvigatel' Revolyutsi1' a similar training 
school prepared workers for the Gor'kii factory .1 When the toolroom of the 
Gor 'kli works went into operation in advance of the main shops it was used as 
J 
a training school - each skilled worker trained two or three new workers - while 
making jigs , tools and fixtures for starting up production. 2 The Khar' kov 
factory started work somewhat later than the other two new enterprises. An 
initial nucleus of workers was for med on the initiative of the city committee 
of the Party , which encouraged skilled workers from the town to work there; but 
the main element of the labour force consisted of untra ·.ned young people , and 
for them a FZU school was created at the new enterprise .J 
The factory schools alone were not capable of meeting the needs of the 
enterprises for workers: the influx of workers was too large and factory managers 
were not prepared to see a large proportion of the workforce leave production 
4 
for several months or even years while they acquired machine tool building skills . 
For these reasons many workers undertook various forms of on-the-job training 
without time off from production. This training usually involved attaching oew 
workers to more experienced cadres,who passed on the basic elements of production 
skills while the workers undertook simple, narrowly defined operations. This 
L~dushchaya rol' ,op cit,p.140. 
2.!!_a,sbi dostizheniya ,1932 ,No .6, P• 95· 
3.!nar'kovskii stankostroitel'ny:i,op cit,pp. 11 and 18. 
4.In mid-1930 it was reported that at all Stankotrest -factories there -..as strong 
opoos1tion to workers goi~~ on courses - !vulleten' stankotrest,1930 ,No .2-3,p.50. 
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training was supplemented by a wide range of short-term technical courses, seminars 
and 'circles' which provided a means of inculcating the moretheoretical aspects 
of technical eduat.ion • During t he First and Second Five-year Plan periods a very 
high proportion of the labour force at all machine tool building factories was 
engaged in some form of course of this type. 1 From 1933 a system of voluntary 
technical exams was introduced in t he engineering industry in association with 
the 'technical minimum' system which laid down basic requirements for certain 
jobs. This was later transformed into a system of compulsory state technical 
exams which had to be pa~sed by workers manning certain specified forms of 
equipment. 
On-the-job training schemes in the mac~ne tor l industry were pioneered oy 
the ' Krasnyi Proletarii' factory, which devised them because of dissatisfaction 
with the form of rapid training then being provided by the l!entral Institute 
of Labour. The TsiT courses took place at special workshops and in six mont hs 
provided an int~duction to a limited range of basic skills. The 'Krasnyi 
Proletarii' factory claimed that the skil , level attained was unsatisfactory -
workers from TsiT had to start at only grade 1. On-the-job training provided 
by the enterprise itself on both a brigade basis,i.e. a group training under 
an experienced worker, or individuall~ was found to give superior results: after 
onlv four to six months trainees could work independently at basic machining 
operations on lathes, milling machines, gear-cutting machines, etc., equivalent 
to grades 1 and 2. 2 TsiT did assist with labour training in the branch 1 however, 
notably at the im.Ordzhonikidze factory , where it organised a training shop. The 
instutute also undertook planning work on the required labour force structure 
at all three new enterprises) 
The new workers, ~y of whom had no previous experience of factory life, 
not only had to be tTai.oed 1n basic skills 1 but also taught the essentials of 
factory discipline. The Party, trade union and Komsomol organisations played a 
large role in combating absenteeism, and other breaches of discipline. At the 
1t,Sverdlova factory, for example, absenteeism was attacked by means of a 
'black kassa , , a special pay desk for deviant workers, exposing t nem to public 
11.7 385 
ridicule. a commonly employed f orm of social pressure was the 'comradely court' 
at which workers were judged for infringements of discipline by their colleagues. 
The usual punishment was a fine in theform of a contribution to charity, but 
the court could expel workers from the Lrade Union. 4 The factory newspapers 
which existed at all the machine tool factories also played a major role 1n 
cultivating labour discipline and also in dimeminating production experience. 
Finally, the various socialist emulation movements which developed during 
the First Five-year Plan , notably the 'shock worker' movement, served as a 
means of raising the revel of productive skills and work culture, and provided 
incentives for acquiring greaterskills through such rewards as access to improved 
accomodation, holidays, bonuses and visits to other enter~ses. At the end of 
1929 11 per centof the workers of the branch were involved in e~ulation activities; 
by late 1931 almost two-thirds .5 
In considering this massive training effort an additional factor must be 
taken into account, namely, the high level of turnover of workers. This turnover 
made it very difficult for the factories to achieve a stable , rising skill 
level because many workers, as soon as they had acquired basic skills, moved 
on to other enterprises which could offer better conditions of employment. At 
this time these better conditions frequently amounted to access to accomodation 
and improved canteen facilities. This problem ap ears to have been especially 
acute at the new factories which lacked social , cultural and housing facilities . 
The Gor'kii factory suffered severely in the early years; it was located in an 
area which already had a number of major engineering enterprises ( 'Dvigatel' 
"evolyutsii •, 'Krasnoe Sormovo', and t he new automobile factory), and lacked its 
own housing and transport. A representative of the entetTise described in July 
1933 how 400 <:>ut of 900 workers had left within a five month period: half had 
gone to the GAZ factory which offered much better conditions of work , so that 
l.!edushchaya rol' ,op cit ,p.141 ;Borisov and Vasil' ev • 0 P cit,pp.144-145. 
2.Zalnd. ,10.4.30 ;Prob.Ek. ,1934,No .6, p.132 • 
3.~d.,5.12 •31.TsiT's training work had the backing ofM.Kaganov~cli- at a me"'tin f th c 11 1 of NKTP in June 1932 he declared that , The training 
of ... wor~e~s bye th~ T:iT U:ethod is undoubtably more ef""ectlve than the FZU" 
4 (~I~. ,22.6.32) • • Borisov and ~asil'ev,op cit,p.135· 
5,~usbchaya rol' ,op cit,p.129· 
u.s 
the machine tool factory found itself simply performing a training function for 
the larger , first priority enterprise . 1 This problem persisted ; in t~e fixst 
e~ht months of 1934 925 men were taken on at the Gor'kii factory - and 709 
left , while engineering and technical workers changed with • kaleidoscopic 
rapidity ' •2 The well-established enterprises also suff ered a high rate of 
labour turnover. At the 'Krasnyi Proletarii • factory in the first half of 
1935 , of the total workforce of 3,800, one t housand had left and been replaced.3 
In thi s r espect the machine t ool industry was in a difficult position throughout. 
the period . It required skilled workers , but being a small branch of industry 
with limited resources compared with other branches a.lso in need of similar 
skilled cadres (the auto- tractor industry,aviation , lomotive-wagon building,etc . ) 
it was unable to attract workers bv off ering better housing and social-cultural 
facilities. Its problems wer e exacerbated by the fact that,partly because of 
the high skill requirements , most of the leading machine tool factories were 
located 1n cities which had a concentration of lar!e, high- priority engineering 
enterprises (Moscow,Len1ngrad ,Gor'kii ,Khar ' kov and Kiev) . Thus the specialised 
mac i-Jine tool industry had to adapt itself to a situation 1n which 1t could not 
establish a stable labour force of the quality desired . the military 
machine tool building factories were 1n a much bettersituation in this respect . 
'he Tula,Izhevsk,im. Ka11n1na (Leningrad) ,Lugansk,.Penza and other machine tool 
buUd1ng shops were part of very large and well - established enterprises presumably 
enjoying the best working conditions and possesaing a force of workers and specialist 
4 
of greater skills and experience than at the glavk factories . 
One of the most important questions o£ the strategy of development of the 
udustry, which it is difficult to determine accuratel~ is t he extent to whicb 
l .Steno amm _ ervo 
0 
vsesoyuznogo soveshchaniya DO stankostroeniyu,oo clt,p.49 . 
2.Pred tie , 193 ,No.19, P • 7 • 
3 .~~d ., 15 .7 . 35· d f f t 
4.This point is confirmed by Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev - the e ence ac ories 
were able to quickly organise large-scale mac~ine tool production because they 
~ highly skilled machine t ool operators and toolmakers and long experience 
of producing armaments on a mass ba. sis • ( P .189) · 
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the suqply of labour during the First Five-year Plan was a causal factor in the 
adoption ofthe policies of the second phase of the industry~s development. Was 
the adoption o~ large- serial production with the widescale use of jigs and 
fixtur&s a direct r esponse to the structure of skills of the new labour force, or 
was the policy adopted and found fortuitously to have the additional benefit 
that workers of low skills could be employed? The problem of resolv ..ng this 
question is that questions of skills and labour supply did not explicitly figure 
in the pOlicy discussion of 1929 to 1931. !t may nevertheless have been 
implicitly accepted by leading members of the branch, VSNKh and other specialists 
that the available labour skills imposed certain constraints which had to be 
taken into account . Fortunately, Al ' perovich' s views on t~e wider problem 
of skills and t he development of industry are known and provide a clue to the 
solution of this problem. in February 1931 at a VSNKh Presidium meeting at which 
Figatner of VSNKh had expres~ed anxiety about the apparent widespread 
lack of concern and action with respect to labour needs and t raining for new 
enterprises, Al ' perovich drew attention to the following factr " •• to date 
the opinion has existed that the new factories need an army of higly skill ed 
turners,etc. as was the case for technically backward production . .It 't-akes years 
to tralil workers of such skills. -Dut now, as a conseque .ce of splitting up the 
la ,our process into its simplest elements , it is ooss ible to train workers 
within weeks or months" •1 Therefore, Al ' perovich concluded, attention had to 
be devoted not to training skilled workers, but training instructors. J.be policy 
of splitting up the labour process into its simple4;~ elements was precisely 
that adopted by the branch in the years /whtRe influx of new, totally inexperienced 
workers was at its hei~ht. This sugpests that considerations of labour skills 
~ere indeed a central element of the policies and practice of phase two. 
During the second half of the 1920s some Soviet srecialists had closely 
followed the trends of development of production organisation and their la~ct 
on labour skills 1n both Western Europe and t he Un1t€d ~tates. There is no doubt 
l .b-Ind., 13.2 .31. 
11.10 388 
tbat the experience of the Ford factory was influential at this time. At the end 
of the decade Ford wrote that skills were showing a tendency to rise:'' Today 
the proportion of jobs which can be learned ia a week or less 1s rather small and 
t-o leill'O any of the more complicated production tasks requires a training 
of fro111 two weeks to a month prov ided the man has some natural mechanical 
ability" •
1 
btatements such as these must have OOP.n very encouraging for Soviet 
specialists - a ma11:h plus an allowance for the peasants' lack of 'natural 
mechanical ability ' was a very short time indeed compared with the many years 
of training and apprenticeship hitherto re~arded as es,.ential. 2 Ot her asoects 
of the Ford exJ;>erience were also relevant; first ,Ford had observed that the 
proportion ot' very highly skilled workers s "lowed a tendeny to I:ise with the 
development of flow production ; second, th~t old craft type workers of universal 
skills were not suited to the demanns of modern production - many old workers 
had bad to be dismissed , Ford claimed, because they could oot meet the re 1:1u1red 
qual ity standards . 3 New workers were , in fact, prefered , as a 1915 study of 
Ford methods had observed : " As to the machinists, old time all-rotmd men , perish 
the thought! The Ford company ha s no use for experience 1n the working ranks , 
anyway . It desires and prefers machine tool operators who have nothing to unlearn • • " 
A Soviet ;rork of 1928 accurately summed up these tendencies of modern engineering 
production since the beginning of the 'War• there ~as,.'-1 general trend towards the 
elaination of the old, universal cra'ft type worker ; the basic mass of production 
workers were of relatively low skills, performing specialised operations, but 
at the same time tbere was a kernel of new highly skllled workers serving as 
toolmakers, setters, instructors , instal ers,etc • .5 Thesetrends were apparent in 
bot'l t~e United States and Western Europe , in the latter being associated with 
t>1e rationalisation movement and the adoption of eleJilents of flow-type production 
organisation, notably in Germany, but also 1n Britain and France .Soviet 
industrialisation took place at a time when the semi- skilled worker had become the 
~ ln:nt figure in engin ~ ering production , a ract which greatly facilitated the 
l .Ford ',H. ,Moving forward,London ,1931 , P .134 • 
2.The Ford experience was described in detail 1.n a number of Soviet works of the 
period se ..rtt.s...~uov A Sistema Forda,M ., 19)0;~ .Proli.Gaz . ,24 .J . 29 . 
3 
, e , e . g .,.,.LAUCL , • •.::::.=.:::.::;::.:=~~~ 
4·~ord ,~ cit ,pp . 123 ; 133-1~.5i, F d methods and Ford shot>s ,191),p.42, cited by ____ ._B:_~in=d~~~:R~:a~=~~d~ ·t~ ' p~~er-,-tLY. , 1949,p .473 · -
------------------------~ 
' 
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aaslailation of new, large- scale , odern enterprises. 
The fact that workers of lilaited and narrow skills acquired after only 
six months training could undertake responsible production operations did not 
sean, as aany Soviet writers o:- the First Ftve-year Plan period tended to asatl!"e, 
that this was a desirable state of affairs. 1 Such restricted skUls gave ao 
scope for the expression of creativity ,for exa~ple, t he introduction by wor~ers 
of adaptations t~ the work process , and meant that all auxiliary processes such 
as settin~ up, ma 'lntenance, work organisation ,etc. hn.d to be carried out by the fell 
hLghly akil1ed workers available. During the Second Five-year Plan the view 
that modern 11aas and large-serL=U production per.mitted l!l!l8S desk1111ng was 
rejected~ However , the 1m~ortant fact was that with such lO• skilled workers 
1t vas, w1 th appropriate wor't organisation, poss ible to ass ilate and aainta1n 
regular production of modern 11achines on a large-scale sis . And this is wnat 
the chine tool industry did during the First Five-year Plan period, the 
I aecond phase of its develop~ent . If in 1929-JO the industry s lead~rs had accepted 
the vif!lw that machine tools could only be bull t by highly skilled wor.tters, a view 
generally acct:pted 1n the west at the time, th~ path of developl!let'lt of the 
branch would have 1 een fundamentally different. 
During t he First Five-yoar Plan years the few highly skilled workers at 
the enterprises served as instructors, toolmakers and setters . In this work they 
11:ere assisted by foreU:n workers , frequently acting as representatives of foreign 
UChlne tool firms supr.lyir.g equip:nent. A relatively soall group of such cadres 
llaa able to service !lny hundreds of inexper ienced trainee workers . Thus, at 
t e 
1
lrasny1 Proletarii 1 factory of ),.500 workers there were only thirty to 
forty old cadre workers who served as instructors and setters, whUe production 1;as 
effectively in the hands offyoung low-skilled labouT: force trained only for 
apec1f1c operations.) l:sut these older,skllled workers (and specialists) were 
5.!!!te1onal1zatsiya promyshlennosti SSSR,M . ,1 928 , p.)J) .See also Lazarev, V • • 
!k.Q.nomicheskoe obozrenie ,1927 ,Dec •, pp57-59 · , ernov a 
5 
ecialist 
LA remarkable,extreme example of this position was that of Z • P 
ot the machine tool industry _ he called for the reduction of mental aad physical 
8k1lle to ~n absolute minim.um in order to provide the fullest .possible mobU1ty 
of labour- Sotsialisticheskava rekonstruktsiya i nauka,19~2 ·~0t9-i3j~p(~7:~~ 2• 1 M.Kaganovich, for exanple, at the ~eventh Congress of ov e s, ;:, e 
3 
~et.E!,M. , 19J5,Byulleten I .'to .10,p.4J .) 
b ·~.Khoz. ,19JJ ,No .7-8,p. 52. 
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not alJ~ays matched to the demands of large-serial production and the use of 
modern production technology . It was found at the 'lfrasnyi Proletarii • factory, 
for example, that these workers at times hindered the adoption of fixtures and 
special tools, prefering the traditional methods of marking out the work,1 This 
conservatism also made itself felt at the new im.vrdzhonikidze factory, particularly 
amo~t the technical workers ~for example, there wasa long argument before the 
factory started work between German consultants and Russian engineers about the 
relative merits of milling machine tool beds over the traditional method of 
planing - the Russians firmly stuck to planing, and it required a trip abroad before 
they could be convinced that milJing was a progressive and feasible alternative.2 
Gudov , the leading Stakhanovite of this same factory, describes how later in the 
decade ol der workers and specialists, in particular those who had worked abroad, 
upheld the view that machine tools could only be built by skilled workers and 
adopted a sceptical attitude to the efforts of t h- new ,inexperienced workers.3 
There is no doubt that t he employment of inexperienced and low skilled 
workers led to considerable wastage and also damage to machines. This was admitted 
at the time , but appears to have been written off as an inevitable cost of rapid 
development . 
The Labour Force in the Second and Third Five-year Plan Years. 
With the adoption of the p0licy of the third phase of the industry's development 
in 193J labour skill requirements rose ,as the indus'by' s leaders appreciated 
at th.e time . lfith the eX{»ansion of the tioazh , batch sizes were reduced and 
the single operation workers became inappropriate as machines had to be frequently 
reset1 furthermore, under the new conditions it was no longer possible to apply 
as many fixtures and special tools. The resolutions of the First All-Union 
Conference of the industry in .July 1933 stressed the vital importance of t raining 
.Zalnd. , 20 .5 , 31 • The then technical director of the f'ac tory, a" German engine ~r, 
Dreigaut noted with amusement in the Stankostroi newspaper• •• you boldly 
and deci~ively struggle against gods and religion, but at the same tiJile you 
are for planing not milling" • 
).Gudov ,op cit, p. too. 
l .Predpriyatie ,1933,No .12,p.10 .The author,Tarlinskii, notes the strength of the 
old pre-Revolutionary ,'Bromley' tradition at the factory. 
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workers of scarce trades for the successful realisat i on of the new policy. 1 
~inW8 •1thin the enterprises continued as before, but with a new stress on 
t ne mass testing of workers to ensure the attainment of unif orm minimum standards. 
Skills rose, but not as rapidly as desired . Thus, at the 1m . Sverdlova factory 
the average grade had reached 3.5 by 1935 (compared with 3 .1 1n 1931), but the 
average grade required was by this time 4.58, and over a third of the workforce 
were ~dertaking jobs which demanded a higher skill than they possessed .2 A 
high rate of labour turnover hindered efforts to raise skills, leading to a 
steady flow into the branch of new, young, inexperienced workers. At t~e leading 
'Krasny! Proletarii' factory towards the end of the Second Five-year Plan the 
majority of workers were aged between 18 and 25r the oldest head of a shop was 
under 35; and the average age of workers 1n the first assembly shop was only 
18 years 3 moths! In t he factory's experimental shop, which relied heavily 
on worker skills, half the workers were under 19 and only a q~rter over 25 
years of age) In the .machine tool and tooling branch as a whole in July 19'35 
38.6 per cent of the labour force was aged below 23 years , and 27.7 per cent 
were women.4 While many of these young and female workers must have been 
employed 1n auxiliary and assembly processes , nevertheless many basic machining 
operations must also have been performed by workers of this t ype. It has been 
estimated that during this period skills of grades J and 4 were acquired after 
three or four years, and of grades 5 and 6 after six to seven years~ '1 herefore, 
by about 1935 the new workers who entered (and stayed in) the branch during the 
First Five-year :Plan must have at~ined a reasonable level of skill (probably 
grades 3 and 4) and been able to make full independent use of t~eir machines • 
The Stakbanovite 1-lovement , de'4oping in the autlllli.n of 1935, undoubtably 
played a positive role in the raising of skills and was itself made pessible 
by the training of the previous period and the experience accumulated . Tbe f irst 
Sta~ov1te of the branch was Ivan Gudov, a milling machine operator of the 
ia.Ordzhonikidze factory, who set a new record on 13th ueptember 19J5, just two 
days after Busygin ' s record at the GAZ factory - the i i:rst Stakhanovite of the 
~ngi..,eering industry. .By September 1936 29 per cent of the workers of the branch 
l,lli,19JJ,No .6, D .4 • 
2.Industrh izats1 a SSSR,1933-193? , p .4)2 . 
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were involved , rising to 39 per cent in late 1938.6 At first this mass movement 
tOCik the form of individual records obtained by simple changes in work organisation 
and by raising the intensity of use of machines . Bu.t as the movement widened 
iJl 1937-38 it took on new more creative forms • ~1any new fixtures were created 
allowing the simultaneous multiple machining of a number of workpieces, multi-
tool devices were made and variDus methods of reducing auxiliary time were 
introduced, such as rotating tables . Moreover, individual records gaveway to 
collective forms of emulation in the form of Stakhanovite days and weeks of action 
involving entire shops or factories , and the aim ceased to l e simply maximum 
output , but extended to raising quality and saving fuel and materials. Leading 
Suahanovite workers trave]ed to other enterprises of the branch to disseminate 
the new methods of work and critically review their practices .? This movement 
was aleo as!"iociated with a marked increase in labour productivity and, in general , 
despite some exces~es and absurdities8 , served as an importBnt means of raisin~ 
the technical and orscanisational level of the maci-}ine tool \.ndustry . 
During the years 193? to 1941 the branch 's labour supply problem became 
more acute. 'l'be rate of growth of manpower sharply declined, even iiall.lng in 
absolute terms 1n 19389. One source of loss of aole-bodied workers was recruitment 
into the Red Army: the 'Krasnyi .r rol etarii ' factory lost over 200 men in 1937 
alone for this reason .10 At the same time thP demand f or highly skilled workers 
rose greatly as the factories strived to increase t be output of co~plex, h1gb-
product1v1ty specialised and special machines and,presumably , the most highly 
skilled workers of the branch were engaged in this individual and small batch 
~oduction . lhe average skill level of the specialised branch continued to rise , 
).Ostrovskii ,Z.I. ,Ot J;romleya k 'Krasnomu Proletar.iyu' ,H . ,1937,pp .12-14. 
4._!ndustrializats1ya SSSR ,1 9'33- 1937, p.4J8 . 
5.Zlaich, Istoricheskie zapiski , No .85 , 1970, p . 39 · Pre-war, a worker of grades 
3 and 4 could set up his own machine, knew how to operate a number of different 
types of machine , could read drawings and used tables to determine the correct 
cutt ing regime (ibid). 
6.Cmarovskii,op cit,o .78 . 
? . lb1d , o.80· Hashtnostroitel ' ,1938,No.12,o.J. 
8,0i\ one oc~aslon Gudov ful +'illed his shi .. t norm by 1,470 per cent' rtaki.ng
4 
) 
SUfficient quantity of one component to last ten months!(f.loskva ,1970 ,No . ,p .119 · 
9.b~rtXJ~~Jdlbx See Table U . I , p . J94 . 
10.0strovskii , op cit,p.4t. 
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reaching grade 4.5 by the War (compared with 4 .2 for the heavy machine building 
commissariat as a whole)1 But there is evidence that the shortage of skill ed 
cadres became more acute as the Third Plan proceeded., the development of the 
movement for manning more than one machine by a single operator providing 
a clear indication of this fact , 
The multi- man ning movement , a national campaign arising out of the 
Sta~ov~te movement , was pioneered by E.F .Kostenko at the Khar ' kov im.Molotova 
factory , s i multaneously with a similar development at Uralmashzavod.2 Whereas 
the multiple manning of automatic machine tools had been widely practised in 
the engineering industry for a long time, the new campaign was directed towards 
the multi-manning of general-punpose types requiring operators of high skills. 
~ostenko himself operated a number of gear-cutting machines, freeing skil •ed 
workers for employment elsewhere in the factory. This campaign , which qaickly 
spread to other enterprises of the branch, was a direct response to a shortage 
of skUl ed workers which was restricting the growth of production. 3 
During the Third Five- year Plan another response to the labour force problem 
was the introduction into the branch of some elements of the technology of the 
auto- tract or industry . The development of flow assembly at 'ltrasnyi Proletar11' 
and other enterprises is discussed elsewherer this move was partly inspired by the 
need to free skilled fitt ers for other work . Furthermore, high-productivity, 
specialised machines , including unit- construction types, were adopted in the 
branch for the first time, a development which was probably aimed at securing 
the best use of skill ed workers. But the striking fe~~e of both the Second and 
Third Plan periods , in parti cular t he latter, was the continued use of the 
production organisation and methods of Phase1wo - large-serial production of 
general- purpose machines with the use of a considerable quantity of special tools 
and fixtures , alonq;side the smalJer scale production of specialised types. This 
combination served as an effective means of overcoming the skill problem in 
l.Zinich, op c1t , p . )9 . 
2.Khar'kovskil stankostroitel ' nyi,oP c1t,p.J8. 
3.Plan .Khoz., 1939 ,No .11 , p . 80 J Mashinostroenie ,12 . 1.40 · 
11 . 16 394 
Tabl e 11.I 
fhe Growth of the Labour Force 1n the Special ised l~achine Tool Indust:cy 
Machine t'fol & tooling_lfld us tl;'y / 
Workersl grp2 To}al la~our I Nach1.ne tool industrv Yeu Workers1 fn'p2 Total lct:bour orce force) 
I--
(1) (2) (J) (4) ( 5) {6) ·,.--- -
29, w;o4 3 , sod+ I I 1932 (41,663) I 13, 324 5 (1 ,750) (18 , 843) I 
19JJ (29 ,404) (3 ,770) (41 , 468) (13 , 232) (1 ,335) ( 18,896) 
I t9J4 (35,197) ( 4,15R) (49 , 194) (t5,S39) (2 , 079) (22,393) 
1 19)5 (40 ,431)6 (4, 901)6 ( .56,665) I t8, 5oo7 (2 , 500) (26 , 250) 
19)6 (46 ,383) ( 5 , 917) ( 65 , 251) (21 ,753) (3,078) (31,039) 
I 
1937 (50 , 9~7) (7 , 57?) (73 , 205) (24 , 474) I (4 , 016) (35 ,613) 
19Jq (44, 135) (?,276) (64,265) (22 , 050) (4, ()02) ( 32 ' .565) 
19J9 (47 ,45q) (9 , 2?4) (?0 , 915) ( ?4 ,678) (5 , 2.36) (37 ,45)) 
1940 52 ,163~ J 10,3963 ?8 , 08~8 (28 ,690) (6 , 232) ( 4) ,65J) 
( , .) est imat e 
Notes and sources ' 
1. Rabochie , 
2.&nglneers and technic<li personnel . 
J .Including offi ce worker s , trainees , and service personnel . 
4.sn , 19J5 ,No.10 , p . 2 . 
5.Kuznetsova ,N.V,, Bor' ba rabocheP"o klassa .• , op c1.t , p.10 . 
6.Note Sii,1935,No .10 , p .2 gives 42 , 350 workers and 5 , o67 ETP. 
? .Problemy ekonom1ki,1935,No .4,p .192 :Planned number for year . 
1,Istor1chesk1e zaoiski,No . R5, 19?0,p.9 . Number of workers and ETP calculated 
from total and proportions given ibid ., p. 26 . 
Derivati on of estimates 
Columns (1) and (2) -From 1940 totals using index ~iven by Zhed ' , op cit , p. J2 , 
1933 1934 1935 1936 193? 193~ 1939 1940 
~orkers 100 . 0 119. 7 13? . 5 157 .4 173 .4 150 . 1 161 . 4 177.4 
ETP 100 .0 110. 3 130. 0 157 .0 201 . 0 193 . 0 246 . 0 275 . 5 
Colwm (3) calcul~ted , us i ng the relations~1p for 1940 , l. . e . workers plus 
ETP represent ~0 per cent of the total la~ur force . 
Column (4) - esti 1ated from t he Known proportion of oachioe tool industry 
workers 1.n total number of workers in t~e machine tool and tooling 
industry ,l..e . 1932 - 45 per cent; 1935 - 46 per cent . This share 
must have risen over tbe period as more enterprises were transferee 
to t he ma.cbi ne tool branch . For the re"laining years the following 
proLortions h~ve been taken(~) , 1933- 45 ;1 934- 45;19)6 - 47; 
1937 - 48 ; 1938 - so ; t939 - 52, 194o - ;s. 
Colwnn (5) - The prooortion of E'l'P in machine tool nutiding was certainly hlghe; 
than 1n tbe tooling branch; therefore number estimated from column 
( 2) by taki ng pro oortion s used in ( 4) , plus 5 per cent. 
Colu:nn (6)- As column (3) 1 workers plus E'l'P accounting for C30 per cent of t he 
total l~bour force. 
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cirCWIStances r equ1r1ng a steady growth o£ output wblle the tipazh was being 
rapidlY eqanded and renewed. 
The growth of the labour force in the specialised machine tool industry 
1n the period 19)2 to 1940 is indicated (approximately) 1n Table 11.I • This 
shows that the total number employed in the branch rose from 19,000 in 1932 
to 44,000 1n 1940, whUe the number of engineering and t echnical personnel 
increased by 3. 6 t imes, from 17~0 to 6 , 230 . Unfortunately, there is no 
information on the l abour force 1n the ' planned ' industry so that the total 
enplov111entln machine tool building as a whole can only be EStimated. A very 
rough esti·nate of total employment C3.0 be derived by taking the average productivity 
of the specialised iudustry in terms of machine tools buiJ t per year per person 
e111ployed and applying this indicator to the total annual output~ In 1932 0.39 
atach1ne tooils were built per oerson employed in the specialised 1ndustryJ1n 193? 
0.44 and 1940 0 .64.2 From total annual "'Utput the following total manpower 
estiaa tes can be der1 ved ~ 1932 50 , 500 ; 1937 110,700 ; 1940 91 , 50cY • The fall 
~ employment 1n the Third Five-year Plan is quite olausible , given the large 
prt:ductivi ty increase of the period, and is concealed in the data for th~ 
specialised branc h because of the addition of several enterprises transfered 
fro• other administrations . 
1.Th1s can be justified on thegrounds that the productivity of the defence l.ndustry 
&achine tool producers was prob~bly comparable to th ~ t of the speclal~sed 
bnnch while- the other oroducers presumably of lower productivity, ouilt ' . - , 
relatively simpler machine t ools . 
2.Calculated from Tables 11.1 ... n.t sA.t. 
) .For comparison the USA machine tool industry in 1939 employed 39,600 people, 
Producin~ 1 J ~achine tools per person employPd (Proizvodstvennyi annarat 
6 
) 
!t_!!lkost~oi~el ' nol proMyshlennosti SShA ,H. ,1970,p41 and 'Wagoner, oo c1t,p.3 3 
J96 
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~gineering,Technical and Managerial Personnel 
At the end of the 1920s, at the start of the First Five-year Plan, the 
aacbine tool branch experienced a chronic shortage of specialists . ~.oreover, 
some of those at the enteprises were removed in 1930 in association with the 
e~sion of 'bourgeois specialists' that took place both before and after 
the Promparty trial . The technical director of the 1m .Sverdlova factory , a 
1 
leading engineer at tb.:> works before the rtevolution , was removed, for example, 
and it ap-pears that specialists were removed from the • Krasnyi Proletarii • 
2 factory. The first specialised training facilities for machine tool building 
engineers were organised in 1929, when a special faculty wascreated at the 
State Electrical-mechanical Institute im.Kagan-ShabshayP. in Moscow .3 In the 
following year , by a VSNKh Order of 12th July 1930, this f aculty was transformed 
4 into the Moscow Machine Tool and Tooling Institute' I Stankin t • This independent 
institute trained a wide range of specialists and skilled workers, including 
designers, on a day release or evening course basis, offering courses of up to 
three and · a. half years. • Stan.kin' was certainl y the first specialised machine 
tool building higher educational establishment 1n the world. During the First 
Five- year Plan its work was hindered by the lack of suitable premises, equipment 
and staff, and there were complaints that the glavk did not pay suff icient 
attention to its development . Nevertheless, in 1932 it had over a thousand 
students , three-quarters on a day basis.5 In 19)0 additional eduational 
facllities for machine tool builders were provided in Leningrad , where a special 
facUlty was created at the Leningrad Engineering Institute , and 1n the same year 
6 
a s1mllar faculty was formed a t the Moscow 1m.Baumana Engineering Institute . 
Thus, during the First Five-year Plan a quite impress ive basis f or training new 
er.gine~rs , designers and technicians was created . In 1940 a second aachine tool 
3nd tooling institute was opened in Leningrad. 7 
1.Borisov and 'lasn'ev , op cit,p.10?;Zaind.,13.2 . 30.The case of the technical 
director, Rents, (and the director) of tm .Sverdlova in early 19)0 was given some 
proJdnence 1n the press 1 i{ui byshev was <1 1rectly involved and ace used Rents of 
'~eking' activities at a meeting of the Leningrad Party and production ~v. 
2.This is implied by an article at the time of the Promparty trial , accusing 
'wreckers ' at the fact~ry of deliberately holding back machine tool building -
~avda, 27 .11. 30 . 
J.Omarovskit , op ci~,p.59. 
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During the First Five-year Plan years provisi on was also inade for the education 
of administrat i ve and managerial personnel for the machine t ool and tooling 
industr y • Machine tool industr y specialists were trained at the Industrial 
Academies ; in 1932 about a hundred were studying •1 Furthermore , a FON (facul. ty 
of special purpose) was est ablished at 'Stankin ' for trainin~ eng1neer- aamin1stra 
2 
for t he br anch , while middle- range managerial personnel were catered for at tb 
technicums , not ably at t~e ' Komsomolets ' factory . 
The traininp effort initiated from 1929 allowed a rapid build up of the 
numbers of engineering and technical personnel (ETP) in the branch , By 1933 
two-thirds of all the specialists in the machine tool industry had graduated 
from VUZy and technicums during the previous four years.J At the l.m,Sverdlova 
factory alone the number of ETP rose from only 19 in 1928 to 225 Ln 1932, of 
whom 95 per cent had been trained 1n higher educational establishments during 
the Soviet r~riod,4 In 1932 the number of ETP at 'Krasny! Froletar11' exceeded 
three bundred . 5 For the branch as a whole the number of ETP increased by about 
2,3 times between 1932 and 1937, reaching abo~ 6 ,250 in 1940.6 In the Ukrainian 
republic alone the number of ETP in the machine tool industry increased six-fold 
between 1932 and 1940, from 227 to 1 ,425.7 An indication of the quality of 
this large intake of specialists is provided by a survey of 5 ,392 memeers of 
the engineering and technical sector of the trade Wlion for machine tool and 
tooling workers in <.~anuary 1938. Ofthe t otal • 29 .1 per cent had completed 
a course at a higher educational establi~hment (including 22 .1 per cent at VTUZy), 
JO,J per cent were gr aduates of technicums (therefore of lower technical skills) , 
and no less than 40 .6 per cent were praktiki . The majority of t,is ~orce (53 per 
cent) had over five years working experience . Of the total 11 per cent were women, 
23 per cent wer e full or candidate members of the Party, and a further .8 per cent 
were members of the Komsomol ~ However, a large proportion of the aost highly 
.Volkova,R . v,, "Deyatel' nost • Moskovskoi parti1no1 organizatsii po stanovleniyu 
i razvityu stankoinstrunental'noi promyshlen~osti v gody pervoi pyat1letki,1928-
193~1l" ,in _:storiya KPSS -1-.arksizm-Leninizm v deistvie,f1. ,1974,p.149. 
5.51.! , 1932 ,No .4 , p. 24. 
6 .0ma.rovsKi ;_ ,op cit,p.59 . 
?.ib1d . ,p.60 . 
t.~·o~d . iona. v godv vt.orn\ 1 t :rPt'Qi ...... ~••"-~ • 
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During the First Five-vea.r Plan years nrovi 1 1 ~ ~ s on was a so made for the education 
of admlnistra ti ve and man ial ager personnel for the machine tool and tooling 
industry • Machine tool industry specialists were trained at the Industrial 
Academies, in 1932 about a hundred were studying.1 Furthermore, a FON (faculty 
of special purpose) was established at ' Stankin ' for tra1nin$r e~ineer-aaministratoJ 
for the branch
2
, while middle-range managerial personnel were catered for at the 
technicums, notably at the 'Komsomolets' factory. 
The training effort initiated from 1929 allowed a rapid build uo of the 
numbers of engineering and technical personnel (E.TP) in the branch. By 1933 
two-thirds of all the specialists in the machine tool industry had graduated 
from VUZy and technicums during the previous four years) At the im ,Sverdlova 
factory alone the number of ETP rose fro~ only 19 in 1928 to 225 in 1932, of 
whom 95 ~er cent had been trained in higher educational establishments during 
4 the Soviet "'eriod . In 1932 the number of .m'P at ' Krasnyi Froletarii' exceeded 
three hundred . 5 For the branch as a whole the number of ETP increased by about 
2,3 tiJnes between 1932 and 1937 , reaching about 6,250 in 1940.6 In the Ukrainian 
republic alone the number of E.TP in the machine tool industry increased six-fold 
between 1932 and 1940, from 227 to 1,425.7 An indication of the quallty of 
this large intake of specialists is provided by a survey of 5 ,392 memeers of 
the engineering and technical sector of the trade union for machine tool and 
tooling workers 1n "'anuary 19)8. Ofthe total , 29.1 per cent had completed 
a course at a higher educational establishment (inclutUng 22 .1 per cent at VTUZy), 
)0. ) per cent were graduates of technicuros ( therefore of lower technical skill s), 
and no less than 40 .6 per cent were prakt.iki. The majority of t his f orce (53 per 
cent) had over five years working experience , Of the total 11 per cent were women, 
23 per cent were full or candidate members of the Party, and a further ·9 per cent 
were members of the Komsomol ~ However , a large proportion of the aost highly 
4 Volkov R v "D tel' nost' Moskovskoi partiinoi organizatsii po stanovleniyu 
'1 razv~ty~ ;tan:~~strwn.ental • noi promyshlennosti v gody pervoi pyatUetki , 192q_ 
1932gg",in lstoriya. KPSS -i1arksizm-Len1nizm v deistv1e,M. ,1974,p.149. 
5.SiL_19)2,No:4, p.24. 
&.Omarovskii ,op cit, p .59 . 
7.~ •• p.60. 
l.ibid , 
'1 --I 0 raiona v od vtoroi 1 tret' e1 atiletok, ' · ndustrializats1 
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skilled specialists worked in the Glavk apparatus and in aanagement posts at 
the enterprises rather than 1n t he actual production shops .Thus of the 701 ETP 
with hLghereducation in Glavstankoprom in late 1939 (after the division of the 
Clavk , therefore excludes Clavtyazhstankoprom and ENIMS) , 210 worked in the 
factory shops , 114 1n design offices and 367 1n the Clavk apparatus, factory 
administrations and other organisat1ons .9 
Despite the rapid growth of the force of specialists the branch appears to 
have suffered gr eatly , 1n particular during the early years, from a shortage of 
·technical skllls . Heasures were outlined by NKTP at various ti .es in order to 
i111prove the situation . The June 1932 Order provided for the direction of vuz, 
and Industrial Academy graduates to Stankoob"ed1nenle { and also instructed the 
personnel sector of !fl\'TP to stop recruiting the branch's specialists .for other 
work) ~ 0In June 1933 the NKTP Order provided for an improvement in the work of 
11 Stankin , with the allocation of new premises , and 1n January 1934 Ni~ 
ordered its sector of cadres to transfer 100 young specialists gra1uating from 
12 
VUZy ln 1934 to GUSIP "for design work. But in the 19)4 to 19J6 period there 
were many complaints about the weakness of the industry's design forces as a 
aajor factor holding back the development of the branch. Al ' perovlch noted in 
April 1934 that there were 400 designers in design offices of the Glavk; this 
number was completely inadequat~ , he stressed, an~ called for the transfer of 
specialists from the auto-tractor branch or rather, as he wryly observed. , their 
return , because ' tens ' of engineers and technicians ' so:ne years ago' had been 
transfered from the machine tool industry to the auto-tractor branch .13 Late 1n 
) .Brover ,I .M ,Ocherkl razv1tiva tvazbeloi nromvshlenr ost.i SSSR ,Alma Ata ,19.54 ,p.127 . 
4 .Y.as'yanenko ,V .I ,Bor ' ba trudyashchikhsya •• , op c1t.,p.29. 
S.!ollektivnyl dogovor zavoda 'Krasnyii Pr21etar11' na 1933 fod ,M.I1933 ,p.J. 
6.See Table 11 .I. 
? .Puchko,op c lt ,p.19. 
8.Industr1.alizatsiya SS3R ,193)-1937 , p. 507 • 
9.!ndustr1ali~atsiya SSSR 11 238-1941 , p.229. 
lO.Sli 11932 ,No .7 ,.p . 2 . 
11 .1b1d ,1933 , No .~ 1P•J • 
12 .Ib1ci . ,19J4,No . ) ,p.2. 
13 .'Za.Ind ' '26 .4. 34. 
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1935 it was reported that over one third of the graduates of Stank1n were going 
to branches of industry other than machine tool building~ Thus, the branch 
seems to have had problems 1n attracting and retaining specialists as well as 
workers. 
Until 1937 the leading cadres of the Glavk were predoainantly engineers 
associated wl th Al ' perovich from his days 1n Orgametall . The backgrounds of 
these workers is not known, but it seems probabl~ that many of them, like 
Xl' perovich himself , received their technical education before the nevolution. 
Al ' perovich graduated from what later became the Moscow l lgher Technical .:lchool 
~ 1914, and was 41 years of age when he became head of Stankotrest 1n 1929 . 
After Al'perovich' s removal 1n 1937 the leadership of the Glavk appears to have 
ehMged several times before the creati on of the Peoples Commissariat of ··•achlne 
Tool Building in June 1941, when A.I .~fremov took over the leadership of the 
indust ry. Efremov had a remarkably rapid rise to prominence J in 1935 he 
graduated from. 'Stankin' and was made a foreman at the im .Ordzhon1k1dze factory, 
then rose to become a shop head and, in 1937, first,chie~ engineer and later,in 
August, director. In 1939 he was deputy NarKom of heavy machine building , and 
in April 1940 he took over from ~1alyshev as 1arKom.2 The deputy head of GUSIP 
responsible for the tool1Qg industry , P .M.Stepanov, held his post for at least 
five years until his r emoval in 1'!arch 19.37 . E .E .Levin, a :former Orgarnetall 
engineer , held the post of first director of ENTI1S frorn 1933 to mid-1937 ; but the 
next director, I .F .Maslennikov , apnears to have been a Soviet t.cained worker 
from one of the enterpr1ses .3 Little is known about other leading figures of the 
Glavk , except that its chief en~ineer towards the end of the Second Five-year 
Plan was v.G.Lap1n, a l eading technical worker of the Bryansk Locomotive fac tory 
before the Revolution, later chief engineer of AMO , and one of the first technical 
4 directors of the GAZ factory. In mid-1937 one of the C"larges against the 
Al' perovich leadership was that it had an incorrect personnel policy , 1n so far 
a.s reliance was placed on people it had known a long time, moving t r.em from post 
to post rather than pr omoting new people. 5 There appears to be some justice 1n this 
char e' etall ou and its ~ssociates dominated the branch 1n its 
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first siX to seven years and this seems to have led to distinct career frustration 
for a new gener~tion of Soviet trained specialists , a nUillber of whom were 
prominent in the attacks on t he Glavk and its leadership in 1936-37 and survived 
the tragic events of 1937- 38 , ( for example , Shaumyan ,Shifrin and Boguslavskii). 
During the period 1929 to 1941 turnover of fact~ directors was quite 
r(lpid . J..he ' Krasnyi Prol etarii • factory had at least six directors between 1930 
and 1940 , the longest surviving occupant o.f tho oost being p .Zhbakov. 6 The 
im.Sverdlova factory had a succes~lon of different directors 1n the late 1920s 
until A .M .Kalashni kov , a former seaman , was appointed in mid-1931 and remained 
at the post untU 1937. During the Third F'ive-year Plan this factory was headed 
by I .Chuikov , a son of a poor peasant , educated at a Rabfak and then the Leningrad 
Polytechnical Institute , rising to director of the 'Pnevmatika ' factory before 
taking over at im .Sverdlova .7 The new im .Ordzhonikidze factory had at least 
five dir~ctors between 1932 and 1939; the most interesting appo1ntment8be1ng 
that of Z.G.Sushkov 1n 1935 . Sushkov studied at the lnstitute of Red Professors 
and after a p"!riod of travel abroad became head of the foreign department of NKTP 
and a member of the Commissariat ' s Collegium . He became director of the factory, 
despite his lack of technical and industrial experience, at Ordzhonikidze's 
personal insistence and presided over a very successful period of its work, 
he was removed 1n 1937 .9 In the 193?-38 period the directors and chief engineers 
of almost all the main enter~ises were replaced, aany before the downfall of 
Al' perovich in the sum,1er of 1937 , the only traced exceptions being the director 
of the Gor 'kii milling machine factory , Titov~0and Gushchin of 'Sa.notochka' . 
!.Plan ,193 5 ,No .12 , p .12. 
l.Khavin,A.F .,Kratkii ocherk istorii lndustrializatsii SSSR ,l'1. ,1962,p. )07; Zaind . , 
20.8 .)7 ; Mashinostroen1e ,4 .10. 39; 18.4.40. 
J .lndustriallzats1ya SSSR , 1938-1941,p.227. 
4,Byli 1ndustrial ' nye,r1 .,197J, p . ?5; Q!rektor - I.A.Likhach~,N.,19'71,p .46,Za!nd., 
18.4.3? . 
5.Sii ,1937 ,tfo .12, p .J • 
6.From incompl ete information the following have been identifieda1930 - Izakov; 
1931 - Legenchenko ; 1932-37 - Zhbakov; 1937 -LapinJ 1938 - Chelysbev ; 
1939. - laranichev. 
?,Borisov and ~asil'ev,op cit , pp195-196. 
8.The following have been identified& 1932 - Arsent'ev ; 1932-35 - Gushcbio; 
1935-37 - Sushi o•r; 1937 - Efre111ov; ? - 1939 - Osharov • 
9 .Gudov ,I. ,Sud • ba rabochego , oo c1 t , p .49 J Zainri • ,21 .11 .:n • 
lO.Titov is- known to have been director 1n 1934 (Predoriyatie ,l934 ,No .19,p.5) 
and in 1939 Sii ,1939,ho .9 ,p.4) • 
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After 1937 there were som.e very rapid 
promotions and the case of Efremov 1s cy 
no 11eans unique e g L ul' ' • • y chenko was 1n 1936 the head of the experimental shop 
of the im.Len1na factory; in September 1939 he is known to have been its director. 
and in November of the same year he appears as head of Glavstankoprom . 
Ceneralising from the above, it is clear that t urnover was at quite a high level 
during the First Five-Year Plan • much less during the Second , and again very 
high during the ~937-1941 period. This rapid turnover of f actory leadership 
aust have had a deleterious affect on enterprise operation and morale, and made long 
tera planning and projects difficult to realise. 
Cone) us ion 
The rapid development of the machine tool industry began at a ti.me when 
skills of both workers and specialists were 1n extremely short su.Pply. Nevertheless , 
• 
the planners and branch leaders dld not adapt the rate of growth of the branch 
to this bottleneck but, 1n moving forward ,adopted a strategy of development 
such as to minimise the negative consequences of the paucity of skills and 
experience . In a very short time a large force of workers was trained to a 
minimum level adequate for the demands of large-serial production of modern 
general-purpose machines , and by the end of the Second Five-year Plan the branch 
had a substantial kernel of skilled and experienced machine tool builders. At 
the same ti.rne the rather slower process of educating engineers, designers and 
lechnical workers was undertaken with great vigour from the earliest period eo 
that by the end of tho decade a new generation of Soviet trained specialists 
occupied the leading nositions in the branch apparatus and at the enterj)I'isos . 
This process of training workers and specialists was attended by substantial 
t f quality pro
duction ,design , eng1.aeer1ng and DUUlager1al 
cos .in terms o poor 
errors and other shortcomings, but the sceptics were ref uted; the skill bottleneck 
wa.s overcome and the vital precondition for t he independent development of the 
lndustry successfully created • 
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Chanter 12 
NT AND CONSTRUC'l'ION n, 
The original First F1ve-y"'3I Plan as adopte., 1n the spring of 1929 allocat-ed 
25 1111on rubles for the construction of two new nach1n to 1 factories; one 1n 
oscow with a cost of 15 million rubles and one 1n Khar'kov ~orth 10 million rubles . 1 
This plan was short Jived. Dy the end of the year the Gor'k\1 milling machine works 
had been adrled nnd eArly 1n 19)0 the capnclt.1es of ell three new factories were 
revised upwards . rhe f1.na1 investMent targP.t for the fiv years ts not known: in 
view of the rapidity w1 th which intentions ch nged in 19JO there "'ay not have 
been one . Accordin to the projects of t~ thre new factor1 s , details of 
which w re published 1n 19.31 , 1nvestr~ent 1n hese enterpr1s s alone l'as to t.otal 
about 51 c:1111on rubles, excluding housing and oth r au 111ary 1t.e s.
2 
r.y 1932 
the value of these projects had -ceen raised 1 invest ent 1n the Gor' k11. factory 
vas to total JO mU11on rubles a!ld L'l the oscow turret lath works 26 cill1on 
rublee . J At the same time n:ajor reconstructions were planned for all the existing 
fact.ortP.e which entered the speci~lised industry tn 19?.9 and 19JO. 
1t 1.a ev1~ent thRt investment plans were cut back very sharply in the course 
of 1930 and 19)1 . Th,. Khar ' kov works was started and then very soon put into 
c~servat1on until the Khar ' kov tr~ctor factory and th~ other two new ~c~lne 
tool factories had been basically completed 1n 1932 .
4 
In August Al ' perovich 
expressed al at the fact that VSN h was then 1ntendlng; to invest only ~2 
~lion rubles for reconstruction and new construction 1n 1930-31. although he 
el1eved that 105 m1111on ... uoles would be necessary 1f plans :.;ere to be fulfill 
Furthermore , h also revealed th:>t 14. 5 million rubl s had be n re uired for 
buUdi.ng the three new factories in 1929- 30 , but only 7 · 5 
11 ton rubles had 
5 
t~'~r1al1sed . ThiA situation led to tncreas1.ng bitterness on the part o!' Al ' perovicb 
d 'Was Som
e upward t•ev1oton of plans for 1931 
an it seemo posoi.ble that there 
rollcwlng t he September VSNKh Presidium meeting on t.he branch . The 1931 plan 
h f investment 1n the machine tool and tooling ~id~ for 95 million rubles wort o 
t i t l ' stva SSh , 1929 .2nd . edn •• V~l.1, ··~!J~a~tl.11~::!JnL!1jl....;2pll.JRBJnun~A:!2rr.!od~n~o~-:!k£!hlSO~Z:JV~a~i~s~t~v~en!!.!!n2o!..rr2o...;s~r~o~::!P..;:_.::::.:::.;..:~= 
.46, 
• esintk IIIP.talloprornyshlennost1 . _::1_:_9.=_J_1.:,,N_'_o_.s..,.., p:,_. 7·3- · --••••••••• 
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!ndustries (Soyuzstankoinstru~e!"!t}a in fact 65.2 million rubles were allocated.? 
In tQ)t and 1932 work started on three new projects ,' Stankopatr.on ' , 'Stankol1t' 
and • St;ankokonstrukts1ya ' . 
Actual investment in each year of the Pl~ period is indicated in Table 12 .! , 
ThP scope o! the data 1n terms of enterprises covered is not known . As can be 
seen investment in the branch rose each ye~r in the prices prevailing , and as a 
proportion of tot al investment in machine building represented about two per cent . 
The actual total invested in machine tool building may have been somewhat. larger , 
because post-War sources given a figure of 11) .2 million rubles .8 Of the total 
50 ral.lll on rubles was devoted to new construction 9 , including 36 mill ion rubles 
on the Gor ' kii and im .Ordzhonikidze factories: 0 The share of the industry in 
total investment in new construction during the Plan period was rather ~arger t han 
I 
lts share overall , ~mountinv. to 2 .9 per cent , compared with 45 per cent for the 
auto-tract or indust ry , 18.? per cent ln heavy engineering and ? . 8 per cent in 
the agricultural machinery 1ndustry .11 T~e machine to~l and tooling industries 
t~et~er accounted for 5 . 1 per cent of all investment in new construction in 
machine bui ding in 1931 and 6 .2 per cent in 1932 .12 Thus the machine tool indust ry 
accounted for a very small share of total investment during the First Five-year 
Plan . 
ConstrucM.on o~ the Gor ' k11 and Moscow facto=ies began in the sunmer of 1930 
and both entered their. start~g uv period is December 1931 , building their first 
r4chine tool s in 1932 even though construction was in fact far from complete . 
A feature of the First Five- year Plan period was the manner in which the final 
project capacities of these new enterprises, and also the older factories , was 
progressively pushe1 up ; tbe extent of the increase provij ing a good indication 
o~ thP degree of opt1~1sm of the period with regerd to future output possibilities , 
Th~ extra output was to be obtained not by additional investment , but by ~ater 
J .Hachinecy , 21 . 1.32 , p. 533 • 
4.Khar ' kovskii stankostroitel ' nyi ,oP clt . p .8 . 
) ,!zvestiya, 9. 3. JO . 
6 .See 1e .p . i bld ., 9 .9 .JO , 8 
? .. ;etall , 1931,No . 1 , p .) ,sotsialisticheskoe stroltel ' stvo,H., l936 ,pp. J88- 3 9 . 
8 .0~ovs"H ,oo cit. , p . 55 . 
9.Planovoe khozya~stvo , 19JJ ,No .?-8 , p . 21 . 
se of shift work and other l!easures T"or mak' '-~ "'Ore 
uL~ ·~ Lnten 1ve use of capae!~y . 
T is process 1 sham in TableSA .X'Ill..,which rev le th t exp ct t\ons reacae their 
~~~t tn th s cond half of 1931 ~d first h lf of 19.)2 . 
Infor at ion about invest ent during the S cond and h1rd ive-year Pi211s, both 
1n general and in theparticul.ar casP of the chin tool industry ,1s sparse 
w comparison wilh the Fi=st Plan period . The draft v rsion of the Second Plan 
outlined an investment pro~ramme for machine tool building of 250 million rubles , 
or ) . t6 per cent of A] J pl<=~nnen investment \n rnachllle building , while the 
achine tool-tooltng and abrasives industry aa R \oihole was to bP. allocated 440 
lHon rubl ea . or 5. 56 per cent of the ~tal1 • These prooor Uon s "'ere higher th 1 
~~-tose of the previous five years . '!'his plnn was rovis , how ver, an1 in the 
final published verlon of thP Plan it was sta t t .300 1111on rubles :was to 
allocated for 1nvestnent in t:1e speci lis A to us try , plus a 
f~her 30 nilllon rubles in the ' planned • fac+o 1v1n a CO'"'bined share 
of total planned oach1ne building investment of 4 . 1 p r cent~ '1 he reason for this 
revision 1s not known , but it is possible that 1t •1as d c1 e to devote core 
ttcntlon to the hranch after the Seventeenth Party Congress . 
Five new factories fe· t.ured in the Plan ,all t.o be completed by 1937 . They 
·ero as follows a a p.:r.ind1ng n'lachine factory 1n Kh·rr ' kov (J , OOO units capaelty ,and 
c st of 19 mU11on rubles) ; a second grinding machine works , th site of ~hich 
as later fixed at Voronezh (2 , 000 units , l? mUlion rubl s) ; factory of gear-
cut 1n machines in Gor'kii krai, later chan ed to Sar ov , (1 , 500 lts ,23 million 
ruoles) , 8 f ctory for builtiing 3.uto=-at1cs 1n th North Cauc sus , l~ter cha. . ged 
o 'lev (probably because of avaiiabilit.Y o4' si<Uled 1 bo~) (2 , 000 lL<t!.ts,19 U ion 
Oles) , and a actory of heavy mac'1ine tools 1n Sverdlovsk (1 SO units , 20 lll1o 
rubles) ,4 This last works was to be locaten n th Ur 1 sbz vorl heavy 
1neer1ng plant , working on a cooperation b s1s u 1 g res rve ca city ofl the 
le.tter .5 It is stgnlficant that 1n an article published befor the Seventeenth 
12. 4 405 
Farty Congress it was stated that seven new f'acto .. cies would be bu1.lt.includlng the 
nve listed and ' Stankokonstruktsiya' • It is ~osslble that the unnamed seventh 
project s.tas the Chelyabinsk heavy machine tool works , one of the biggest .new 
ent~ror.ises built during:: t.,e ~econd Five-year Plan an1 one about which 1 ittle ls 
known . Early tn 1. 934 the mach 1n e tool tnd us try' s journal reported that this works, 
$fbich was to have a caoaci ty of 400 large l'la.Chines of 25 tlpes and sizes to a 
tota) value of 53 mlll1on rubles , was to be >-or"ing at full capacity 1n ~uary 
19)6 and was to be allocated 56 mll11on rubles investnent 1n 19)4.6 It cannot be 
ruled out that the final version of the P~an inclu1e i this project in the total 
planned investment for the machine tool \.nd ustry , thereby account l.ng for the 
apparent increase . 
The Second F ive-year Plan doc~~ent described tho develop~ent of machine tool 
building as" the leading link of the plan of capl tal work" 7 and stressed the role 
of the branch ln equipping the entlre metal working industry and in strengthening 
the technical-economic independenece of the country . Fulfilment of the plan was 
poor , however , and to compensate for tnadequate development of new capacity 
ore enterprises of other branches of mach ine building joined the 'planned· machine 
tool industry . Thi~ path had some :Ustinct advantages, of cour~>e, in terms 
of reduced investment demands, easier provlsion of skilled labour and , above all, 
ll.me . The onl v new factory to be built to a reasonable dP.gree of completion was 
~~e Kiev im .Gor' kop-o automatl.cs factory , on which about JO rnll.J ion rubles had 
been s,?ent by tnid-1937 .This factorv started with a capacity of 2,000 Wlits,reduced 
by the time construction started in August. 19:34 to 1,500 units of JO types ani 
s1zes8, then 680 1n early 19:359 , and finally 500 units by 1937~0 Only ·t.he 
ex~rlmental shop was built at the Saratov gear-cutting machine factory, and the 
s~er~lovsk heavy machine tool factory project was conserved , a smaller works 
producinv small precision-type rnachinP.s being developed 1.n 1 ts place - the 
Sverdlovsk factory of sl"lall unit-construction machine tools. The two grinding l!lllChine 
factories wer~ not started . 11 The fulfilment of the investment plan .for the 
five-year oerlod is not known . 
J:se" Plan: 19J4 ,No •1 , p . 32 for a crHlque of this location decision on grounds of the 
lACkOfskt,led labour . it ::1 48 49 
·1!!1d ., p.31; and Proekt vtorogo pyatiletnotro pl~na • • ,oo c ,apoenu x .pp. - , 
S.flan ,19J4,No . 1 , p .:3J;The second five year plan • ., op clt,p . l52 • 
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hxamination of t he annual investment plans during the Second Five-yeax Plan, 
1n particular those of 1935 and 1936 , anri also the later 1939 annual plan, reveals 
that lt was the practice to allocate resources in SllUlll amounts to a very large 
o1.1:1bf>r of projects - in fact almost every single enterprise of thebranch was to 
be a recipient . The usual amount was from 2 to 4 mill ion rubles . This stJg£ests 
that more could have been achieved with the given resources if a stricter and 
ore purposeful investment policy had been pursued ~ 
Even less is known about the Third Five- year Plan . Early 1n 1937 Al ' perovich 
proposed the building of at least ten medium stzed enterprises and a total 
~vestment over the five yearR of about 500 mil,lon rubles . 12 This was challenged 
~ critics at the time on the grounds that such a seale of investment was unnecessary 
siven the existence of large reserves at existing fact.Qries, One spoc1al.1.st. 
coneidered that first priori t.y should go to .investment directed towards the 
completion of existing enterprises and the construct.lon of only three to five 
new specialised factories for precision m-,chines, grindi:ng aac!11nes and automatics~) 
Al' perovich ' s original plans were clearly .not accepted; ln est·ly 1938 l't. was 
reported that capital i nvestment for GUSIP as a whole would t.otal ?00 million 
rubles over the five years , t . e . for machine tool building and the production 
of tooling ,abrasives ~nd haro alloys .14 Of tho total 570 mllllon rubl cs wae for 
the machine tool and to:>ling branches , and it was intenC.ed t~a.L 60 per cent of 
tne total allocation should be spent tn 19.38 and 1939 ,. This new plan was crlticisen 
as being to modest 1 1 t was reported that 225 m11, ton .rubles would be required 
f or eo111pleting already started machine. tool building projects and a further 150 
Olton rubles for uncompleted tooling factories , leavin~ on 1 y 200 million rubles 
f 15 8 5 111 · le was all.ocated for investmsnt o:- new construction , In 193 17 mi on ru r_ s 
ln the machine tool and tooling industry, 16 a considerable lar er sUB than l.n 
~ious years . 
£.S11,1934,ho ,4,p. 40 . 87 Th hin t 1 ind t 
7-Pro kt t til t 0 ... 0 ~lana op cit. ,Vol.1 , p . • e mac e oo us ry •• e v oro.wo pya P. .n ,.. ., • • • din 
also occupied first place in the section on investment in oachine bull f • 
6.Za1ne . ,27 . B.J4 . 
9.1ota. ,26 .2 . .... 5. 10- .) 
.lbid . , J0 .7 . )7 . 
H .!Iienshtadt and Ch1.khachev , on c1t ., p.219 . 
t2.Zaind. ,8 . 5 . 37 ; 12 . 5 .37 ; 12 . 6 . j? . 
1J -. t.'b1d , ' 12 . 5. )7 . 
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The actual Third Five- year Plan as a t'! opted in 1939 ontllned an ambitious 
progr2m. ,e of new construction for the branch , tnc] uding a number of factories 
of' nedium capacitv for building automatics,vertical tu.r:ning and boring machines, 
planing • borinp; and grinding machines , located predominantly to the east of the 
1 
cou:1try . Particular emphasis was placea on the building of capacity !or the 
~duction of heavy machine tools • In 1938 construction work began on the delayed 
Sverdlovsk factory and the Krama torsk heavy machine tool factory , while a shop of 
heavy machine tool building was built at the Gor ' kil milling machine works . 2 A 
list of the projects at this time is provided 1a T .SA .XAV11l .The SNK decree 
adopted on the occasion o - the outbreak of the Second ~orld War listed eleven 
nev factories to be built in 1939-4-0 , in addition to a major progrnmr:.e for the 
cor.pletion of capacity for heavy machine tools~ But in the fol l owing year this 
~ogramme was cut back and the number of new factories re~ucer to five because, 
1t ls claimed i n a recent work , thP shortage of meta l was growing more acute,and 
~cause of the growing dan~er of war~ The five incluied a factory of precision 
~chine to0ls in Penza and one for automatics and turret lathes in Alapaevsk 
\n the Urals. 5 At the end of 1940 plans were again revised . The joint Party 
C~tral Committeee and SNK decree on the industry outl lned a massive investment 
programme to a total value of 1 , 500 million rubles , involving the reconstruction 
of a number of old factories and. the construction of 25 new enterprises, plus 
~ additional 6 factories for allie~ productlon .Furthermore , this decree provided 
for the transfer of a large number of factories of other administrations to the 
specialised industry. 6 Earl y in 1941 Voznesensk1i outlL"'ed a construction programc:e 
for the industry 1n 1941 . This inclu:ied thirteen new factories , wo:tk on some of 
Mch had already started . The list of projects reveals the extent of the co~~itnent 
to developing the industry at this time - heavy machine tool factories in the Urals 
-"' Siberia, and factories for boring machines (Siberia) , grinding machines (Voronezh) , 
~ectsi.on machines (Penza) , automatics and tur··et lathes (Urals - Alapaevsk) , 
~ch~g machines (kazan) , gear- cutting machines(Volga region) , large lathes 
Ol.yanovsk) , planing 
lat~#ls {Ryazan) , and 
machines (~ovosibirsk) , automatics and semi-autos (Siberia) , 
7 
unit- construction machines in Vladimir . Stn~1c considerations 
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•er~> clearly to the fore 'both 1n the products to be built and tn the location of 
t~ ent.erorises , all of which were to be buUt to the east of Moscow . The ~ar 
~ented the full realisation of this programme~ 
The actual volume of investment tn t.he Machine tool industry 1n the 1938-41 
years is not known · The only available data refer to the Ukrainian industry and 
t.hese provide some indication of the pattern of growth over the three pre- •a.r 
ftve-year plans . Investment in machine tool building tn the Ukrainian republic 
totalled 11.4 million rubles in the First Ftve-year Plan, 58. 1 in the Second and 
118.0 in the Third. 9 
Statistics on the growth of the capital stock of the oranch are few and 
p"'ovide only a very general tmpresc:ton . The value of the basic funds of the six 
ain factories of the industry in 19)0 on 1st October 1928 was 16.1 mUlion ruble~~ 
!-. .......... .;. ...... oi " ... u ... ., 
alVaough the proportion of this actually devoted ltn 1928 must have been q uite 
1t 
nall. By 1931 the totRl was 28 mil , ion r ubles , ann by 1st January 45 .7 million 
rubles , including 27 .4 at the old fartories . 12 Growth 1n t.he Second F1ve-year 
Pl~>n was rapid as old factories were reconstructed, ne.,. factories entered service 
Md enterprises were transfered from other branches . By 1st January 19).5 basic 
13 
'unds of specialised machine tool factories totalled 115 million rubles , rlsing 
t4 
to about )00 million rubles tn the sununer of 19.30 . Thus basic funds increased 
'ty 6,5 times over the five year period . Thez:e is no informa·tton for later years. 
'i'h!l share of the branch 1n the total basic funds of machine building was Slllaller 
than its share of investment, eu~toun t.lng to a mere t.lh per cent tn 1933 , risl.n.g. 
to 1.86 per cent by t he beginning of 19.35 . 15 For the whole machine tool-tooling 
1 .Sii ,1938 ,No.2, p . 4. ; also Planovoe k~oz,ya1stvo , 19.39,no .),p .?4 . 
15.SU , 19J8,No .2 , p.4. 
t6 .Pla.novoe i<ho7.valstvo , 19J8, no . 6 ,p. )4 . _ 
t.TretU at1letn11 lan razvlti a nar.odno&to kho~ .alstva. So u~a SSH ,t.. ,19)9,p.122 . 
2.1n~ustrtallzatsiya SSSR , t938-t941EZF" . , oo c1t,p . fl I~ves·t.iya , ) . 10,J9. 
}.ilirektivy KPSS •• ,op cl t, Vol .2, pp.602-603 • 
.Kas'yanenko • V.I. ,Zavoeva.niA •. , oo cit., p . 198. 
S.Kashinostroen 1 P, 8 ,J . 40 . 
6.Zh->~' ,op cit1 p . t6. 
?.:f!~'..llovoe khozyaistvo, 1941 ,No .J , P . 44 • . . . 
6 So r th -f t · b .. ~lt and en t erec service during the ~ar a na later , • :1eo. ese ac or1.es were l,LL ana b• 1 · t lr.cluiing those at Alapaevsk, Voronezh ,Ryazan d a heavy mac 1..ne too worxs a 
~M~~. • 9 .Puchi.o ,A .A • :Razv i tie stankostroi tel • no1 promyshlennosti na Ukraine v dovoennyl 
,ettoct , 1917- 1940 ,Kiev ,1970 , AftoreferAt , p . 10. 
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an1 abrasives industry the share of total machine building basic fWlds aoounted 
to 2.52 per cent 1n October 1930 , rising to J . 4? by tbe beginning or '19Jll ,16 Thus, 
despite its crucial J'Ole as as the ~atn supplier of industrial equipment. the 
b'anch was very small 1.n the broader context of the engineering industry - a 
relationship true , it should be stresJied , of all the cain machine tool building 
count.r1es , 
The \J.r.(rent buildtng programme of the Thtrd Fl.vc- year Plnn when ccndttions were 
renerally WlfRvourable .would not have been GO necessary 1f the origi.nal construction 
plans of the previous five years period had been realised. Serious d1fficult!es 
ap'le,u- to have arisen in 1935 . The an'lual plan provided for a ~!larKed concentration 
o~ ~vestment resources on just twelve largP- projects relating to the auto-tractor, 
rall transport machlne building and heavy engineering b~1ches , but not the 
ch·~e tool indllstry: these projects accoun·t.ed for fl.fty per cent of all investment 
1ll Mch1ne building in that year . 17 F'urthernore , 1n 19)5 the Second Five- year 
flan targets were revised in order to acceler 1te the pace of developcent of the 
~t"fence lndustry .18 It is clear that the !!lachine tool industry suffered from these 
.. asures ,altho~h on strate#!tc grounds alone it aou.ld seem that 1t.. should have 
en granted higher prlori+,y for investment . If this had ·ooen realised , loport 
" donee during the Third Plan could have bePn re~uced and the crash progra.mne 
tr. tbe i1.1111ediate pre- War years to some extent. mitigated . In particulnr , capacity 
rcr henvy machine tool buildin~ was neglected during the Second Five-year .Plan 
~rloc! a ·this was an eRpac1ally seri ous error of planning because shops <>-"ld 
raetories of heavy machine tool building required relatively large 1nvestJ:tent 
c t.lays and l ong construction times • The capacity whlch was created d~..ng the 
!~>Jld Five-year Plan period was only completed shortly before the •ax and production 
•u not. properly assimilated 'by the time the War st.arted • 
10.Pl.an ,19J4,No .1 0 , p,4. 
~ l.!!tind • , 29 , t 0 . )2 • 
12.E).an , l934 , I~ o .1 0 , p . 4. 
•).!!)1' shevik ,19J5 ,No . 6 , p .11. 
t ·Zalnd. 12 , 5, 37 . 1 t teY.:~lt - 18 1 ·~ fu.nds o-r machine building , 1/1933 - Planovoe Khozye. 8 vo , 7.F'"t' 0 •>•.P · ; 
1/35 - T)•azhelaya oro~~tvshlennosti SSSR za 19J1- :34Jt£ • , op cit , ~ .12(bo .. b 2 .nTP) • 
t . ulc funds of machine building - Planovoe khozyaistvo ,19)4 ,No .J ,p. 18. 
'·~ino-khozva1stvennv1 plan na 1935 god • , op cit , p. 76 . ... 
•.l!torln h:om.mun t stlch'eskai parti1 Soyetskofto Soyuza , Vol .4, book2 ,r-. • ,19?1,p.;50. 
Table 12 .I 
(a~i;~l Investment in the l.'iachine Tool Industrv 
m on rubles ,prices of correspondlnv. year) . 
192f/9 
Specialised P. 
Kachine Tool 
In~ustry A. 4 . 1· 
~-
Machine Tool P . 
k Tooling 
Industries A. 
Investment as 
M: ~rcen tage 
q4' ___total, in 
~eh1ne building 
Specialised P. 
&ebine Tool .. 
ln"ust.ry A. 1.65 
~ f-
~achine Tool P. 
and Tooling 
Industries A. 
• excluding I Stankol1t I 
( approximate 
Sot.ttcet 
192~0 Sp .Q 
10.41 6 .61 
-
, , 
1 . 95 ) . 17 
1931 1932 1933 1934 
~--
)2.8' 38.6' 
95 .6 ' ' 51 .0 1)0 . 8 
.. ' I £ *65 .2 *78.7 48.0 76 .0 
~ 0. 
2 . 16 1.75 
-- -
• • 2 .75 ; .62 4.27 ) .5? 
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1935 t9J6I 1937 19JE 
(621. S9
1 
(501 
- - -
973 
'} 
175~ 90 .0 
... '? 
2 . 64 ) . 00 
't y 
4 . 15 4 • .59 
l.Kholnyansk11 , I ,S etsiall~atsl a i koo er1rovanie mash1nostroen1 a v nervoi 
ova.t1letke ,M. -L .,19JJ , p . 28 : also Zaind .,28. 12 .J2 except 19)2. 
2. sti.oated from Naro:lno-khoz istvennvi plan na 1 , p .810, and .Narodnokhozyaist-
venoy1 olan na 193 g .,Vol .2 , pp . 29 .- 518. 
).e.stll!lated from Narkhoz . plmna 19J6g . ,Vol.2 , pp.296-5t8 • 
• ?lanovoe .khozyaistvo , 19)81 No . 6 , p . ')4 . 
S. !!t.all , 19Jl,No. 1 ,p.J . 
6.!,g,19J4 ,No .4 ,pp.2-.3 . 
? ··•arodnokhozya tstvennyi olan na 1936~ . , 2nd . edn . , .P · 7 5 .Total refers to ••.• rP .c. build 
.Sots1a11sticheskoe stroitel • stvo ,M. , 19J6, pp . J88-J89 • 
• Calculated from total investment 1n machine bullriing (not defined) Zaind . ,28. 12.:; 
Thls appears ·to exclude the electrical engineer1.ng branch .Perc en t.age for 1931 
by this definition 2 .71 . 
l .CalculatPd from total .tnvgstmeat in NKTP nachine building - Tvazbela.va 
,pronvehlennost ' SSSR za 1931-19J4g~ •• M., 19J5 , p ·9· 
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Chapter 13 
THE ECONOMIC PERFOBI1ANCE OF THE MACHINE TOOL INDUSTRY 
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In this chapter an attempt is made te assess the econo 1c perforfJBJlce 
of the machine toel industry 1n the period 1929 te 1941, with consideration 
of the 11evement r-£ cests, prices , labour productivty and pref1tabllity 1n 
the specialised bra.r:tch • Throughout the period 1n question these econoaic aspect 
of the industry's work were not given auch prominence in the literature; technical 
and orsanisational i ssues were primary. For this reason it has proved difficult 
tt obtain suitable statistical material on the economic performance of the branch 
and , while the basic tendencies can be 1n11cated , it is not lw ya poss1bl 
tt provide precise quantitative evidence • 1 
Costs 
A cost reduction target was included 1n the an nual plana of large-scale 
industry from 1926-2? , and in quarterly plans from 1931.2 In machine tool 
buUcl1n! rationalisation eff orts during the second half of th 1920s were 
directed towards reducing costs, which were then very h~h co pared with both 
foreign level s and those of uchine tocl bu1ld1ne; f&ctories befor the ar . 
According te the NKRKI survey of 1929 the average coeff icient of coat 
appreciat i on for aachine tools built ~ Soviet factori s co pared with the 
pre-~ar level was 2 . 67 , with considerable variation by types and between 
factories . Machines built by the larger enterprises ·•·!· 'Krasny1 Proletar11', 
tended to be relati ely more expensive than those of soaller enterpri es bee us 
t.he foner had hi~her overheads steDUiling from poor production organisation . Thus, 
the relationship or overheads (shop and factory) to the wages of production 
woriters waa 187 per cent, for t.he , nal1 'Suotochka • work a, but 279 per cent 
for 'Krasnyi Proletarii' and 368 per cen~ 'Dvt!atel' Revolyuta11' .3 Cost 
teduct1on was , of course , one of the priaary concerns of the NKRKl &urvey and 1 te 
recouendat1ons . 
Gt Should be noted , however , that inform.ation on the performance of the branch and 
1n particular , of individual enterpris s, is available in gr ter detaU 1n the 
publiahed literature of ~he period, than has been the case 1n the ore recent 
PGst-War .Period. 940 .cg 
2.Turetaki1 Sh y Sebestoimost' i voproay tsenoobra.zovaniya,M.-L. ,1 •P•JV • 
3 .~S1alistiche:k;ya ra.tsionalizatsiya v bor'be s pote;yam1,op cit,pp167-168. 
~. 
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1 e •oveaent of coste durin~ the Fir t Fi · e ve-year Plan years 1e extreaely 
difficult to deteraine because of the inadequacy of the cost reduction statistics. 
~ertheless , it is clear that costs roee,as th f e oll owin5 table indicates, and that 
c at reduction targets werenet ful.fllled. 
"'able 13 .I 
A 1 Red ti f nnua uc on o Pro~uctien Coats in Hachine Tool Bu1.ld~l 
(per cent1 
1930 I Spl.Q I 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
1. S 11ecial1sed Machine 
Tool Industr,l t 
Planned r eduction -9.0 2 -19 . 0 -10 . 0 
Actual reduction -1. ) 
2 + 4.4 +4.5 -15 . 0 -10.2 -J.O -13.1 
11.111 Endneerin! Ind. 
AcWal. reduction -2.9 -9.0 -12.) -12.2 -7.2 -1.2 
l .Although not always specified in t he source s , cos t reductions appear to take 
ccount of price chan!es (this is def initely the case f or 1933-1936) . 
2.Nach1ne tool and tooling industry. 
~· 
1.19)0 Spl.Q. - Zalnd . ,28.2.)1. 
1931- lk .Zhizn' , Aug.1932 ,Supplecent lannual balances),No.tl. 
1932- Planned- Zaiod .,11.2 . )2 ; nc tual- Zalnd. ,28 .4 . )J , 
19)JP- Sots1aliat1cheskoe narodnoe khozya1atvo SSSR ,1933-t940~g . ,M.,196J,p.262 . 
11.19)1 ,19)2 - Malafeev ,A.,Istoriya tsenoobrazovaniya v SSSR,1917-1963gg .,M., 
1964,p.t_56. 
1933-36 - as 1. 
Th1a non-fulfll~nent tell s us more about t he lack of real1 of cos t planning 
daring 1931 and 1932 than about t he actual performance of t he branch. The problea• 
of tbe period was the introduction of new aodela ef odern design , which 
n18~ costs for the f actory and rendered cost reduction statistics unsatisfactory 
~uae they general ly only took account of cost changes for co parable ~oduct&. 
or 1932, for exa111ple , comparable products taken as a basis f:r calculating cot 
t ea ac r,ounted for only 34 per cent of the gross output of t he branch .
1 
During 
1 ~ First Five-year Plan years the swit ch to new modern • els involved 
t oos1derable outlays Gn fixtures and tools and other costs of asaiu.Uationa the 
rol of engineering and technical workers rose sharply, cost s of tra1n.1Jlg and 
Pftv1d.1ng facU tt1es for a greatly expanded labour force had to be lllet., and the 
-1. llni ,28.4.33 .This point is also stressed by Kuperman,Veato1k met.a.llopromysh-
1!-'Uloati, 1935 ,No .9, p.113 • 
-
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introduction of new 11ach1llery raised depreciation chargee. These factors coablned 
to produce a substantial increase 1noverheads ,e.g. 1n 1932 alone they rose by 
36 per cent. 
1 
The aasimila tion of new models 1n so e cases led to very large 
cost 1ncre.aaes1 for the ia.Sverdlova factory 1..n 1931, when the R-80 boring aach1ne 
was being aaatered, costs rose by 46 per cent during the year, at;alnst a plan 
target of a 20.5 per cent cost reductiont 2 
The initial cest of new models introduced in the years 1931 to 1933 tended 
to be extremely high , and there was a very substantial difference between the 
cost of these new models and the price of existing older ~odels of the same 
type . Thus, in 1932 the DIP-200 lathe had an average cos t of 15,000 rubles, 
whereas the price of lathes of this size had been provisionally fixed at 4,000 
J rubles in the SUIUier of 1931, and the price of the DlP-200 1 the itself bad 
been provisionally set at 9,100 ru~es in mid-1932.4 The new boring m.achine 
of the ia.Sveralova factory had a cest in 1931 of 73,000 rubles ( a provisional 
price of only 9,000 rubles was fixed fer machines of this type5), and the 
factory was unofficially asking a price ef ?0,000 rubles for its new planing 
machine, although a slightly smaller,older ,model butlt by the Odes~ 1a.Len1na 
factory was priced at only 4,000 rubles.6 However, as the scale of production 
of these new models rose and initial production proble~s overocme, costs fell 
rapidly. In the first half of 1933 costs were cut by almost 24 per cent compared 
with the aaae period in the previous yes.r .? A a Table SA .XXO:Shows , t he cost of the 
DIP-200 lathe was aore than halved by the end of 1934 , when it reached 7,206 
rubles, while the cost of the Gcr'kii aillin machine f ctory's •682• universal 
eachine fell fro11 40,20? rubles in 1932 to 1),500 rubles 1n 1934~ An indication 
or the extent of cost reductions for new ttodels introduced 1n 1931 and 19J2 is 
provtded by the following table; the new models of 1932 were reater 1n number 
anrl more eignif:toant for the develo~ot of the br&llch than those of 1931. 
t.Zaind. ,28 .4.33 · )4 M 19"4 26'=~ In the ~~Lentngradskaya tyazhelaya promyshlennost' 41931-19 ,L.- •' / ,p. ./ • 4 8 fOllowing year , however, costs fell by 17. per cent ,against a target o£ 2 • per 
eent - ibid. 
~.Zaind . ,23 . 7 .Jl . 
·~· ,).8.)2. 
s .~. ,23.7 .31 . 
6 • .!_bld. , 1!). 1.)) . 
7 olbid. ,21.9 o3J • 
.'S"ee Do S81 • 
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Table 1) .II 
!h• Chan in Cost or Coa able Preducts - Metal cutt 
Machine Tools , 1932 _ 193 
1932 1933 1934 
l.Coat Index1 12~2 • 100 
All ce•pa.rable products 100 ?5.6 65. 8 
1nclud1.ngs 
First produced in 1931 100 94 . 1 82 . 0 
Firat prGduced 1n 1932 100 66 . 9 50 .8 
U.Annual cost reductions(!} 
All COIIparable products -24.4 -12.9 
1nclud1nga 
Firat produced 1n 1931 -5.9 -12 . 9 
Firat produced 1n 1932 -)) .1 -24.0 
1 , 1thout account of price changes 
Sourcea Calculated fro11 Turetskii , op cit,p.98. 
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1935 1936 
62 . 1 46.4 
?6.2 5).6 
4).6 )0 .6 
-5. 6 -25.) 
-?.0 - 29 .? 
-14.2 -29.9 
The large cost reductien shown above for 1936 presumably reflect the impact or 
the Stakhanevite meveaent and the revision of output nons which teok place 1n 
19)6 . 
The new ent erprises coming into operation at the end of the First Five-year 
Ptb faced a particularly unfavourable cost situation, because the high overheads 
o! the aaei.aUation period had to be distributed over a aaall output. Aa a 
result overheads r,presented a very h~h proportion of total coats, as au be 
Men frem the case of the ia.Ordzhonikidze factory , the economic performance of 
llhich wae very poor 1n the first three years. The following shows the c~ing 
r~ture ot the factory production cost of the basic product of the enterprise, 
the '136' turret lathe. In this case overheads represented 63 per ce.'lt. of total 
cost 1n 1933 , falling to a planned 53 per cent 1n 1935. The case of the Gor'k11 
factory was aimilar 1 over.heads represented about 60 per cent of the total cost 
1 tr the '682' milJ1n6 machine 1n 1934· The older , more experier.oed factories 
~hleved better resul ta ,e.6 . the Tula factory , one of the aost eucceesful in the 
•1d-1930s 1n reducin£ production costs, 1n 1935 achieved the f6llowing cost 
l .Zaind. ,29 . 9.35. 
13.5 
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structure fer 1 ts basic product, the ' 681G' ( • Dzerzhinets' ) milling machine 1 
aaterl~ls (including spoilage) - 32 . 5 per cent, wages of production workers -
1?.6 per cent1 and overheads - 49.8 per cent .l In late 1935, Sushkov, the 
The Cost Structure of the '136' T t L _ urre athe , 1933 - 1935 Table 13.III 
1933 1934 193.5Plan ( 4thQ) 
Item of cost Cost(r.) tf., total Cost(r.) 1> total Cost(r. ) , total. 
Materials 4,855 28 . 2 4,564 29 .5 4,692 36.7 
I ages of Prodn. Wrks • 1,496 8 .7 1,646 10.6 1,364 10.7 
Shop Overheads 5,287 30.8 6 , 0361 39 .0 4, 277 3).4 
Factory Overheads 5,551 32.3 3 ,2281 20 .9 2 ,455 19.2 
Total cost 17,189 100.0 15,474 100 .0 12,788 100.0 
! .Changing proportions mainly result of the transfer of many engineering and 
technical personnel from the factory administration to the shops . 
Sourcea 1933 and 1934 - Vestnik metallopromyshlennosti ,1935 ,No.9,p . 118. 
1935 4th quarter plan- Zaind.,11.11.35. 
director of t he im,Ordzhonikidze factory, cited the German specialist , Schlesing~ 
who for the German machine tool industry had outlined an optimal cost structure 
for a ~acbine tool of average weight ofa materials - 41.2 per cent; wages - 18.3 
per centt and overheads - 40.5 per cent. Sushkov considered this a desirable 
and feasible target or the Soviet industry, and demonstrated that it could be 
~chieved at his factory on the condition that eutput norms were overfulfllled 
by at least one hundred percentl2 
In 1933 large cost reductions were achieved as the new models were 
as· tm1lated , but from the beginning of the Second Five- year Flan, as the branch 
enterered the third phase of its develop~ent and the expansion of the tipazh 
became a ceatral concern, the problem of reducing costs became more difficult and 
t he rate of annual reduction fell in 1934 and to a stlll greater den-ee during 
1935. A substantial cost item at this time was spoilage (brak) . This waste 
production resulting from poor materials , inexperienced workers , and design and 
technical errors a•counted for a rising pro~ortion ot total output from 1931 
to 1934, when 1.t attained no les!) than 6.8 per cent of the cost of groes output 
1.~. , 29 .2 . 36 . 
2 .~. ,11.11.35· 
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of GUSIP factor ies • 
Annual Cost of Gross Out ut Table1).IV 
1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 
Specialised Machine 
To~l Industry ) .6 6 . 4 ? . 1 - -- ~ - - -
All GUSIP( 1. e . inc. 
tooling industry) 8.8 ? .Jl 
l .'i 1rst siX months only • 
Soln'Cea 1931 - Sokolov, A.,Sovetskoe stankostroenie,f1.,1932,p . 21. 
1932 , 33 - Sii,1934 ,No.4, p . 2 . 
1934 ,35 - ilan . Khoz . , 1936 ,No . 2 , p .37. 
1936 ,37 - ibid . , 1938,No .5,p . 25 . 
1936 
6.4 
It vouln be a mistake, however, to regard this r 1stng share of accounted 
193? 
6 .6 
spollage solely as an indication of a deterioration of quality of work; 1t also 
reflected rising qW\lity standards and an improvement 1n quaJ.1tyinspect1on . Frolll 
about 1935 the proportion of spoilage showed a downward trend, but .'leverthelas 
reaained at a high levela 1n 1937 the total value of spoilage in GUSIP as a 
whole n.mounted to no less than 35 million rubles. 1 The trend dlU"1ng the 
Third Plan is not known, but in 1939 spoilage acc~ounted for only 2.1 per cent 
o! the total cost of production at the 'Krasnyi Prolet;trl i' factory . 
2 
In 1935 the attention of the NKTP leadership and also that of GUSIP turned 
ore seriously than in previous years to the problem of cost reduction , and a 
drive for profile~ble operation began. In t he u.chlne tool branch. this campaign 
tU directed towards securing price r eductions in order to br1.llg Soviet prices 
tore into line with foreign equivalents, while at the same tt..e attempting 
t o free the branch from subsiriies . With the development of the Stakhanovite 
ovement from the autwnn of 1935 real successes were achieved, and the rate of 
eost reduction rose sharply in19'36 , giving the Glavk a substantial above- plan 
profit for the year ,3 Direct evidence on the movement of costs during the Third 
Five-year Plan period is lacking, but it is reasonable to as UAa the.t. the rate of 
1•ha.rt .Khoz . , 1938 ,No . 5 , p . 25. 
~·!!sh1nostroenie,1 .2 .40 . 
·~~. ,10 . 3 . 37 . 
'"TJ. f 
reduetloo slowed considerably , and may even ~ve been reversed, as the br~~ch strived 
to build a large number of complex special and specialised aod.els. At the lead.1ng 
'Krasnyi Proletarii ' factory cests were cut by 4.6 per cent in 1938 and ?.8 per 
1 cent in 19)9 1 thPse rP-1uct1ons were probably obtained through the develo~ent 
of flow asGembly of the main large-serial models. Indirect evidence that problems 
of reducing costs were greater duringthe 1938 to 1941 period is provided by 
the fact that prices of machine tools built by both the Glavk and the ' planned' 
factories during this period were not reduced, in marked contrast to the previous 
three-four years when reductions bad been frequent. 
Prices 
Given the vital role of the machine tool i ndustry in supplying production 
equipaent to the rest of the engineering industry , the question of the price 
of domestically produced machine tools was of particular importance, especially 
during the Second Five- year Plan,when imports formed~ smaller proportion of 
total installations . Information about price fixing policy before and durin~ t he 
First Five-year Plan is sparse . The first complete list of all Soviet built 
machine tools and their prices was published 1n 19JO as a guide for tbose 
2 ordering equip.11ent tn t he following year. It is known that general machinery 
prices (pro~y 1ncluding ochine tools) ttere reduced by up to 4.? per cent accordin 
to a VSNKh or der of 14th February 192r • and that 111achine tool prices were cut 
on average by 4 per cent on tst October 1929. In September 1930 a tU%nover tax 
of 4. 2 per cent was imposed o~7~achine t ools and t ooling industry, which 
aay bave led to 
4 
corresponding price increaseo for aachlne tools. Price lists 
were published in 1931 and 1932 in con nection with the placingof orders . but as t he 
latter expbcitl y specified , these were 'erientation~l' prices only. In both 
llste the prices of a number of new models recently introduced or about to be 
eal1 ti 
5 Price discipline was not ~lw~ys 
assiJIU ated were clearly unr s c • 
observed by factories of 
that some factories were 
the branch ~t this ttme a one critic early 1n 1933 noted 
taking advantage of the • hl!h conjuncture ' and chargiD.g 
excessive prices on new ~d 
1.Masbinostroenie , 2 . 10.J9 I 
2.Za . Ind. , J1 . 10. J0 . 
J .Torg.Pro111 .Gaz . , 16 . 2 . 29 . 
special 111achines. 
6 
1 .2 .40 . 
1).8 4-18 
With the introduction of new, modern models and the modernisation of older 
;achines prices r4se sharply , partly because factories tended to pass on the 
high initial costs to customers. Nevertheless, some prices were below cost 
&t this time , e . g . in 19.34 the ' 114' semi-automatic had a list price of 25,000 
rubles , although its cost in that year averaged 25 , 021 rubles .? This 
problem continued into 19)6 - 1n February the director of 'Krasny! ·Proletar11' 
claiated that prices of aost machines b~t by his facte:ry could n ct. be further 
reduced because they were below cost.8 But , 1n general, as the new aodela 
were put into regular batch pr~duction their cost fell quickly , givtng the 
possibility of quite substantial price reductions . 
A procedure for approving machinery prices was laid down by an SNK decree 
of 5tb August 193.3 , which established that STO was to approve prices for a 
wide range of products , including machine tools , made on a mass or batch basis. 
The prices of other products were to be fixed by a ,a;ree111ent between t he producer anc 
the customer. 9 In the case of machine t .)ols this latter provision clearly 
applied 1n the case of special machines and , in practice appears also to have 
applied to new machines in the initial period of their production before ao. STO 
apporved price had been fixed . Approved prices were listed in price handbooks 
which appeared annually from 19.35 t covering al l machines built i n the us~~). 
Prices of new machines not yet assimilated into batch production , and of special 
ucbine to~ls , were listed in the price handbooks as • contract' prices, providin! 
an apuroximate indication of prices set by mutual agreeme~t of buyer and seller. 
The system of contract prices was ope~ to abuse as factories were sometimes aole 
to offset losses by fixing extremely high prices for 'one-off' special machines, 
e •!• in April 19.35 the director of the i.m .Sverrllova factory was reprimanded 1n 
iZl NKTP Order for gross violation of price discipline - a special machine supplied 
4.Izvestiya ,13.9.)0. This rate of 4.2 per cent was almost the lowest of rates 
5 fixed for a range of industries by an SNK dec ee: . 
'!_alnd., 2) .?.31t) .8.)2 .The 'Komsomolets ' factory s co~oined achine tool,for 
example' was priced 1n the 19.31 list at a mere ),000 rubles; in the f'ollowi.ng 
year at 20 , 000 rubles , 
6.!_alnd . ,15.1 .)3. 
7 .See Table SA .XXIX. 
S.!_alnd , , 24 , 2 . )6. 
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tt Dvigatel ' stroi had been priced ( with the agree !Dent of the buyer and GUSIP) 
at ;10,000 rubles , subsequently cut by t '"'e Order to 120 , 000 rubles.1 
As new model s enterered regular batch production costs fell and Jlle&sures 
were taken t o reduce the machine tool price level . An STO decree of t 6th March 
1935 outlined price re.iucti«»ns for f!q_uipr,ent f or aany branches of industry, 
l.:tclud1ng machine tools • According to this measure GUSIP was t., introduce p.r1.ce 
cuts giving a total saving of 11 .6 mlllion r ubles , and GVMU (Glavnoe voenno-
!ob111zatsionnoe upravleni e) cuts providing a saving of 4.9 mill ion rubles 
(~es~bly this applied to the machine tools produced by the defence tndustry) . 2 
The overall per centage reduction was not stated , but from the known planned output. 
o~ the Glavk in 1935 it must have been aoout 10 per cent . In February 1935 a 
caapaign began for the further reduction of machine tool prices , initiated by 
the director of the Tula Arms factory , Vannikov, who declared that the prices 
of machine tool s built by his enterprise would be red.uced by 20 per cent in 19:36 . 
Al'perovich soon replied, stating that the Gla.vk had reviewed costs and was 
to reduce prices by 2? .8 per cent . But 1n March the government acted to refora 
~ices 1n general in order to strengthen khozraschet and eliminate subsidies . 
According to this mea sure prices in some branches were increased and in others 
had to be reviewed to take account of consequent increases in material and fuel 
costs, To of ... set these increases th~ rate of turnover tax applied 1n heavy 
l.ndustry was reduced to 0.5 _ 2 . 0 per cent compared with the previoua rates 
of UD to 5 per cent . 3 Furthermore, some of t he costs of assimila Hng new 
4 
technology and training cadres were transfered to the state budt;et . This 
•~sure led to a review of the previous price r eduction intentions of the cachine 
tool industry ; in 19:36 new prices approved by STO provided for an average 
teductton of only 6 per cent . 5 
Th r evie .... occured in -'anuary 1937 when according e next machine tool price .. 
t f hines were further reduced , e.g . the 0 a. SNK decree the prices of a number o mac 
~1 b 2 680 rubles to 15, 000 rubles , but this t• ce of the 'DIP-:300' lathe was cut Y ' 
6 
t• liJD.ited range of aodels. During 
·'iew appears to have been restricted to a r:z- uld also be • profitable ' , not 
8~·,29 .4 .)5 . Building special machines ~~es but ·0y fixing exag~erated 
l
la.ply through sett ing a.rt..if1ciallY high pr i~e annual plans for cost reduct.lon; 
p tnned cost estimates which entered en terpr con t .next page . . 
13·1.0 
420 
tbe Third Five-year Plan, following t he break up of NKTP and the subsequent 
further fragmentation of administrations, authority f or approving price changes 
appears to have been decentralised to t he Commissariats . Betwe n 1937 and 1941 
there were no more a<(!ross -the -board price reviews for machine tools, and 
!lith few ex~t.ions, prices remained stable over the four year period? . At this 
tae machine tool prices were ap~ed by a very wide rang e of organisations , 
including NKMashinostroenie ,NKTyaz.RMash,NKZem. ,NKMest .Prom.ef the republics , 
MdGULAG , and in a few cases this led to the fixing of different prices for 
the same model built by enterprises of different or9'an i sations . 8 No evidence 
on the extent to which price disCI'ipline was observed at this time has been found, 
but the reduction of central control may well have led to some deterioration .It 
may be significant tha t in 1940 the prices of a. number of new basic models 
built by the specialised industry were approved by Ekonomsovet , indicating 
a reassertion of high-level, central authority.9 
The movement of prices and costs of a number of the most iJnportant .models 
built in the pre-War years is shown 1n Table SA .XliX . 
During the Second Five-year Plan concern was expressed on a number of 
occasions, notably by M .Kaganovich, over the very great dif.ference between 
the prices of Soviet and foreign JP.achine tool s . Estimates of the 1!1agllitude of 
this difference varied. One observer in Harch 1935 considered that S'Wiet 
10 
prices were three to four times higher; Kaganovich in August of the sue year 
believed that Soviet machines cost six to seven times more than forei.ga 
11 ~as one of the alms of the price and cost equivalents. Reducing this dif"'erential " 
reduction campaigns of 1935 and l9J6. But not only was the absolute level -
tb d real costs providing additional 
e difference between these cost esti!llates an t r eduction tar~et - t he 
rofits and facilitating the fulf ilment of t;e t~~: deception - Zaind •• 6.5 . J5 . 
t .Sverdlova factory was also found g uilty 0 -
2•!!!she stroitel'stvo,1935,No.9,p .J6 . 
1 
ot known 
3.Tbe new rate for t he machine tool industry s n ' 
~·~al.afeev , op cgt ,p.185. 
6·~. ,18.4.3 • 
7·~.,5.2.371Plan,1937,No.?,p.52. t the orices of many models built by ' e 1940-41 price handbook reveals tha 
1 1
-htly reduced in August 19)8. 
enterprises of the defence industr y were s g M .-L ., 1941 . 
;~e~llorezhushchie stanki.Preiskurant,1940-41~0~~mic body of the ttme . ·~. Ekonomsovet under SNK was the supreme 
lO,Zaind 29 "l 35 1.J_j'j --- • • • J • • 
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tf prices much higher' but the price differential s between simple and complex 
aaclrl.nes were also greater than for foreign machines . Thus , in October 1935 it 
;as estimated that the cost of the DIP-200 (x?50) lathe was three tilles higher 
tha.n the price of theequivalent foreign model, and that of the'136'turret lathe 
;,6 t.illes nigher, but the price of the '114' semi-auto was eight ti.Jies h1g.ber 
than the price of the equivalent fore~ model, and that of the '116 • seai-auto 
15.8 times higher • In the USSR the '113' automatic of the im .Ordzhon1kidze 
factory was 10.5 times as expensive as the TN -20 latheJ abroad the d ifference 
vas only four tl~es. Thus the prices of Soviet machines produced on a large-serial 
basis were three-"" our times h1gt'ler th~.n for similar foreign models, but very much 
~eater for· specialised machines built on an individual or small batch basis. 
there was concern that the pattern of price differentials would jiecourage 
8!\terprises from using more complex, specialised equipment, inducing a bias 
towards simpler, general purpose types.1 Between 1935 and 1937 the diffe J.·entlal 
in price between general purpose and specialised machines 1o1as in fact narrowed 
because 1n many cases the cost reductions 1hr the latter tended to be greater than 
fof the for mer. 2 
Tbe overall movement of machine tool prices during the period can be 
apuroxlmately indicated. Bet1o1een 1928 and 1930-31 prices fell by a small amount 
each year; from 1932 prices began to rise, increasing quite sharply 1n 1933 and 
19)4; 1n 1935 and 1036 prices were reduced, with further IDOre limited reductions 
1n 1937 i but from 1938 to 1941 prices of comparable models remained stable . There 
have been two at tempts by American economists to construct indices of Soviet 
3 B th ttempt to renresent by an index lachine tool prices in the pre-War years • 0 R. . r 
n b t 1 Produced in a !iven ye-.r, weighting the \1:1 er the average price of a machine oo 
l.!!stnik metallopremyshlennosti,1935,No.tO,ppf~~; •136' turret lathe, the ' 116' 
2.For example, the ratio between the prices t 0 tic (all built by the a . 
seu-auto , and · the '123 ' four-spindle au ~ma _ ls2.6:J.8 ; 1936- 1s2.0t).3; 
0rdzhonikidze factory) changed as follows ~i i;~ 1n handbooks of correspondi.ag ye&r 
•
1
;937- 111.4a3.2 (calculated from prices ants in the Soviet Union ,1928-51,RAND 
n.urgeon,L. ,Prices of metalworking equipm t R Prices and :n-oduct1on of 
Research Memorandum,RM-1112, 1953 J Moo~end • 1962 - -
!!£.hinery 1n the Soviet Union, 1928-58 a ar ' • 
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series by the structure of output in certain bas.e years. The results obtained 
are shown in the following table 1 
Table Q.V 
Price Indices for Soviet Metal cutting and f (
1937 
_ iOO) _ ormin~ Machine Tools 
Index 1927/8 1928/911929/0 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937-41 
I 
Turgeon1 55.8 55 .8 53 . 6 35 . 7 44 . 2 80.0 107.2 100.2 101.1 100. 0 
2 -- - -Koors t een 70 . 2 70 . 2 I 6?.3 46 .? 51.0 95 . 2 128. 0 119.4 101.7 100.0 
1. Turgeon,op cit , p . 50 (1937 output structure weights) 
2.Moersteen ,oo clt,p . 390.(1937 output structure weights) 
The Moorsteen index is probably the more accurate of the two, but both suffer 
from a number of serious weakness es. The price data employed is far frolil co111plete, 
being gathered from scattered journal sources rather than the price handbooks 
cited in the present work . Information on prices is particularly weak during 
the 1927/8 to 1933 period because the • orientational' prices are employed,even 
though they clearly understate t.he actual price level in so far as new machines 
w-ere frequentl y listed at alearl y understat.ed pre-production estimated prices . 
Furthermore, the n Ulilber of prices taken for some y~ars was very small 1n both 
cases. No account is taken of qualitative c latlges and special machine t ools, 
which accounted for a.n increasing share of total output in the course of the 
period are completely omitted. Finally, the output data employed is of a rather 
sketchy nature , that refering to the structure of output being espec tally weak . 
Despite these problems , the general trend indicated by the indices probably 
Provides a reasonably accurate impression of the actual movement of prices, with 
the proviso that 1n both cases the fall in prices 1n 1931 and 1932 eot~pared with 
1929-30 is probably overstat.ed , while rurgeon' s index appears to understate the 
extent of the fall in prices betwe n 1934 and 19.:37 • 
~ Prof1tabll1 ty of the Industry 
During the First Five-year Plan and thA beginning of the Second the 
apecialised machine tool industry was almost certainly a subsidised branch . 'i'hla 
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can be deduced from the fact th t i a a ser ous campaign for proftable operation 
began only 1n 1935. It is known that Stankoob' edinenie made a loss of 1.78 
million rubles in 1931 • when its marketed output amounted to 36.42 million rubles.1 
In 1935 a campaign started in heavy industry for profitable operation and an 
end to subsidies • A pioneering role in this campaign was played by the 
im,Ordzhonik1dze machine tool factory which, in 1935, succeeded 1n obtaining 
a one million ruble profit despite a plan target of a two mlllion ruble subsidy. 2 
~ 1935 the new Gor'k1i works also became profitable~ but other enterprises of the 
branch , notably the smaller factories and those newly assimilated (including 
'Samotocbka • , 1m. Ts .K , 111ash1nostroeniya, 'Komsomolets ' , im .Len ina ,Khar ' kov and 
4 'Stankokonstruktsiya') still required subsidies. For GUSIP as a whole, 18 
enterprises made profits totalling 24 million rubles, but 20 made losses to 
a total of 36 million rubles, giving a net loss of 12 million rubles,5 In 1936 
it was interlded that only five machine tool factories would receive subsidies 
from the internal resources of the Glavk, aamely ' Stankokonstruktsiya' ,Khar'kov, 
the factory of small unit-construction machines in Sverdlovsk, and two enterprises 
6 
recently tranfered to the Glavk, im.Kirova in T"W.isi and im.Sedina. in Krasnodar . 
The campaign for profitable operation was successful! despite price reductions, 
the Glavk as a whole ended the year with a significant above-plan profit .7 The 
8 
branch appears to have remained profitable for the rest of t he period. 
~bo~ Productivity 
The vital importance of raising labour productivity in the branch was 
kn It is' however, very difficult to provide ac owledged f rom its earliest days . 
labo.~ productivity in the machine tool a satisfactory measure of cl-tanging I.U; 
1 d data for value o "' output are incomplete and n ustry during the pre-War years; 
1~·Zhizn' ,Aug,1932,supoleMent, 'annual balances' ,No.1l. 
23·~. ,2.1.36. 'kovsk okra .,Cor'kH , 
•.!stori a industrializatsii nizhe orodko o- or 
4 
196a,p,334• 
5·~ . ,18.4.36. o1bid, 
6.Xlli. 
7 ·1'>1d 10 3 ) 8 ~'' • .37. tO r cent (Plan.Khoz .,1938,No.10, p . 57 
' 1937 GUSIP had a profit rate of 9- bpe infered from the fact that 'NA"Ty~Lzb.N.asb 
a(nd Profitability in 1938 and 1939 can) ~ profits o:f 4.2 a.nd 103.5 aillioa 
ot Which GUSIP was a major component m e 
40 rubles respect! vely - Mashinostroenie' 12 .2 • • 
1) . 14 
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strongly influenced by the change 1n Wlit 1 va ue of machines bull t, while an indeJ 
of the number «rf physical units buil t per worker cannot take account of 
qualitati ve changes . The limited evidence on changing labour productivity in 
t.he s?ecialised machine t ool indust ry i s presented in the following table a 
Table 1) .VI 
Labour Productivity in the Specialised Machine Tool Industry* 
1928h 1927Ail 1931 1932 1933 19:34 1935 1936 193? 1938 1939 194 
1.0ut put/ worker1 
Qer vear ( r .1 1680 1865 1555 -2460 3580 4165 4865 5800 6515 
Index I 
1932 • 100 68 76 63 100 146 169 198 236 265 
1938 = 100 100 1:5< 
Previous year 
- 100 - 111 83 158 t46 116 11? 119 112 
11.h 11111 ber of 0 . 61 0 .65 0 .?5 0 .55 0 . 59 0.52 0.55 0 .61 0 .64 0 . 90 1.00 0 . 9/ 
mc .ts(unlts) 
Per wrk./n: 
• Approximate 
!.Marketed output in 1926/27 priceS J workers (rabochie) only 
Sourcet 
1. 1928/29 - 1934 calculated ~"rom m:rrkete~ output data (Pro'b .Ek . ,1935,No .4,pp1~2t 
and number of worker s (Table ll .I ) Note , number of workers 1928/29 taken 
as 4 ,1?0 and 1929/30 estimated as ? , 500 . 
1935 and 1936 estimated , on basi s of interpolation between 19J4 and 193? for 
marketed output 
1937 - calculated from marketed output of 159 . 4 m.r.obtained from 486 per cent 
increase over 1932 - Ai~enshtadt & Chikhachev ,op cit,p . 214. 
1938-1940 - Index - Klimenko , K.I . ,Puti ov shen1 a olzvoditel'nosti truda 
v mashinostroenii SSSR ,rot. , 1950 ,p .12 This probably refers to gross output 
U..Caloulated from data of Table SA . I and Table ll . I (No .of workers 1928/29-29/ 
as 1. above) .Note - Plan .Kboz.,19J9 ,No.9 , p . ~2 also gives 0 .64 units per worker 
in 193? . 
Tne uuluence of the transition to new modern types from 1932 is clearly 
Y\a1ble: the value per unit machine built rose very rapidly from 1931 to 1934, 
bat the nwnber of machines bull t per worker fell as they became more co!!!ple:x. ; the 
fall 1n 19'32 also reflecting the influx of new workers 1.nto the branch. From 19.35 
-~units per worker indicator began to recover, exceodin.g the 1931 high point 
ain 1n 19)8. Labour productivity continued to rise steadily during the Third 
l1•1e-year Plan years , when it is estimated t o have accounted for over 80 per cent 
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of the growth of production
1 
• Taking the period 1932 to 1940,labour productivit1 
~ value terms must have increased over four times, and over six t~es between 
the start of the First Five-year Plan and tft~ ar. 
Information on thegrowth of labour productivity at individual enterprises 
1s only available for tiu'ee leading factor.ies - 'Krasny1 Proletar11', the 
Gor'kil milling machine factory ~nd the im.Ordzhonikidze wor~s Ln Moscow ,2 From 
an initial ve~ low level of output per. worker, the two new enterprises rapidly 
achieved levels superior to that of the older ~a~tory • The impact of the 
transition to new models was particularly acute 1n 193J at the 'Kra snyi Proletarit' 
f actory; output per worker actually fell. The other, small enterprises of the 
branch, producing less complex machines, presumably h~d a much lower level 
of labour productivity, because the branch average indicated above was much 
lower than that of the three lea~ing factories. 
~lany of the means of raising labour productivity have been d iscus ·ed 
elsewhere. lhese included increasing the seriality of production, improving 
v~~ organisation, improving production technology, standardisation, the develox;men· 
of sub-contracting , raising labour skills , and socialist eaulation campaigns . 
The Stakhanovite movemant undoubtably had a positive influence on prodnctivit.y 
1n thP branch and was "lssociated with at least two major revisions of output 
norms.In February 1936 the Glavk held an all-Union conf erence to discuss new 
t echnical norms founrled on intensified cutting regimes and these technical norms 
provided a basis both for reviewing project capacities of enterprises and increaslne 
3 output norms for a very large number of operations. Output nonas were raised 
on :>verage by forty per cent in i'lay t936 for GUSIP as a whole and by t he end of 
th~ yeax 1t was reported that they were bein~ fulfllled or over.fulfUled by 
by 84 per cent of workers , 4 By means of raising output norms some of the 
galns achieved by individual Sta.khanovite workers were diffused throughout the 
branch as a whole. A second branch-wide revision of output norms took place 
in April 1937; by June 1938 the average rate of fulfilment for the brao.ch..as 
Llliaenko,op cit ,p . 12. 
2 .See Table SA .J.X'A . Note , not ril.rec tly 
bec~use gross output is employed . 
3.Zaind . ,14. 2 .36 . 
,J:lan .Khoz . , 1937 ,No.8, pp . )7- 33 • 
comparable with industry data (p. 424 ) 
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almost 170 per cent, only 10.5 per cent of workers falling to meet tbem.1 During 
the Third Five-year Plan considerable at t ention was devoted to 1aprov1ng productic 
organisation and methods, while emulation developed to embrace multiple machine 
aanning. At some enterprises, e.g. 'Krasny! Pr -Jleta.r11.', these measures led 
to a reducticn 1n the number of workers employed,and quite substantial productivity 
increases. 
It is not possible to make any meaningful compar isons of labour product1vty 
in the Soviet machine tool industry and the indu.atries of other countries during 
th~ 1930s on the basis of the available information. Apart from the usual problem 
of determining an appropriate exchange rate , there is the formidable diff iculty of 
accounting for differences 1n the structure of the Soviet and foreign Lndastries, 
the latter generally showing a higher level of development of s~ec1al1sed 
process ann parts production. Furthermore, we have only considered the spec1 lts£d 
aacb1ne tool industry , which accounted for less than half total ~~put during 
aost of the period, information about nroductivity of the ~emainder being 
unobtainable . Soviet economists did not attempt tc make any but the most 
elementary comparisons at the time. Two comparisons have been traced, both 
giving the sa.Jile result a1 though refering to different periods . The first compared 
t he Soviet and American industries 1n 1927/28 and concluded that output per 
wage earner in the former was one third of that of the Jatter r the second coapared 
the Sov1et industry 1n 1935 and tbe American in 1929 and again concluded tbat 
2 
labour productivity 1n the soviet industry was one third of the American level. 
These rough estimates indicate the magnitude of the task of'catcbing up' 
facing the Soviet machine tool industry of the nineteentbirties . 
1.Zalnd , ,17 .4.)7 r Plan. Khoz., 19J8,No .10 ,p. 78 . 
2,192?/28 - Sotsialisticheskaya ratsionalizatsiya v bor'be 5 pote;yaml,op cit,p. 167. 
1935/29 _ Khromov,P.A.,Proizvoditel'nost' truda v promyshlennosti SSSB,M.,1940, 
p .204. 
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Concl1181on 
The efficiency and productivity of the machine tool industry as one o£ the 
primary suppliers of basic production equipment to the engineering industry and 
other branches is an important £actor determining the cost of production of 
industry as a whole. The Soviet machi .e tool industry during the period under 
investigation lTas faced with a formidable problem of reducing the considerable 
cost and price differential existing between its products and those produced 
aborad,while at the same time making the transition from small-scale production 
of simple, backward models to large-scale production of more complex, aodern 
machines. During the transition period , 1n particular the years 19:31 to 19:34, 
costs and prices showed a tendency to rise as new models were assimilated and 
at this time the branch was subsidised , although the full extent of this 
subsidisation is not known. After this relatively brief transition period costa 
and prices were somewhat reduced and labour productivity rose quite strongly 
for the remainder of the period. By the mid-19:30s the branch was operating 
without subsidies. This picture is incomplete, however, because only the 
specialised component o£ the industry has been considered. The defence industry 
aachine tool building enterprises do appear to have been relatively efficient 
producers , at times setting a lead for the industry as a whole in reducing 
costs and prices, but the situation in the rest of the industry was presumaoly 
leas satisfactory. By the end of the decade thertt were IUJly sull-scale producers 
aaking simple machines by methods which must have been extremely primitive 
eoapared with those of the main specialised factories! by 1940 there most have 
been a substantial gulf between best and worse practice with very substantial 
•ariations 1n costs and productivity. The growth of labour productivity achieved 
~ the spectalised industry from the m1d-19JOs suggests that the relative 
level of productivity between the soviet industry and foreign equivalents may 
:~tell "'- ed b th .Jar but this may not have been the case for 
u .... ve been rais .~ y e "' , 
'the industry as a whole' because of the necessity of u1nta1nlng a substantial 
0"'"\..- d in conditions of acute scarcity of machine tools 
~~4 of secondary pro ucers 
c! all types. 
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Chapter 14 
CONCLUSIOr. 
The machine tool industry is a relatively small branch of production 1n 
any economy. In the Sf'viet Union in the early 1930s it accounted for a mere 
two per cent of the total output of the machine building and metal-working 
industry • Yet its economic and strategic importance is far greater than t his 
simple quantitative measure suggests. One of the most serious problems for 
Soviet machine tool building was that of establishing its priority as one of 
the most important branches of the engineering industry and of industry as whole. 
There is no doubt that in the 1920s its significance was not sufficiently 
appreciated. Despite the clear call of the Fourteenth Party Congress for the 
development of an independent machine buildine: capacity the industrial and 
economic leadership of the time did not pay much a t tention to machines for 
building machines. Imports supplied almost all requirements and aa.chine tool 
building was not considered sufficiently consequential to merit the creation of 
an effective administrative centre. The decision in early 1929 to form a 
separate trust marked a significant step forward • There is no doubt that the 
'turn' at this time owed much to the activity of NK RKI and Jo1 . KBGanovicb in 
exposing the serious weaknesses of machine tool bu.i.lding and drawing attention 
to the necessity of gran tinp- it higher priority· 
In 1930 the plans for the machine tool industry were revised substantially 
and on paper at least it appeared that the status of the industry had been 
a~owledged; but in fact in that year tne branch to second place to other 
S!ct1ons of the engineering industry 1n resource allocation, seriously restricting 
lts ability to fulfil 1 ts investment programme during the five-year period, The 
~se with which machine tools could then be imported, coupled ~itb the prevalence 
ot the view tbat 'll&Chine tool building was too complex a matter to be quickly 
~ertaken , seems to have promoted an attitude t~t the branch could wait until 
cucUJIIstances were more favourable. This outl ook was challenged by Al' perovich 
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and other industrial leaders who apprec4 -ted 
..v.l the s1gni.f1ca.nae of quickly laying 
the foundat ions of a strong domestic machine tool industry . The advocacy of 
HK RKI , 1n particular t1 .Kaganovich in person, was again important 
1 
and there 
does appear to hRve been a definite improvement in the status of the branch and 
its abil i ty to obtain resources when Ordzhonikidze took over the leadership 
of VSNKh • and Kaganovich was made responsible for the engineering industry. 
During the First Five-year Plan period new branches of engineering were 
created , notably vehicle and tractor building , which were much larger in 
size than machine tool building and generally had much greRter political- economic 
weight than the machine tool branch . Not only did they tend to take priority 
withln the engineering sector to the detri ment of other branches, they also 
~creasingly began to impose demands on the machine tool industry and seriously 
~fluence i ts path of development . By the beginning of the Second Five-year Plan 
the status of the machine tool industry had undoubtably risen , but again, 
despite plans which aknowledged its leading role and provided for substantial 
~vestment allocations , resources were not forthcoming on the scale foreseen. 
It is clear that the demands of military production played a large role in 
d1vertingresources from civilian branches at this time , but it is curious that , 
given its strategic importance, the machine tool industry should have suffered 
to such an extent. The construction plans of the branch weJE very greatly under-
fulfilled J a short-term vie~ seems to have prevailed with capacity bei.og 
~xpanded at existing enterprises of the engineering industry • This was in many 
respects a sensi ble policy , but it was not in itself adequate to meeting all the 
neOOB of the economy; in particular it led to the neglect of two sections of 
the ~dustry of vital military importance , namely the building ofheavy and 
PTec1s1on machine tools . During the Third Five-year Plan yea.rs in far more 
dl~ficult economic conditions the Party and government was forced to take urgent 
easures to remedy these weaknesses, above all by rapidly building capacity for 
heavy machine tool production . Furthermore, at this tiJile measures were taken to 
e f the machine tool industry • Most of the new orrect the regional imbalance o 
projects were located 1n the east of the country , a nUJIIoer in the Urals and Siberia . 
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This leads one to c onclude t hat if higher priority had 1n fact been granted to 
the machine tool branch in the Second Five-year Plan peri od , problems of 
developing the engineering and defence industries 1n the immediate pre-~ar peri od 
would have been less acute. In the event the ambitious plans of September 1939 
and the massive programme outlined in December 1940 were only partially realised 
by the out break of war. 
The leadership of t he machine tool industry clearly found it difficult to 
obtain recognition of the priority of the branch • Al ' perovich and the other 
leaders of the industry did not carry t he s~~e poli tical weight as did the 
leaders of the auto-tractor industry and the directors of its large factories , 
The building of machine tools lacked the mass public appeal which attached to 
the giant tractor factories and other major projects of t he period . At the end 
of 1935 the industry lost its powerful advocate 1n f.IKTP, M.Kaganovich, who 
became the head of the aviation industry , and this fact may account for some 
of the industry's problems towards the end of the Second Five-year Plan . Another 
difficulty facing t he specialised machine tool industry was that it had to 
compete f or resources with the machine tool building shops of the favoured 
def ence industry. On the other hand, the splitting of NIITP at the end of 1936 
to form a separate defenceindustry commissariat may have had negative consequences 
in so far as it must have made interchange of experience between the machine 
tool builders of both sections much more difficult . Thus, while 1n theory the 
priority of the machine tool industry was generally recog.nised and this found 
its expression in t he resolutionsof Party congresses and conferences ,and in 
planning documents , in practice the industry by its nature found itself often 
at a distinct disadvantage . 
In 1933 Al • perovich declared that there had been no errors of principle in the 
development of t be machine tool ln~ ustry: this was surely correct. The mistakes 
~d problems that occurred were in t he realisation of the strategy of development, 
rather than in the stra t egy itself. Mistakes there certainly were - the policies 
ot Phase Two were carried to extremes, the labour skills required were under-
est~ated, the implications of technical progress were not perceived correctly 
4J1 
1n t.he early period, there was an excessively 
distrustful attitude towards 
:foreign technical assistance , and there w.ae 
perhaps an over-abrupt cut back 1n 
oach1ne tool imports. So f th me o · ese problems stelnl'led from the fact that 1n 
the first stages of industrialisation there was a rather abstract understanding 
of the differences between the capitalist and socialist econoc1es • It took a 
number of years to arrive at a more concrete appreciation of the specificities 
of each system and their implications for industrial organisation 1n the Soviet 
e<:'onomy • The development of' the machine tool indust ry , Md industry as a whole, 
at this time was not just a question of bui.l ding new factories and products, 1 t 
vae a complex learning process undertaken under conditions of intense pressure. 
This learning process was in part a-+'fected by the I!Wlifest a Uure of the 
capitalist economic system at the time of the r::ost tense lndustrtalisation effort; 
a failure which could not but reinforce an already present tendency to reject, 
& oriori ,all things capitalist. 
During the F irst Five-year Plan period this radicalism r eached its highest 
potnt . In many spheres, notably in relation to the possibilities of production 
spe~ialisation , the scope for mass production and the technology appropriate 
for Soviet condi tio11s, forms steflllling from a schema tic understanding of the 
advantages of the socialist planned econolllY were counterposed to the reality 
of capitalist practice without regard for the achieved level of developaent of 
the Soviet economy at the tiae. This tendency was quite short-lived, enjoying its 
&J)O!ee during 19J1 and the fixst half of 19J2 • and whUe 1 t did not have 
any real practical consequences for the machine tool industry it must have oade 
Us general conditions of work more difficult . The leadership of the industry 
at all times had a ~uch mare sober assessment of the path to be followei and t~e 
~aaibilities of each stage, but it constantly had to face criticism of its 
actions and policies bo~h from observers on the sidelines and from within its 
01in ranks. These criticisms , .frequently of a destructive and sceptical nature, 
lllii so111et1mes ill-informed , created a climate of suspicion and cUatrust which 
aerved to erode the authority of t .e industry' a leadership . Such critic~ 
~ ~ not just from radical theorists, but also the industrial press which 
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played a distinctly ambivalent role during the £1rst two five-year plan periods 
( the character of the press changed somewhat in the Third Five-year Plan , as 
can be seen by comparing Mashinostroenie of , say 1938-194o, with Za Industr1al1z-
atsiyu of ~ive years earlier - the former is much more like a present-day Soviet 
paper). On the one hand it played a positive role in mobilising activity , 
initiating campaigns and exposing poor work. It also provided a plat~orm for 
Al 'perovich and others to propagate the importance of machine tool building and 
"raw attention to i t s real problerns . On thEa. other hand, it also indulged at times 
tn destructive and irr espons ible criticism , at times showing a very poor grasp 
of the real problems involved ,and siezed upon f'lilures in the realisation of 
dUricult tasks as a pretext for generalised negative assessments of the entire 
work of the industry . One of the worst offenders appears to have been tbe 
newspaper, Tekhnika, the technical paper associated with Za Industrializatslyu 
It was this which first raised the attack against the ' DIP ' lathe 1n tne spring 
of 1932 , and its editor ,Kapust1n, seems to have had a particularly cynical 
view of the industry and its achievements. Both .1\.aga.novich and Al' perovich 
expressed their disaporoval of Kapustin and the technical press 1.n general at 
the First All-Union Conference in June 1933 • l'he former accused the technical 
p'~"ess of hoping for further failures and problems so that it woLll.d have grounds 
for launching more attacks ~ainst the technical leadership of industry, while 
the latter noted wryly that it was quite impossible to argue with Kapusti.n , 
b h always had the last word~ The press was thus a powerful ecause whatever happened e 
social force, but it was not a l ways used wisely. 
As the ' thirties a new force developed,which also tended to aaY.e to work of 
the ind ustry ,nore difficult and again its role was ambivalent . '!'his was the 
pressure exerted by the rising new generation of Soviet trained , politically 
co~~tted technical specialists . This was a positive phenomenon in so far as 
1t was a sign of the risingstrength of the industry , creatin8 conditions £or its 
•~cessful future development. But it had .a negative side in so far as these 
r 1a cadres tended to have a very hostile attitude towards e tively inexperienced new 
ft:teign experience and what they regarded as the subservience of the industry 
l.~nnogrRmmy •• , op cit , po . 230 and 86 • 
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to foreign methods , in particular the practice of copying foreign designs. The 
urge to create orig inal Soviet designs and new methods was of course creditable, 
but at a time when even the basic skills of machine tool buildi ng had not been 
assimilated it was premature to expect the industry to take a new, unkno~n course. 
The criticisms of these younger specialists tended to mount during the i:3econd 
Five-year Plan period , and tended to be accentuated by the fact that serious 
problems were experienced at the time,eg . in building machines for the auto-tractor 
factor ies. There is no doubt that this group played a prominent role in the 
events of 1937; their career interests were congruent with the broad , destructive 
political process then underway in Soviet society. This is not to deny that 
these younger designers and engineer s later pl ayed a considerable role in the 
development of machine tool building 1n the USSR , notably during the difficult 
years of the War • 
It is temptingto directly draw lessons from the Soviet experience of creating 
a machine tool industry f or developing countries today , treating the Soviet 
case as a 'model ' . While t here are undoubtably some general guidel ines which 
can be drawn from Soviet experience,it is also ess ential to realise the diff erent 
circumstances facing developing countries today , partly stemming from the very 
successes of Soviet industrialisation . The Soviet Union was forced to develop 
i ts machine tool industry in a very short period of time in exceQtionally 
difficult international circumstances. Technical independence from the capitalist 
world was one of the fundamental aims of the indust ial J eap forward. But today 
any country embarking on a genuinely independent (non-capitalist) pat h of 
development has the possibility of drawing on the machine tool industries of 
the Soviet Union and other socialist countries both for imports and technical 
assistance . This maltes feasible a much less intensive , costly and difficult 
process of development than that experienced in the USSR . Tbe adoption of this 
path has resulted in the successful creation of strong machine tool industries 
in a number of East European countries and China, and is today per111itting the 
raoid growth of machine tool building in such countries as .North Korea and Vietnam. 
A number of development economists have rightly drawn attention to the crucial 
role of the machine tool industry in the development process1 , and certain features 
of Soviet experience have been incorporated in United Nations publications and 
recommendat ions for industrial growth in the conditions of present- day developing 
countries . Thus the Soviet practice of the second phase of the industry's 
evolution of building a narrow range of products on a high seriality basis is 
2 thought to have general a pplication • creating a foundation for gradually under-
taking the building of a wider range of machines of greater complexity. The ~oviet 
practice of using production- type equipment permitting the employment of workers 
of a semi-skil led type is also considered to offer benefits in terms of reducing 
skill requirements} The use of special tooling and automatic devices to desklll 
machine tool building may also h?ve more general application at an early stage 
of development of the industry as a strategy for overco·111ng; the skill bottleneck. 
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Finally , one of the characteristic features of the Soviet experience is that it 
suggests that 
the use of the most advanced world technology may in some circumstances be a 
rational course for a backward country striving to rapidly catch up more advanced 
economies , and may even by an essential condition for doing so, despite the 
very different initial conditions . Thus the use and proriuction of high- productivity 
t b Condition for achieving modern levels of i ndustrial au omati c machinery may e a 
development and productivity in certain branches of machine building permitting 
lare:e- scale production • notably vehicle building~ Such a policy is of course 
i 1 i dom' of the 1950s and 1960s iirectly at vari ance with much 'convent ona w s 
1n the West, which held that countries with a scarcity of capital and plentiful 
labour should adopt labour intensive technologies. 
A K ' Alternative patterns of growth under 
l.See,for example, Ra j .K.N.and Sen. • ·•, xford Bconomic Papers,Vol.1J,1961,Feb. 
conditions of stagnant export earnings ,Qh . i 1 interoretation of the marginal 
Raqvi ,R.,'Machine tools and machines l as rsV~~ 196J,Feb.;Atkinson ,A.B., 'Irnport 
rate of savin~s ' , Indian Economic Review ' ~a · nant export earnings • ,Oxford Economic 
strategy and growth under conditions of s g 
papers ' , 1969 ,Nov. . h ical industry starts , the demand for 
2.Thus ," • • when the development of the mec t~n es for maintenance and the fabrication 
hchine tools corresponds to elementar~ dyp lopment demand is scarcely diversifiec 
of simple articles . As in this stage 0
1 
eve re present for construction 1n series , 
in types and models , favourable condi t ons ~ h1gb scale 1n machine tool 
above a hundred , for example ,wh:ch r epre:: sr:dustries 1n Develooin <.ountries, 
•anuracture • • "- Develo ment of r etal wo~ew York ,1969 , p .1JO. 
, UN ,Industr i a l Development Organis~tion ' He tal Working Industries 1n Developing 
.... •ID.Q.rt of the Inter regi onal Symposi um on 
~o~tr1~ ,UN ,IDO ,Vienna , 1968,p .70 . 
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During the brief period 1929 to 1941 the Soviet Union built the foundations 
of a modern machi ne tool industry, making a decisive break with past Russian 
backwardness • Many fEatures established at this time have become essential elements 
of the industry to thi s day . Characteristic are the large scale of factories l 
tbe large seriality of production of basic general-purpose models; the use of flow 
organisation ; the policy of' build in~ standard, • basic' models and unified 
r:mges of machines ; the e;reat stress in general on standardisation; the stress 
on building unit- construction machines; the structure of R.& D. organisations 
in the industry, combining a powerful,central institute ,ENINS , with design and 
devel opment facilities at the enterprise level; the organisation of castings 
supply from central foundries . At the same time a number of problems having their 
origin in the early period of development have continued to afflict the industry 
in the post- War years. Some negative features stemming from the conditions of 
the 'thirties tended to become institutionalised and diff icult to overcome . These 
shortcomings include the relatively low leveJ of specialised parts productiona 
problems experienced in introducing new models and securing regular design 
modernisat ion ; an inadequateLy close relationship between machine tool builders 
and their customers; problems of securing high quality and reliability; inferior 
quality semi-fabri cates maintaining the hypertrophy of the lathe stock ,etc •• .But 
despite these problems and the great difficulties o~ the early years the 
development of the Soviet machine tool industry must be rated a considerable 
success , At the cost of great sacrifices for the ~oviet people , a stage of 
development which in other countries took generations was traversed by Soviet 
~dustry 1n a mere decade . The development of a stroag,independent machine tool 
ti f the tecbnical basis for tbe defeat industry was a vi t al element in the crea on o 
o:German fascism , and a crucial component of the construction of the economic 
fo~dations of the world ' s first socialist society . 
~ "Th ide those skills whicb enable the machine tool 
• e automatic device can prov ti hile theinfrastructure of 
innust~ to initiate and continue its opera on
8 
w 
-.J ilt II ibid p 7 0 
qualified manpower is being bu up'----' 'utomated toole at a faster rate 
5."A developing country bas the ability to use a and greater flexibility of its 
than a developed economy , due to the si~e,ag~stacles to automation o: both social 
~1ustrial plant . Although there are ma~~~5° selective automation at tbe current and economic origin in developing count be beneficial but may be 1ecessary , 
Astage of industrialisation nkoint onli a ;~ies mav be the'onlv route to economic utol]lation of the metal-wor 1t. n .It ibid p 70- 71 . 
survival ~or develoP14ltt. countries· • •- • • P • 
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A1 . 1 Ap~ndix One 
Before Oc~ober 1929 there was no speclalised adminlstratlon for machine 
tool butlding . The fe~ ~actories buildin~ machine tools were under different 
!!lachine tonl building trusts which, l.n turn , were under overall control of 
Glavmashstroi of VSNKh. Responsibllity for machine tool building at this time 
was vested with tl-te Section of 1-1achine Tool Build l.ng at t.ached to the Convention of 
Syndl.cates of the r~ etal Iw1 ust..cy , but its powers were limited 1.n so far as it 
had no direct control over t he trusts bu1.1ding the ~tachines, In January 1929 
the Presidium of VSNKh aknowledged the necessity of creating an all-Union trust 
of med ium machine tool building and called for thetransfer of two enterprises 
to VSl1jJih USSR as a step in this direction •1 .t:.arly L, tay 1929 Glavmashst.ro1 
presented a report to STO on the need for the new trust2 , rutd the government 
oHicially approved it on 29th f•lay) The statute of the State Trust of Nedium 
Hachine Tool Building , ' Stankotrest ', was approved by VSNKh in June1 it was t,o 
bo comJ?Oser" of three factories - ' Krasny1 Proletari i ' , im .Sverdlova and 'Dv18atel' 
4 
Revolyutsii' - and have an initial capit:Jl of 18 . 9 m.UJ ion rubles. The new 
trust started work on 1st October unner the ch~lrmanship of E .M.Al ' perov1ch . 
Shortly be ore this Glavmashinstro1 appr.oved the formation of an all-Union 
tooling in •. lustry trust , and this appears to have ~::>ta1:ted work in the aut.ul!ln of 
1929.5 Also ,at the end of September 1929 GlavmashL~strol approved t~e creation 
of a special construction orgP.nisation for building ne~ machine tool factories , 
'Stankostroi ' trust , which at first was organisationally independent of St.a.nkotref: 
According to the VSNKh decree of 11th January 1930 Stankostroi was under Orgaaetal.J 
and had rE'sponsibility for .,roject1ng , bullding and putting into operation thP 
ne· factories .? This arran£etnent was clearly unsatisfactory for St.ankotrest , whict 
early 1.n 1930 decided to open ne~otiations for the tranafer of Stankostrol from 
O.rgametall • 8 
In January 1930 Glavm3.shstroi was replaced by a new all- Union Ob''edi.oenie 
of the 11\achine building industry , ~1ashlnoob"edinenie , which incorporated lila~y 
l .~r~ . -prom . p:~7.,26 . 1 .1929 • 
2t'1d •._!L •• t 1 • 5.1929 . 
3.Hzensht::odt and Chikhachev , ov c1t ,p . 194 • 
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machine building trusts,including Stankotrest . 1 But shortly after this it was 
decided to further ·decentralise industrial administration by creating a series 
of ob"edineniya for the main branches of the engineering industry . A decree of 
STO of 2nd April 1930 approved the formation of the All - Union Ob"edlnenie of the 
Machine Tool Building and Tooling Industry •2 There is some confusion in the 
literature about this event and reference at the time to the possibility of 
an ob"edinenie for th~ boiler-turbine and machine tool industries). However a 
meeting of thP Presi~ium of VSNKh of 8th April favoured the formation of Soyuz-
stankoinstrument , as the new body became known , incorporating Stankostroi .4 Its 
statute was approved on 2F- t"l t<Iay 1930 it was to h~ve an initial capital of 
55 mill ion rubles an~ its rights were n-eater th~n for the previous trust , notably 
with respect to t he sale of machine tools and tooling~ Al'perovich w~s ap ointed 
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chairman of the new organisation , which began work in mid- June . 
Until September 1930 Soyuzstankoinst_·ument only had responsibility f or machine 
tool building at its own enterprises , with no rights tn relation to other 
enterprises and organisntion which began to play an increasing role 1n machine tool 
building at this time. A decree of the Presidium of VSNKh USS~ of 16th September 
1930 attempted to change this situation. The r1ecree set out a nwnber of rules 
for planni ng production and constru0tion , an~ procedure for the sale of machine 
tools built by other ob"edineniya . The planning of production was to be undertakP.n 
by Soyuzstankoinstrument within the limits of a nomenclature which it also 
established , with the a~rePment of the organisation concerned (or VSNKh if no 
Cl!!'eementcould be reached) , So.vuzstankoinstrumP.nt was to concentrate data on 
the machine tool needs of the economy and on the production pos "'ibillties of 
i.he various machine tool building s'-lops and factories . It was alco to agree the 
i.rafts of long term plans and control figures presen~ed to VS:f!{h by the other 
llb"edineni:t.a ln so far as they related to m;"Jchine tool building, and to participate 
in the work of VSNKh and other higher government organisations in elaborating 
Plans and control figures for all mll.chine tool production · 
, ' 696 ·~branie zakonov 1 rasporiazhenii , 1929 , pt . 2 ,lJ0J , p . • 
5 .~.zhtzn ' , 26 .9. 29 . 
6·!;!\ar' ~ovskii stankostroi tel ' nyi , on cit,p.f.. 
~ ·lli,19)4 ,ll 0 .10 t p .5. 
1 
•!2'ul.leten ' Stankotrest , 19.30 ,!lo .2- ) , P . f.9 • 
.z~tn,; . 11 1 1n J.J. 1 ~o 
Advice on the choice 
Al.J 
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of types and designs was to be provided by Soyuzstankoinstrument , which was also 
to approve types and designs of machines to bo built on a serial or mass Msis 
within the programme establis,ed by the control figures . Finally , the selling 
of of all machine tools was to be exclusively the concern of Soyuzstankoinstrument. 
Prices were to be fixed by the ob" ed.tnenie with the agreement of the other parties 
concerned . This oecree gave Soyuzstankoinstrument quite considerable rights 1n 
relation to other ob''edineniya, altho~h significantly the requlr.ements for sup~ly 
of information were much less stringent for military enterprises , and whereas 
Soyuzstankoinstrument could now directly investigate production at other factories, 
this rip;ht d i d not a oply to the machine tool ·ouilding ofth9 defence ob" edlnenva? 
This at t.empt to extend central control was not entirely successful. A later 
commentator observed th~t the ~anting oP the right to plan the production of 
8 h~ries of other ob"edinenY-"'- did not give positive results • .out thf'! system 
whereby Soyuzst~koinstrunent took responsibility for the sales of all machine tcols 
produced became a feature of the industry from this time on .Later, a special 
organisation was create~ within the ,achine tool a~ministratlon for handling this 
work - Stankoinstrumentsbyt (date of formation not Kno~n) . It nas this body which 
issued catalogues and price 1 ists fo.r: the whole industry . 
In July 1931 SNK USSR issued a de~ree calling for the splitting up of 
Soyuzstankoinstrwne11t into separate ob" edineniva for the machine tool and tooling 
industries . 9 This measure was not immediately realised , and it took a later SNK 
the leo.~.o.rshi'P of the industry carry out this div1slon. 10 action 1n December to make .... l. 
By the end of' the year two separate all-Union gb"edineniva had been forr:ed for 
lachine tool buildin~ and the tooling abrasives industry· Earlier in the aut~~ 
a new glavk with overall repsonsibiJ ity for the m.achlne building and metalwo:Itd.ng 
Lrtdustry was created within the structure of 1/Slil\.h . '!'he new or.ganlsatlon ,Clavmashpro! 
was under the chairmanslo)ip of H .M •Kaganovich 
deputies ,11 
I 
with Kritsman and Dotsenko as 
2 ·~Im1 . , 2 5 • 5 . 193 0 • 0 rted this !\roposal. 
),ZaJ:nd 6 4 1930 This source clains that ST suppo · r 
4 ~·· • • • it aftoreferat p 9 . ·~Uznetsova ,N. J • ,Bor ' ba ra bochell'O klassa • · • 00 c ' ' • • 
t·~tanie zakonov 1. 1930 ,No . 39,P · 218• hl nnosti VS11Kh 1929/30 No . 50 art 1521 
·~1k postanovleoii i prikazov po promys. e ' 1 1 1 • • 
~·~. ,No . 9) 1Art . 1J96 , decree of 16 . 9 . 1930t 
•fhru,voe khozva istvo , 1 Q)4,N o . 3 , n .95· 
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The next change in the administration of the industry came in August 1933. 
A decree of SNK USSH of 31st August called :-or the creation of a new glavk uniting 
the machine tool and t.ool ing ob" ed ineniy;a ~This measure was part of a broader 
process involvinP-" the breakiny up of Glavm·• shprom of NKTP , and gave rise to a 
two- tier system as opposed to t'"le previous three-tier structure. i1ow the new 
mac~ine to~l and toolin~ ylavk , GUSIP for short , was dlr~ctly subordinated to 
1\K'TP . The structure of GUSIP soon after its formation was as showna 
The Structure of Glavstankoinstrumentprom 
l N .K . T . P ·I 
I 
Glavnoe upravlenie st~nko-instrumental'nol 
1 abrazivnoi promyshlennosti 
f 
'-- -- - -
I 
20 machine tool Office of Abrasives I Hard Alloys 
and tooling Stankoinst- Trust Trust 
enterprises and lW!len t s by t --,.- x~l l ~- ,c-)<- _,.._,_~ 1!-.. -~-
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lines of subordination and pl~nning 
lines of planning only 
-~-11.-'K-"- sales only 
- ---- --, 
Hepresentative 
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republican, 
krai or oblast.' 
isoolkom 
I 
-x- .... -"- l lt-;oc-,._,._ 
lL 
l Republican and 
l local trusts 
I 
Factories and 
shops 
ak 0 O~l}:=:e=.r~k=.i_:o~r~a~an~i:.::~!!:a~t:.:::s:..:::i:..:::i_t.::.YL!a::.:z:.:.h:.::e:..:l;.:=o=l_.pr:;..o::..:m;.;.oy~s;.:.h;_-_ Source a Sakharov ,G.;Cl!ernai , l'T .;Kab ova , ••...;. !:"! 
lennosti S.::>SR , t. . , 1934, P • 83 • 
i~ lit in relation to planning the machine As can be seen GUSIP had some reli:J~onsibi es 
i d shops of republica~ and local organisation tool building activities of factor es an • 
responsibility which the industry oaintained from This was part of tbe general 
thro"~hout the economy . ~lthin the Glavk there was 19)0 for machine to"'l building ......_ 
1 pro~yshlennosti v SSSR, 1.,1961, 9.Venediktov ,A.B . ,Orp:anizatsiya gosudarstvenno -
· Ol.2 , p . 565 ;Zaind . ,20 .7 .31. 
10 ,~Ind . ,4.12. 1931. 
ll .Ek .~hizn' . , 19 . 9 . 31 . 
l .Sobran ie ze.)(onov 1 1934 ,1~ o . 58 , P • 346 • 
441 
!O office for the 'nla d ' f . nne .actories , as they beca~e known , of other 
organisations. GUSIP appears to have had some say ln the :fixine of outJlllt plans 
and in the establishment Rnd approvel of the range of types ~~d sizes to be built 
by all factories and shops of heavy industry. These were rights were granted by 
the NKTP order of 16th June 1933~ It. se~"ms likely that GUSIT's powers in this 
respect were weakened at the end of 1936 when the branches of the defence industry 
left NKTP to form a sepltrate commissariat . 
In August 1937 the machine build tnr. sector of NKTP split off ID form a new 
commissariat of machine building, which \nc] uded GUS!P. 2 Developments 1n 1938 
are poorly documented, but lt appe?xs that towards the end oP the year the 
machine tooJ and tool tng industries were agal.n separated for admln.1.strat1ve purposef 
with the formation of Glavstankoprom ,GJ avl.nstrument ~d Glavabruz lva .J A further 
fragmentation occured in September 1939 , when the p;ajor SNK decree supjlOrted 
the tiivision of Glavstankoprom tnto GJavtyazhstar1koprom and Glavstankopro:n, the 
former included fourteen factories, the latter eight . At the same time the 
research Lnstitute , ENIMS and its factory ' Stankokonstruktsiya' were :remcved 
from the Glavk and subordinated directly to NKTyazhhash. 
4 
This latter cOI!l":issariat 
to which the machinetool inn us t.ry wa.s subord l.na ted , was created from Nr.r1ash in Feb-
ruary 1939 , unde:r the leadership of f1alyshev • 
During the Tt'lird F lve- year Flan some measures wet·e taken to 1mprove t.he lo:Ork 
of non- spec1A.lised machine tool bullc'!.ing enteprises . In September 1936 an All-Union 
Technical Office ,' Stankinprom ' had been created within the structure of CUSIP 
for provtd ing technical assistance to ente!'m:ises of the Glavk, in pa-..-ticular 
those newly tranefered from other branches and new enterprises . Its w~rk prlnarlly 
consisted of plan r.ing techn(;)nological processes ; by the ar it had a total of 
about 120- lJO workers . .5 The September 19J9 SNK d ecree C;tl l ed for the or@:anisation 
or an Adlllinistration for Non-sreclal tse~ Machine Tool Factories (U:1Z) on the 
basts of Stankinprom , in order to provide technical 'iS"istance to these enterpriset: 
and also for undertaking plan.1 1cl.g work 1.n relation to their machine t.ool building 
~tivities . 6 The W~Z of NKTyazh Mash was created , but it is not Known whether 
1twas 1n fact founded on Stankinpro~ . At the Fifth Con~erenc€ of cach1ne tool 
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designers tn April 1940 t.he head of UNZ, Aravin , complal.ned that planning of 
only 
new models in this sector was inadequatet/six new types and sizes had been introduc 
during 1939 • and m~ny of the UNZ facto~ ies had no designers even thou~h they 
built thousands of machine tools a year . 7 The September 1939 decree also gave 
Ni\'Tyazh Mash responsibility for leadinll!: •:ork on establishtng the tioazh for all 
t'l chine tool building of otl-}er comMissariats 
' and l~id down that new 1esigns of 
machine tools to be bull t at all factories of other commissariats had 'l.o be approve' 
by Ekonomsovet of SNK USSR . 
8 
Thus, in 19JS' there were attempts to reestablish 
central control of all machine tool buildin~ in the country , which had been 
weakened in the preceding three years by the fragmentation of commissariats. 
From 1929 when Stankotrest had been formed to 1939 the lmportance of machine 
tool building had steadily e;ro~m and the industry had gradu111y acquired sz:eater 
strengtf.l as an administrative unit . In t940 and early 1941 the 1.ndustry formed a 
~ajor component of NKTyazhHash , which from April 1940 ~·as headed by A . I .Efremov , 
a former machine tool industry worker~ In June 1941 the new status of the 
branch received full recognl tion , By a government -i ecree of the 5th a new Feople;' f 
Commissariat of Hachine Tool Building US..:>R was created , uniting the previously 
separate glavki of machine tor:l building , tooling , abrasives and the building 
of metal-forming equipment •10 The NK Machine Tool Building was headed by Efrer.~ov . 
It proved to be short-lived. In November 1941 it was disbanded and the machine tool 
and tooling factories transfered to mill tary commissariats, out this el!!ergency 
lfartime Jleasure was reversed 1n February 1942 .11 'l'he Col:l!!lissariat, renaoed ~iinist.ry 
in 1946 , ret ained its independent existence fron then on until the Sovnarkhoz 
re:'orm in the 1950s . 
The changing administrative structure of the industry between 1929 and 1941 
is sumnarised in the chart on the fo1low1ng page • 
1.Industrial1zatsiya SSSR , 1933- 1937 , op cit , p.249 · 
2 ·~Ind .,23 . 8 . 37 . itl'19J8N 11p2& 
J.'~here are references to these glavki in ~.ashinostro e • ' 0 • ' • 
t .Direktivy KPSS p cit v ol 2 po 604- 606 . ;Mashlnostroen ie, 12 .11.1939 . 
5.GOsudarstvenn i '' ~oektn~-tek~oi~p-icheski i 1 eksoerimental' nv i inst~_i;...i....;.t_u_t 
6 
Q!sstankinprom , 193 -19 1 , .. . , 1961 , pp .J - 4 . 
•2...irektivy KPSS . , op cit , p . 605. 
? •.. ash1nostroenle , 10 .4.1940 . 8 .Direktivy KPS3 , op cit,p .~05 . 
i~liiostroenie , 18. 4 . 1940. lP ·ill • 1947 ,No . 11 ,p . 20; Zhed , on clt , p.16 • 
• Zlnich ,M.S ., Istor icheskie zapiski,N o • 85 , 1970 • PP . 11and t5 ' 
1939,llo . 
v.s .N.Kh . N.K.T,P. N .K.Mash . 
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~nterorises temoorarily under ~~e nach\ne tool industry adc1n1stra tion 
a . ' Dvigatel' ftevolyuts11' 
b. 1men1 F .Dzerzhinskotco 
Cor' k1.1 ,RSFSrl 
Per.cfU1olotov) , HSFSR 
Pre-Revn/ c . t9l1 
1931 
1929 - 1930 
1931 - 1932 
Nt'tes 
t.Renaned 1n 19)6-:n - l•1oscow (surfnce) ~r1nd1ng "'"'ch"-e r t 1 • "' h • _ o=.;o u1 ac ory 1 a so Known as, 
nOSCOK mac.~,e to~l butl~i~ factory. 
2.Later rPnarned,Srednevolzhskii machine tool factory. 
J .Frol!l about mid- 1910s known as , imen 1. L . '•j . Kaganovicha . 
4 .I,nter. (post- ar) rcnamed ,imeni Kosiora . 
5 ·~~4~~e site of thP. SvercHovsk heavy rnachlnc to-"'1 factory _ ook thls name by 
'> .Also known as , t 1-te fector.v of intern::tl ,rr1nc'l1n~ machines .Former. Remmashtrest 
? .In 1920s known as 'Energiya ' , later (post-\lnr) rena•ed , lmen1 Oktyabr'skoi 
Revol vutsii . 
q.Unt11.19J4 knol-m as 'Kornmunar'. 
9.Full nane pre-b'ar 1 ' Krasnyi Netalli.st 1 lmen1 Kirov'l. 
10.Fort!erly 1 'Proletar11.' . 
1 t.Fomer tfKZem factory 1 later ( 1944) rename'!, irnen t 23 oktyabrya . 
12 .Fortner NKVD labour com::1unes . 
Sources - for date of entrv i nto spec1~11sed tndustry . 
1., 2 .- ~.29 .6 . 29 . 
),4 ,5,6 .- Zalnd ., 16 . tLJO. 
7,8. - Zhed' , oo c1t , p12 . 
work& 
9 - as~ed 1933 as this was year production started - ~knr ' kovsktl stnnKostrolt-
el'nvi , on r1t ,p12 . 
10 .- Leningradskaya m:omyshlen.,ost ' zn 50 1~ 1 oo cit , p229 . 
tt. - Alzensht adt & Ch1khnchev , p21S . 
12 .- jQ_J_et h.rasno'iar.skH stankostroitel'ny1 , on r.it , pl.~~ . 
13.- A.& Ch ., p219 , 
14 .- J..hid. . 
15.- lstor.lya industrln)izatsiva Gruzhinskoi SSR , 1926-41,o~ c1t , p~22 . 
16 • ~ A • &:C h • , p21 ~ . 
t? .- ffi , 19)6 1NoJ\ , o1 . 
111. - No specific reference , but known to have be n b~>t.ween 193-,; nnd 1939, an1 ~:a~es 
kn~wn total of 1q snec1.nlise~ enteror1ses 1n 1937. 
19.--IPnln£:rads'kaya oro~vshlennost ', op c\t , o 4J6 . 
20.21 ,22 ,2'3 . - Zhed ' , oo r.1t , p15 . 
24 - 3'3 . - A.& Ch . I ~ltX«XX¥ P . 220 . 
a , - TPC I 29 .6 .29 ;Pr.ob.Ek ., t935 ,No4 , p195 · 
b.- lebyachenko , op cit , p? . 
The nuober of" specialised factories 1n e~c., ye:~.r is sht}t.:n 1n Table ,AI.I • P ·4~7. 
fhe data coincides with that or- Sovi"t sources up to an.; including 1939 { 23 
speciaHsed enterprises _ MRshinostroen1e , t0 . 12 ,. J9 . ) , but diverges for 1940, 
J>Oss1bly t.ecause enterprises llhici-, should have been tr.::nsfererl to t'1e branch in 
1940 were transfererl l at.cr . (Nos . 2L+- 33 above) . Totals given for 1940 are 29 
(ZabcHn,B .M. ,Kon tsP..~t.ra tslyn 1 snetsial i zntsiya _.Eror!lyshl ennost1. v uslov~kh 
!gfor~ 1 M . ,1970 , p9) and 31 (calculated from Omarovski i ,op c1L ip70) .Sooe sources 
r.lve a total of 37 specialisPd fac ories by t.,~ ar (Zhed • ~op r.it 1 pll;Aizenshtadt 
L'li Chi. hac:hev 
1
p220) ; tl1ts if diff1cul t t.~" reconcUe wtt'1 kno;,n fa~ts and lt 1s 
Coosslble th~t so e allie~ or tool.in!; '"~tctories of the Ministry of Kaehine tool 
B~t1Hin a arR included . 
~prises of t!le Def=--e;;..;!"..;.:.C::.."'--.:I:..:.n:=:d:..!:u~stry Build ine: ·•achi T 1 - _ __ ~ . . ne oo a 
~ame of Enterprise Location 
Year started 
machine tool 
buildingtapprox. 
I l.Tula Arms Factory 
2.bhevsk steel fotm:iry .J..nd ~un factory 
I J . imeni Kalin ina artillery fac to1·y 
4.Factory No .25 ~ircrnft fartorv 
1 5. 1men1 Dzerzh1nskof."'o1 
6 .Factory No .60 
7 . 1meni Frun'le ,No . SO 
8.1meni Volodarskogo 
9 .~ZU , imen 1 Maslenn lkova fac• orv 
10 .Podol 1 sk factory No . 172 
11.im"ni K .Li bknekhta 
12 .0ZPO factory 
13 .Ts .I .T . ffiRf'~ine tool factor.v Nn1~ 
14 .r.olotov tekhnikum 
Tula,RSFSk 
l:;r,hevsk , RSFSR 
Lentngr.ad , RSFSR 
Moscow , 1~SF3k 
Pre-Revn/ 
1927 
1930 
1932 
Perm ' ,HSFSR 1931 
Lu.gansk( lforoshilovgrad)HS£i'S?. 1933 
Penza ,RSF'SR 
Ul'yanovsk,RS~SR 
Kuibyshev ,HSFSR 
Porlol 1 sk, RSFSR 
Leningrad ,RSFSR 
IJlr:~nimir,RSFSR 
Moscorl ,RSFSR 
Perm 1 (Molotov) RSFSR 
1934 
19J4 
19)4 
t935 
1937 
1938 
1932 
1938 
In addition , there Here a number of FZU Schools and techn lcums of the defence 
in1ustr y which built machine tools at v.::>r'l.ous t.lrnes. 
1922 
Note - not all thP ~ bove enterprises bull t mac \-tine tools throughout the period 
indicated - a number appe~r to have ceased during the Third F1ve-year Plan. 
~ 
Lin the specialised machine tool industry f or about a year , apparently 
transfered to the defence industry in 19J2 . 
2.App:u-entlv based on the sewing m::ichine factory at Ponol'sk 
).Transfered to t''1e aircraft industry i'1 19)8. 
rc -
Sources - complied f:rom catalogues , pricP handbooks and other sources. 
Some other enteror.ises bulld:tne- machine to~ls on a r~ular basis 
.rear s·tartett 
machine to~l 
build1I1g (appro 11ame of Entperise Location 
L1.Jn ,Voskova tool ing factory Sestrnretsk iRSFS.t 19)4 
I 2.Zlatoust tool iniZ factory Zl ~to•1st ,HSFSH 1stFYP 
3. 'Prezer1 im .Kalintn:a tooling factory fotoscow, RSF'SR 19.3.3 
4·Uralmashzavod heavy me , bldg , f3ctory Sverdlovsk ,RSFSR c . 1935 
5.Kramatorsk im .Stalina heavy ro.c . bldg .f . Kramatorsk,mcrainianSSR c . 1935 
6,Azstankostroi N 
0 
. l Baku 1 Azerba:tdzhantilnSSR 1st.FYP 
7 ·AZstankostroi N 
0 
.z Baku ,Azerbaldzhan ianSSR 1stF'iP 
8.toeni Kamo T lollsi ,CeorgianSSR c .19)6 
9. ' ltrasnyi Put 1 1 i{a7..an ' , .KS~'"R c .19.34 
10,1 Rekord ' Grim ,German VolgaASSR c .1934 
1' ~- Leningrad ,RSFSR lst.FYP 
·-~~·K:a:rl:a~M~a~r~k:sa~~t~e~x~t~i~l~e_:mc:y~. f~·~----L-----~--------------~-------------
A1.10 
~orises of t !'le DefencP Industry Bt.tildimz: Machine 1'ools 
Sane of Enterprise 
t .T,tl8. Arms Factory 
J.ocatlon 
Tula ,RSFSrt 
lzhevsk , .kSFSH 
Len l.rtgrad , RSF'SH 
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Year started 
machine tool 
building~ approx. 
Pre-Revn/ 1922 
1927 
19)0 
2 .I~hevsk steP} founMry ~nd £un factory 
3.1meni Kalinlna art111er,y factory 
b,Factory No .25 aircraft factory Moscow , rlSF~rl 1932 
5·lmeni Dzerzhinskogo 1 Perm ' ,HSFSR 19)1 
6.Factory No .60 1 L~ansk( Voroshilovgrad)R.3I•'Sft 193.3 
? . lrnenl Frunze ,No. 50 
8 . lmen 1 VoJ odarskogo 
9 .t"ZU , imen 1 Maslenn tkova factory 
tO .Podol 1 sk factory No .172 
ll.lfl""ni K .Libknekhta 
12 .0?.ro factory 
l) .T"' .I.T . llm"'11ne tool factorv ''ol ~ 
14 .Y:olotov tekhnikum 
Penza ,RSF'SP. 
Ul 'yanovsk,HSFSR 
Kuibyshev ,HSF'SR 
Ponol ' sk , RSFSR 
Leningrad,RSFS!i 
Vla1i'-'lir ,RSFSH 
Hoscow ,RSFSR 
Perm'(Molotov) RSF'SR 
19)4 
19)4 
19)4 
19)5 
t9J7 
1938 
1932 
19)8 
In addition , tliere were ;'!\ numbe,.. of FZU Schools and t.echnicu!1ls of the clefenc-El 
1n-lustry which buH t mac :"'ine tools a; varl.ous times . 
Note - not all the above enterprises ouill mac"line tools t~roughout the period 
indic ~ ted - a number 1ppe~r to have ceased during the Thtrd Flve- year Plan 
Jlotes 
l .In the specialised machine too] industry for about a year , ::!pparently 
transfered to the defence industry in 1932 . 
2 . npp:u-~n t1 y based on the se~~ l.n.v. ml'ichine factory at FotioJ 1 sk 
) .Transfered to the ;a trcraft industry in 1938. 
~s- compiled from catalogues,price handbooks ann other sources . 
So:;,e other enterprises buUdin£ machine to'11S on a reJZul~r basis r--
Jiane of ~ntpe.,..ise Location 
r l ear sT.art.eo 
r:~achlne to'll 
build ir.g ( appr 
-----------------------------------~~-------------------------------
1 . lr ."oskova tooling factory 
l .Z!atoust t ool tn~ factory 
) ,'Frezer• im .Kali.ntn'i tooling factory 
~ .Uralmashzavod heavy me . bldg. factory 
) .Y.ramatorsk lm .Stalina heavy me. bldll: • f • 
6,AzstMkostroi No .1 
7 ,Azstankostroi No .2 
3.1l!leni Kama 
9. 'lfraanyi Put ' 1 
10. ' Re~ord • 
~ .1m.l<arla hark sa text1J e lllCY ·f. -
§.£.ur~ - as above . 
Sestroretsk ,RSFSR 
Zl~toust ,RSFSH 
~ioscow ,RSFSR 
Sverdlovsk , RSF'SR 
Kramatorsk ,UkrainianSSR 
Baku,Azerba1dzhan1anSSR 
Baku ,Azerba1dz~ru~ian3SR 
Tiblis\ ,Geo.rgianSSR 
Kazan ' ,RSF'SR 
Grirn ,German Volga!iSSR 
Lenlngrad ,RSFSR 
19)4 
1stFYP 
1933 
c . 1935 
c . 1935 
lstFYP 
lstFYP 
c . 19.)6 
c .19J4 
c . 19,34 
lstFYP 
Year 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
193? 
19)8 
939 
1940 .. 
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Machine Tool Bulldinlil. E:nterorlses 1925 - 1940. 
Uu1:1ber of Enterprises Bull iinsz: l~ach1ne Tools 
( end of year) 
I S pee i al1sed l r ~iach1ne Tool Defence Other 
Industry ln~ustry* Enterprise 
I - 1 3 I I -
1 6 
- 2 8 
- 2 9 
3 2 8 
6 3 7 
7 3 10 
8 5 11 
9 6 13 
11 9 21 
14 10 24 
17 10 ) 1 
18 11 35 
18 13 J9 
23 1.3 
42 
33 13 
40 
• Approx1.rr.a te 
Sources 
Table At . I 
r 
Total 
t.u,ber of 
Enterr.rises-a 
4 
7 
10 
11 
13 
16 
20 
24 
28 
41 
48 
5R 
64 
70 
78 
86 
l .Sr.eclalised , seep . fro c:qtaJ.o;tu"'s,price handbooks, 
2.Defence in~ustry - based on L'lfor nt1on 
fac ory h\stories ann other sou,..ces . 
) .fl'lu:r - as 2 . 
li .Tot.al - as 2 , plus followin~ additional cvi,.lence : 
1927 - 10 , Ek .Zht7.n' , 19 . 5.29 . 
192S - 11 B~twik , 19'35, lo . 6 , p11 · 
19 I -30 - 1~ , ibid . , rl , -Ai"'enshtndt. oc Chikhachev , p218 . 
1933 - 2~ , 9 spzd .;plus 19 pl"lnne 
1934 - 41 , as1928 . 
1935 - 4e ,ibto . . 6 19~ - 41 ,mor than 40 - Zainc,1 .9 ·3 ; enshtadt & Ch1khachev , p213. 
193? - 64 , t S3 spezd ., olus 46 ' plan?ed ,,u: 
1940 - 96 ' b'scd on 1940-41 prtce nqn1boo • . 
A2.1 
The First Five-year Plan 
Variant I For five years , 1926/27 - 19.30/Jl 
(May 1926) 
Appendix Two 
Machine tool needs 1 JO m r a year for ~lv 1. 150 ( i • • · ... e years , . e . m.r. ncluding 
metal forming machines) 
448 
Output in final yearr 28 . 8 m.r .; including 12 m. r. from three main factories 
('Krasny! Proletarii ' , 1m .Sver.dlova ,' Dvigatel ' Revolyutsli): 
5.6 m.r . Kramatorsk (for~ing machines) ; 11.2 rn . r . from 
two new factories . 
Construction plan : ReC'on struction of existing factories , plus construction of 
t wo new - one in Sverdlovsk (Uralmashv.avod) for metal forn1ng 
machin~s , one in the South , primarily for needs of railway 
workshops . 
Variant II For five years , 1927/28 - 1931/.32 (appumtly an amendment of I) 
( .. arch 1027) 
Machine tool needs and outout , cuttin~ machines only: (ml.llion rubles) 
1Q27/28 lto?8/29 j t929/JO j 19JO/jl 19.31/32 Total 
-- · 
~eeds 1?.98 20 .28 
I 
I 
22 .50 I 24 .80 2? .00 112 .6 
Output 6 .78 8 .70 10. 78 1) .50 19.20 
I Per cent of needs met J? .7 42.9 47 .9 1 54.4 71.1 
Tot.aJ. needs i ncluding forming machines 150 m.r . i total output 8J .l .r .. 
Out out 1n ~in .1 t b ed of . 11 5 m. from the three mnirt factories ; • ~ a year o e comoos · • 
5.6 ra.r. Kramatorsk: two new factories _ 6 . 2 m.r. ;local factories 4. 9 m.r . 
COt:struction plan , ti f existing factories; construction of two Reconstruc on o 
f t i in t he South and in Sverdlovek ; devPlopment new ac o:r. es 
Slilall factories having experience of machine of a nu"'ber o~ 
tool building . 
!·1ts variant was stlll in force in l'!ay 1928 • 
.59 .0 
52. 4 
• 
A2 .2 
Var1atlt III For five years • 192fV29 - 1932/33 . This ap:;ea.rs to have been VSt Kh' s 
final variant of thf' Control l • lgures for the Five- year Flan . 
(October 1929) 
Total nachine tool (cut tin~) needs over five years; oot known . 
Output plan: not known. 
Construction t;>lan: Specialisation and reconstruction of the three Main factories; 
building of 5 ne"' small enterprises, ~o."lth a capacity of 
4 - 5 m.r . output each . 
Variant IV For five years , 192R/29 - 1932/JJ . The Five-year Plan as adopted 
in April 1929 . 
{April 1929) 
Planned needs over t'ive years a 152 m.r •• 
Output plan 1 not known . 
l.!onstruction plan: Two new factories to be bu.ll t - in hoscow {cost of construction 
15 m.r . ) and Khar ' kov l10 m. r . ) . Also a possible lhlrd (forming?; 
\ln the Lr ... ls . Najor reconstruction at the three na1n factories, 
and the specl?.lisation and developmtHtt of a number of ex:ls·t.lng 
smaller works. 
Variant V Revised Five-year Plan . 
(1-:ay 1929) 
flanned needs over f\ve years 1 about JOO million rubles, inclurling 84 n.r . in 
the final year , 19J2/JJ • 
Output plan: Final year outout of 53 m.r ., tncluding 2.2 . 5 rn . r . from the ~ee 
main factor.ies . In finaJ year 62 per cent of needs ·to be 
met from domestic production · 
Construction plan : Five new factories to be built . 
!!rtant VI There appear to have been several proposals for changes 1n the revised 
Plan adopted in Nay durin£ the autumn of 1929 . Detalls are kno;on o:1ly 
of the fol1owing variant a 
(August/September 1 1929) 
Planned needs 1 Approx . 85 m.r . in 19)2/JJ. 
Oat 8 - inchxiing 38 • .5 m .r. froc e.xistin8 Put Plan 1 Final ye~rs output of 1 • ' m.r • • 
r ne~ factories . Output 1n 19Jl/J2 - 45 m.r, 
factories , and 43 m. r • •. rom · 
C b. uilt , with a total capacity of 64 m.r ,, 
ons ruction plan: Ten ne"'" factories to b~-
giving an. output of 43 m. r . L~ the :1na1 year . 
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!here ts reference to the existence of a final year target of 86m.r. at the tlce 
of the next. revision 1n January 1930. 
Variant VII 
(.!anuary 1930) 
Thts revtsion apnears to have been based on the followins estimate of needs 
presented by Gipromezz 
1928/29 1929/30 1930/Jl 19311)2 1932/33 Total 
NePda , value (rnr) 42.0 71 .1 105.7 121 .1 144.1 484 
Needs , unUs 9 ,550 tf- t 1 so ?4 ,0JO 27 , 520 )2 ,?.50 110,000 
Value per unit - 4 ,400r . 
Output plan:End of planperiod aim of 150 rn . r . (1n import prices), coopared 
with 86 m.r . (in 1926/27 nrices) previously accepted. Later in 1930 
the follow1n output plan was adopted , a pparentlY based on this 
new final year target : 
1928/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/32 1932/ 33 
Output. , 1'1 . r . 9.0 1? . 1 32 .1 49 .0 n.a . 
Per cent needs met 21.4 zz.:. 1 ·- '}0 .3 40 .5 
Construction plan:about ten new factories to be built ; three ln 1929/30 for 
operation by the end of 19JCV 3l • l.;apac1 tios of these three 
factories rRised compar.nd w tth prev 1.ous December . 
Vartant VIII 
In July 1930 Y..aganovich refered to a final year output tar et of 150 m.r., and 
planned needs in that year of 250 n .r.,ie. 60 per cent sat.isfe.ction . 
(Dece ber 19JO) 
.achine tool needs and output plan: 
192&/29 1929/30 1930/31 1931/)2 t93~:.VJJ Total 
•eeds , ( ' OOOr) 61 ,650 129 ,000 189 ,975 219 ,300 270 ,900 878.925 
I eeds , units 9,600 20 , 000 29 ,455 J4 ,000 42 ,000 1)5,055 
Output ( ' OOOr) 7 ,700 1? , 100 32,100 67 ,000 152,100 
275 ,001) 
Per cent needs met ..._ 12 .25 1J.19 17 .39 30 .9 
56 .1 JLJ 
alue per unit - 6 ,450r . 
'ihls appears to have been the final plan variant • 
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variant V -
(Feb.19)J , Al' perov1ch) 
Oa\put of all machine tool building factories, pres bly h .TP only . 
1933 1934 1935 1936 193? Total 1933-? inc .,., 
tbit.S 13397 16467 21350 26850 32150 110214 240 
Value (m.r. ~ 94. 1 128.7 1eo.z 23? . 5 298.0 938.5 )17 
(1926/27 p . 
Value/ uni t(r) 70)0 7800 8450 8840 9280 8515 132 
Variant VI 
(l'.ay ,1933 , Al' pProvich) 
Output of Stankoob"edineni~ factories in 10)7 - 15,000 units. 
Variant VII 
{December ,19)) , Theses of ltolotov and Kuibyshnv on the ::iecond Five-year Plan) 
Output in 193? to be 40 ,000 units (NKTP) (cf . 15,000 units 1n 1932) 
Increase of output 19)2-J? - 267 per cent. 
M!nt VIII 
(Janua y 1934, NKTP Order of 23 . 1 • t 934) 
. 1934 19J5 1936 1937 Totnl 1933-7 lnc .~ 
CUSIP (un\ts) 8~2 13600 21550 30800 74$322 347 
Defence factories 4965 7145 8850 10750 31710 
217 
~i_~' planned ' factor1es 5635 7315 8950 10650 
)2550 189 
'iotal Output 19472 28060 J9J50 52200 
1)9082 268 
....... 
~lant IX 
(Feb.1934, The final Second Five- year Plan) 
tJtput NI\'TP r - ' acto.d.est 1934 1935 1936 193? Total 1933-7 1nc .)'. 
~ 1932 1933 40000 129400 260 
Units 15000 15400 19000 24000 
)1000 
bOO 120Q-1j00) 
VaJ.ue(m .r) ?6 .9 10000 C966o> I 
~ue/W'I1t 5127r . 
(. ,) esur..ate 
A2 . 5 4.52 
DUfilment o" the First Five-year Flenl 
output l marketed output in 1926/27 prices , million rublesa 
1928/29 11929/30 \ 
Sp .Q. 
1930 19J1 1932 1933 Total 
SFectalised factories 7.0 14. 0 4.5 18.5 32.8 47 .4 124 .2 
Other factories 3.4 6.0 2.1 15 .2 46 .8 54 .8 128. ) 
Total output 10.4 20 .0 6.6 )) .7 79 .6 102.2 2:52 .5 
Total ~,achine Tool Supply - do~Uestic pro~uction plus 1mports n:.Ulton rubles) 
1928/29 19291 JO I Sp .~ . 19)0 
2 Imports (16 .?) (41.9) \16 .3) 
Total supply 27 .1 6t .9 22 .9 
Per cent domestic prodn. )8 .4 32 .3 28.8 
Output and total supnly 1.n un1 ts terms r 
1929 1930 1931 1932 
Output(ex . simple mos . ) (4500) (8200) 1t665j:l 17666 
Imports 5000 9000 14000 12000 
Total supply 9500 17200 J068.5 I 29666 
Per cent domestic orodn. 47 .4 47 .7 )4 .3 
{ •. ) estimate on basis of calendar year data · 
1.1933 added for com para bill ty with Plans • 
59 .5 
1931 1932 ! 1933 I Total 
107 . 1 9? .1 )6 .6 317 .7 
140.8 176 .7 140.8 570.2 
23 .9 45 .0 ?2 .6 44 .3 
1933 Total 
18501 62525 
7746 47?46 
2624? 113271 
70 .5 57 .8 
2.The series used at the time , including some non- machine tool 1ter:.s - for 
comparability with Plans . 
~urces: 
Variant I 1 Byul1eten ' konvents1L. , 1925-26 ,No . 10-12 , pp .154-l 58;Sistema 1 
Variant II 
Variant III 
Variant IV 
organi~atslya,1926, 1 o .4, pp . 10-1J . 
a l-iet al1 , 1927 ,No .6 , pn . 74-76 • 
27 10 2a. E. zhizn ' ,4.1. 29 . 1 Torg .-oror. . • Raz ., • • • · t 1 00 cit . , p .173;Py .tnetnU 1 Sotsialisticheska~atsionaliza 8 :12. • ''..:.;..;;;.__;;;..;;;;.... 
. 
plan •. , 00 cit ., Vol .1, 2nd . edn • ,p .46 · 
11 t iva oo ctt ., p.t?J ;Tor.~Z ,-oroc.saz . , ar1ant V 1 Sotsialisticheskava ratstona za s · • '' 
V 12:5:29; Ek . zhizn ' ,19 . 5 . 29 . hlen vi tmnort , op c1t ,pp .26 & 142 . 
'1~\.ant VI 1 Aralov ,S . I., 1Shatkhan , A :S · I~9o;~sNo . 3-4 ,p . 2~0utput-Izvestiya , 25 .6 .JO; -1ant VII1 Needs-Izvest1ya , 10. 5 . JO,g_ , ' ti: 10 5 JO 
Z 15 7 'lQ c struction - Izves YA • ' ' ' v aind ., • . .., 1 on d 24 7 'lO •150m r . aJ.so Zhibarev ,oo c1t,p.27i tr1ant VIII Pr d l'l 12 'l0 · July - Zain • ' • • .., ' • 1 av a • "' • •"' • bl SA 'VI and V neshnya:a 1U1f , lmoorts - Ta e .. - :!. 
ilment 1 Output - Tables SA .I ' . • 1960 p.269 . torgovlva SSSR za 1q18-1940g~., ., ' 
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The Second FivP-ye~r Plan, 191~ - " J-19'37 
Variant I 
(Jan .19)2 - June? 1932 ; Al ' perovich) 
Base'l on the directives of the Second F 1 ve-year Plan. 
Output 193? to be 80 ,000 w1i t s ( c+' . 22 , 000 in 1932) 
Value of Output to be 640- 650 m. r . ( cf . ?6 m.r. 1n 19)2) 
Value per un i t to average 8 ,000 r . in 193? (cf . ) , 450r. 1.rt 1932) 
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Machine t ool stock to increase by 400 , 000 units (cf .GOO , OOO units beginning 1932) 
Vax1ant II 
(1st June 1932 NKTP Order) 
Output to reach 70- 80 , 000 units in 1937 , and a value of 750 m.r . 
Value per unit 10 , 000 r . approx . 
At the July 193? Conference of .Uesi.cmers an output target of ?2,000 units 
was in1icated , 
Variant III 
(Sept.-Oct . ? 1932 , Zernov - Stankoob''edinenle) 
1932 1933 19)4 1935 1936 1937 Total 
Needs (unit s) 85000 40000 45000 55000 ,65000 ?5000 280 ,000 
- 1~--
Planned c utout 
Stankoob" ed . 11000 15000 24500 )6000 49000 57900 182 , 400 
Other 13000 4400 5000 8000 10500 11350 39.250 
Total output 24000 19400 29500 44000 59500 69250 221,6.50 
Per cent of 
needs met 28 . 2 48. 5 65 .6 80 . 0 91.5 92 .) 79 .2 
Variant IV 
(Jan . tQ~) , Al ' perovich) 
flanned output of Stankoob" edinenie; 
1933 1934 1935 
15000 
1936 
200CO 
1937 
26000 
19J3-? 
Tot~ inc.]t 
(Units) 7307 11000 
7939? 3.56 
Output of ' Planned ' factories in !937- 14,000 units; Total out.put- 40 ,000 units. 
Value of output i.n 1937 : Stafu<oob" edinenie - J0.5 f!!l . r . ; 'Planned •- 91 m .r ' 
e.lue per unit in 1937: Stankoob''ecinenie - 11?}0r . ; 'Planned' - 6 , .500 r. 
TotU value of output tn tG37 - J96 m.r. i value per unit 9 ,900 r . 
A2.9 455 
Fulfilment of the Second Five- year Plan ( unl ts) 
1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 Total 
1.~ 
Five-year Plan 15400 19000 24000 31000 40000 129400 
Annual Plans n . a . 19000 19800 23905 30000 
Actual Output (13000) 15900 19378 23624 (26000) (97900) 
i'er cent fulfilment (FYP) ~84 .4) 83 . 7 80 . 7 76 .2 (65 .0) (75 . 7) 
2 ,GUSIP plus 1 Planned 1 
Actual Cutout 18501 21131 24872 )2408 )6120 1))032 
As per cent NKTP FYPlan* 120.1 111 . 2 10) .6 104. 5 90 .)0 102.8 
) ,Gt;SIP 
Actual Output 7838 8)04 10100 13288 1.578.5 55315 
( .. ) estimate 
·• I'\ the course of the Pl~n period this tot.al increastngly began to displace 
that for NI\TP i n measurin~ the success achieved ln fulfilllng the Five-year 
Plan , 
Sources 
Variant! c Sii , 1932,.Mo.2, p .2 ;Zainn . , 2 . t . )2 • 
Variant II r S1I ,1932 ,No . 7 , p .2 ; Sii,19J3 ,No . 1 , p .f • 
lariant III a Sotsialisticheskava re ~.or,struktsiya 1 nauka , 1932 ,No .9-10 , p .83. 
Variant IV 1 Sii,191J,No .1, p .1. 
Variant V : SU,193J.~?o . 2 , p . 1. 
'ariant VI: Sii , 19JJ ,No .4, p . 1. (is.;;;ued in ~.ay) . 
YariantVII : Zaind . , JO .1 2 . JJ . 
Yar1antviii: Sii , 1934 ,No , J , p .1. 
olana •• , on cit, Vo1.1 ,pp.69-70;450-451 . VAriant IX 1 Proekt vtorogo pyatiletneF.o 
FrU!Ument J Fro!" Table SA .I. 
f du I I I I 
t t ttr'r rr.f rtrrrtr r;f1i tt T • - u ~-r t~r-! - -
!-J..; I 
I j - -
-l-l-1-+H-+-+-HH-+-++-1· 
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The Third Five- vear Plan , i QJB-l Q42 
Variant I 
{May 193? ; Al ' perovich, on basis of Gosplan target) 
Total out put 1942 - 7 0 , 000 un 1 ts 
GUSIP output 1942 - )P , 000 units 
Kaehine tool stock to double in the five year period . 
Variant II 
(r.arch 1939 1 the final Third Five-year Plan) 
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Inc .~ 
12~? Actual 1942 Plan Total 12~8-42 193Z-42 
Total output 36 , 120 70 , 000 270,000 194 
inc . 
NKTyazhMash 19 . 330 43 , 000 222 
¥.achine tool s t ock to incre~:~se from 380 , 000 units (1 . 1.,38) to over 600 ,000 un:lts . 
Fulfilment of the Third Five-year Plan 
1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 
L~l(ex . simple mcs~ 
Five- year Plan (40000) (46000) (53000) (61000) 70000 
Annual Plans n . a . 44415 51.300 58000 
Actw.tl Out put 40170 40900 42500 n .a. 
Per cent fulfilment 100 . 4 88 .9 80 . 2 
2 .NKTyazhMash 
F 1 ve- year Plan (2.5000) (28000) (,32000) (.37000) 4,3000 
Annual Plans n .a . 27795 ,32000 35000 
Act lal Output n .a . 250)0 27?54 24572 
Per cent fulfilment n.a . 89 . 4 86.7 /66 .4/ 
( •. ) esttnated on the basis or the final year target and total planned output 
during the oeriod . 
Sollrces • 
~· 
ariant I • Za!nd .,8 . 5 .37;10. 5 .37r E1f , 19J8 ,No . 2 ,p .3 . 
zviti a narodno~o khozvalstva So uza SSR, 
1 Tretii pyat1letni1 latt ra 07 XVIII s"ezd VKP b , sten .otchet,p.J86. 19JA- 1942 g...: . , Y1 ., 1939 , PP • 20 ;2 d ~~:.....:=..-=;:;;.....;-=-......... · 
lrlantii 
l'lllflll!lent 1 from Table SA • I . 
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Apcendix Three 
THE STRUCTURE OF l~ACHINE TOOL INSTALLATIONS 1918 - 19J4 
This section is devoted to an examination of the evidence on the structure 
of machine tools installed in Soviet industry, primarily the engineering sector, 
~uring the period 1918 to 1934 ; a periori chosen because of the availability 
of detailed material prov11ed by the 1932 census of metal working equipment (parts 
of which were updated to 1934 prior to publication in 1935). This analysts must 
oeces!>arily be brief and cannot do justice to the wealth of material presented 
1n the census , which represents a unique document, unrivalled by any subsequent 
published stock census for the USSR, and possibly any other country . The only 
ajor shortcoming of the census materials is that they exclude the specialised 
defence industry ~ The followin,<;r analysis is devoted to a consideration of 
such questions as the sectoral and branch structure of installations, the type 
of enterprise in which machi es were installed ,the role of imported equipment, 
t.ne form of production organisation, the structure of types, the degree of 
sooc1alisation and automation , and the labour skill requirements of the installed 
'"'\C"lires,. 
a. The Sectoral and Branch Structure of Installations 
The structure of t~e entire civilian stock of metal cutting machine tools 
in the economy in Aoril t932 (the date of the census) is shown in the table (p . 459 ) 
1 rhls reveals that 82 per cent of the stock was installed in inr!ustry , 11.7 per 
cent in transport and coml'!unications and less than three pe.r cent in the 
~icultural sector. Of the total 60.5 per cent of machines were located in 
2 other 
t:'1e machine buildin!l and/ rnet"ll working branches (hereafter MCMi) Durtng the 
Jl!ars 19l? to 1928 55 per cent of machines installed went to the I-1CMV branches; 
~u:ring the First Five-year Plan 3 these branches received over 64 per cent of 
4 total number of machines in the NC sector in April a.l! new installations . Of the 
1~2 the lar9;est sub- sector holding 
i.'ld the second largest, agricultural 
•ter of the total was transport equi~ent one qua~ · 
t Of al l types. The largAst individual eouipmen 
1 themselves but is confirmed by l.'!'his is evident from the census materia s ' 
i:as'yanenko -Voprosy istorit , 1964,No .11 ·~·rrd.in'! covered all branches making 
2Sor the purposes of the ~~~us machine r~fered to branches devoted to the 
complete rnachines ,wherecaw~tal working e It tools, beartngs,fastners,and diverse 
ea.kinR" of separate parts and ass ern bl es • • • 
etal it c'l 
I 
I 
AJ ,2 
!able A3 .I 
The Distribution of t1ach1ne Tools by Branch of h .. , _ t e c.conomy 
10th t<.Dril 19:32 
l.Industrv 
Number of metat-
cuttin.p: cc.ts. 
•:achine build 1np; 82 , 797 
Other br~nches of metal workine 26,948 
Metd working enterprises not i1 use2 2 ,JJ8 
Electrical bat.. tery and cable works ?98 
Specialised repair enterprises J ,496 
Repair shops of industrial enterprises) :)1 , 612 
Total Industry 14?, 989 
2. 'l'ransoort and Col!lOunications 
locomotive and wagon repair shops(NKPS) 
Workshops and depots of NKFS 
~ater transport r.epair works 
Repatr works of other transport orgns . 
Repair works of communications 
Total TranRport and ComMunications 
), An1cul ture 
Repair shops of l'lTS and Sovkhozy 
·• l'lun1c1pal repair shops 
5. Other branches 
Total Stock 
7,639 
8 , 500 
), 135 
929 
1 , 093 
21 ,296 
4,794 
3,293 
4,031 
181 , 40.) 
Per cent of 
total. 
45 .6 
14 .9 
1. ) 
o.s 
1.9 
l?.lJ. 
81 .6 
4.2 
4.? 
1.7 
o.s 
0 .6 
11.7 
1.6 
2 .2 
100. 0 
459 
1 '.. 1 udi u machines not .1nst.alled • • '!otal nuMbet' existing 1n the economy , Le • .u•c no 
2.Mach1ne tool s At enterprises under construction. ki enterprises included 
j,R,.Pai:r. shops of machtnA building and other .metal wor ng 
1n the appropriAte branches above • 
!tur~:Sotsialist1cheskoe stroitel ' stvo SSSR,19Jj,p .70 . -
A) . J 
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branch stock was in locomotive and wagon building ( c:IL ) 7,7~ units , followed by 
~1aultural machinery and implements (~ , 812) and the building of prime movers 
(~ lesels, internal combustion enP:ines ) , etc •• 
Turninv to new machine tool installations , we find a very substantial 
c~ge io the allocation by branches between the 1918 to 1928 period (for convenience 
here termed the restoration period), and the First Five- year Plan 1 taken here 
as 1929 to 1933.5 
! able A3 .II Branch Allocation of New Machine Tool Installations* 
Restor ation Period (1218-2~) First Five-lear Plan ~1222-~:l) 
Branch producing:. No . of Culmv .~ Branch producing: No.of 
Culmv ,, 
units total units total 
l .tocomotives- wagons 1,652 10.1 ! .Tractors 5,2:31 10.4 
2,Electr1c power eq • 1,305 18. 0 2 . Automob1les 4,897 20.2 
3 .Agricultural mcy • 1 , 294 25 . 9 3 . Agr1cul tural mcy. 4,306 28 . 8 
4,Control-measuring eq 1 , 079 32 . 4 4 .1-iachlne Tools 4,087 )6 .9 
5.Coeunlcations e 1 . 1 , 072 39 . 0 5 .Electric power eq . .3 ,227 4) ,4 
6 .PrimP. movers 1 , 062 45.4 6 . Locofflotives-~agons 2,140 4? .6 
7 ,Machine tools 980 51.4 ? .Prime movers 2,122 51.9 
S.Fuel-ore eq. 949 57 . 2 8 .Metallurglcal e~ . 2,102 56.1 
9 .Textile mcy . 734 61.h 9 .Measurtng-opt1cnl 
+ 1 ,937 59 .9 eq, 
10.Cloth.1nP'- footwear ec 666 65 . 7 10.Auto-tractor spares 1 ,934 6) .8 
Be~ininp: branches (2o; 5,639 J4 .J Remaining branches ( 20) 118, 169 )6 . 2 
All branches 16 , 432 100. 0 A 11 branches 50,152 100 . 0 
• Calculated from the t tme of installation of those machines ln the stock in 
April 19)2 (updated io 1 933) : therefore less accurate for restoratl6n period 
ln so far as some machines rust have been withdra~n or relocated . 
·Items for individual use - clooks,watches , cameras, binoculars, etc . 
~~ calculated from Oborudovanie , oo cit,vyp .2 , pp.1J0- 1JJ , 
"''h1a reveals t he massive increase 1.n t"'le rate of introduction of new machines 
during the "F:,1rst Five-year Plan, and thf' considerable role of new branches, 
), 'First Five- vear Pl~n ' here generally refers to 1929 to April 19)2 • 
.Calculated f~ol'l Obo1·udovanie;op c1.t,vyp . 1 , pp.49-50 . 1 . lit . 1r! t• 5.If the end of 1932 is taken a number of major enter~ skses ou o.fur tg nteh 
Fir t p 1 d d i.ac1 uding the Cbelyaoin tractor ac ory , e s, l an period are exc u e , - . d Uralma.shza"od heavy engineering works 
K~ kov turoine 1actory,the KramatorsK ~~erefore , the end of 1933 is taken in J 
and the Cor'ki l millin~ machine factory. ~riod of heavy englne~ing factories , 
o~er to allow for the longer ~estation P 
A3.4 
-,t.ably the auto-tractor industry accotmt1nr: for on~ fifth of all installations. 
r ~ prol'l1nent role of the machine tool 1nt!ustry itself is also notable . In both 
period only seven hranches nccounted for. over half the tot.a1 number of machines 
lnst.alled . Other , smaller branches which grew rapidly 1n the 1929-33 period 
include the C!::-kinP' of office eauip~ent , medical inst.ru::.ents , quip!lent for the 
r--.1 industry t and I other I tr t 1 ( 
!hill · anspor equ pment prooably bicycles, and motor 
cycles) . 
b ~The Rol e of Imported Nach tnes 1 
The census provides some information on the role of importE-d machines 1n 
'he total stock and in installations of differen-t. periods. but the exclusion of 
he defence industry ·precludes a full asses~.!!lent . The proportions of inported 
and domestically producer:! machines 1n the lnstnllations of different years :were 
11.11 follOWS! 
The Share of Imported and Do~esticallv Produced MachineD 'I'able A3 . III 
I Tw- of All the Economy Machine building nnd other cetal working Propn . o:r mc . ts \~) nopn. CoWltry of orJ.eln - per cent 
installation* Imported Produced in Imported of all inported cachines 
USSR ~ Gerl!lSlly USA Brltal.c1 Oth r 
I 
1
Before 1917 75 .? 24.) 82 . 3 42.6 )2.0 11.7 1).7 
1918 - 1923 68.5 31.5 73 .? 55.0 21.6 8.1 15.3 
l 
1929 - 4/19)2 57 .6 42.4 6J.9 .54.0 29 • .5 
• or year produced in few cases where year of 1nstalla'tion unknovn. 
Soarce1 calculated from Oborudovanie , op cit.vyp. l , pp,49-50. 
1·5 
l' us t.he share of imported machines gradue.Jly declined to the extent that over 
9.0 
'~ty per cent of all installations in the First Five-year Plan were of docestically 
ll" od G th J·0 ,.. foreia" supplier, but the USA accou.'tte.d for .. pr ucts . ermany was e ma - C"'" 
lrty percent of imports 1n the First Plan . As one would exp ct. th~ 1 ported 
!lines went predominEln t1 v to the HCf·1W sector but , neverthel eso. over o."le quarter 
the economv, 8 mur.h )ower proportion than durL1g the ~'ll to other sectors or 'J 
t ... e First Five-year Plan years the domestic industry • lorat1on period . During " 
t 55 per cent of the installations w1 th only 36 
·See also Tabl e SA ,XXV I , pp . 
per cent 1n the MCMW sector . The direction of installation of imported and 
s~v1et-buUt lll.achines is shown by the follow1ne table: 
Table A).IV 
The Distribution of Imported and s 1. _ ov et-built Hac hines by Sector 
or the Econom~ 
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Year of Imported machine tools Soviet-built nach1ne tools 
installation Per cent installed 1n, Per cent install erl 1n 1 
MCml Other ~c.,: Other 
Before 1917 70 .4 29 . 6 47 .1 52 . 9 
191~-1928 59 . 0 41.0 45. 8 54. 2 
1929-4/1932 71.3 28 .7 54 .6 4) .4 
SourcezCalculated from Oborudovanie , oo c 1t,vyp.1 , pn .49-50. 
The branches with the highest share of imported equipment were either those which 
developed vigor ously durinp; the First F1ve-yenr Plan perl.od , or those requiring 
special , heavy or large machines not then bu11 t tn t he USSR, In HC alone 1n 
April 1932 the average proportion of imported machines was 74.0 per cent; the 
hlgnest shares were found l.n tbe automobile industry ( 92 .8 per cent), the tractor 
industry (90 , 0 per cent) , the pronuct1on of measuring-optical equip::~ent. of 
~rsonal use (86 .1 per. cent.) and the elEctric power equipment lndustry 84 .5 
per cent) . Two branches of heavy enllineer1n~ also had a hi@h dc~rce of laport 
dP.~ndence a the locomotives and wagons industry (80 .6 per cent) and the cetellurgicnl 
e1u1p~ent branch (SO.) percent) . As one would expect the de~reo of reliance on 
poris depended to a great extent on t~a complexity of each particular type 
of 11U\Ch 1ne a of the tota.J stock in A' priJ t 932 in HCI'jW over 93 per cent of all 
rear cutting machines "ere of foreign origiil ,91 . 5 per cent of turret latl'tes , 
automatics and sem1-autos,89 per cent of boring nachines ,87 per cent of oilling 
11 hines and 73 ,4 per cent of grit;ding machines , but only 57 per ce.n t of threading 
chines 61 per centof drilling machines and 67 per cent of lathes . 
c.Kach1ne Tool Inst all a ttons by Type of Enterprise 
1.New and Old Enterorises 
The following table indicates the age of enterprises in which machine tools 
ere bstalled in various years :or those machines in the stock of April 19)2s 
I 
A3.6 
Table A) .v 
Machine Tool Installations and the Year ~f Foundation of Enterprises 
in Machine Building 
Year of Installation of Hachine Tools 
Year of Foundation 
1918-1928 I 1929-Apr , 1932 of Enterprise1 Before 1917 Total 
Before 1917 26 , 504 13,911 : 18, 007 58,422 
1918-1928 212 1,887 ),492 5,591 
1929-Apr .1932 588 468 12,790 13,864 
Total 27,304 16,284 34,2R9 77,877 
1.The presence of old machines at 'new' enterprises is explained by the fact 
that the pre-1917 group inclunes a nuMber of enterprises evacuated from the 
Baltic republics durin~ the War; the 1918-192~ ~roup includes a number of 
new enterprises created by concentratin~ existing factories ; and two 
fundamentally reconstruct.en entf.!rnrisPs (the Moscow AMO factory and the Putilov 
tractor department) were categorised as new enterprises of 1930, 
SourcesCalculated ~rom Oborudovanie ,op cit,vyp,2,p.168. 
From this table it can be seen that of the total number of machines installed 
during the First Five-year Plan, 12,790, or 37.) per cent ,were install ed at 
enterprises founded during the Plan perio'i itself, wh Ue 52.5 per cent were 
used in the reconstruction and exp~nsion of enterprises founded before the 
Revolution , Machine tonls inst~Jlen at enterprises founded rlurin~ the Plan 
period represented 17.~ per cent o~ the total stock of April 1932, whereas 
those installed at enterprises founoed before 1917 accounte1 for 75 . e per cent. 
ii.The Scale of Enterprises 
The census does not provide much information on the scale of enterprises , 
but the limited data oresented do prov i.de an interesting indic~tion of the 
degree of concentration of the machine building industry in April 1932 and 
the re'ationship between scale and installations in cHfferent periods , From the 
table it can be seen that in the restoration period machines tended to be installed 
at small and medium sized enterprisess in fact 48 per cent of all 1918 - 1928 
installations wer~ at enterprises of 5 million rubles or less basic funds , but 
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only 6 per cent at the very lar~est enterpr ises of 50 million rubles basic funds . 
In the First Five- year Plan period these proportions were resepectively 41 and 
22 . 5 per cent , showing the importance of very large enterprises . 
Table A3 .VI 
rhe Scale of Enternrises and the Alr.e of t~achl.ne tools - Machine Building 
Stock of Anr1l 1~ 
I 
Scale of Enterpris~s 
Va) ue of Basic Funds 
( ' 000 rubles) 
Up to 250 
251 - 500 
501 - 1000 
1001 - 2500 
2501 - 5000 
5001 - 10000 
1 0001 - 25000 
2 5001 - 50000 
Over 50000 
Stock 
~.pril 1932 
No .of j ~ of 
units total 
1 ,940 2 .4 
3 , 189 4.1 
4 ,338 5.6 
9 . 529 12 .2 
9 . 825 12 .6 
13 . 74? 17 .? 
10,324 13 .3 
12,773 16.4 
12, 212 15.7 
- ---------------------
Total 7? ,8?7 100.0 
Age structure of machines by scale group 
(per cent of total by scale group) 
folachtnes installed: 1 Yr .not 
I Before 1917 j 1918- 28 I 1929-4/32 known 
10 .6 
14 .2 
1? .2 
2) .) 
28 .4 
J6 . J 
42 .8 
57 .1 
28.6 
I 
21 .9 
)2 . 5 
I 28 .4 
2J .4 
21 . 9 
14. 2 
20 .4 
! 
58 .4 
4? .4 
44.? 
9 . 1 
46 .6 2.? 
45 . J 2.1 
)8.6 1 . 7 
32 . 5 2 .8 
27 .) 1.4 
61 .0 2 . 5 
42 .5 ) .2 
Snurce 1 C~lculated ~rom Oborudov~nie , on cit,vyp .2 , p.218 • 
.But despite the emphasis on extremely large enterprises in the First Five-year 
Plan period , larger enterprises tended to have a higher proportion of old 
machines t~an small and medium sized enteprises • 
Hl . Type of Production R.t Enternrises 
Machine buildtn~ enterprises nere grouped in the census by the type of 
Production organisation , defined not by the organisation of machine shops, but 
by t~e nature o~ the assembly of tne final product . Three categories were 
distinguished • first , indivtdu~l and small serial production ,e£ .' Krasnyi Putilov • 
("ith the exception of tts tractor department) , 'Elektrosila' and ' Krasnaya Pre~~ya' i 
s~"<"ad ,large serlal production ,e .g . the ' Samotochka' machine tool factory , 
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and the ' Krasnoe Sormovo ' loco-wa~on works· third 
- f I enterprises Hith mas!=;-flow 
production, divi~e1 into two groups - first, th~se of a multi- product nature,e.g. 
the Rostov agricultural machinery factory, and second, those making only one or 
two products , e .g . the Stalln~ad and Khar'kov tractor factories,tl'le Moscow 
and Gor'kii automobile works , and the Moscow first and second watch factories. 1 
Enterprises with mixed forms of production were categorised according the the 
form which was dominant a procedure which probably led to an overstatement 
of the role of lar~e serial and mass production . 
A high proportion of installations during the First Five-year Plan years 
were at mass- flow type enterprises. The changing emphasis on different forms 
of production is shown by the following table: 
Table A3.VII 
Machine tool Installations in Machine Building according to the Ty~ 
of Production of Enterprises 
j Proportion 
-
Type of of installations by typP of production (per cent) 
Production Year of Installation: "Stock 
Pre-1917 1918- 27 1 1928 I 1929 1930 1 1931 1 1932 1933 April 
Individual & I I I 
Small serial 38.4 27 .4 28. 4 24 .6 21.2 18.0 31.3 1 27 . 1 28.3 
Large serial 38.7 51.7 48.8 44 . 5 35.7 36 . 5 37 .2 )2 . 5 41.1 
Mass- flow 22 .9 20 .9 22.g )0 .9 43 .1 45.5 31.5 40.4 30 .6 
(inc .1-2 items 11.6 9 . 1 9 .0 12 .8 25 . 5 37 . 1 20 . 5 31.9 18.5 
Source aCalculated from Oborudov~nie,on cit,vyo .2,p . 193 . 
The verv high proportion of mass- flow oroduction iniicated for 1930 to 1933 
--
of 
1932 
is clearly caused bv the instal1ation of machines at t~e auto-trac tor factories 
( exclusion of the tractor branch alone reduces the share of mass-flow production 
in 1933 to 2~ per cent). It is probable that the high share of mass- flow production 
indicated by the census for April 1932 was ~ temporary phenomenon stemming from 
the peculiarities of the branch structure of installations in the preceding three 
year period c after 1931 it is likely that the share of individual and small 
serial production increased . 
• .Oborudivanie,op cit,vyp .2 ,p .XIII 
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d .The Arrangement of Machine Tools 
The trad i tional type of machine layout in the production shops of individual 
and small serial engineering fact ories is the grouping together of machines of 
a similar type or s i ze. In large serial and mass production it becomes expedient 
to arrange machines ac~ording to the flow of work . The role of flow oroduction 
and its definition ar e discussed in Appendix 6 
The extent 0! t he adoption of flow organisation during the First Five-year 
Plan period i s indicated by the following table s 
Table A3.VIII 
The Arrangement of Machine Tools in the Production Shoos of Machine 
Build inll' Enterprises 1 
St ock Of the April 1932 stock - machines installed • 
April 1932 Before 1928 1928 1929&30 1931-4/1932 
All i nstalled machines 57 ,375 31 ,631 2, 528 10,260 12,95& 
2 Arranged in Flow 11 ,878 3 , 948 306 2 , 544 5,080 
Flow as per cent 
of t ot al inst al led 20 .7 12. 5 12.1 24 .8 39 .2 
l .Machin i ng and assembly shops . 
2 .Remainder arranged in groups accordin~ to type or size , or in some other way . 
Source tOborudovanie ,op c1t ,vyp .4 , p. J2 . 
Durinv the First Five-year Plan period 32 .8 per cent of all machines installed 
in oronucti on shops were arran~ed on a flow basis. These machines were predominantly 
installed at new enter pri ses built durin~ the Plan periodr 
Table !>3 .IX 
The ArranR:ement of ~lachine Tools ac ~ornine: to the Year Qf Foundation 
of 11achL"le buil din&r Enterprises 
I Year of Foundat ion Stock of Of the April 1932 stock - arranged by I 
of Enter pri ses April 19'32 Flow I Groups '!- Other , "!> 
Before 1917 4) ,209 4 ,600 10.9 32 , 276 74.7 6 ,223 14.4 
1918 - 1927 3 ,486 763 21.9 2 ,256 73 .3 167 4 .8 
1928 - Apr. 1932 10 ,680 6 , 525 61.1 3 ,695 34.6 460 4 .3 
I All Enterprises 57 .375 11 ,838 20 .7 3R, 227 67 .3 6 ,850 12 . 0 
Source tObor udovanie ,op cit , vyp .4 , p.?4. 
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From the above two tables it can be deduced th~t very few of the new machines 
instalJed during the First Five-year Plan were employed at old enterprises on 
a flow basis , ann that a substanti~l number of older machines at existing enterprise 
~ust have been reorganised to provide a flow arrangement . As one would expect 
the majority of the machine tools arranged on a flow basis were to be found at 
enterprises of a mase-flow type. 
There was undoubtably a massive shift towards flow production at new 
enterprises built during the 1929 to 1932 period, but this shirt was in the main 
accounted for by about five branches which developed intensivey during these 
years . 
Table A3.X 
The Branch Concentration of Flow- arranged Machines in Machine Buildln~ 
Branch 
Production of1 
1 1 .Automobiles 
2.Tractors 
) ,Agricultural mcy . 
4.Electric power eq. 
5 .r4achine tools 
6 .Locos,wagons 
? .Measuring-optical 
Total seven branches 
--
eq . 
~ .Clothin~-fontwear eq . 1 
Remaining; 22 branches 
All branches 
I 
I 
Stock in production shops (April 1932) 
Flow-~rran~ed mc . t . s 
Number t of stock 
2 ,78) 79 .8 
2 ,005 72 .6 
1,187 26 . 2 
647 19. 1 
496 15. 8 
420 7. 1 
296 17.1 
7,834 31.4 
1,875 58 .9 
1,530 5 .4 
11,2392 19.6
2 
Per cent of all flow-
arranged mcs.(cumulative) 
24.8 
42.6 
55 .4 
58. 9 
6).) 
67.1 
69 .7 
69.7 
86 .4 
100.0 
100.0 
l . T~is is an exceptional branch , the main enterprise of wbich,the Podol'sk 
sewine machine factory,was the sole mass-flow civilian e~ineering enterprise 
before 1914; its machines were arranged on a flow basis before the First 
Five- year Plan. 
2 ,The totRl and percent~~e do not coincide with those usually given (11,883 
and 20 .7) - possiblv because of an error in the source from which the branch 
data are calculated. 
Sources Oborudovanie, op cit,vyp.4 ,po . 59-60. 
Thus three branches which accounted for one- third of all new installations between 
January 1929 and April 1932 held 55 per cent of all flow-arranged machines at 
the time of the census. It is probable that the share of flow arranged machines 
AJ .11 
in the total stock declined by the end of 1933 with the commissioning of such 
large, heavy engineering works as Uralmashzavod, Kramatorsk,the Khar'kov turbine 
factory and the Lugansk locomotive factory. 
e.The Structure of_!ypes of Machine Tools 
The 1932 census provides an extremely detailed an~lysis of the structure 
of the stock and new installations by type of machine. The structure of types 
installed in a given branch depends on many factors including the type of product, 
its wei"ht and size, thE> scale of production,the typ~" of pro:iuction organisation, 
the skills of workers and the availability of machines of different types. In 
gen~rRl, •the more 'progressive ' structure is that characterised by a relatively 
high proportion of automatic lathes and grinding machines and a relatively 
low proportion of lathes and planng and shaping machines . As a rule, the 
~eavier the product the greater the reliance on lathes and planing machines; 
the branches making lighter pro~ucts, especially those of interchangeable parts 
pronuctlon, tend to have a much higher share of mtlling and grinding machines 
anrl tur~et lathes. 
As one would expect, the structure of the machines installed outside the 
NCMW branches in t.he Soviet economy of 1932 was very different , and backward, 
compared with that of the MC~1-" sector• the machines installed were predominantly 
of a simple, general-purpose nature: 
The Structure of the Stock by Main Secotors Aoril 1932. I Table A) XI . -
Share of total stock represented by: (per cent) 
Sector L. PSS, D. T . ASA. M. c . GC . B. Br . Th . o. 
HCM\i )4. 5 6.5 19.9 7.3 2.9 9.6 a.o 1.3 0 .9 0.2 J .l 5.8 
inc .MC )6 .0 6 .9 20 .6 7. ) ) . 1 9.5 7 .. 0 1.6 1.1 0 .2 2 .8 ) .9 
Rest of 
Economy 4? .6 9.5 25.0 1.6 0.4 4.6 2.5 0.5 0.4 o.o 4.0 ).9 -I iotal Stock 39.6 7 .9 21.9 5.0 1.9 7 .6 5.8 1.0 0.7 0.1 ) .5 5.0 
Key1 L. - lathes, PSS.-Planing ,shaping and slotting machines; D. -drilling machines; 
T. - turret lathes; ASA- auto~at1cs andsemi-autos . ;M . -milling ~chines; 
G. - ~rind1ng machines ;GC - ~e8r-cuttin~ machines; B.- boring machines; 
Br . - broaching machines ; Th. - thre~din~ machines ; O. - other t ypes • 
Sources Obr>rudovanie , o~ cit,vyp .2.pp .2-5;Sots1aJisticheskoe stroitel'stvo,193.5,p.?4. 
I 
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~:achines installed in MChW during the First Five-year Plan period had a markedly 
more progressive structure than those installed in the pre- 1917 ~ear and the 
preceding restoration period : 
The Structure of Tynes in Mm1W by "tear of Installation Table A3 .XII 
Type of Hachine 
Structure of Types by year of Installation1{per cent 
of total installed in each vear) 
Before 
1
1918-
I 1928 ! 1929 1 
I ! 
1917 192'7 1930 1931 1932 1 1933 
! 
~ 32 .0 I ! Lathes 3~.7 37 .9 31.2 32 .0 30 .2 31.3 28.4 
' 
inc.centre ,one tool 32.9 )4 .3 28 . 0 27 .4 27.9 26.3 26 . 2 23 .1 
' 
Turret lathes 6 .6 9 .2 7.0 7 .6 6 . 1 I 6.6 5.2 5.9 
Autos .& semi-autos. 2,0 2.6 2 . ) 2.3 4 .2 ) .7 4.0 5.9 
Drilling mcs. 16 .4 18. 9 22 .2 20 ,6 I 23.7 2).1 13.0 1).7 
inc .vert .t spindle 11.4 15.6 17 . 1 16 .9 19.0 I 16 .6 12.7 9.2 
" vert .multi-spindle 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.6 2 .1 ) .5 2.6 2.8 
I 
" radial drilling 2.7 1.7 2 .3 I 1.7 1.5 I 1.8 2 . 8 2 .2 
Milling machines 10.6 8 .6 9 .3 9 . 5 I 7 .9 9 .8 10 . ) 10.8 
Grinding machines 3 .7 5.8 9 .2 12.7 11.1 I 11.2 15.5 17.0 
inc . tool ~rinding 0 .9 
I 
1.2 1.4 1.3 1.7 1.9 2.5 2. 1 
Gear-cutting mcs . o.s 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.8 2 .2 1.2 2 .0 
Borinp- machines 1.3 0.7 0 .9 0.7 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.8 
Planin~ ,shapin~ & 
slottin~ machines 8 .2 7 . 2 6.) 5.6 5. ) 5.3 5.5 4 .8 
I ' 
0 . 1 1 0.4 l .o:>roachin&~: machines 0. 1 0. 1 0 .1 O.J I 0.2 O.J 
I ThreadinP' machines 3 . 2 J,J 5. 2 I 3.5 2 .8 2 .0 2.1 3 .4 
I 
Other types 8 .4 4 .6 4 . ) I 4 .6 4 . ) 4.7 5.3 ).4 
Total 100 , 0 100.0 100 .0 100.0 100.0 1 00 . 0 jt 00 • 0 100.0 
1 .Or year machine bull t in a fe·· cases where year of installa ticin unknown 
SourcesObau~ovanie , op cit, vyp.2,pp.20-22. 
Thus durin~ the 1929 to 19)3 period, compared with the restoration period, the 
share of lathes and olanin~-tvpe machines declined , turre t lathes gave way to 
~utomatics and semi-autos, ordinary 0ne-spindle drillin~ machines were replaced 
by multi- spindle ~odels , and the share of ~rindihg machines rose sha~ply. Also 
i 
I 
I 
. 
4?0 
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notable is the extent to which the s t r ucture of types changed in the course of t he 
First Five- year Plan s the sh~re of grinding ~achines rose , while aut omatics and 
semi -autos played a gre~ter xole , their structure changing sharply - multi-
spindle types represented only 10 per cent of alJ autos and semi- autos in 1929 , 
risine: to 55 per cent in 193'3 . In so far as the information relates to the stock 
of 1932 , the structure of the installations of earlier years is influenced by 
the exter.t to which machines of different types survived . ~ bile no firm evidence 
is · available it would seem likely that the more specialised and higher grade 
machines were kept in use in preference to simpler , more readily replaceable 
general- purpose machines and , if so , the improvement in the structure of 
installations must have been greater th1n indicated in the table . 
Table A3 .XIII 
The Structure of' Types and the Year of Foundation of Nachine Building 
Enterprises 
Year of Foundation of Enterprises In sta lla t ions 
Type Pre- 191? 1918- I I 1930- All FYP1 in 1929-32 at 
~ 1927 I 1928 19Z9 4/1932 1929-32 pre-1929 ents . 
Lathes 38 .8 )6 . 1 :n. P. 2? .81 23 . 0 2) .6 36 . 1 
I 
Turret lat hes, 
l 
I 
.autos & s- as . 9 .8 15.? 15.? 7 .4 11.5 11.0 10.2 
I 
Drill ing l'll.cs . 1'P .6 20 . 5 21.3: )4.7 2).6 24.9 22 .6 
Milling mcs . 9 .4 7.5 I 6 .6 6 . 1 11.? 11 .0 8.0 
GriM~ ing mcs . 5.7 6.2 4 .8 8. 5 13 .9 13 .3 7 .8 
Gear-cuttin,~r mcs 1.0 1. 5 0 . 1 0.5 4.) ).9 1.4 
Borinv mcs . 1 .3 0 .3 0 .4 0.5 0.? 0 .7 0 .9 
Planin£ , shapin~ , I I 
slotting, and 
6 . 2 6 .0 4. 9 6 • .5 broaching mcs. 7 .8 5. 2 4 .7 
r >rrea r1 inll mcs . 3 . 0 2.? 2 .8 4.81 1.4 1.8 2 .6 
Other :tvpes 3 .6 4 . 3 4 .3 ) .7 5. 2 4 .9 3.9 
Total 100. 0 100.0 100 .0 100 .0 100.0 100. 0 I 100 .0 
l .Apnroximate -on the assumption that machines l ocated at enterprises founded 
in 1929- 32 were installed during the same period. 
Source : Calculated f rom Oborudov;mie ,op cit ,vyp. 2,p . 176 and p .JO . 
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The consi~erable improvement of the structure of the stock which took place 
with the construction of new enteprises tn the First Five- year Plan can clearly 
be seen from the above table . The share of lathes and machines of the planing 
group fell to a very low level , while that of grinding, milling and ee~r-cut ting .. 
machines rose sharply . From the structure of new install ations during 1929 to 
April 1932 and ~he structure of installations at new enterprises it can be 
estimated that the structure of types installed at older (pre- 1929) enterprises 
was much less progressive than at the new , with a higher share of lathes and the 
planing eroup , and relativel y fewer of the pro~resstve types . 
The table on the follo~ing page reveals ~ number of interesting f eatures 
anrl determin::~n ts of the type structure tn different branches . Branches are ordered 
accordin2 to the share of progressive types 1n their total stock in April 19321 
in this case automatics, semi- a utos , ordinary turret l athes , milling machines 
and grind tng m.achln es . A n Ufll ber of regularities are o bserv R bl e • 'rhe pro port ion 
o~ lathes and olaning m~chines tends to vary inversely with the share of progressive 
types . Branches with a relatively high proportionof progressive types tend to 
be those having a large proportion of new installations during the FLrst Five- year 
Pl~n period , while such branches also have a below average labour skill level. 
The most striking feature of the type structures presented in the table is 
the very stron~ influence exerted by the type of product and the seriality of 
production . The first three branches ,wtth an exce ~tionally high share of 
progressive equipaent are ones producing light wetght, relatively small • hign 
precision products on a large serial or mass basis; the average skill level is 
extremely low and a high proportion of the stock of equipment 1s devoted to 
machi~ing on a large batch or mass b3s1s . A second group of eight branches 
c~n ·oe i~ent1fied coverin~ those for which progress ive machines repre-ent JO tO 
40 per cent of the stock, but alsc the exceptional agricultural machinery bu11~ 1ng 
branch which shares all the feature~ of this group while ~g a lower proporti on 
of prones~ive machines(because of the unusually large role played by drilling 
~achines , representing one third of the stock , comp~red with the 15 lo 25 per 
per cent typic~l of other branches) . Thi.s group is characterised by the large 
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Table A3 .XIV 
The Structure of the Stock of the Main Branches of the Engineerin~ Industry 
April 1932 
Percent total Per cent Per cent Average Percent 
Branch brfnch stock2 installjd machining branch stock Production of : I II FYP1 batches labo~ arranged 
I of 500+ skill in flow 
1 ,Office Eq , 50 .1 22 .6 
I 
69 .7 77 . 0 2 .5 o . o 
2.Clothing-f ' wear eq 47 .0 22 . 9 10 .3 74. 0 2 .6 .58 . 0 
I 3 .Measuring- opt. eq . 43 . 1 30 .3 I 76 .5 67 .8 2 .7 17 .1 
Average Group I 46 .7 25.3 52.2 
-
72 .9 2.6 I 25 .3 
4 .Tractors 39 .8 I 25. 1 I 85 .4 35 .95 2 .9 72 .6 
5 .Automobiles 36 . 5 22 . 5 89 .8 81.2 2 .7 79 .8 
6 ,f>,achine tools 34 .2 41.2 64 .0 10 . ~ 3 .1 15. 8 
7 .Auto- tr . spares 32 .9 44.6 72 .6 29 .8 2 .7 
I 
6 .4 
8 .Control- measrg .eq . 32.7 41.7 44 .9 41.9 3 . 0 3 .6 
9.Electric power eq . 31.1 I '36 .3 43 .7 17 . 5 2 .9 i 19 .1 10 .Communications eq . )0 . 5 33 . 5 
I 
32 .2 38 . 3 2 .9 4 . 5 
I 
11 .Agricul tural mcy . 18.8 25.1 55 . 1 31.4 2 .7 I 26 .2 
Averaf!,e Group II 32 . 1 I 33.8 61.0 39 .9 2 .9 I 28 . 5 
12 .Textile mcy . 29 .7 52 .4 
l 
25 .0 6 . 5 2 . 9 J , 5 
13 .0ther t r anspt .eq . 26 .1 36 .4 57 .6 5.7 3 .0 16 .2 
14.Pumps- compr essors 24 .0 53 -7 30 .8 11.5 3 .2 4.5 
15.Prime movers 22 . 5 53 .9 18. 2 4 .4 3 .2 5.3 
I 
t Avera~e Group III 25 .6 49 .1 32 .9 7 .0 3 .1 ? .4 
J16 .Locos . , wagons 20 .1 52 .3 16 . 1 8 .3 ) . 5 7 .1 
17 .Shipe 1'3 . 5 51.5 20 .3 5. 0 ) .8 ) .6 
18 .Printing- paper eq 17.8 59 .4 33 . 1 5.2 3 . 5 22.9 
1 9 .Fuel-ore eq , 17 ,6 56 .5 I 40 .0 4 .5 ) .6 5.9 
20 ,Foon inustry eq , 17 .0 55 .2 I 48.7 8 .2 3 . 1 ) .6 
1 21 .Timber ind . eq . 16 .2 l)z .o 42 .8 4 . 5 3 • .5 1.1 
22 .Metallur~ical eq. 12 .4 67 . 0 J4 .o O.J ) .4 ) .9 
2J .Lifting- t r spt .eq . 12 . ) 55.9 43 .4 5.9 3 . 1 11.2 
24 .Road-constrn . e~ . 11.1 .58 .7 44 . 1 '3 . ) 3 .3 J . O 
l25.Boiler eq. 10.8 57 .s )8 .7 1.0 ) .7 6 .4 
I 
Average Group IV 1.5 .4 57 .6 )6 . 1 .5 .1 ) .5 6 .9 
All Branches 6 26 .9 4) . 1 43 .9 24.9 I 3 . 1 19.6 
1 .Total share of autos ., semi-autos ., turret lathes , milling machines and grinders . 
2.Total share of or~inary lathes , planing ,slotting and shaping machines . 
J ,Percent~~e of the stock of April 1932 1nsta1led 1929 to April 19J2 . 
4,Average skill grade (on eight noint scale)of mach1n~s installed in each branch . 
) ,Incomplete data - excludes the Khar ' kov factory - branch average probably higher . 
f' • Includin~ five branc'1es o~ minor importance excluded from the table . 
Source :Calcu)ated from Oborudov:;~nie , op c1t ,vyp.2 , pp112- 117 &130 ;vyp .4 , pp6,9L68. 
A) . 16 473 
serial or mas production of medium or lt~ht :roducts cf a fairly high degr~e 
of precision . This group tends to have a high proportion of First Five- year Plan 
p~riod installations, a relatively lo~ averc~e skill level, and quite a high 
proportion of (ltachines devoted to machining in large batches . A thi.rd. group of 
four branches represents mediwn machine building of a lower level of precision 
~~an group two ; the l~bour sk111 lev~l is so~ewhat ht~her and a much smaller 
shPxe of installations date from the Plan ~~riod . Fina'ly, there ls a fourth 
group of branches having one fifth or. less pr.ogres ive machines , ~nly devoted 
to the production of a range of ~edium-heavy to very heavy engineering products 
o~ relatively low precision , generally on an individual or small serial b~sis . 
a 
This group tends to barEYbeloto: average sba.re of First Five- year Plan installations 
and a much higher thnn :werS~r,e skill level . As can be seen from t.he table , there 
is a close correlation betwef"!n the proportion of machines arranged en a fJ ow 
b~sis ano ~he seriality of production • Flow-arrangel machine~ had a very 
different structure of types than machines arranged on a group basis , as the 
followin~ table shows: 
Arrangement Percenta~·e of stock reoresented by,• 
L. T. ASA . D. I ~:. G. GC . I P . B. I Br . 
I 
In Flow 16.9 5.9 ) .9 )4 .8 15.6 8 .9 J .J 2.6 0.9 1.2 
In Groups of 
simUar type 
or size 40 .7 10 .J 5.2 18 .2 8 .7 4.9 1.8 6.8 1.5 0 .1 
Kev : as p.468 . 
Source rOborudovan te ,op cit , vyp .4, p. l 02. 
The characteristic ~eatuxes of the four groups are sum~Arised by lhe indicated 
avorage ( unweirhted) values, which provide a oasi.s for concluding that during 
the First Five-year Plan period new inst~llatlons were prlmarllv directed to 
light and medium en~inePring branches of a type suited to the employment of 
progressive equipment pernitting the employmen of ~orkers of 1~latively low 
skills , the high level of seriality also alJowlng the adoption of the flow 
principle of organisation, 
o. 
6 .0 
1.8 
I 
I 
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f.The De£ree of Speclnlisatlan and Automation of MachL~e Tools 
The machine tool census distinguished :five degrees of specialisation of 
machines rangin~ fr.om universal to narrowly spec1el , wtth t.hree lnt.ermediate 
1 
stages • The de~ee of automation was defined according to a rather complex 
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~our point scale with a number of sub-divisions , but in essence the cJassixication 
reducei to the followin£1 
1 . ~achine to~ls without power feedr a . sin~le to~l ; b . mult1-to~l . 
2 .Nac'1ine tonls w \ th power feed 1 a . s1ne;1 a to'll b . mul t:t- tool . 
) .Semi- automatic machines (autornatlc ~on t.rol of feed , speed and the enga~ement of 
t~e tool(s) . 
4 .Automatic machines (as J.,plus ~utor-atic fe~d of material by magaz1ne ,bar 
feed devtce ,etc . ) . 
The largest slnvle group of l:'.achines 'ln the stock of April 1932 was th t. of 
universal machines of Stage I spec1al1satlon: during the Firat 1"1ve-year Plan 
the share of these machines in total installations in the eng1.neer1ng industry 
slightly decllned , and the proportion of machines of Stage III rose 1 
The Soec1al1sat1on of Nachines 1t1 the Stock of the EnY1neerlng Industry 
Tabl e AJ.XVI Aoril 1932 
No .of Structure Structure of mcs . installed; 
DegreP of Specialisation mc . ts . per cent before l929 1929-4/ 1932 
UntversAl tStagP~I 28 ,720 :;36 .2 }7 .9 34 . 1 
Stage ..II 22,009 27 .8 27 .7 27 .8 
Stage III 24 , 2..58 )0 .6 28 .9 32 .8 
Stage IV 1,121 t.4 1.3 1..5 
N ndy • S pzdStage V J , 189 4 .0 4.2 ).8 
All Machines 79 ,297 100 .0 100. 0 100.0 
Sourcet Oborudovanle ,op cit,vyp.2 , p. 107 . 
1 .ThP degree of specialisation was define~ L~ teras of the ra~e of operations 
rPal1sable on a ~lven machine , and tbe range of types an~ sizes of cooponents 
machinable without reducing its productivtty . 
Stauei - rr.achines of th~ most universal type able to fulfll ,within their 
technoloF.lcal ftmction , al] types of machining withln a wide range of 
dimensional limits , and not requtrlne complex retooling on switch~lg 
to work on p?~ts of another type or size: 
Stage II- ltiachines di.fferin&r fron stage I by one of 'the t'u'eR listed featuresr 
i . e .a reduced ~ah~rf of ~achintng , machinable dlmensions,or requiring 
complex retooling on switching from one type of work to another; 
Stageiii-Differing from I by two of the listed features; 
Stage IV-Machines of a rPduced range of types of aacblnin~ , a reduced range 
cont .page 4"Jt. 
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Quite a large proportion of the universal machines installed iuring the First 
Five-year Plan were presumably used for equipping, t~e toolrooms and repair shops 
of the new and expanded factories . If we consider the degree of specialisation 
according to the vear of establishment of enterprises a greater shift towards 
more specialised equipment is revealed: 
Table A3.XVII 
The Specialisation of ~achines in the Stock of Enterprises 
Founded in Different Periods 
I Per cent of machines by enterprise age groups 
Year of Foundation Degree of specialisation of machines in the April ' 32 stock 
of Enterprises 
Stager J Stage II Stage III Sta~e IV Stage V 
Before 1917 39 .6 28.2 27.4 1.2 3.6 
1918 - 1928 32 .8 )0 .2 3) .4 0 .8 J .6 
1929 - 4/1932 27 .6 25.4 39 . 2 2.4 5. 4 
SourceiOborudovanie ,on cit , vyp .2,p.179. 
Thus the share of th · more spP-cialised types of machines (Stages III to V) 
rose from less than one third at enterprises founded before the nevolution to 
~lmost half at entPrprises foun~ed durin~ the First Five-year Plan period. 
Semi- automatic and automatic machines of all types represented 7 .3 per cent 
of thP. total engineerin~ stock in April 1932, while simpler machines without 
power feerl represented 26 per cent . t•tacl!ines installed during the First Five-year 
Plan period included a relatively higher share o~ the more automated types than 
those installed in earlier periods: Table AJ .XVIII 
The Degree of Automation of Machines in the Stock of the Engineering 
Industry, April 1912 
De~ree of Automation No .of Structure Structure of mcs . installed 1 
mc . t . s per cent bPfore 1929 1929-4/ 1932 
Without power fee~ 21 ,253 26 . 0 26 .J 26 .0 
fiith power feed- 1 tonl 45,531 56 . 2 58. ) 5J . 4 
" " " - mul ti- to -1 8 ,480 10. 5 10 .4 10 . 5 
Semi- automatic 3,191 4.0 2 .4 5.9 
I Automatic 2 ,653 J . J 2 .6 4 .2 
l AU r~achines 81 , 128 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Sourcet0borudovanie ,vyp.2 , p.10J . 
. 
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As with machine sp c1al1sation , the shirt to more automated equio-ent was oore 
r!larKed than sugaesterl by the abov"' tablea if acC'ount is taken of t.he year of 
fou.'1dation of nterpr1ses, we see that machines inst lled at the new enterprises 
of the First Plan were characterised by a much higher level of automation than 
those installed at ol der factories , with a notablyh1 ~hare of se 1-aut~4tic 
oachines t 
Table A) . XIX 
The Degree of Aut o:nation of J.·•ach1nes in thA Stock of l!.nterprl.ses Founded 
tn Different Periods 
Year of Foundation Per cent of machines by enterprise age proup: 
of Enterprises Degree of automation of machin s in the April 19)2 stock 
Without J With power feerl Semi-
power feed I one tool multi tool auto Aut.ol'lat.1c 
Be-ror 191? 25.6 59 . 0 10 . 1 2 .5 2 .8 
1918 - 1928 )1.7 51 .8 9.1 4 . 2 4 .2 
1929 - 4/1 Q)2 24 .1 49.4 11.9 9 .8 4.8 
Source • Oborudovanie ,oo ctt ,~p .2 , p . 1?9. 
~1ost semi•automatic and automatic machines were of 1ntermed tate specialisation , 
pr.edomtnnntly Stage III , while the simpler machines without power feed tended 
to b~ of the aomewhat lower degr ee of spec1al1saUon, St.age u .1 1'he degree 
o· specialisation of machines arran~ed on a flow basis tended to oe ouch higher 
than for machin s arran~ed in ~oups or on anoth r basis .a 
The Arrang;ement of 1-iac"ttnes ami the Degree of Soeci 11sat1on Table A) .XX 
(Production shops of p~gineerin£ e~terpr1ses , April 1932) 
Forn of ar n~e ent Propor ion of oach1nPs by def!ree of . specialisation(~) a 
of :.ach1n s 
Stage! sta~eii Stage III Stagen r St.ageV 
In flow 16 .6 26 .4 39.7 2 .4 14.8 
In other arrangement )6 . 0 28.4 )2 .2 1. 5 1.9 • ~ 
Sourc£ a Calc11lated from Oborudovanie ,op clt ,vyp .4 , p, )2 . 
r.:ont.. from p . ~14- . 
of machinable di "nPnsi.ons , anr:i requlrin~ complex retooling for dif eren ~ work a 
Sta«eV-Narrowly special machines designed speciflca Jy for perrorming a given 
autonat1cally realised operation , or for Aak~ sp clfic part . 
(s e Oborudovan1 ,op c1t , vyp . 2 , pp .l~I-XVII;Cl s1fic tion ~awn up by !a . vasha) 
t .Oborudovanle , op cit. , vyp .2 , p . 109 • 
. 
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The~ent of utilisation o~ specialisation and automation of machines varte 
.s•Jbstantidly from branch to bra.,ch, as the following table reveals. The 
tr:mches ar~ ordereti and 17l'"Ouned ac :-:orrlin&r to t'1e role of pro~essive types of 
equlpnent (p . 472 above). 'Iable A) ,A.Xl 
The De£rrec of' Soeclal'tsatlon and Auto!'JAtion of Machine Tonls Ir.stalled i.n. 
~ches of the ~!_neerin!.l.!!_dustrv , -AOrii 1932 
Brancht 
D~ree of Specialisation Degree of Automa·Uor 
Production Of 1 
Untvl . ' Intermediate Speczd . W1. thout. 
Sta~Ze I Sta~elii StRgesiV&V power feed 
t. Off' ice eq ui prnen t 24 .7 46.2 2 .0 I 47 · 5 
2. Gloth1ng-f'wear eq . 17 .5 )6 .3 30 . 8 22 .2 
) . Keasllring- optl.eq. 13 .7 55.4 • 11.3 I 44.7 
Average Group I 18.6 46 .0 t4 .7 38. 1 
4.rractors 27 .3 I 45.1 ' 7 .6 1) . 1 
5.Autonobil es 2? .o )3 . ) 11 .6 I 20 .9 
6.Mach1ne tools )9 .4 J0 .5 ) . 5 
I 
21.6 
7 ,Auto-tractor spares )? .3 )6 . 5 J .J 25 . ) 
11 .Control- measr.g . eq . 1~ . 1 4~ . ) 2.? 57 .4 
, .Blectrlc power eq . )2 .0 33 · 5 1.7 30. t 
10.C"'t111W11cat1ons eq . 1.~ . 0 IJ.2 . 2 2.5 5) .4 
U.Agricul t.ur!\J rncy . )?.'3 ' 
20 . 5 l ) . 5 )O .J 
I 
. 
I Averap:e Group II 34.6 I )6 .9 I 4.5 ) 1. 5 I 
i2 .TextiJ e mcy . 41.8 35 ·3 1.6 20.8 
l).Other transpt .eq . 37 .1 29 .0 J , O )0 . 5 
11! .Pu nps- corn oressors 49 .3 20 .0 2.9 19.2 
15.Prime r'lovers 4'\ . ) 2) .2 ) . ) 17 .7 
I 26 .9 I 2.7 22 .1 
I 
!Y!rage Croup III 44 .1 I 
16 .locos. , wagons 41.1 24 .2 5.2 18.6 I 
l?.Shlps 18 .6 2 . 0 16 .4 .52 . 1 
t6.?rintinp and paper eg 55 .1 14 .7 4 .8 19 -J 
19J'ul!l -ore ~ . 5) .8 19 .4 z.4 16.4 
30.4 
20 ,f'oo'l Indus try eq . 46 .7 19 . ) 1 . 0 
12 .5 0 .4 17.8 21.Tllltber industry eq. 55 .6 
1~ .4 4.6 9.4 22.~1etallurgioal eq . 57 . ) 
t6 .2 ;::.8 23 ·'7 2} .1:1ftinP"- transpt . eq . 47 .8 
~.Roan-constrn . eq . t6 .4 2 . ) 
24 .J so.; 
14.7 1.4 21.7 ~5.Boller AQ • 4S.6 
2.7 19 . 9 !·rerage Group IV 50 .8 17 .3 - 25. 8 I All Branches1 37 . 0 29 .9 5·3 -
i t nee excluded from the table . t.lncludina- five branches of l"iLlor mpor a 
~u~ 10borudovante ,op cit ,vyp .2 , pp.t56- t58 . 
Semi-autc 
ann autoa 
4 .J 
12 .0 
24.5 
1).6 
18 .9 
16 .5 
? .J 
11.?. 
j,4 
7 .2 
7·5 
) .0 
9 .6 
4.6 
? .7 
3.1 
2. 5 
4.5 
J .? 
2 .0 
ts. .? 
).6 
2.4 
0.6 
4 .7 
2 .1 
1.9 
1 .0 
2.7 
7 . 1 
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From the above table it can be seen that narrowly specialisen machines were 
used in quantity in only four branches; the clotnim~-footwear machinery branch 
dominated by the pre-war S1nger factory was the only one to place considerable 
reliance on such Machines . In gener~l the light and mediu.'ll engineering branches 
tiven priority during the First Five-year Plan period made considerable use 
of machines of intermediate specialisation, corr~sponding to the 'production' 
type equipment widely employed in the engineerin~ industries of capitalist 
countries during the 1920s . In the branches of heavy engineering of low seriality 
medium engineering about half of the installed machines were of the widely 
universal type, with only one fifth of the stock taking the ~orm of more specialised 
equipment of Stages III to V, ThP wide use of semi- automatic and automatic machines 
was ~~ain restricted to a small number of branches of light and medium eng1n r erlng 
havin.q; a high seriality of pro:~uction . Furthermore, those branches pro3ucln~ 
li~ht products tended to make much ~eater use of relatively simple machines 
without power fePd Mechanisms . In the main m~ss production branches established 
durin~ the First Pl an period (thP making of tractors,auto~obiles and their spares) 
a relatively high proportion of semi-automatic machines was installed: these 
three branches alon p accounted for 40 per cent of all the semi-automatic machines 
1 
installed 1n the engineering industry in April 1932, but one fifth of the automatics. 
g.Labour Skills and the Machine Tool Stock 
An interestin~ feature of the 1932 census was the attempt to deterMine the 
labour skill requirements of thP machines in the stock in ter~s of the skills 
of the oper~tors manning each machine at the time of the census , rated on the 
eig~t grade scale then employed. This information provi~ed skill profiles 
of all branches an~ , tn order to take account of possible divergencee between t~e 
skills of workers and the skill requirements of the machines manned,account was 
also taken of the relationship betwe~n worker skills and the skill requirements 
h k ' e O.l'l the day of the census. A striking of the work being performed on eac mac· tl.!l · 
~ Fi Plan period was the lowering of skill re~uirements ~eature of the First ve-year 
~the engineering industry, notably at new enterprises founded ~ithin the Plan 
founded in different periods are 
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The ectent of utilisation o"' specialisation and automation of machines varied 
substantially from branch to branch, as the following table reve~s. The 
br~ches are ordereo and grouped ac~ord in£ to t~e role of pro~ressive types of 
equipment (p . 472 above). Table A) .XXI 
The Den-e!' of Soecial tsation and Automation of Nachine Tonls Installed tn 
Branches_Qf the EniT.ineering Industry , APrilW- ---
Branch• Degree of Specialisation 1 De~ee of 
Production Of ; Univl. l !ntermedi~te Speczd . 'wi ithout. Stage I Stagei ii StagesiV&V power feed 
1 • Office equipment 24.7 46.2 I 2,0 I 47 • .5 
2. Clothing-f'wear eq . 17 • .5 I )6 .3 ;o.s 22 .2 ). Measuring-optl.eq, 1) .7 55.4 ll.J 44 .7 
I 
Average Group I 18.6 46 .0 14 .7 )8.1 
4.Tra,.tors 27 . J 45.1 7 .6 13 .1 
5 .AutomobiJ es 27 .0 )8 . ) 11 .6 20.9 
6 .~!lachine tools 39.4 J0 .5 ) .5 21.6 
?.Auto- tractor spares J? .J )6 . 5 ) ,J 25.) 
8 .Control- measrg .eo . 1 ~ .1 48 . ) 2.7 57 ,4 
9.E1ectric power eq • )2 .0 I JJ . 5 1.7 30 . 1 10.Communications eq . 18. 0 42.2 2.5 5J ,4 I 
tl .Agricultur~l mcy , )7 .3 I 20 . 5 J,5 JO ,J . I 
A vPra.~rP Group II ]4 ,t'. I J6.9 I 4 • .5 31.5 I 
12 .Texti1e mcy . 4t.8 3.5 .3 1.6 20.8 I 
l).C•ther transpt .eq . 37.1 29.0 ) .0 J0 . 5 
14.Punps-compressors 49 .3 20.0 2.9 19.2 
15 .Prime novers 4q . J 2) .2 J ,J 17 .7 
AvE>rage Croup III 44.1 26 .9 I 2 .7 22.1 I 
16 .locos . ,wagons 41.1 24 .2 5.2 18.6 
17 .Ships 52 . 1 18 .6 2 . 0 16 .4 
1~ .Frintinp and paper eq .55 . 1 14.? 4 .8 19 .3 
19.Fuel- ore eq. 5).8 19 .4 2 .4 16.4 
20 .Food Indus try eq , 46 .7 19.3 1.0 )0 .4 
21 .T1mber industry eq . .55.6 12 • .5 0.4 17 .8 
22.t1etallurgical eq . 57.3 16 .4 4 .6 9.4 
2J .Liftin~-transpt . eq . 4?.8 16 .2 2 .8 2J .7 
24 .Roa~-constrn.eq . 50.3 16.4 2.J 24 . J 
2 5 .B:)il er eq • 4S.6 14.7 1.4 21.7 
Average Group IV 5o. e I 17 .3 2.7 19 .S 
All Bnnches1 J7 . 0 I 29 .9 5·3 25 .6 
1. Including ftve branches of minor importance excluded from the table . 
Source tOborudovanie ,op c1+. ,vyp .2 , pp .1 .56-158 . 
Automation 
Semi-autos 
and autos 
4 , ) 
12.0 
24.5 
1) .6 
18.9 
16. 5 
7 ·3 
11.2 
; .4 
7 .2 
7.5 
J .O 
9 .6 
4 ,6 
7·7 
3.1 
2.5 
4 . ;, 
) .7 
2 . 0 
4.7 
).8 
2 .4 
0 .6 
4 .7 
2 . 1 
1.9 
1.0 
2 .7 
7.1 
I 
I 
I 
l 
l 
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s~own in the following t~ble: 
Table AJ .XAi..I 
The Skill Levels of f1ach1ne Ooerators at Enterprises Founded in Dif eren-r. 
Periods (production shops,engineering industry,April 1932) 
Year of Foun~ation No.of ~ Averap:e ~rade of 
Proportioq of machines in each group 
rnc . ts . operators mantled by operators of grades a (~) of Enterprises 
I I & II III & IV I v & VI I VII & VIII 
Be"ore 1917 43 ,209 ).1 39 .0 45 . 5 1~.8 2.? 
1918 - 1928 4 ,062 ) . 2 )8 .7 I 44 .7 12.9 J .7 
I 
t 929 - 4/1932 10 ,104 2 .A 41.0 53 .o 5.2 0.9 
--I~ --
All Enterprises 57,375 J .1 J9 .4 46 .8 11 ,4 2.4 
Source aOborudov;:tnie ,op cit , vyp .4 , p.79 . 
Thus the new enterprises of the First Five-year Plan were founded on the semi-skilled 
worker , follow in; the 'trend establishec'l in the ;Jest durtng the 1920s. The 
proportion of hiP"hJ. y skilled workers af grades V to VIII was correspondlingly 
verv low , only 6 per cent agatnst about 16 rer cent for enterprises built before 
1929. It is also notable ~hat wherP.as at the enterprises founded before 1917 2) per 
cent of the m::.chines were beln~ manned by workers of a skill below that required 
by the job in h~nd on thP ~~Y of thP census, this was true of only 12 per cent 
o~ the ~achines at the newest enterprises . The deskilling process was clearly 
associated with the great emphAsis placed on ~ss and large- serial medium and 
li~ht engineering whtch chAracterised the 1929 io 1932 period . Analysis of the 
SKill profiles of enterprises havin~ dif~erent forns of production reveals larpe 
variations ; Table XX.1II 
Skill Levels of Machi ne Operators at Enterprises of Different Serial1t1 
of Froductton (pro~uction shQPS,engLneerinY in ·ustry ,April 1932 
Type of Production ' No . of I 
Proportion of machines in each }roup manned 
mc , ts . bv workers of gradest (per cent ., 
I I & II 1 III & IV 1 v & ·vr r VII & VII 
Av .Crade 
l ind tvid u~l & S!llaH 
29 . '5 
I 49.1 t6 .0 4.4 J .4 Eertal t 6 ,li-J 1 
Large serial 2) ,327 J9 .J 46 .7 11.9 
2 .1 ) . 1 
MasF;-f1 ow 17,617 48 .4 
I 
44 .9 5 .~ 1.0 2 .8 
1nc.1-2 itens 10 ,91J 47 .9 47 .8 
J .7 0.6 2.7 
All Enterprises 57 ,375 J9 .4 I 46.8 11.4 I 
2 .4 ) . 1 
Source :Oborudovan ie .op cit , vyp .4 , p . Bti • 
I 
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The reduced skil 1 requirements of the new enterprises were linked with the 
:.rend to~s the use of' macliines of 1 nterm~diate spec1allsation,Stages II ~diii,the 
next stage of speci:1J l.satlon, St1 R:e IV 
J ' appa:rentl y ffave no advantage tn sk1.1 1 
saving and his fact may account. for their very li"'ited '" employment . A considerable 
proportion , alMost JO per cent , of the universal Stage I machines werP being 
nanned by workers liavinP. a lower skill ~ZXade .~.. ... n th _ ~ '1" ·• ~ . required by the work on 
the day of the censm;; this propo2:t.ion fell h - as t . e ne6 ree of spaciaJlsation rose 
- 18 per cent for Stage II; 17 o_ er cent. for st Ili ·~ e:e , and onl · 9 per cent for 
:.hP narrowly speci:=il ised Stage V rllachines . The relationship between machine 
spechltsation and labour skills is shown 1.n the foll owlr.g table 1 
~ree of Soecialisation of Machines and Labour Skills 
(Production s'lops, en,~I:inePrlnu industrv April 1932) 
Taole A) • .UIV 
~ 
~,_ . ~· , 
Proportion of machines manned by workers Lo Average I 
Ll!!gree of S OP.cialisa t ion of' erades: (per cent) grade --
I & II III & IV V & VI VII & VIII 
"-
Universal - Stage I 2q ,4 50 . 1 16.4 4 . 1 ),4 
I 
Stae;e II 4).2 44 .6 lO,J 1.9 J.O 
Stae:~ III 4l! . 1 46.2 3.) 1.4 2.9 
Stage IV )6 .9 52.2 7 . 1 J.8 J . l 
1'-,..rowly special~Stage v 5R ,J )6 .0 4 .5 1.2 2.7 
1111 "'achines 39 .4 46 .8 11 .4 1 2.4 J .1 
SnurcP:Oborudovanie , op cl t, vyp.4, p .47 . 
The relationship bet.reen the degree of autor:tation of mach1nPS and labour skills 
~as more complex; the ordinary single tool machine with power feed required the 
highest average skill level , and the simple machine w~thout power feed the lowest, 
even less than tliat requren by semi- automatic and automatic machines. The 
~chines to~ithout power feed were presumably very simple and useri for perl-orming 
highly oif~erentiated machlnin~ ooerqtions . However , the semi-automatic and 
automatic machines were hi ll'hly hhour saving because Wllike the simple Mchines 
~'1-)ev couln be oper!'lted on a !TIUl tiple-manning basis, i.e .one operator. working on 
t~o or more machines at a time . lhus only 4 per cent of the ordinary single-tool 
J 
I 
cac~ines were manned on this basis in April 19)2 , but a quarter of the semi-autos J 
r 
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(fron two to five or more h' mac lnes per worker) and half the ·automatics ,1 1'he 
rel~tionship between the -:lef2:ree of autom"'tion ~nd labour n skills is shown in the 
followin~t table : 
~ree of Automation of Machines and Labour Skills 
(orodnction shops , engineering industry , April 1932) 
'I able A) .XJ..V 
Proportion of machines manned by workers of 
Degree of Automation grades: (per cent) Average 
I u; II III & IV V & VI VII & VIII Grade 
Without power feed : 
singl e tool 49 .1 41.8 7.7 1.4 2.7 
multi-to >1 54 .6 31.9 ).0 0.5 2.4 
With power feed' 
sin.gle tool 33 .5 48.6 14. 5 3.4 J .J 
multi- tool 45.2 45.1 8. 5 1.2 2.9 
Semi -autorna tic 27 .9 6t.7 7.7 2.7 J .2 
Automatic J4 .9 49.9 13 .5 1.7 ) .1 
! 
I All machines 39 .4 46.8 11.4 2.4 ) . 1 
Source :Oborudovan ie, op cit , vyp .4, p . 50 . 
The average skill grade of workers mannln~ individu~l types of machines 
was provided in the census , giving a useful indication of the implications of 
dU'erent structures of types of machines for the skill requirements of various 
branches : 
Labour Skills and Individual T es of Machine Tools Table A) .XXVI 
machines in production shops , engineering ,April 1932) 
! .Very low skil l types 
Ordinary turret lathes 
Multi- spindle drilJln~ mcs . 
Threading mac~ines 
Single- spindle drillin~ mcs . 
l .Oborudovanie ,op cit , vyp .4 , p.50 • 
Average 
Grade 
2.4 
2.4 
2. 5 
2.6 
Percent mcs.manned 
by workers grades 
IV - VIII 
7.4 
8.2 
3.7 
12.9 
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Average Percent mcs.mannerl 
Grade 
Broaching machines 
Horizontal milling machines 
2. Avera~Z:e skill types 
Surface grinding mcs , ( vertic;~l) 
Single-spindle automatics 
~ult1 -spindle auot~atics 
Milling group (all) 
Plano-m1111n~ machines 
Multi- too] Jathes 
Vertical mil J 1n&J rnar;hines 
Shaoin8 machines 
3. Hi~Z:h skill tyoes 
Centre lathes - one tool 
Radial drUJ tng machines 
Grinding machines (all) 
Gear-cutting machines 
Universal milling machines 
Cylindrical grinding mcs. 
Slotting machines 
Vertical turning and tor in~ mcs, 
4 . Verv hiph skill t~ 
Tool and cutter grtndinp: machines 
Planing machine~ 
Boring machines 
Whe~l lathes 
Combined machines 
Average - alJ machines 
Source aOborudovanie ,oo cit ,vyp .4,pp .109-110. 
2.7 
2.'7 
2.8 
2.8 
2.9 
2.9 
'3 .0 
J .1 
) . J 
) .3 
J .4 
).4 
) .4 
) .5 
:J.5 
) .5 
3.5 
) .6 
J .B 
4.1 
4.2 
4,J 
4.9 
) . 1 
by ~orkers STades 
IV - VIII 
? .0 
15.5 
14 .9 
17.1 
15.7 
2) ,7 
21.4 
24 .2 
)6 .9 
)f> .9 
J8 .7 
42.6 
42.8 
)6 .0 
41.7 
45.5 
47.6 
49 .6 
58 .9 
52 .) 
6.1.6 
79.5 
75 .0 
28 .8 
The average skill levels of different branches are shown above(p. 472). The 
lo•e t skill branches were those posses ing a high proportion of progressive types 
of intermediate and high speclalisa tlon , and an above average share of sirlpler, 
r:on-power feod models and also semi-automatics an.; autol!latics . The branches 
10h1ch developed most vigorously during tha First Fi e-year Plan period tended 
to be t.hose characteri.seCl by a low or very lO\ol average skill level, usually of 
a lar~e-ser.1al or mass nature . 
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Apoendix Four 
A CO~lPARISON OF Tnu. SOVJET AND A!·IE..."!ICAN MACHThE TCOL srocKS 
There are major difficulties involved 1n comparing ~ the structures of the 
nachine tool stocks of different countri"'s . In the case .:· of the Sov let and American 
stocKs of the 19J0s slx main problems can be 1denti fied i three relating to the 
nature of the data available , and three of a more general methodolo~ical character . 
t.The ' American Machinist ' inventory , thE' only censu<> available for the USA , was 
COI'Ipiled on a sample basis and was therefore less comprehrnsive than the Soviet 
19)2 census which covered all er.terprises; 
2.The classificationsof br:lnches of 1ndustrv werf\ quite different , the Soviet 
census emnloying a much clearer and more rigorous sysLeo of clnseif1cat1on , which 
)rluded a distinction between tf)e bullcHng of complete machines (machine buildlng) 
and the production of ~~chinP. parts and SA~i-fabricates (other metal working)a 
) .The definition of l'lachine types ancl categories varied and lacK of infon::ation 
about the definitions employed in both cases makes nccurntc cocparlson impossible; 
4.For an accurate comparison adjustment ls needed to take account of ·the different 
branch structures of the engineP-ring industries of both counLrles1 
5. Any comparison of the Soviet and American stocks is rendered difficult by the 
different levels of sub- contracting aad provision of centralised services such 
as repairs , tool and fixture supr.ly, etc . In the case of the Soviet industry a 
~lder range of activities took nlace at the level of the enterprise, leading 
to a different, genera1Jy less progressive , stock structure , 
~ .One of the main determinants of thr structure of nachine tools ln thD stock ie the 
r le the ~eater the scale of outnut scale of production of enterprises ; as a u ~ r 
i type the more pro~esslve the stock structure. of homo~reaeous products of a lZ ven 
There is insufficient i.nformc:ttion on thE' comparative scale of engineering 
enterprises in dlffer.:ent branches in the Soviet Union and USA 1u the 1930s to 
determine the influence of this factor . 
Despite these formidable problems the American stock structure does ~vide 
a~al.·st which changes in the Soviet stock can oe very appror.imate yardstick ~ 
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c~sessed , and the results are of in ter+"'s+ in 
so far as the technology of the 
M:erican engineering industry was considered 
worthy of emulation by Soviet 1n.dustry . 
Fwrthermore , if any m 1· diff .a. or erences are revealed they may :plnpoln t asoects 
of the practice of Soviet machine tool choice deserving attentio~ as they may 
reflect responses to specific economic or technical circumstances of the period 
w question ,or more general systemic dif~ere~ces . 
From the point of view of comparabi] ity the American census of t93511s the 
!!lOst appropriate in so fa it · 1 · r as .tnc udes installations made dm'lng the 1929 
to 1932 peri od covered by the Soviet census d f an , urthermore , the branch and 
type cl assi fications employed are closer to thos~ '-= of th~ Soviet census than those 
employed in the 1930 American inventory 2 • The class ification of types adopted 
by the Soviet 191? census h3S been taken as most lt bl f su a e or comoarative purposes 
Md the American da t a adjusted ac :ordL'lgly . 3 
The main findings are shown in the tables , which provide a comparison between 
the Soviet and American stocks in th~ metal working industry as a whole and 1n 
~achine building alone ; in both cases an attempt has been made to adjust for 
differences of branch structures . 
l.Sup lement to Ameri can '1achinist ,Europea.n edition ,25 . 5. 1935. 
2.The overall stock structurPs revealed by the 19)0 and 1935 American censuses 
were , in fact , very similar , the only dif~erences of note betng small 
declinfE L'l the shares of .~rrinding machines and lathes , and small increases in the 
shares of boring and gear- cut ring mach lnes . 
1 .The fol lowing adjustments h~ve beon ~Ade to the A~erican categories: 
a .vertical borin~ machines ~emoved from ' borinv machines ' and added to lathes; 
b.broachine machines gro~pec with pla~ln~ , s~tng and slotting mac~incs for 
most pll!:"poses ; 
c . centerin~ machines removed from ' drilling machines' and added to 'other' group . 
d , honin~ , l~oping and cutting-off machines generally included in ' other' group 
unles~ spP.cifically sho~n seper~tely i 
e .' ~'loor ~rinders ' exclu'ef"} from ' ,n-L11ding r1achines '. Note , the grlndin~C machine 
grou~ in both censuse~ are tn~ most difficdlt to reconcile, the Amerlcan 
catep-ory ao'"'arently bc1 udi.ng a wider range of machines . The category ' floor 
grinder ' cannot be r conciled with any of the types included in the Sov!e~ 
census , btlt i t is possible that other types shown in the American census were 
also excl uded ,e .g .' di sc ' type machines . • 
f .all metal forming ~achines have been removed from the American stock.anc also 
polishing ,buf ing , pipe cutting and threading machines, shears , and •other' J 
machines . I 
In the case ofthe Soviet categortes the only adjustment nade when considering 
~hP metal working industry as a whole is the exclusion of the ' wood screw caking 
machines ' group (for machine bulldin~ only their share is so sm5ll that they 
have been retained and included in ' other' l'!aChines) . 
I 
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Table A4.I 
Comparison of the Soviet and American Machine Tool 3 tocks Buildinsr. and Metal WorkinG: - all Machine 
(per cent total stock) 
USA USSR 
Stock of 1935 Ad juste~ stcck1 Stock !:c . ts. installed a 
Under 10 under 10 1/19)4 1/29 - at ents. 
Type All yrs .old All yrs .old All 12/JJ f/undeJ : 1 29-4 32 
Lathes 20 .3 15 .5 22.0 16.9 )4.8 J0.8 25 .4 
Turret lathes 6 .0 5.8 5.9 6 . 0 6 .7 6 .2 
} 10 . 1 
Autos & s-as. 5 .1 7 .2 ) .9 5 .6 J .J 4 .2 
Drilling mcs . 21.0 23 .3 20 .0 20 . 8 19.? 20 .6 2) .6 
tilling "'ICS . 11.3 9 . 8 10.5 9 .4 10.0 9 .8 10.? 
Grinding rncs . 15. 3 18.6 15.1 19.4 9 .6 1J.5 14.5 
Gear-cutting m. 3.7 4.3 J .4 4 .J 1.4 1.7 J .O 
Boring mcs . 1..7 1.9 2.0 2 .4 0 .9 1.0 0 .6 
Planing mcs . 2 . 5 1.1 ) . 1 1.4 2 .1 1.5 
Shaping mcs . 3.2 2 .6 ) .? J .2 J .4 2.9 
5.0 
Slottinf.r mcs . 0 .? 0 .5 0 .8 0.6 1.1 0.6 
Broach in~ mcs. 0 .6 0 .6 0 . 5 0·.4 0.2 O.J J 
Threading mcs. 2 . 1 2 .8 2 .8 2 .9 J .O 2.6 1.9 
Cutting-off m. 4.9 5 . 0 5.5 5 .8 2 . 0 1.9 } 
Other mcs . 1.6 
5.2 
1.0 0 .8 0.9 1.8 2 .4 
All types 100.0 100 . 0 100 .0 100 .0 I 100.0 1QO.O 100.0 
t.Adjusted very approximately for the main structural dif£erences by re ovlng 
two branches from t~e American stock (the aircraft industry and the production 
of domestic apnliances) which do not aopear in the Soviet data, and reauc1ng 
the American motor industry stock by four fifths to bring its share 1n the 
total stock to that of the us:R in 19J2. 
2.New enterprises founded in the period January 1929 to April 19)2,plus a number 
of radically reconstructed factories,notably the Moscow ~0 vehicle factory . 
Data refer to the stock at these enterprises in Aprll 19)2 .• 
Source ; 
USA - calculated from ~rican machinist,European ed1tion ,supplecent ,25. 5·19J5. 
USSR - Stock of Jan .19J4- Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo,19J5,pp.82-8J . 
Installations ,1929 - 193) - calculated from Oborudovanie,oo c1t,vyp .2, 
op.20- 22. 6 ?actories founded 1929 -32 - cnlcula-ed ,~.,pp.17 -1?? . 
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Table A4.II -
Q91'1parison of the Soviet and fimerican Machine T~ol Stocks - liachine Buildine: 
f Comparable Branches1 II USS.:i All • a~hine Bulldtng , 4;'1932 
USA stock 1935 USSR All -
under tO stock 
mc .ts MCS .at ncs .at 
stock instld . ents . fd . ents .of All yrs.old 4/1932 4/1932 1929-32 
i 
1929-32 mass prd! 
lathes 20 . 5 15.8 17 . 5 36 . o 31.1 2) .6 2J .? 
Turret lathes 6.6 7 . 0 7.3 6.5 
Autos & s-as. 4.4 
9 . 1 10.5 11.0 
5 .5 3 .1 6 ,4 
Drilling mcs , 22 . 5 21.8 21.0 20 .6 23 . 5 24 .9 24 .9 
MUling mcs . 11.0 10.8 8 .8 9 . 5 9 .2 11.0 12 .0 
Grinding mcs , 14. 0 16 . 5 {.J 7.0 10 ,0 1J .3 10 .0 
Gear-cutting m. 3.2 3 .6 1 .3 1.6 2 .4 3 .8 2 .9 
Borine mcs . 2 . 2 2 .6 1.3 1.1 0 .8 0 .7 0 .6 
Planing rroup2 7.9 7 . 0 8 .2 7 . 1 5 .9 4.9 4 .7 
Threading mcs. 2 .6 J ,5 2 . 8 2 .8 2 .3 1.8 2 .9 
Other mcs . 5 .1 5.9 3.7 ) .9 4 .3 5 .0 5 .4 
All types 100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100 .0 100.0 100 .0 100 .0 
!.Twelve branches of the American stock havinc reasonably comparable equivalents 
in the Soviet census (fifteen branches according to the ~rviPt classification) . 
These branches (the production of automobiles ,agricul tural machinery ,rail 
equipment of all types, machine tools, prime movers , electric power equipment , 
construction industry equipment, fuel-ore in•lustry eqipment , food industry 
equipment , liftine: and transport lf!achinery , of ,..ice machinery, pW'lps and 
compressors , orintin~ and paoer mRchinery, and textile machinery) account for 
47 per cent of the Soviet MCMW stock of, 1932 and 56 per cent of the USA stock 
of 1935. Differences in branch structure havP- been el.l.minated by adjusting the 
American branch structure usin~ branch weights derived from the Soviet stock 
of April 1932. -
2.Planlng ,shaping , slotting and broaching machines • 
Source s 
~
USA - calculated from American mflchinist ,European edit ion, suo!'le!'lent ,25 . 5.1935. 
USSR - comparable branches - calculated from Oborudovanie ,op cit , vyp .2 , pp . 112- 11? 
all machine building - Sntsialisticheskoe strnite1'~,1935,p .74 . 
machines installed 1929 to April 1932 - Oborudovanie,vyp .2 ,p .)O . ~ 
machines at enterprises founded 1929 to April 1932- ibid .,pp.t76-1r7 . 
machines at enterurises with nass-flow production - Sotsialisticheskoe 
stroitel'stvo,1935,pp.34-85 . 
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From Table A4 .I it can be sepn that there were a number of quite substantial 
dif:erences between the American 1935 stock and that of the USSR in Janllai-y 1934. 
The main differences were of the type one would expect - a higher share of the 
less progressive types , notably or~inary lathes,slotting and threading machines, 
and a lower share of progressive types such as automatics and semi-autos,grinding 
machines , gear-cuttlnF machines and broaching machines,The lo~er proportion of 
~utomatics was compens~te~ by a relatively higher share of ordlnary turret lathes. 
But , if account is taken of the more recently installed Soviet machines a rather 
di~ferent picture emerges: in the years of the FLrst Five-year Plan the 3oviet 
stock conver~ed rapidly to the overall structure of the American stock, although 
it still lagged from the structure of American machinesinstalled ln the 1925-35 
period . This convergence is especially striking at new enterprises founded in 
the Plan period; the share of ordinary lathes is in this case close to the 
American (adjusted) proportion, and the most significant discrepancy is a much 
lower share of boring machines. A similar pattern emerges for the machine building 
branches alone . Comparison of comparable branches reveals a quite considraole 
difference between the Soviet 1932 stock structure and that of the USA in 1935 , 
a difference wnich is even more marked if only the yow1ger American machines are 
considered . The younger Soviet machines are, however , much closer in structure 
to those of the USA , esrPcial1y at new enteprises, this shift being closely 
linked with a transition to a higher level of seriality of productlon t the stock 
of machines at Soviet mass- flow production enteprises was not very dissimilar 
in structure from the American 1935 stock. Thus, in the First Five-year Plan 
Soviet industry made considerable progress in modernising the structure of its 
machine to~l stock in a direction similar to that taken by the American metal 
working industry , 
The maJi consistent differences between the Soviet and American stocks will 
now be examined in detail . They can be summarised as follows: 
a . a notably higher proportion of ordinary lathes; 
b . a somewhat lower proportion of automatic and semi-automatic lathes, but a 
cor:·espondingly higher proportion of non-automatic,turret lathes • 
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c .a consistently lower proportion of gr indin~t machi es; 
d ,a rather lower share of gear-cut ting machines 'not 60 \ marked at new enteprises) 1 
e.a consistently lower share of boring machines: 
~ .a slightly sma) ler proportion of plan tng: machines ; 
~.a smaller proportion of broaching machines; 
b.a consistently s~aller share of cuttln~-off ~chines , 
The most signi.f'ican t of these differences are d h a ., c .,e. an • ; differences which 
are to some extent tnt.erreJ a ted in so far as the lower st,are of PXinding machines , 
boring anti cutting-off "'.ac"lines was compensated by the higher share of ordinary 
lnthec , 
The relatively high proportion of lathes and low proportion of grinding 
li\ach1nes can be Axplained above all , we believe , by the nature of the materinl 
lnput • In the case of the American en~ tneer\.ng industry this 1nput. took the form 
of high-quality , accurate forgings , stampings and castings, and. rolled metal of 
a wide range of profiles . The accuracy of the semi-fabricates meant that rough 
aachin\ng of the type ~enerally performed on an ordinary lathe was redu~ed to 
a mitltmum and many parts could be directly machined on grinding type equipment, 
by-passing the traditional metal-cutting machines . In thP. Soviet. Union of the 19.)0s 
(and also today) the main input of semi-fabricates to""k the form of castings, a 
relatively small share fallinp: to starnpings and forgings , whlle rollerl oet.a.J. 
was produced in a very li~ted r~P'e of profiles . Further ore, the quality of 
castings tended to be lower than 1n the USA , the spoilage rate being ve~ high, 
and the castings had much greater all or.•anccs 1 th~ extra metal having to be removed 
by rough machining operations, primarily on ordinary lathes . Excessive and varlaule 
allo~ances were a pf'rslstent problem of the period caused partl,y by shortco::1ngs 
of foundry technolo~y, and partly by the syste.o of plan indicators w~ich assessed 
the performance of foundries tn terms of weight . The narrow range oP profiles of 
rolled metal , in part stemming from P.Xc~sstve specialisation of rollin~ mills during 
the Second Five- yea.r Plan period1 , meant that much exr.ra rowrh machining was 
r ulxed on !'!any 1 tems produced from rolled metal stock. 
1.3er> Granovskii. ,E .L. and r>1arkus , B. ,Ekonomika sots1.aU.stichesko1 oromyshle.'lllostt, 
K.,1940,pp .25? and 265 . 
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The poor quality of the castinus an~ ... ~oru . .t'n
0
us of th i d t 1 o u ~ e per o no on y led 
to an increase in the r ole of l athes , but generally inhibited the use of 
o-rogressive technology · ExamPles of this negative influence can be found in the 
~chine tool industry itself . At tht> ' Kr.t1snyl Proletarii' factory when the '.!)IP' 
lath€' was being assimilated it was found that progre~?sive methods of machining 
and special fixtures original 1 y selected had to be rejected or adapted in view 
of the 'ext:caordinar:y ' varlation in allowances on c~astings (from 5 to 15 ffi"l) .This 
variation made it impossible to correctly locate components in flxtures,e .g . for 
surfaces of a housing for gearboxes I. t ~1as intended to use a roughing grinder, 
but this han to be rejected in favour of a milling machine . 1 The inferior 
quality of castin,q:s and forgings aJ.so imposerl constraints on Soviet engineers 
buying progres~oive equiument in thP United States . 2 
While the ooor quality of the semi-fabricates was probably the pri~ry 
reason for the hypertroohy of thP. stock of lathes and the relatively small 
~rinding machine stock compared with the USA , an ad1itional factor influencing 
the role of grinders 1-1as certainly the lower quality delilands of the Soviet 
engineP.ring industry of the period . The quality of Soviet finish was not a prtmary 
concern except where necessary for technical reasons and this b1as was reinforced 
by the product strncture which was orientated pre~ominantly to the industrial 
or other productive consW'l.er , rather than the individual :final customer .Further;nre 
verv few machi nes had to meet more rigorous demands of export marKets . 
In considerin~ the share of ~rlndinv. machines in the Soviet stock , and also 
other pro~essive types , on~ cannot ignore the question of supply . The domestic 
pro uction of grinding machines , one of the most difficult types of machine 
to~l to build because high standards of precision are required, was not properly 
organised until the Second FivP- year Plan. Durint.!: the years of the F1.rst Plan 
almost all n-rindin$l; machines Here imported so that while the new, high-priority 
enterprises were probably quite well supplied , out other lowerpriority branchPs 
and enterprises probably had to find substitutes for grinding machines and other 
progressive types . Durinv. the Second and Third Five-year Plans the limited dooestic 
production almost certainly went predominantly to priority branches , notably the 
1 .Sii , 1933 ,No . 10 , P .9. 
I 
j 
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aircraft industrv, Innort possibilities at this tine were even ~ore linited t.han 
tiur1np: the First F ive-yen.r Flan , so the lathe-p.rind i..ng machine ir.lbalance was 
probably maintained,or even reinforced , tn ;any branches of the Soviet engineering 
industry dur1nr,; the 1910s . 
An additional factor leadL~~ to an inflation of the lathe stock was the fact 
that a relativelv small olace ~as occupied by specialised cuttin~-off machines 
{metal disc saws , banrl saws,abrasive disc cutters,etc . ) • Cutting-off operations 
had to performed on pene~al-purpose machtnes . Th1e bins can be explained firGtly 
by a desireto avoid special equioment which may not have been fully utilised, 
an~ secondly by sup~ly considerations• mPtal cutting disc saws were not buill 
1n the US .. iR untU the Second Five-year Plan and it is unllkely that foreU:n 
exchange was allocated for their importation 1n view of the ready availability 
of substitutes . 
The relatively smaller share of ~ear-cutting macQines can probably be explained 
by structural di~ferences - with the developnent of the notor industry and onchine 
o~l building dur1np, the First Five-year Plan h proportion rose sharp:y ,notnbly 
at new enterprises . ThA case of borinr machines is rl1fferent , however, and a 
comblnat111n of t.wo factors propably acconnted for the.l.r low share. ~"irst , bating 
achines tended to have a very high initial cost compared w1th other general-purpose 
cachinesP and , second , boring machines posed very high sKill dernands4 . Thus the 
lo'i propot'tion of boring l!la.Chines can probably be explainen 1n terms of capital 
saving , adjustment to the scarcity of skllled l2bour or,more plausibly, a 
combination of both factors . The same probably applied to planing machines . 
The relatively lower prooortion of automatics and semi-autos coulg have been 
a result of a nuober o~ factors • dif:terences inthe scale of proAuction and the 
sor1al~ of output , t~e high initial cost of t~e oachines ost of which ~ere 
i~port~d until the m1d-1930s , and th~ fact that h1gh skills were required for 
sett.1nQ; up the machines and their maintenance . 
2.This tact is noted by a former chief engineer of the GAZ factory - Bvli 
1ndustrial'ny1 1r. .,19?0,p.82 . 500 bl 
) .The average unit value of boring nachines 1n the April 1932 stock was 12 , ru e. 
compared with 2 630 rubles for sin~le-tool lathes and 1,117 rubles for vertic 1 
s1.ngle-spl.nd1 e drilling machines - Oborudovanle ,op c1t ,vyp.1 , pp.2-5 . 
4 .See Apnendlx J , p . 4q2 . 
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The main differences betwe=n the Soviet and A 1 t k -· mpr can s oc s were not sicply 
features of the develop~ent of the pre-War period , but. have persisted to 1;he 
present day . Comparison of the Soviet and American stocks of l962 and 1965 
::-espectively rf!veals the samP. larrc:er share of lathes, and smaller shares of grindi.r\j 
and cutting off machines , while the sll.frht difference in emphasis on turret anCJ 
automatic and se~i-autornatic lathes recains . Pal ' terovich, in presentL1g this 
co21parison , also stresses th~ determining infJ u~nce of the structure and quality 
of semi-fabrinates , coupJed with somewhat, lower quality standards for the finish 
of engineering products . 1 
The comparisons so far h~ve been of a Flobal type , but it is also of int.erest 
t.o exal!line two individu~l branches of great importance : the motor industry, the 
choice procedures of which have been cons.tdered , and the I!W.chlne tool industry 
ltself . It must be noted that t~e scale of the Soviet vehicle factories ,A}~O 
Md CAZ , while very large by il:uro,pean standards was not as great as that of major 
Anerlcan light car enteprises , and also that t."te Soviet factories were primarily 
devoted to the building of trucks , and activity which requires some;~hat heavier 
and larger machines and lower quality demands for surface finish , In the case of 
~he Soviet motor 1.ndustry stock there l.s a pesslbility of providing an indlcat.1on 
of the influence of adjusting the stock for differences in the extent of in-plan·t. 
repair , worker tr.ainl.ng and tool.makinR activitles , on the as umptton that most 
of these activities were organised as separate bPsis in the USA . Data are 
avnllable for the structure of equipment 1n the machining and assemoly shops only, 
an~ ~or the whole stock , for branches of en~ineprlng cbaractP~ised by the nas~-flow 
~uction of one or two iteMs: the automobile induGtry was n major conponent of 
this group~ Apol,lng the proportions obtained in this way to the Motor industry, 
!t is possible to calculate {very approxinately) the structure of the stock of 
t~ l'lain maoh'1.n1ng and nssembJy shops. The results are shown in the ta•ole •. gain, 
t.he the most ai,..n tf'tcant difference ls t,he lower share of g1.·1ndlng machines 1n the 
SI1Viet stock , compensated 1n part by a slightly higher sl:ura of mllllng machines . 
Ir. this case the nature of the product is probably the main determinant . The 
a~]e factor probably accounts for the rather lower proportion of autoaattcs end • I 
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semi-autos . This analysis sup:ge-ts th t t~ s "" • a ue av 1.et a utornobU e industry adopted 
· ,'"' latest :t.echnoloe-y of thP. Amer1.c;~rt 1.n :1 
Table A4 . III "us try almost. l' tthout any adaptation . 
The Structure of the l'lachlne :ool Stocks of t.he Soviet and American 
Automobile Industries 
L. T. A. D. M. G. GC . B. FSS .Br. T. o. 
USSR 4/1932 1? .8 -1 t.O- 28.1 11.6 1) .9 4 .2 0 ,6 -4 .?- L1 ? .0 
" " prodn .shoos* 1).9 -14 . 1- }1.3 1J .4 10 . '3 5.5 0 .7 2.5 1.) 5.5 
USA 1935 ll~ . 4 6 .6 10, () 25 . 5 10.9 16.,5 5.4 0 ,6 1.9 0.9 3.) 4.0 
IJSA 1935 me. ts, 
o!lder 10 yrs . old 11.9 4.9 12 .1 29 . 5 10.6 16.5 4.6 o.s 1.6 1.0 2.8 4 .0 
"'A pproxtma te 
Key - 1.- la t.hes ;A. - automatics and semi-autos; D.- drllll~ machtnes 1 t'l . - milling 
mach~nes ; G. - gr~dina machi~es : GC- gear-cutting machines; H. - borlnp 
machlnEs; ?SS- pJan~g , sh~ninp ?.n~ slottin rnachin~s: Br . - broaching machines; 
T . - threar1 ing mach\.nes ; 0 . - other types. 
Source : 
USA - calcul~ted fr.orn 1915 Inventory,oo cit. 
USSR - OborudoYanie . oo cit , vy~ .2, p .1l2- 117 . 
If ;:~,ccount could be taken oft.he scqle: •actor it 1s quite possiblEl that Soro.dn'o 
assertion in 1933 would bB proved correct. : "In general , by type and productivH;y 
of theii' equipmPnt our automobile factories are undoubtably at a hlP; her 1 evel 
than Am,.rlcan factories of a similar scale" .J This finding ts in line with that 
of Dodge for the tractor industry - American production technology was used w1 thout 
4 adaptati on , The significant feature of both t.hese new branches created in thA 
First Five-year Plan period was that. they were granted first priority and were 
equipned almost entirely with foreiltn machinery ; it seems reasonnble to assume 
ihat such a pure ' American' solution was not adopted 1n lower priority branches 
force~ to rely to a greater extent on domestically produced equipment . 
1.?al ' ter:lvich ,J .r . ,Planirov:mie potrebnosti v oborudovanH .~1. , 19'72, p . 127 • 
2.Cborudovanie,on cit .,vyp.2,pp .184-tA5:191-192. } .Z~Ind ., 17 . L33 · See also t.be comment by an American observer, .Carver, cited 
Ebove ,p. 
4 ,!)odge ,N. ,Trends 1n 1 ~bour nroductivitv in the Soviet tractor inaus_tn,darve.rd, 
19€0,Unpubllshed PhD thesis ,pp.415-4t6. 
I 
~ 
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The machine tool industry presents a rather different case in so !a~ as it 
10as less reliant on foreign equipment , and machine tool building is generally 
re.garded as one of the most highly skU led branches of engineering . In view of the 
high average scale of Sovioot machine tool en tepr1ses anri the lonP' production :runs 
one would expect a relatively progressive stock compared llith the Acer!.can 
lndustry ; but against this must be set the lo~er level of parts specialisation 
and greater role of in- pl::tnt toolmarl:ing , repalr and train.tn~ fncil1t1es. The machine 
tool tn<iust' 'Y is the onJy Soviet branch for ~:hich information on the stock at the 
enfl of the p~"ri<Y.I is avCt ilable . i t ''"' · ·J ,. "e • h · +' "' .... .. !: 0 153-. t : : k 
:iat. JG :o t ins' tdl t. nt1 :uu ~ lilw' IiJJd: q .. J ill'aGI' .W!zz, ii;i ' J , .- .;s . 
Table A4.IV 
The Structure of the ~1achtne Tools Stocks of the Soviet and American 
Machine Tool Industries 
L. TA . D. M. , G. GC . I .B . IPSSB. '1' • 
USSR 4/19)2 )3 .5 14.6 16 .1 11.) 8 .) 1.8 t.4 7.7 1.4 
USSR 1940 22 .0 16 .2 10 .9 11.0 9.8 6.5 . . . 
USA 1935 19 .5 9 ·7 12 .0 18. ) 19 .5 4.4 2.7 6.9 2 .6 
U3A mc . t .s under 
1'l yrs . old 18. 5 11.3 9.9 v:; . 2 24 .9 4.9 ) .8 4.) 2 . 2 
. no data 
0 . 
) .8 
. 
4.0 
4.0 
... lathes,autortat.ics ant1 seni-autos;PSSB.- planing fu - as p.492 except TA. - t11.rre"' 
shaning , slottin~ and b.roachL~~ machines . 
~· 
USSR - 1932 - Oborudov::tnte , op cit.. , vyp . 2 , pp . 1 12-ll? • 
1940 - Omarovskil ,or cit,p .67 . 
SA - calculated from 1935 Inventory • 00 cit . 
hi e is very marked 111 this case, The difference in the share of grinding m8.c n 5 
ot· mil l ing machines . The and there is also a significant divergence 1n the use 
d au~o~tics 1n the Soviet stock 
rela!.ively high proportion of turret lathes an " · • 
but also the fact that many fasters were 
~1 ~ part reflect scale differences , 
• A the high proportion of gear-cutting machines 
11 e by the factories themselves · -~"gain ' 
e not suoplied on a sub-contract 
lc 1940 probably ref1 ects thP. fact that gee.r:; wer • 
oac!11ne tool industry were adapted to 
~is. It is known that processes in tbe 
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;ake account of the lack of skilled workers , especially during the First Five-year 
Flan period . At the ' Krasnyi Proletarii ' factory, for exat!ple~ at the time of 
ass1Elilat1.ng the ' DIP ' lathe J hand scraping of surfaces had to be carrted out bec.ause 
the technology of surface grind ine; had .not been ~stered ( a case of the adoption 
of labour intensive methods not for reasons of capital sav inP. , but because 
skills were lacking) 
1
• At tbis factory the share of grinding m'lch1nes in the stock 
rose frorn 4-5 per cent in 1934 to 10 per cent by 1939 , and in 1938 all machine 
tool beds were fintshed on surface grintilng machines •rlthout further hand work, 
1ndtcat1ng that the techno1 ocry of .srr.lnding had hy then been m<Iste1.·ed . 2 Planing 
of beds was substituted for thP. more progres-:ive rnlll1np. because of the poor 
'l uallty of castin~s , but sp,.ci.al templates had to be used 1n order to reduce 
t"le skill required . BorinPt J'llachtne operations had to be deskUl P.d by provtslon 
of elaborate !':pecial fixtures and , tn fact I fixtures had to be made 1n order 
t.o deskill many components produced on a range of machlnes .J Thus , in the case 
of the machine tool inn us try , and prestll'lably also other branches of engineering 
JLI:lking products of a htP-"h technical level, capital had to be sustituted for 
scarce J a bour skill s . 
It has been argued elsewhere that the differences bet~een the Soviet and 
Aner1.can stocks can be expla in~d primarily in terms of an ef; ort ·to conserve 
4 
the -::0v 1_et engineering ltldustry. This , .1n Granick 
1 
s capital on the part of .... 
view , 1.s the main factor behind the la the-gr l.ndin~ machine imbalance 1 an~ 
ti Of borin~ machines ana automatics and also the lower relative oropor ons ,., 
s~ru.-automatics , A number of obje-ctions to this hypothesis can be put forward . 
h A ·can census ct\ to2or ies to bring ttten into First , Cranick does not a9just t. e mer~ -
t · . • his leads to nn exa.I'...,gerat.lon of the line with the Soviet type classifica ~on • .. 
of the lower share of boringllachlnes in the 
lathe-grinding mAchi1e imbalance and 
T.Fredpriyatie ,1933 ,No . 12 , pp . 1 0- 11 • 
2.01:'.arovskH , op cit , p ,170 • t. ditsll on cit p.24 . 
3 ·lli~ 1933 , 1Io . 10 , pp . 9-12tsee also Slavnve ra ' • 
~ .tranick , op cit , pp.t8)-t89 · 
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Soviet stock . Second , this apnroach is founded on the assW!lption that it is. 
possible to classify ind1v1dual types of machine tools as • capital conserving' 
~ 'relatively ~asteful of labour' from the character of tho machines themselves 
ll'ithout regard to the specific features of each nachine anci the conditions of its 
use . 'But whether a letthEl or a grinding machine, -f'or example, is capital sav1Jl8 
or otherwise depE-nds on sue~ factors as its degree of specialisation or o.uto~tion, 
t.'le nature oT' thP workni""CP, the required level of accuracy, the sc<~le of output. 
the uroductivi ty of the Machtne ( output per unit time), the level of ut.1llsat1on 
of th~ ~uipment , the possiblliLies of multiple manni.np ann shl.ft work,etc . Third. 
no acr.ou.fJt is taken o"' the question of t~r sKills rPquired to oper~te machines 
of 1ifferent types 1 but t:.hA fact that the underrepresented types were ~renerally 
those requiring above averat?;e skills suggests that such a.n undifferentiated 
approach to labour is inadequate. Examples cited above prov1de evidence that 1.n 
soo.e cases capital was substituted ·f'or skilled labour J in the machine tool 
industry this appears to have been quite a general phenomenon . 
On the question of the lathe-grindin~ machine imbalance Cranick does admit 
that structural factors may have hao some :influence , buL beJ ieves that capital 
~ving was the prifllary determ ina."lt. He cons i.ders that the relatively high sh!.l.re 
o" lathes ml!y have beP,n tnfluence-1 by the feel:. that C"i stinp:s werr.l more ~~:i'Jely 
osed than in thP USA , ~nd that lower quality standards r:ay have dio1n1shed the 
rol,.. of' !lrinrltng macht 1es . But thP interrelationshtp betwern the relative proportions 
of lathes and llrindtnsr machines is not taken into account (poor quality sem1-
f' a~i ....... _-ctly roUP:_h and fine vrou."lti), and fab!'icates bein~ rough turned instead o """-"" r.-
h Of Semi- fabr"cates .is overlooked. It was not just t, e influence of thP. q uall ty •·· "' 
h Castinas were used, but also that all material inputs t " case tha. t relatively more :;; 
lar~rer allowances tluln usual 1n the lJSA . Therefore, ve;re of a lower quality 1 wit.h ~ 
h.thes were not simply substituted for other types ' but more lathes were enploynd 
have been nP.cessary , i.e . this deep rooted 
ln absolute terms than would otherwise 
d t"le ~ct control of individual 
stnctural 1nfJ uence , freauently beyon, 
enterorises 
- I 
Capital and labour at the level of the entperise , was wasteful of both 
a:td probab]v for the industry as a whole • 
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Finally , Granick does not 'ake ff · ... · su iciPnt ~ccount of the supply aspt':ct., both 
in terms of the abtlit.y of th~~ domestic indust.ry to meet the deoand for the core 
coll!plex types and the ability of the various branches of engineering to obtain 
inoorted equipment · 'I'he minimisation of foreill.n exchange outlays was probably 
a ~uch 1'\ore powerful determinant of machine to'"'l choice than any strivL'lg to 
coaser~e capital in ~eneral . In conclusion , we b"'lleve that Granick overstates 
the case f or the in fluence of c~pital savinf!: considerations on the choice of 
MChine tool technolofly • 1 he observed d tfferences in t.h"' Soviet and American 
cachine tool stocks can be best PXplal.ned 1n terms of structural differer.ces , 
the neP.d to adjust for the scarcity of skilled machine tool operators , and 
supply factors • 
The most stri kinp: fact about the Soviet. and American machine to,.l stocKs 
of the early 1930s i s t hat 1 disregard in~ the lathe-grind i.ng maeh1.ile iJnbalance, 
n rapid process of ca tchlng up was taking place . The structure of the l!lachines 
installed durin~ the First Five- year Plan and, in part-icular, of those installed 
at new enteprises was very simil~r to that. of the American stock showing that 
the Soviet engineering- tnrlustry had ~one f::tr in adopti.nP: the ln.t13st,most advanced 
capitalist technology . Hore definite conclusions can at be reached without 
analysis of two important factors , lnfor:netion on whtch is inadequate' the l.nfluence 
of scale differences , and of different levels of process and p.1rts speci"!J.1sat1on . 
Both these factors may have fl'iven rise to a oias against the aore specialised 
types of machine tools . Finally , it would b~ of great iflterest to col!lpare the 
3oviet stock with tha.t of Germany or Britain , but unfortu.."'ately suitable 
information is not available . 
J 
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Appendix Five 
KILITARY PRODUCTION AND THE DEMAND FOR HACHINE TOOLS 
Any niscussion of the choice of machine tool technology during the years 
of of the pre-War five-year plans is incomplete without consideration of the 
t~fluence of the demands of military production. So long as the Soviet Union 
with its relatively weak economic base was the sole socialist country flanked 
to west and east by powerful capitalist states, the possibility of armed 
intervention was ever-present , necessitating the formation and maintllnance of -
a military capacity large in relation to the economic streng'bh of the country . 
The build up of military production , which effectively began from the beg1.nning 
of the First Five-year Plan in 1929-30 , exerted a profound influence on the 
industrial development of the nation ; an influence which intensified 1n the 
course of the decade. Not onl v did this acquisition of a powerful military 
~apacity require the development of specialised branches producing aircraft, 
hnks , artillery, small arms, ammunition, ships .:ind other war supnlies, but it 
also involved branches of civilian industry , notably engine ... ring. This 
tnterpenetration of the military and civilian , and its implications, has to 
a large extent been negJ ected in sturl.ies of tf-}e Sov let economy of the 1930s. 
In this section an attempt is made to analyse the impact of military considerations 
on the engineering industry and its technology • 
There are two components of this question or the impact of military demands 
on machine tool technology: first , what were the requirements of the specialised 
defence industry enterprises and, second, what impact did military considerations 
, 1ert on the technology of the civilian sector? The former question can best 
be 
u in branch of military production and its 
tackled by sep¥-ely examining each rna 
f eral points can be made . First, ln the specific requirements, but a number o. gen 
military bran
ches is to provide the maximum possible 
~vent of war the role of 
_ cost and profitability are secondary 
output in the shortest possible time 
considerations although by unimp
ortant .Second , most branches of military 
no means 
.Production experience regul ~r changes of product 
and often imposed by innovations of the opposins; 
sometines of a radical natur e 
military forces . Third , military 
producti on under conditions of' war must be so equipped as to permit the employment 
of manpo,.:er not normally engaged in the engineering industry in oeaceti.me , e .g , 
~skilled female workers , young workers and other people with no previous 
experience of factory employment. At the same time the conditions of war provine 
Httle opportunity for proper training of new skil ed workers and also technical 
and ~~erial personnel . This situation of scarcity of skilled workers lD.ay develop 
into an acute scarcity of workers of all kinds. Finally, the production technology 
11ust be such that the scale of pro-iuction can be very rapidly increased at 
short notice if necessary . These demands are to a certain extent contradictory 
and their technical satisfaction presents considerable difficulties. Summarising 
the above demands , machine tools in t~e mil i.tary branches must ensure high 
~oductivity , but also a large degree of flexibility, must be suited to operation 
by workers of very limited skills and pos·~ibly of belo"' average physical strength, 
and at the same time should be quite simple to build. 
The aircraft industry 
There is no doubt tl1-"lt of all the branches of military procluction the 
aircraft industry exerted the greatest influence on machine tool building in 
the decade before the war. The rapid creation of a modern aircraft industry 
was probably tf'le most outstanding technical achievement of the Soviet economy 
1n th~ period of raoid industrialisation. Output of aircraft increaseri from 
!399 units in !930 to 1,734 in 1932, jumnine- to 2,952 units 1.n 1933 and reaching 
4,4)5 units by 1937 . 1 Expansion durinq t"le Tf'lird Five-year Plan period was 
~rticularly intense and , despite a major renewal of mo~els from 1939, output 
2 Th potential for r~pioly increasL~g output 
rose to 8 , 311 units in 1940 • e 
t. ut 1n 1942 rose to 22,768 units even 
in the event of War was considerable: ou P 
d to the east in 1941 ,J The 5ost machine tool though many factories were ev,cua~e 
the building of aeroenglnes, an activity 
tntensive sector of the industry was 
- 42 V 1 1 l'l. ,197J ,p .214;1937 only -t.Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voiny, 1939-19 ' 0 • ' 
Klyuev ,s .v . t11fy 1 pravda ,L.,1969,P·~ · 44 
2,Velikaya ot;chestveonaya voin::!,M ., 19? rP •1 i_ uroki velikoi otec~estvennoi volny, ~~ .Deborin ,G .A. and Tel ' pukhovskii.B .s .,I~~f ut 1n Cxermany amounted to 8,295 units 
M • ' 1970 ' p . 184 .For com pari son,~a~i~r;!:c~r!a~f£tL£f!:_P_s~t~r~a~t~e::!:rz~1~c:_.::b::::o=m..=.b-=in;.;;;rz~o_n_the Geri!Wl liar 
1n 1939 and 15,5'56 in 1942 - !he effect 0 
econom~ ,1945,p.2?7. 
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vhloh involved a nWII.bAr of very large enterprises , notably those of Perm (•iolotov) , 
.. ybinsk , f~oscow, Zaporozh ' e anrl Voronezh. At the end of the First Five-vear Plan 
. -r1o-f aeroplanes werP bull t at seven factories~ but by 1939 there were at least 
18 aircraft butldinv enterprises, whtle a Central '"'01!1.'!11ttee decree of September 
1039 provided for the construction of a further nine , three to be completed 
by June 1941~ From about 1937 enterprises of other branches of engi eering were 
sw~tched to thP aircraft tndustry , including a combine harvester building factory 
transfered in that year tJ by the end of 1940 over sixty factories had been 
4 
switc~ed to the making of aviation products . The total size of the mac~ine tool 
•ock of the branch is not known , but according to Shakl1urin, n former Narl\.oc 
of the industry , there were tans of factories by the •ar with 5-6 , 000 units of 
equipment each, and emplovin~ tens of thousands of workers5 , while another 
authori ty states that the aviation industry then h:'ld many tens of thousands of 
6 euu cut ing machine tools and hundreds of thousands of ~orkers and specialists. 
This suggest that the branch had at least. 50 , 000 machine tools Md possibly 
al' !llany as 100, 000 - a vast quanti ty tf one considers that the total Soviet 
r.etal cutting machine tool stock in tlovember 1940 was 710,000 units , and that 
the tractor industry, which developed so tntensivel~ during the First Five-ycnr 
Plan per1od1 had less than 10 , 000 
machine tool~ at the 9nn of 19JJ ,7 It is 
claimed that 1n the last 18 months bo two years before the outbreak of ar both 
th~ total factory area and t,e quantity of equipm~nt 1n the aviation industry 
~lmost doubled . 8 
The pre-War Soviet aircraft industry was a branch of large-scale production , 
coabini.ng sectors of' individual and sl:!lal1. serial production with large serial 
Of Planes and engines . In this respect it was and mass output of basic mociels 
T industries of other countries , which at this time 1n advance of the a1rcaft 
" 
h sndividual and small serial pro iuct1on type. The aacb1ne were predominantly of t e .L 
t SS do 1918 goda,r-t. ,1969,p.420. ' .s~vrov ,V .B., Ist.oriy~ konstrukts11 Sa.J!\!;!O~l:!:.:e~o~v:........:V~:.:::.:::.;_=._;~:...:..::;,_o;.,=;;.;. 
2.Vo ros 1stor1i ,1Q74,No .2 , p . 83 . f t ry a m~jor new enterprise of 
~ . 1b1d ., p .90 . This was probablv t~e Sar.ato~ ac 0 ed ,production of combines durinv 
the First Five- year Plan , wh'ich definite Y ceas ) 
the ' thirties - Rozenfel ' d and Kltmenko,oP cit , p. j20 • 
4 .ibi1 ., p.99 . 
S. ibid ., p.96 . S'~SR v .... odv velikoi otechestv'!!nnoi voinv 1 1-1'14__i,H •• 
. Kravchenko ,G .,~E~kgo~n2om~Xik~a~~~~LJ~~~1-~!1~~~~~~~~~~~~.-~~ 
1970 , p.176 . 
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tool requirements of the plane-making sector of the branch differed froa those 
of engine building • The former relied heav lly on universal type equipment; the 
ll!ltversality being needed to acr.omodato frequent design changes. The largest 
£roup of machine tools in the plane-making stock tn mid 1935 was turre~ lathes of 
all types, in particular small machines of up to )'3 am d 1ameter .1 Automatics 
~ere used for making fastners , but these were ma inl v of th~ single spindle ,, . 
'iiJciex• type possessing a quite high degree of universality (the first Soviet 
built automatics were of this tvpe) . But ordinary lathes t 'DIP ' and ' Udmurt ' ) 
w•re also widelv employed even in shops of serial and mass producti.on . 'l'he 
second lar~rest group was l'lilling machines of Rll kinds of small and medium sl~es; 
by cid- 1935 these were mainly of Soviet production . Drilling machines , predom1nantl 
of the sinYle- spindle , verttc2l type, formed the third largest. group . Few 
~rinnina: machines , apart frol'l toolroom types , were used at this time . Chaussk11 
Ln describing the i.nd ustry' s rn'lchine too] stock noted a tendency on the part 
of factory workers to 'over insure' , 1 . e . to have uni verse.l type MChines in 
all cases not only to provide for plane design changes, but also to cover 
ahortco~ings 1n the planning of technological processes & this factor must have 
played a role throughout the engineering tndust y at this time . 
The aero- engine factories had a quite different stock of machines, both 
1n terms of quantity and qu~lity . Universal macl'ltnes were employed, out specialised 
and special model 5 occupied a large place , e .g . mul~'i\-splndle drilling mch1nes, 
nit-construction tvpe mRchines , c~mshaft and crankshaft grinding machines , and 
diamond- boring 111~crines . High-productivtty versions of more Wliversal machines 
lnaludeo ' Fay ' type semi-automatic Jathes , Bullard vertlcal,six-spinq}e lathes 
n-1 gear-cutting machines of all tvpes required in la.r...:P number for making 
~1uct1on gearing . But, unlike most other branches of the Soviet eM!,_ineerln£ 
~iustry at this time, a large proportion of the stock took the form of grinding 
!Chines . Thus the aero- eng lne industry posed a large demand for high-productivity 
1 
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.ac~ine tools of high standards of accuracy . 
What influence did the a~tion inriustry exert on the development of the 
Soviet machine tool industry? The speci-"ic demands of the orancl'} were reco gnised 
~rom an earlY cl~te. Zazar , writing in 1932, observed that the aviation industry 
• 1 n have a large 1,1resented unusually complex denands because mac ... ines h"'d to 
'lroductive ranp:e adaptable to a variety of types of a given part, while at the 
S"Eie time high productiv't. ty was desirable "- i f t ~l v ew o he scale of production. 
The dif "erence bet-ween the demands of the mass nroduction motor in · us try and 
t'le aviation branch was stressed: the specialisation of machines appropriate 
to the former was unacceptable in the latter. Thus at a time when some specialists 
were putting forward the demancl for a much p:reater deeree of specialisation of 
"lachine tools built by the domestic in0ustry, the aircraft building branch 1o:as 
calling for flexibility. It is evident that the aircraft industry did play a 
~ajor role in determining the direction of development of th m~chi1e t ool 
industry • Writing in 1935, Rinberg stated that ,"The demands of the aviation 
industry on other branches were so great that they exerted a decisive influence 
on the pro~ile and development of a whole ran~e of branches of production ~ferrous 
and non- ferrous metallurgy , machine tool building, electrical engineering ,etc.) . 
t)us , for example, in drawing up the F'\.ve- ye::tr Plan for machine tool building 
the aviation industry part tall v dictated to it technical demands, 1.ntr oduc1ng 
into the plan about 200 types and sizes of machine tools, replactng machines 
hitherto imported" • 2 Thus the tipazh dr::~wn up tn 193'3 and refined in the 
following year was to a considerable degree shaped by the demands of the aircraf t 
in'iustry . This was indirectly confirmed by E ,Levin of ENII'\S at the first All-Union 
C:onference of July 1933,when he revealed that after the NK'l'P order on renovi.ng 
achines from the import list stankoob"edinenie had discussed requirements with 
a number of large- scale machine users - the first listed beitlg the aircraft 
trust) 2 The difficcl~y 
industry glavk 
(the secon~ was the Al1-Union &un-Arsenal 
tn tracing the 
inrluPnce of the a~tion tn~u~try (and other military related 
that open reference to it was rarely made: in tbe press J 
tekhnicheskikh sdvigakh vo vtoroi pvatiletke,K. ,19J2,pp. j sectors) lies in the ract 
1.Za'Ziar , V .A. in K voprosu 
153-154. ~ 2 .Steno~rarnMy ,op cit , p . 90 . 
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the 'auto- tractor ' industry was frequently used as an umbrella term , which in 
fact covered the aviation industry as well . It a '"!pears that a compromise was 
reached between the demands of these major branches . Early 1n 1935 M.Kaganovich 
reported that a tipazh of 250 types and sizes had been drawn up for the aircraft 
wdustry , the types being unified with those to oe built for t he auto-tractor 
branch .1 This solution may well have forced the motor innustry to accept 
aachines of a less specialised type than it desired. 
The specialised machine tool industry and the main ' planned' enterprises 
were not the sole source of supply for the aircraft industry - it was itself 
a machine tonl builder , meeting part of its demand, notAbly for special machines, 
from its own resources . The branch had its own machine tool building factory 
attachen to the Moscow No . 25 aeropl~ne works. This small factory, founded in 1931 
for the produ~'tion of special machine tools anrl fixtures for the aero-engine 
2 factories , ts repnrted to have been welJ equipped • Hachine tools were also 
built in t~e repair shops of aircraft factories and at a number of FZU schools 
and branch technicwns; notable was the school FZU of the 'Aviapribor ' works, 
which built about 600 machines in 1934 and 1935, mainly bench-type lathes fo r 
precision work .3 The Aviatekhnikwny of the Taganrog,Rybinsk and Voronezh 
fact~ries built a range of types, includin~ shaping, drill ing and tool grindtng 
~achines , and lathes .4 Many machines were supplied by the machine tool factory 
of TsiT, its highly adaptable unit-construction models being particularly 
well - suited to t~e industry ' s reouirements, ann at the end of 1940 the institute 
was united with the ' Orgaviaprom' trust ,Turther strenghtenin~ its links with the 
branch . 5 
Writing in 1935 Chausskii claimed that by then t~e aircraft industry had 
oeen frePd from foreign dependence with re~ard to machi~e toolsl t he growth of 
1 with Soviet-built nachines . Exceptions t'1e stock was being secured predomin:=~nt Y 
Special types not yet as ~t ilated by ~he were large universal machines anri 
Cle~r that the vast expansion prograc~e of domestic industry. However , it is 
l .flanovoe khozyaistvo,19J5,No .3,
6
P
6
.J6 • 1 om shlennost ' ,1935.No .6 ,p.31. Z.Stenogrammy, op cit,pp .?8 and 1 • ; Av aur Y · -----
) .Zaind . ,23 . 11 .35 . 
4.Price lists and catalo~lleS of various years . 
) .Tsi T i ego metody NCT ,M.,1970,p. 54 · J 
' 
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the immediate pre-"B.r period did require the importation of cachin" tools on a 
substantial scale , not so much because the domestic industry was incapable of 
bmld~ them , but because it was overstretched an~ delivery times would have 
been excessively l ong . In June 1939,when the dedSion to build new engine factories 
was taken , 31 mil] ion ru -lee val uta was allocated for. the purchase of foreign 
eoulpment , while in beDtembPr of the same year plans for the construction of 
new plane works leo to the al]ocqtion of a further 14 million ruoles. 1 Frorn 
early 1939 a vigorous campaign for the modernisation of thP aircraft industry's 
production tech 1ology was inl tiR- ted. Conve;1erisa tlon and flow organisation 
were expanded , and the use of spPc ial and specialised machinesa increased ; lathes 
and tcrret lathes were reolP.ced by automatics, and the use of such progressive 
technology as centreless grinders , broachinP:, honing, l~pping ,gear shav1nr.; and 
diamond bor ing was stepped up . 2 The gre~t stres on high pr~uctivtty 
equipment of these types tn the machine tool industry ' s plans from 1939 must 
have been in part a resf'onse to the de •'1:1nds of thn aircraft industry . 
Summarising the tn~Juence of the aircraft industry on the machine tool 
buildi ng in the pre-"ar perion it c.'ln only be concluded that tt was considerable 
an:i an tmportant factor in the drive for the domestic production of prot;rcssive 
tyoes . At th~ S'lme time the branch posed a large demand for such UitiverBal types 
as millin~ machines and tur~·et lathes - significantly the 'basic products of 
t~.e two new m:?.chine tool factories of the First F'tve-yen: Plan . The aero-env.i.ne 
br · of grln:iln--: machines and , in view of t.h lln!te:! anch was probably the m~Jor user . -
dot'lestic production of precision grin " inP: equipment. during the period ,it is 
branches 
quite p~ssible t hat aero- engine building effectively starved other lower pr1ority I 
of these machi res . Because of t heir lower prior ity t "lese other branches were 
m ... chlnery . Tbls f'l::tY be an important. factor presumably unable to import much a 
~ acaountinv for the relatively low s hare of grinders in t~e stock of most 
~. igh o.uality requirements of tneal-~raft 
·oranc"les at tl-tis time . In gener::~l thP :J 
1n 1nstcy mufit have exerted ;a oosi t tve 0 !1 
thP_ machine tool oranch • influence 
refinerl nethods or work · 
forcing; t t to raise 1 ts standards anrl a-t opt more 
\. -
l.!Qprosy tstor:U , I9?4 ,No .2 , pp . 8)- 134. .co i..ndustry ,Chapel H111 ,195.5, PP ·162- t68. j 
2.See Tsonev ,V. ~tal .,ThP Soviet a.i.rcra ... t - ~ 
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I~ s ~llery , fll~ll Arms and Ammunition 
The production of artill P r-v , small ar"'s v "' an~ ammunition required a large 
nachltle tool stock and appe1rs to h1ve been carried out at 1 11 d t 1 spec a se en erpr ses, 
aany dattn~r from before the tevolution . A b num Pr of the leading factories of 
t~is branch of the defence i.n1ustry had machine tool buildine; shops which made 
a substantial contribution to the development of machine tool building L~ the 
USSR . Notable amonP" t11ese were the Tula , Izhevsk , tm.Kal1.n1na (LenL'lgrad) ,Lugansk 
!io,60 , tm.Frunze (Penza) , im.Volodarskogo (Ul ' yanovsk) and Podol'sk No . 17 
~~ctories. These enterprises bull t a ·..r\rle rPnge of un ivers:'ll, specialised, 
special , and precision machines , "!any of which were installed 1.n civillan branches 
o! the engineering in~ust-ry. These enterpr\ses presumably built highly special 
tvpes specific to the milnitions i ndustry - this was certa1nly the case at Tula 
which had a very lon~ tr~dition of special machine tool building dating back to 
the eighteenth century. 
The basic types of machines installed at the gtm and small arms factortes 
were presunably, following foreign practice, general purpose models supplemented 
by special an1 specialised equipment, notably for boring ~un ba~ls. The 
'Krasnyi Proletarii ' factory built neep drilling m~chines and long-bedded latheD 
of the types used 1n art111ery pr.oriuction from the middl~ of the Second !"tve-year 
Plan periori, and many special heavy machines for e:un barrel turning , borinQ:. and 
rifltnq were prooucen in thP Third Plan period. 1 But despite the efforts of 
the domestic industry not a11 needs could be met and in t..he two-1-hree years 
·oPfore the Wrtr a large quantity of special equipment for the artillery and gun 
industry under NKV was imported . At this time (19397) the Party eentral Com~ittee 
and SNK USSR allocated about 200 million gold rubles to NKV for additional 
2 
1.aports of special machine tools and other equip:nent • 
During the First World War the production of ai'IUilunltion had 
been lare;ely 
machines suitable for manning by 
~ied out using simple, general-purpose 
1 .Price lists of various years . 
2,V.,orosy istor11, 1969 ,No . t , p . 1)1 . 
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~skilled workers. The basic types of ~achines employed 1nthe industry were 
slaple general- purposP. J a thes and also thread "'illi.ng 
PI machines 1 both t~ese types 
were were bu11 t by the tm .'.tslt f'iash tnostroen iya factory in Kuibyshev during the 
1930s. In the pre-War period. attention was devoted to the creation of s~pl1fied 
u:tlversal and specilll is<>rl operat · onaltype machines for munitions production. some 
bE'lng obtained by modern ising and modif/yi.ng the ex.istin~t stock of universal 
11achlnes. Lar~e numbers of simple operational lathes and ot'ler types l4ere 
1n fact built forthe branch during the ~"~ar itself, many by the enterprises of 
the munitions and mortars comnlssariats . 1 
Some time before the ~ar the German munitions industry began to turn away 
froa the use of simple standard machines , rep1Rc1ng them by a range of ne~ 
heavy-duty , single and multl-spinrlle semi-automatic and automatic lathes designed 
for very high proouctivity munitions production with workers of low skills . Unlike 
ost operational machin~s these new tvpes were designed for use with supe~-hard 
alloy tools . This move was promoted by cons11erations of labour ovallnbility , 
the new machines gi·'ing considerable sRvlnes , and also by the :fact. that they 
gave substantial savin/Ts in r~ctorv floo>· sp;lce cotcpared with the si.mple , 
ore~tional machines . This developl'!ent was fol 1 owed wHh interest 1n the Soviet 
Union and its benefits in terms ~~ raised Productivity and reduced labour 
sj{i.l] re'luirel!lents ~ere propagated in the techn1c'll press. 2 It seems probable 
that the very considerable eMphasis on the buildinv. of automatics and se~i-autos. 
fro:u 1939 was in part a response to these new poss1b1.11.tes 1n munitions production. 
But whlle progres in the use of both operatioMl and automatic types was 
~doubtablv made before the outbreak of War, the basic equ1p~ent of the munitions 
factories appears to hava been of the universal type. It is notable that the 
prol!linent engineer, Satel • , in a work published in 1943, refere to the prelioalnance 
of ~1versal tvpe equipment at enter~r.ises producing military products, and found 
it necessary to propagate the ~dvantnges of crP1ting operational and sicp11!ied ~ 
un 1versal machines .J I 
l~Aizenshtadt and Chikhachev~op cft.,pp.JJP- JJ4. 
2 .~shinostroitel~1939,No.a , pp . 11-18. Althouvh ostensibl! a~~!id:~t:;"t~;velop~enis 
thts article str6ngly suggests that Soviet engineers H-re • pp.45-46 . 
relat1 VP. ~eri ts of ·the ol c and new technology· r. inostroen 1 va. ,M. -Sver;Uovsk, 1943 • 
• Satel ' ,E . ,Tekhnolop:iya i tekhnicheskie resursv r.~as .. 
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Armoured Fighting Vehic les 
To a P::r eat er extent than in the other main branches of the defence industry 
tank and mill tar y vehicle production relied on the capacity of existing civilian 
enterprises ,rather than specially constructed new factories , The tank industry 
w~s basical ly a product of the First Five-year PJan z production rose from a ~ere 
1?0 tanks and light tanks (tankettes) in 1930 to 3,038 units 1n 19321, a high 
proport i on bein~ the small T-27 tankette . Output averaved about 3 , 100 units a 
year from 1935 to 1937~ but fel l somewhat in quantity terms durin~ the Third 
~lve-year Pl an pertod as t~e industry strived to intro~uce new , heavier models , 
notably t he T-34 and KV , Output in 1940 was 2 ,794 units , rising to 24 ,719 units 
in 1942 ,
3 
The main tank buildin~ factories before the War were the im ,Kirova 
(Putilov) wor ks in Leningrad (the pre- war base for the KV tank) , the Khar' kov 
locomotive works i m. Kominterna ~the pre-War base for work on the BT series and 
the T- 34) 1 and the Leningrad ' Bol ' shevik' factory . But it is clear that the 
three new t ract or factories were also intended to provide a base for tank buildlnE 
and that tanks ann artillery tractors were built at all three at times before 
tl)e War . 
Ther e are two as~ects to the tank building activity of the tractor factories . 
tlrst , the main production shops of the enterprises appear to have been deliberatley 
4 PTOjected with the possibility of switching to tank pro1uction 1n mind , This 
is aknowledged in t~e case o~ the Chelvabinsk factorv by Vannikov , later NarKom 
of armaments 1 who was in charR:e of the equipping of this works at. the time of 
its const ruction5 , and supported by ~estern specialists who wor~ed in the USSR .6 
Hence it is reasonable to assumethat the tractor factories were not sup~lied 
with as much very hi ghly specialised equiPment as they would nave been if intended 
soley for t r actor bui lding . Even in the initial stages of the work of these 
factories mil itary work was undertaken , e .g . the Khar ' kov factory failed to fulfil 
its 1932 plan for t r act ors because ~t was loaden with a large order for the 
l.I~toriy~ vtor oi Mir ovoi vo1ny ,1919-1945 , op cit, p .214 . 
2.Voprosy ekonomik1 11970 ,No . 51 p . 14. 
~ Deborin and Tel ' pukhovskii op cit , p.183 . For comparison pronuction of tanks in 
~ ·Ger~any (excl~in~ occupied territory) was 1 ,459 units in 1940 and 4 ,137 units 
lr. 1942 (The effects o~ strateg;ic bombing; .• , op cit l p .278) . J 
I 
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Khar' kov looonotive factory: en ordP.r which r~utred t he allocation of a major 
part of the enterprise' s equipment and technical skills. This major order was 
a~ost certainly assemblies for tanks built at he locomotive works.7 Second, 
t.ank building appears to have been carried out on a ""atrly regular basis at shops 
attached to the tractor factories , i . e, without disrupting the basic production , 8 
and this method probably provided a means of devising and vertflying techr.ological 
proces~es in prepar~tion for the conversion of the whol~ ~ork~. Both the 
~helyabinsk and dtnl1ngrad factories began build1n~ the KV and T- J4 tanks 
respectively in 10L~o.9 
The mac,ine tools required for t~nk building arc of the hea vy-duty ,general 
Purpose tvpes similar to those re~utred for ~aking rail tr~sport equipment. 
During the 1930s reference s to 'r~ll trans port nachlne bulldtn~ machine tools' 
Probablv covered the tank indust~-y as well . The building of these heavier 
types and of special equip~ent for r~ll transport was one of the weaker sectors 
of the domestic machine tool lnrlust.ry at least until the end of the Se cond Five-
year Plan, altho~h a tipazh of such machines was discus ed oy the Third 
OonferP.nce of Besigners in 1935. The sole producer appears to have been the 
Gor'kii ' Dvtga~el' hevolyutsii ' works, which bullt a range of special wheel 
and axle lathes . In the Second Five-year Plan l.t Wl'ls evidently the ltltenti.on 
to build heavy raU equipment machine to ls at th~ new Chelyabinsk heavy machin~ 
lool works t~en under construction . This enterprise is something of a mystery , 
I+ construction was initiated by a dec1s1.on of tbe Central Committee of 15th May 
19)0 which provlrled for the building of sixteen giant eng1.ne~r:1ng factories in 
tne ur~ls ,10 Work began in t9J1 an~ by early 19)5 its ~ool rooo started operr.tion, 
but the main machining and as~emoly shop was not COJ!lJllls loned wttil 1937 •11 In 
l9J5 its director , Kattel', explained that this vast factory, with a planned 
4 .In t"lis connPctlon it shoul::i be noted t• ,t at the t ime of planalng and constrocttor 
of thE'se factories tanlts ,.,ere p;ene""ally sf'laller ln size and l.l.g,hter than they 
became later in the decade so that the technical problems of rapid conversion 
were probably less demand~o:r in the efU'l v years than they actual 1y were just 
be-rore and during the 'War. 
5.Voproey istorii. , t969,l'lo .1,p. 1J3 . d t co sultant 'E Lowry observed in 19:39 
6 F'or eva111ple an American armaments in us ry n • • ' , t 
· that the Ch~lyabinsk and Sta.lingrad tractor tac1.ortes , 'could ?-i1&JJ.."':rl~c. fver o · ] t at the wink of an eye ' . In .Lowry 5f .. 'iie ua 
small tank prot:iuction • a !nOS • for the relative inefficiency 
~~fh:es~i~et~~ci~~ en;:g~~;t:sw~~m~a~~~0~1~8~~r1can equivalents(The iron ~e. 
5t.h Oct . , 1 QJ9 , pp)5-1f>) 
size of twice that of the neighbouring tractor factory , was t.o produce large 
mac~tne tools (440 a year of twenty types and sizes) and vital parts for rail 
transport machine building , including wagon axles, and roller bearings for rail 
1 
equipment . Machine tool building began on a small scale in 19J5 , and in 19)7 
tie first '1D64' l athe was built prior to its serial production in the follo~tng 
2 
yerr . Critical reports at this ttme pointed out that the factory should by 
t.ien have b~<?cor::e the bas~ for building verUcal turning and boring r::.achlnes 
and other equipment required by the rail transport industry) Machine tool 
4 building was carried out in the Third Five-year Plan years , but the primary 
activity of the enterPrise was probably , as a well-infor~ed American observer 
s~gests , the production of tanks or , at least, parts and as ernblies for tank 
build1ng . 5 This is supnorted by the fact that metallurgical capacity was added 
by 1941 and after the outbre~k of ~ar 1.n November 1941 a number of the shops of 
6 the works were separated ofr as a factory of transport machine building • and 
this may well have entered the Chelyabinsk 'Tankograd ' complex. Thus it is probable 
th~t the tank industry did have tts own machine tool building base in tbe Urals 
tefore and durin~ +.he War. 
The building of tank engines did require more specialised , high-productivity 
111achtnE' tonls . During the • thirties tank engines were "bull t by the Khar ' kov 
locomotive factory 1n 1 ts diesel: enp;ine shop and during the Secatd Five-year 
Plan a major new enterprise , the Khar ' kov diesel engine factory, was built 
alongside the locomotive works specifically for aakin~ tank diesel engines . 
Pro~uctton of this lsrge, modern factory began ln 1939, one of th oain products 
being the ' V-2 ' en~ine developed at the neighbouring works, which provided the 
basic power source of Soviet tanks of th~ orld •ar .
7 The Stalingrad tractor 
? .!Rtoriya khar'kovskogo traktorno2o zavoda ia .Ordzhonikidz~,Vol.lfK~:k~~ii~~~~ 
p.17) . se~ Sutton,op cit,Vo1 .2,pp.2)8-2J9 for furthP.r evi ence ° K 
at Khar'kov and StalingTad during the First Five-year Plan. - ( il er c 
8 A special tank bu1id1ng shop was under construction at Stoli~rad 1n 19;2 H g • • 
• 246)· t Chelvabinsk th1s activity 
The 1ncornoatible allies ,Ne York,195J,p. ' a ( ~ it p 24J) apparently occupied the factory technic"'l school Sutton ,on c • ; · 
9 .Kr~vchenko , op cit , p .74 . ;Letoois' chelvabins~o o traktorno o2~.,1~1'2,p.209· 
10.Sogr1n ,G.V.,Perellstvvaya stranitsv ,Chelyaoinsk,l • 
11 • .1£!£. ,pp.52 and 2)0 . 
1 .~ ... 3 .12 .)5 . 
2.Sogrin ,oo cit,pp.SJ-60 . 
J .Zalnd ., t4 . 5.37:29.6 .J7 • 
4.Sogrln,oo cit,p .S; . 
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factory also bull t tank diesel e~g1nes before the War . 8 In the early part of 
the War the Khar'kov diesel engine works, together with the Leningrad Kirov tank 
factory and parts ot other enterprises were evacuated to the Chelyabinsk tractor 
factory to form the ·~ankO?r3d' complex, the base for theproductlon of the'KV~9 
The Khar'kov locomotive factory was evacnatect to the vast wagon works of Nizhnii 
Tagil to form t~e Ur.~ls tank factorv No . 18J , the main base for building the 
'T-34'.10 
Military Production Rnd Civilian ~nterprises 
The specialised defence industries formed only part of the base for military 
production in the pre-"ar ye:'!rs . 'I here was cle-rly a major effort to organ1se 
arms production at the far'to ·ies of civ tlian machine bu1ld1118 and to prepare 
for a quick conver ion to such production in the event of war. As early as June 
1926 t~e Politbureau stressed the necessity of providing for rapid conversion 
to military pro:iuction at new ann reconstructed factCTries of Glavmetan .
1 
Evidence on t~e extent to w~ich convertability was taken into account at new 
enterprises built nurtn&: the First Five-year Plan is not avaUable. In 19J2 
so~e enterprises were hastiJy switc~ed to t~e Production of military related 
proQucts , e .F..the Khar'kov f'artory , the \.m .Kirov;1 works tn Leningrad (t.he turbine 
~nd tractor buildin~ shops of which were s witched to makin~ tank parts and,later, 
full tank pro uction) ; the im .Dzer7.hinskorTo factory tn .Perm' was sw1.t..ched from 
the machine tool industry to defence production , and at about ~~is time part 
of the PodoJ ' sk sewing machine works appears to have been transfered to t~e 
defence 1~dustry . This action 1n response to the deteriorating situn~lon 1n 
the Far l!.ast , cou'!")led w lth the rise to power of Ritl·er 1n 193'3, must tmve mad e 
ease of convertab1.1 it.y a h l.v'Uy dPsirabl e feature of all new capacity fro:n this 
S.Scott,J. , Bevond the Urals ,London , 1941 , p , g9 , Scott claims thot ' Stankostroi' 
was orivL,ally con~eive~ as a light machine building plant but r~projected 
in t~e early ' thirties for tank pro~uction. 
~ .Sovrin , oo rtt,o .210 . 
? .1e~oois'che1yaDinskogo tr~ktorn~g2 , op c1t , p.225. 
B,Kravchenko,op Git , p.74. 
9.See S1obot1in , K.r.,Tank na oostamente ,M. ,t968,pp . J-2.5· e 1 lO.Likho~anov ,M. I , ,C'r!a.nizatorskaya raboh narti1 v oro~shlennost! ~?~~ 
oe~iod vel\koi oteche~tvennoi voiny . ,1941-42gs. ,L.19o9,pp .6) an • 
1 .In~ustrializats1va SS~,t926-1qzq,~. , t969,p . 509 . 
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time on . But it was dur~ ng th"' Third "' 
- ~ive-year Plan that the milltarisatlon of 
civllian engineering became a widesca 1 e ohenomenon . 
It is evident that f rom 
about 19)7 very many enterprises of' th~ htn 
m~c . e building industry were prepared 
for military nroduction or actu::tlly began such production , At enterprises of 
the tractor , agricultural machinery , machine to~"ls , ship butlriing and otner 
branches ' spectal shops ' were or£anised at wh lch the technology 
01 
the chosen 
military product was developed and checked , cadres prepared an1 ,1n many cases 
batch orod uction 1 started. Control ove ·mobilisation prepara tions was ln 
the hand; of the enterprise NKVD organisation , together with mllitary aides, 
and they had thP ri.vht to rearrang~ equipment and disrupt th~ n or mal flow of 
work of the enterocise in the interests of securintt rapid conversion , 2 .r r om 
about 1937 an tncreasin~ number of civilian factories were switched to t he defence 
industry , e.~ . some engine"'ri.ng enterprises were transf ered to th~> product.ion 
of artillery in 19)7 , and morP in 1 9)9- 41 • J 
The need to secure rapid converston of civilian factories to military 
production must have exerted an influence on the choice of machine tool technology 
and pro juction or~anisation . Nar~owlv spect~llsed types were clear l y inappropriate• 
adaptability was a primary requirement , but adaptability coupled with h~n 
productivity was presumably the best solution . It was aporeciated at. quite an 
early datP that the unit-construction principle offered great advantages in this 
respect . Vishnev , a lead'\.np.; Soviet expert of thE' capitalist war economy and 
technolop;y , wrote in 19)5 of the rejection of the principl.,.sof narrow specialisation 
and operational dif-ferentiation an~ t~e transition to new machines of the ~~it­
construction ty"C , combininv operations and providin£ fl~xibil t~y . These 
hi,hly productive but flexible machines , he wrote, had ~ eat significance for 
the def ence i ndustry ,which had to provide for fre 1uent product changes ' but , 
", .still more important is the fact that th~"" introduction of such machine tools 
~civilian industry (in particular ve'1icl~ buil ding) ~ill to an enormous degree 
4 
facUitate the task of converting to war production" . Significantly, tUtit-
of Soviet and estern sources - seD ~annikov , 
l .This i s confirmed 
6
by a n1umbe~~~ Khavin A F Kxatkli ocherk 1s~or1l 1ndustr1al1~ats11 vopro-y 1stor11 , 19 9 ,No . , p • .J,i • • '- ) ,.,. c;. .. t o t 
M., t962 ,p. (en~"Sineering ractor~s L11 the Urals rLO\oT)', he_!.E£n aR._!.u .. l . c • , 
1939,p.J5 ; Sutton , op cit, Vol . 2 , p .J • Th S viet secret police,I.ondon,1957,p.121 . 
2.Lowry , 1oc cit. ;Wolin,S and Slusser ,R. ,_e_._Q_. 
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construction type ~achines were chosen for oach1ntng a n~ber of basic components 
at the expanded and reconstructed auto-tractor factories 1n 1936 and 19)7. A large 
nUMber of unit-construction type machines were tn fact built for the defence 
industr1rsdur1np: thP War , their hi~h productivity perolttln&! the replaceaent of 
•~ny ~rrlinar.y machines and freein~ many skil l ed workers ; at the sane time new 
designs were evolved permittin~ th~ econo~ic application of unit-cons~ruction 
machines in serial , as oprosed to mass , proriuction . 5 But unit-construction type 
mach1nes were generally only suitable for m~ch1n1ng certaln b3stc components 
produced i n very large quantit~ . notably in en~tne bulldtng for nircraft . tanKs 
and other vehic) es . For other TJ:rrts and products the desi r e 'fo1· adaptabUlty 
probably reinforced the bias to universal type equipment already ,existing in 
the industry because of the circumstances of production at the enterprises 
and the limited domestic !>ro~uction of more specialised machines. 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the t'!emands of the defence industry exerted a strong 
influence on the SnviPt machine to~l butldin~ in thP pre-War years and that 
they helped to sh:pe the structure n.f" out. rut. an~ the pattern of machine choice 
in the enginePrin.P.: industry . The nr\ture of the demflnris was such that adaptabl.11 ty 
becRme a basic requir.eMent ; within the defence industry Ln order to allow for 
frequent desiBn c'1anges and in tl1e civilian branches for rapid conversion 
in the event of war . At the same t\me Soviet des 1.gn policy during the period 
always placed great stres on the need for s1mpl1c1 ty o f control of nachlnes 
an essential requirement for proouctlon in liar tine conditions, and during the 
illll"..edi.ate pre- ~r period automation was given high priority as a oeans of des!d.l ~ 1.ng 
•any tvpes of machines. 
The very rapid transition to military prCY.luctl.on achieved 
by many 5oviet engtneerin~ enteprises in the 1hit1al period of the ~ar indicates 
th~t th~ machine tool stock must have corresponded well to the new ~emands: 
Own factorie
s , for example, were ~lmost 1moei1ately 
machine tool industry ' s 
3._50 let vooru?.hennykh sil SSSR ,:. • • 1968, pp . 201 and 2~4 • 61 4 .~. ,9.9 . :35 ; seoo also Proble!'lY ekonomi~t419)6 , No. ,p. • 5.Atzenshtad t and Chikhachev ,op cl t , ,PO · '3J5 3 7 · 
the 
A5.16 512 
switched to making tan!< parts, shel] s and other items .1 In another respect the 
demands of such branches as ~ero-an~ine and diesel enginP building led to pressure 
for the domestic production of progressive types such as broaching machines, 
all types of ~inders, lapping and honin~ machines, diamond borln~ machines,etc. , 
while the very high quality standards for machining must have helped to raise 
the overall technical lev~l of th~ machine tool industry . 
Tl1e implications of military dem::t.nds .for Soviet machine tool building 
considered above are given suoport by the experience of the uSA durinl2' the war. 
Pre-War preparation was on a much sm~ller sc~le than in th~ USSH and much ~f 
the equ1ppin.v. of industry to r\eet war del'lands took place in the period 1942 to 
1945. As Wqgoner, the hi~tori~n of the American machine tool industry, observes, 
"u.,..int.r the ~Jar there was at least a p<trtlal suspens ion of the trend towards 
the specialisation of machinetools,and increased production of the more 
standardisen genera] purpose types. 2 He also notes a tendency for defence 
contractors to order ~eneral purpose equipment wlth all possible accessories 
even when sll'lpler machines 'I'Ould h":!.ve been adequate' this tendency to 'over 
insure' stemmed from a desire to provide for all possible future circumstanc~s 
of both new defence orders and subsequent peacetime production . The Soviet modern-
lsation ann automation campai~n of the Third Five-yP.n.r Plan perio<"l aimed at 
increasing · productivity and deskillin~ the eAistin~ stock is also interesting 
\n the light of American experience t~At, while oJder machines could be eMployed 
ro~ defence production, their oroductivlty~!Rferior anc thev required more 
1~bour of higher skills than newer machines,and for these reasons were not 
favoured . J 
Taking a broader view , the impact of mill tary demands on the mac,ine tool 
1n ~us try was clearl v not restricted to the question of technical choice . MUi·tary 
consicerations ~ust have been to th.e fore in the pressure for lmpor~ substitution 
1n the Second and Third Plan periods , forcing the inoustry to take on tasKs 
vl':lich could otherwise have waited until a firmer foundBtion had been established. 
l.Istoriya SSSR , 1971 ,No .6 ,p .97 • 
2. agoner , on cit , p .260. 
),lbid . ,pp . 2J6 and 2.60 . 
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Appendix Six 
A NOTE ON ' C.ONTINUOUS FLOW ' ORGANISATION IN THE ENGINE"ERn!C DlULSTtfX 
It has been argued by Granick1 that 1.n the First Five-year Plan period the 
Soviet eng1neer1n~ industry adopted R policy of *investing heavily• 1n continous 
flow organisation , with the result that 1n 1932 ·there wes • an amazing concentra1 
ion tn m~chine building as a whole on mass production and on continuous-flow 
arrangement of equipment" , whereas 1n 1929 mass production methods "were 
virtually non-existent in Soviet macl-)ine bu11d1nA:" •2 Continuous flow organisation 
he argues , was regarded as " a peculiarly Amerlcan technique of manufacture" . 'But , 
in Cran1ck ' s view, this investment in continuous flow organisation (more accurately 
1n large , new plants or~anised on a now basis) was a failurea "The Soviet 
effort to 1.ntroduce continuous now methods during the c3rly 19)0s .,as thoroughly 
1eplaced . It repr esented an atteMpt to push the metal-fabricating industry 
1nlo quite advanced production techniques while skipping over the historically 
normal 1ntermediatP stages . The results were ne~ative , and a retr eat to the 
establ1shment of necessary preconditions was imposed upon Soviet management" .J 
The 'retreat' , Granick believes , took the form of an abandonment of flow 
or~anisatlon in the 19)0s , altho~h he does concede th3t hls evidence for this 
ls only indirect . 
Space does not permit a detailed examination of this question , which is not 
of central il!lportance to the present work . However , so!!le comnents are felt to 
be necessary , both in general, .and in relation t.o the machine tool industry . 
1. Gr anick throughout employs the term 'continuous flow' production, a1 though 
1n Soviet usage of the period 'flow' production haa a broad meaning and 
encompassed non-continuous forMs not posl.ng such strict organisational and 
planning demands as the fully- fledged , rythmic, ooatinuous no~ form . The definition 
of • flow production • is discusse~ in the appended note . Here 1't should be noted 
that the definition of 'flow ' arran~ement employerl in the 1932 machl.ne to~l census 
(the source of Granick ' s evidP'lce on flow production) was a broad one . Finally, 
1n dlscussin.r flow prodttct1on distinction must be made ·oet.ween machining and 
t.Granick , og c1t , pp.24-27 ;110-115 :124- 125. 
2 .1 bid • , p . 2 • 
.) . 1bid·. , p.115. 
A6.2 514 
assembly processes, 
2. It is not strictly true to say that mass-production methods were virtually 
wtk."lown in Soviet machine building 1.n 1929 1 or that industry had no exper1.ence 
of flow orp:anisation • Before the Pirst worl1 1iar the only Russian enrrineering 
factory with masc:- flow (aase,:~bly) nroduction was the Podol' sk sewing r1achine 
works of the Sin~~r company , but during the War mass production machining methods 
were quite widely adopted for the producti on of shells and other military products , 1 
In the 1920s there was considerable interest in developing £low production in 
Soviet industry as a component of the rationalisation movement 1 which was 
lnspired to a great extent by the Germ~n experience of applying and adapting 
A~erican mass production techniques . Conveyerised assembly on a flow basis was 
introduced at the Khar ' kov ' Serp 1 Nolot ' agricultural machinery factory in 19262 
and by the time of the First rll- Union Conference on Continuous Flow Work in 
1928 there were quite a few enr.ineering enterprises of a number of branches 
which had introduced elements of flow work , primarily for assembly processes; 
ihese included the Podol ' sk sewing machine factory , the Tver'wagon factory , 
sP.veral enterprises of the Ukrtrestsel ' mash , and electric motor building worls, 
1ncl uding ' Elektrosila ' , 'Elektrik ' and the Khar ' kov electro- mechanical !actory .3 
Furthermore , continuous flo~ organisation was t~en envisaged for a number of new 
enterprises includin~ the Staltngrad tractor factory, Rostsel ' mashzavod , and 
the Lyubereisk combine factory . There is no doubt th<tt Ger.man technical assistance 
was received for organising flow production ,eg . ore of the wain reports at the 
conference in 11ay 1928 was presented by a Gernan expert attached t.o NK RKI (the 
organisation most prominent in promoting flow production at the time); Peppelmann, 
vho spoke on flow production abroad and 1n the USSH , put particular stress on 
th~ oossibilities offered by flow work for emplovlng ~orkers of relatively low 
6k1lls.4 The German s peci~l1st, Schlesinger, was a consultant at both the Putilov 
t-actor works and the AMO vehicle ~actory 
- two of the fir st to develop flow 
i 5 .At both these enterprises the machine tools production on a regular bas s . "' 
k flow
6 and this was a lso the case at the 'Elektrosila 
were Rrranged according to wor 
l .Rozenfel ' d and Kltmenko ,op cit , p . t26 ;The Russi an economist ,Vol . 1 ,~o .4 , July-
September , l9Zt,pp . tl53-1157i' hinostroeaiya SSSR v 1921- 1928gg ,~ishinev , 1962, 
2 .Makeenko , M .M • , 0 cherk razv it ya mas 
n 1 C..?. 
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f ctory . 7 The d f 
e ence industry enterprises appear to have oeen pioneers in this 
respect . As early 11s 1926 it was reported 'that the Tula and olestoretsk factories 
king guns, machine guns and revolvers, had shops specialised for the production 
of particular items with machine tools arranged according to the flow of work .8 
1hus by 1929 , draw1ng on German experience, the Soviet machine building 1ndu~try 
did have soae experience of flow organisation of both assenbly and nachining 
processes. The system offered thP possibility of re.is1ng productivity and reducing 
costs with lit.tJe Adrlttlonal capital outlay and with the further benefit that 
lhe associated dif"erent1ation of operatlons facUltated t.he Pmployc:ent of low 
skilled workers . 
), It is true that, as Granick observes, one fifth of the stock of nachine 
tools 1n the oroduct1on shops of onterprlses of the m ~hlne bu1ln1~ industry 
ln April 1932 were installP~ in a flow arrange~ent , 9and h t a relatively high 
1~\re of new machines installed in the years 1929 to April 1932 were arranged 
according to work flow (one ·third). Further~ore, over sixty percent of the 
chines installed in the production shops of new enterprises established 1n the 
1929 to April 1932 period were installed on a flow basis. However, th1s picture 
requires some quali fice.t1on . Forty five per. cent of t.he flow-arranged machines 
1n April 1932 were located at old enterprises , i.e . founded be"orc 1929, including 
1 ost forty per cent of the total at enterprises dating from before tbe kevolut1on. 
A 1 rve oroportion of these Qachin~"s must have been existing old models 
rearranged on 8 flow basis 1n the Soviet period. This ne~ds to be stressed because 
Cranick assorts that flow arranged machines w~e heavilv concentrated at new 
tO 
fftctories . 
In considering flow organisation 1n 1932 1t is es ntinl to look at the 
branch structure an aspect not examined by Gran1ck. As shown elsewhere, 
J,Sotsiallsticheskaya ratstonalizatslya v bor ' be s pofreryaml,op c1t,p.5); 
Rats1onal1zats1ya promyshlennosti SSSR ,M.,1928,p.29 • 
.Tor~ .-prom .gaz . ,24 .5 .29 . 
S. ibld .,)0 .8 . 28t Byll~dustr1al ' nye,M.,1?73,p . l52 . d sotsinlisticheskoi 
6 .-aeYskl1 , I . V. ,Eyazhela a om shlennost v erv e o Y 
1ndustrializatsi1 1 2 -1 2 ,M. , 1959,p.127; Direktor- I.A .Likhachev,~ .,197l,p.ll 
7 .Torg .-prom .~az .,2J . 5 . 28 • 
• Sistema 1 organ1zatsiya , 1926 ,No .1- 2,p .6 . 
9.For this and following see Appendix ) ,pp.466-46S. 
o.cranlck ,op cit, p .112 . 
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O\'er fifty five percent of alJ flow-arranged machines in April 1932 were installed 
ln only three branches which all develonen vigorously during the First Five-year 
Pian ,i.e. tractor building ,vehicle building and the production of agricultural 
oach1nery •
1 
A further 17 per cent were machines in the clothing- f'ooi::.ar machinery 
.. 
branch , mainly those of the Podol'sk factory dating from before the Revolution 
and having flow production before the First Five- year Plan . The only other 
branc1es with notable pronortions (between 15 and 20 per cent of their stocks) 
were t·~e machine tool industry itsf'lf, electric power equipment (probably the 
making of small electric motors) , anrl the production of commQ~ications equipment. 
In the case of the m~chine tool industt~ ann other branches with some flow-
arran,:!.'ed machines it is probable that ~Y the machines of certain shops and 
sections were so arran~ed,tn cases where specialised , quantity production of 
certa tn oarts and asseMbJ ies could be secured . Considering the scale of 
production adopted for the auto-tractor industry flow arrangement was t ~e only 
rational form of organisation at that time, belng widely employed ln these 
branches not only in the USA, but also in ~urope . Thus, flow-arr~1ged nachin~s 
were predominantly to be found in the mass and large-serial light and medium 
roachine buildinu branches intensively developed in the 1929-1932 periodl the 
chosen priorities of branch developaent predermined the bias towards flow 
2 organisation . 
4. The above comments are relPvant to Granick's thesis on the ' abandonment ' 
of continuous flow protiuction in the mid- 19J0s . Like Granick, ..,e have fou!ld no 
direct evidence to support this th~'>s1s, What in fact probably happened during 
the Second and Third Five-ye~x Plans was that the use of flow organisation 
but the Sh~_.re of machines in the total stock arranged on gra~ually increased , 
t d for by mass-flow enterprises a flow basis and the proportion of output accoun e 
Clearly underway even in the r'irst Plan period itself: d!clined . This proces~ was 
! .Appendix J ,p.46? . tatistics were frequently cited to deoonstratE 
2, In contemporary sources alternative si 1 roduction during the First Five-year 
a massive shift to mass and larEe- ser a ?in building production stem ed from 
Plan period a in 1932 48 .6 per( centd~ rna~~ 4eoer cent from mass-flow),40.6 per 
aass production enterprises inclu g and o~ly lO .S per cent from enterprises 
cent from serial production enterprise: t d with with American data for 1921 -
of individual production. This was con ra:n~ serial nroduct1on, and 35.7 pP-r 
41.9 per cent mass production , 22 ,4 per ~h No . t p.?O}. The Soviet portions ___ ..._ ~-"···•-'! .. .,, n'l"'nrlUctionCPlan.khoz . ,19 ' I next fZ 
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In the last nine months of 1932 and L'l 1933 the branch structure of tnstaJ.latlons 
Ehifted - the role of mass- flo:.: branches declined , but that of 1ndiv.1.dual and 
aerial production branches rose . 1 There is no evidence that flow production was 
a~ndon~~ at t he auto- tractor factories andr presumably , the extensions of 
ti-e l!lain enter prises durin~ tl'le 'Second Five- year Plan were also founded on flow 
prlllclples . The new tm . KIM l~ht car ractory developed during the Third Plan 
vas definitely planned for now production - its deputy chief engineer , 
F.S.Demyanyuk , a learlin~ Soviet expert on flow production , noted 1.n 1940 that 
tM principle of potochnost • had been ap!"Jlied even more widely and deeply 1n 
both machining and ass~mbly shops tharl at any o-r the ex!sting automobile factories . 2 
But some of the other branches with a relatively hi~'l level or now or~an1sat1on 
~ 1932 probably experienced a slower rate of growth in subsequent years , notably 
a~trlcultural machine building , but possibly also the prcxiuct1on of clocks , 
watches and photop:raphic equip ent , ano the making of electric motors . 'l'hus, 
we believe that the hi~h proportion of flow production indicated by the April 19.32 
census 1o1as a temporary phenomenon producerl by the structure of branch priorities 
in t~e previous t hree- years and the speed of completion of construction of 
enterprises , The absolute 1 eve] of use of flow organisation probably rose 1n 
the 'thirties, but :tts relative share ~ecllned . 
Evidence for a continued extension of t. "l~ use of flow organisatlon can 
be found for the machine tool industry itself . In 1932 16 per cent of the branch's 
total stock of machine tools in production shops were arranged on flow busi.s, 
and presumably the ' Krnsnyt Proletarii ' accounted for a substrultial. proport1on ,3 
1 Lt.~~·~&~.E~£~--~·~· .-.. ~~'do The new Gor ' k11 and tm .Ordzhonikldze factor es \ 1 ~ · - • 
d 1 t his way at firsta H. was reported in 1937 not appear to have 'teen organ i.se n 
f e~u1pnen~ while the latter switched 
that the former had a group arrangement o "1 "' · 
ble extent by the ratber unusual branch 
were clearly influenced to a considera den in the considerable ach1eve£ent itn 
~t:ructure prevailing in 1932 . ~hile notFi~si F~ve-year Plan , these figures should 
aefeloping mass production during the f roduct.ion 1s here defined (fer "the USSR 
be treat~d l-lith caution . The seriality 0 f !ssembly processes, and enterprises 
at least) ln terms of the organisation ° lasslfied according to the do~ant 
~~e~ in mixed forms of production .w~~~mcof asse~bly 1n w~ich ~oducts passed 
tJpe . But 'flow' assembl.v covered an~ln to the flow of work regardless whether 
frort one operatlon to t,he next accor e ~od ucts were mechanised . (~) .Thus, 
t~· operations or thP. novement of th - Jl!: 1 itPmS includPd about three- ouarters accordin~r to this definition fJ ow product ~~nch (all non- J!lecbanised now Lover 
of the 1932 outnut of the wap:on building · cont .next. page •• 
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to en arrangement ~ccord ing to sceciftc compon~nts and assemblies in th~ preceding 
year , SUR"gesting that elements of n 4 ow organisation were adopted , 
While evidence on flow organisation in machining shops is sparse , t~ere 
!s mformation on flo~ assembly processes which does suggest that its use increased 
liuring the oeriod • Given 1 J,at CrAnick' s thesis rests on the argwnent that Soviet 
~agement ~as unAble t.o cope with the or~an1sational aspects of flow product lon 
this is of some imoortance becallse flow assembly also re rtu\.res strict work 
scheduling and 1nterchangeabi11 ty of parts. The adoption of flow assembly in 
thE l"achine tonl industrv from about 1937 has been considered elsewhere5 , The 
aircraft industry had a major campaign for the introduction of conveyerlsed flow 
6 assembly in the Third Five-year Plan period at both engine and plane factories . 
Furthermore , in 1938 it was reported that continuous flow assembly methods had 
been applied not only at mass proluction ent~prises of l ight and medium machine 
building, but also at a number of enterprises of heavy englneerL~g with a low 
er1ality of production e . /l . 'Russk111 Dizel' ' and ' Elekros1la' where an output 
ar low as 600- 900 units of a ~riven motor a year was considered adequate for 
''lo" or~anisation . 7 The aPplication of flow methods to serial production in a 
n~ber of branches of industry, including aircraft buildin~ , machine tools 
and bearings prorluction was one of the basic directions of work of the Central 
lnst1tutP of .L.abour during the 1930 , with particular emphasis on multi-product 
now lines . 8 Cranick sug ,ests that the widening product ranges of the mid- ' thirties 
cay have accounted .for t:.he ' abandonment ' of flow production, c1t1ng the case 
o!' the m::}chine to"'] tnd us try as a branch tn which the range rapidly widened . But 
• is branch was not one in which flow methods played a prominent role 1n 1932 , 
an~ the widening pronuct ran~e di~ not prevent the adoptlo&of elemen~s of flow 
enterprises . F'inal ly , Granlck cites one 1940 asse111bly a t a nWllber of leading -
to Continuous flow production as evidence in &ource whi ch makes no refer ence 
support of hi s case , but it is notable that another oajor work of the saoe year 
~i ery almost one hundred percent of the auto-
tvo- thirds of a11 aP"r \cuJ t.ural ;act n r:er' ce~t of com!!lunicatlons ettuipoent. and 
tractor industry ' s nutput,overofo~o~o·~otivesr the high proportion of reFrt.ed. 
ftfteen percent o~' a11 output t d bl ( se~" Sotsialistlcheskoe stroitel stvo S~""R. 
now production is t.,us under s an a e . -
19)5, p.66 .) ... 
l.See Ap)lendix 3 , p . 460 . 
2.Mashi'&ostro1tel ', 1940 ,No . 4 , p . ) . 
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o~rved that this form of production had ~ide application tn branches of mass 
nachine buildin~ 
9 
- auto-tractor building , and the production of sewing machines. 
otorcycl es , 'b!lcyc 1 es, etc • 
In conclusion , we believe that the Soviet authorities consulted by Cranick 
vho denied that there h;:~d been an abandonment of 'flow production during the 
10 
• thirties were correct • The h~h indicated level in 19.32 was a product of the 
t.l!llng of the censuss from thenon the relative share of flow productton declined 
but. its ao'{)lication in absoJ ute terms probably increased, rising more sharply 
during the War from 1942 . The introduction of flow methods was not a fatlure and 
1t certainly cannot be said that the effort to introduce flow production was 
'thoroughly l!lisplaced ' • FinR1ly , C.ranick claims that this example dernonstrates 
that the Soviet attempt to adopt the quite advanced production technique of 
continuou · flow shows the folly of trying to skip over' historically normal 
intermediate stages 1 • .But in the Soviet case no stages were 'skipped over' 1 
~dtv1dual, small batch and large batch production methods were all well knQwn 
and l!la.Stered long be~ore the First Five-year Plan and , as described aoove , 
So:!:e experience of flow o:r..gan1sat1on had been gained before the Plan commenced. 
Flow pr'Xiuction was th~ next stage for the Soviet engineering 1.ndust.ry the 
successes of the vehicle and tractor factories (despite th~ initial probleos 
of as~imib·tion at. St.Alingr~d) amoly demonstrate that. Soviet engineers and 
aanazers were quite capable of mePting thP challenge . 
ou arran~er.1ent by type of ~chlnc to specialised 
) .Th"' ~actory switched from a gr p d .. blies wit"l the transition •o the 
s~ctlons for particul~:r components an assem 
'DIP ' model (Slavnye traditsii, oo cit,p. 119) 
4.~. 12 . 2 .J? . 
6S.See P· . f ctories began in 1937 - Mashinostroenie ,4.3 .40 . ~Conveyerisation' of aero-engwe a 
7 .Av.iapromvshlennost 1 , 193!3 ,N ° .6 • P .J? • 
6 
·l6?- 18o . 
8.Tsi7 i e~o metody NOT , op c1t,PP· 12r~tJs~tsialis~lchesko1 pro~vshlennost1,M.,1940, 
9 .~ranovsk11 ,E. and Markus , B. ,!E~k~o~n~o~m~. ~a~~~~~~~~.:=..::~=.:;:..t..==~;...;;...o.-.. 
p.196. 
10 .Granick 1 op c1t,pp. t24- 125. 
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A Note on the Def1n1 t1on of ' Fl6w ' Production 
In view of the r:tther loose usage of this term met in the literature it is 
useful to clarify tho meaning of ' :f.low ' production understood by Soviet writers 
of t~"' Pre-~~ar per too · The term ' flow.: ' ( notochnav:a) production was first 
introduced by the pro min en t "'na· tneer ,Professor A .Pankin , in 1926 as a Soviet 
equivalent of the German term ' fliessarbeit' to describe a form of organisation 
oi' s"lops and equipment securing a straight flow of work through an enterprise: 
previously the J oose term 'fordizma ' had been el'\ploved . 1 But tl-te 'flow' arrangeaent 
of machines 1n 1 tself simply refers to the placing of mac"lines in c".nsecutive 
ord l"r ac~ordin~t: to the ser:tuence of work processes and can cover a number of forms 
o" oroduct1on org:an1sat1on . In thP 19)0s two mal.n variants were identified: first , 
'vroup' nrofluction (or • formal ' "'lo\ol work): second, continuous flo~ (rabota 
nepreryvnvm potokom) .Group production was characterised by the arranger.~ent of 
LI-te .,ach1nes and worknlaces according to the path of moveme~t of components and 
sQe!'li11es, the diversity of the t.lme of inrHviduRl operations , and the existence 
of 'nter-ooera+ton stocks . hlech<=m tc~l transport. devices could be employed , giving 
echan iset'l or movinl7 ,~oup,flow prodncti.on. Contlnuous flow production , best 
sulteo to mass pro~uce~ conponets 1 ~ssemblie • and f inished products , was d1st1ng-
u!s~ed by the fact th~t th~ len~th of each operati on was equal or al~ost equal 
v..i.vlnv. a continuous , rythmic flot-l of work, without inter-operation breaks and 
stocks , This form was often <lS"'or-iated with conveyers and other £orne of mechanised 
t.ransport , for 
oachine tools 
both as·embly work and the transfer. of parts between machines .The 
employed in continuous flow production were ~evote to the machining 
of a given , fixed part . 2 
In the 19)2 Census o£ metal working machinery a broad definition of ' flow ' 
pro~uction was A.rlooted . 'l'he census basically distinguished between the a.rrnngement 
of nachines 1n rrouos according to their type or size, and arrangement according 
to tl-te flow of work , i . e . both qroup anti continuous flow production were included . 
Furthermore , machines were rEWar1ed as ::;rranged Oll a flotl basis even if they were 
in ~oups by tvne OT machine if oper~tions were perfo~ed consecutively according 
~ the path of work . J There is no indic~tion fro~ the census of the role of 
d f i ed Tn oonular usage in Soviet writings conti nuous flow prorluction proverly e n • - ~ -
of the pre-.~ar period 
1 
in p::;rticular in the late 1920s end the F1.rst Five- year 
Plan p~riod , all types 0 r 'flow' production were lndiscrinlnately termed 
' ~ thi time enterprises were generally categorised as 
continuous flow ' • And a •· s · -
· dl g to the orll'8111sat1on of asse bly processes 
oe~ of the ' mas.::- flow ' type acror n -
nther t"l~n of their machtnin~ shops · 
l.~ma. 1 or~ani7:atsiya, 1926,No.l-Z,P·6 · hlenno1.. stattstiki
1
M. ,1934,pp .13.5-1J7; 
2 .See Rotshtein , A. ,~ovnye proble~y or~;~st o.b op .J?-)8. 
'irofimov , I .P . ,Avlaoromyshlennost ' 1 1 ' · 
3.C.borudovanie , op cit , vyp .4 , P . 18 • 
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Appendix Seven 
'raE ~LACHINE TOOL BUILDING ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRAL INSTITllrE OF LABOUR 
The Central Institute of Labour (TsiT) was rounded in 1920 by Aleksei 
lap1tonov1ch Gastev ( 1882 - 1941) f th or e study of the sc1entl:f'lc organisation 
of labour (NOT) . Gastev was one of the lea~ing • proletarian poets' both before 
ll'ld 1!111'1ed1ately after the Revolution and also a leader of the metal workers' 
tnde union~ In the 1920s the Institute , at fir.st under the central council 
of the trade unions and later under NKTP , was primarily occupied with problems 
of NOT . and also the training of workers by techniques sn~cially developed by 
Gastev for rapidl y inculcating basic p:! oductive sk1ll1 , 2 rhe achlevenents of 
the Institute were put into practice by a limited company ,later trust . • Ustanovka' , 
which 1n effect acted as a khozraschet innovation and labour traL'ling organisation . 
By 1935 TslT employed over a hundred . oriters, ' Ustanovka ' over three hundred r 
and the latter had two experimental factories 1 No . 1 employing 600 workers ancl 
No.2 employing 285 . 3 Gastev was director of the Inst1 tute !rom 1.ts foundation 
until 1938, and from 1932 to 1 OJ{. was also chaira:an of the All-Union Coi!UI\ittee 
for Standardi sation of STO . He was a prolific and highly original writer on 
nroblems of NOT , training, standardisation and machine tool design and use . In 
1938 be was removed from the leadership of the Institute , a victim of the purges . 
In 194o TsiT was combined with the trust , ' Orgaviaprom• and subsequently 
transformed into a bl;'anch rese rch instltnte , ap,pa.rently of the aircraft industry . 
4 
Of primary interest here is the work of Gastev and other TsiT workers, 
notably N .M .Bakhrakh , on machine tool desi.;n and construction . Ba.Jr.hrakh wes 
df!puty director of the Institute and c .,ief engineer of ' Ustanovka' and 1n the 
'!.hl.rties headeri work on unit- construction machine tool building. Castev. s 
interest tn Machine tool building arose out of his work on mn . He first put 
,_ the Institute ' s journel,OrganiZatsiya Trud~? 
forward hie radical ideas 1n 19.30 .1.u 
His startinp-point was a convictionthat 
machine building as practised in both 
resrv>c t.a irrational 'from ·t.he 
the cap1 talist countries and the USSR was in many r-
1 ~Biographical details from TslT i ego metodY t:CYI _• ~ • ~P~· 3;!~~l~mes du 
2.Some of the activities of TsiT are described in ~ r e i 0 ' • ·=-=-~:.;:;;;:~-=-= ~:acb1nisme en URSS et d::!ns les pays capitalistes,Par-s, t...:J4. 
technical and economic points of view. 
The social and econooic conditions of 
ca.r1talism had, in \.tastev's opinion • Placed serious lim1 tations on machine 
design and proeuction • Machine to r.ols tended t.o ·oe conceived as closed Wlits 
rather than as components of produ""tion systems1 they tendej to be built by 
snall scale, craft methods , and their design ~as i f .. n 1 uenced s·t.rongly by such 
factors as secrecy • company and national pride , technical 'style~ tradi t1on and 
convention . In order to successfully develop mass production in the conditions 
of the socialist planned eco Ollly it was essential , <.rastev believed, to subject 
capitalist machine design anrl pro1uction to radical review and create new forms 
appro¢.ate to the conditions of proletarian powe~ . 6 
The starting point and focus of socialist machine buUding , in Castev • s 
view , had to be the stage of ~ssembly (montazh)J the aim had t.o be the achievement 
of the most rapid possible construction of machine tools ~pectfic to each 
operation , and ease of assembly had to determine the design and previous stages 
of ·roduction. All machines , he considered, could be broken down into a relatively 
.saall number of constituent primary functional elements , e .g . unlts rotation , 
11111ts of forward and back'. ard '!lotion , speed chang"- units, motor unitn,etc . 1'h1s 
~ovided t~e possibility of building ~Rchine tools using the principle of 
agregatirovanie , defined by Bakharakh in 193? as , " •• the making anrt assembling 
or machine t ools of various purposes from sAnarate standard units or mechanis!".s 
-~1ch are common to all machi ne tools, ot for the given machine tool, with 
ad fivtures depending on the purpose of the machine". 
7 
di.tional special units and • ~ 
The units themselves were to bnilt from standardised components and because many 
of them would be common to a wide range of machines it was believed that their 
large-serial or mass production at spe·ialised f actories ~oudl be possiole . The 
actual ~~~ach1ne tools could then be asse.mbled either at special cachine tool 
as embly works or f bl 
·t machine building enterprises ,which would build 
pre era y,a 
ap machines when required for specific purposes . It was believed that the 
t ti
on principle would render the conventional 
rigorous pursul t of the unit cons rue 
Of 
machine , eg . lathe ,drilling,mllling machine,etc. obsolete, 
classification by t yoes , ...... 
),!;auchno-issledovatel ' skii institut 
.TsiT 1 ego metody N<Yl' ,op cit,p • .54 · i<ak 
S.Or&ranl.zatsiva truda,19JO,~o .4;see · 
nado rabotat • ,'H • , 19?2 'pp .44)-449 . 
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and also supersede the traditional • universal ', • special' and • specialised • categories . 
Gast ev and his colleagues ~lso advocated a r~vision of traditiona~ lY hel d views 
on the materials to be used in machi ne building; they believed that there was 
scope f or the use of wood , simpleargled girders , plastics (for gears ,control 
buttons ,etc.) • and ferro-concrete , t he latter for making machine tool beds at 
the place of installation rather than at the machine tool factory. 
8 
Gastev 
rursuea the idea of unit-construction machine tool building with a scientific 
r1.gour unknown in the West at the time ' 
and with a unique comprehensiveness 
of approach and vision. And although the principleof unit-construction was not 
new and there was so~e similarity between Gastev 's work and the ideas of Taylor9 
he must be credited with an original contribution to the development of 
machine tool technology . 
Gastev was not content with undertaking theoretical work alone , he also 
actively propagated his ideas for ' technical reconstruction ' in order to influence 
I 0 
policy 1n the eng ineering industry , and began to build machi1 es based on the 
ne\i principles . Earl y in t•1ay 1931 a VSNKh ord r appeared supporting the Insti tute ' f 
work and shortl y aft er this t he newspaper Zalndustrializatsiyu devoted a whole 10 
page to Gastev ' s work under the title , ' For a revolution in machine building'. In 
October 1931 this d irection of activity received high level backi ng when the Party 
Central Committee issued a decree approving the Institute's work.
11 
It appears 
to have been after this decree t hPt an experimental factory was created for 
bullding machine tools undex -t he aegi s cf''Ustanovka' . The experimental factory 
! o.1 began work in 1932 building a small,simple lathe ,the ' S- 03 ' incorporating 
some of Gastev' s i deas .Thi s machine was to be widely used in training wor~shops 
\.n the 1930s. Over 300 machines were built in 1932 and nea ~1y 500 in the fol l owing 
year .12 
l .ibid . 
7 .organiza tsiya truda ,1937 ,No. 1 0 , P .19 • 
8 .Ek . zhizn ' , 11 • 3 . 1932 • f 9.3ee above ,p . 227 , Despite the similarity of ideas we h<>ve +-ound no re erence 
to Taylor ' s work in Gastev ' s writings • 
10 .Zaind. ,18.5 . 1931 · 
11 .TSIT1 ego metody NOT ,oo c1t,p .125 . 
12.Stankostroitel ' nyi zavod Tsrra~M . ,1934 , p . t9 & chart 8 . 
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Despite some high level support ~ t ~-- as ev "-'' 1935 noted that TslT' s activity 
had been backed by Ordzhoniltidze , M . Kaganovich 1 , and Al ' perov1ch - there seems 
to have been quite wide scepticism about TsiT ' s work and 1 ts practical value. 
Bakhrakh ,writ ing in 1937 , aknowledged that there had been a large number of 
ooponents to the work on unit-construction tn the early years. 2 Furthermore, 
the 
Castev found it necessary to ~rgue 4"o;,.· the right to take/risks involved 1n the 
novel work of creating new mac~ines~ ~evertheJess 1n October 19)3 GUSIP issued 
an order supporting TsiT ' s work and call ia.ll' for an expansion of 1 ts production 
of machine to "'ls and standard units , and also proposed that the Inst1t\.lte draw 
up a project for a. new factory for making standard units for low-powered machine 
4 
tools. There may be a connection between this measure and the creation two 
years later of the factory of s~all unit- constructton machine tools in Sverdlovsk, 
but virtually no reference to this works has been traced . It is kno~n t~At this 
works was sited at wh~t was originally to h~ve been a heavy machine tool factory, 
w~ich was projected then conserve~ , and that it built a small universal cilling 
machine of a type suitable for toolro,ms . 5 
The TsiT ~r o .1 factory not only bu1l t ma6h1ne tools (its range of Ul11t-constr-
uction models widened from 1Y3J) , it also pioneered progressive new production 
organisation. This factory was t he first Soviet machine tool works to ew1t.ch 
(in 1933) f r om t he traditional method of brigade assembly to flow a.ssecbly . 
Under the traditional system a brigade of workers built a complete machine and 
wcrk was or~anised on a batch basis . Despite a qllite small annual output af 
about 500 units a years 1.n 193J , planned to rise to 100 units a month , the assec.bJ 
do~ into a sequence of operations each of approximately the process was broken "~ 
same length and machin"'s pass ed from one operation to thP next on spectal trolleyt 
large units were assembled in the sane way . The flow principle was also extended 
job card~ The 
to "laChining oper ations , each of which was specified onadetailed 
b very sl.J!lilax to those later i ntroduced flow as sembly methods ap~ear to have een 
• lso lllB.de a direct. contribution 
at the ' Krasnyi Proletari i ' factory • TsiT worKers a 
• .. k at a meeting of NKTP ' s coll.egiu:n 
l.Kaganovich spoke in favour of TsiT s .. or 
in June 1932 - Zaind .,22 .6 . 1932. 
2,0rganizatsiya truda,1937 ,no . 10.p.19. 6 3 3.Zaind . ,22 .6:1932 1organizatsiya truda ,19i~: no · ' P• • 
4 .~tankostroitel'nyi zavod TsiT , op cit ,p . 
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to the wor k of t"le machine tool industry at t!le 1 Ord h lkid _,.. . m. z on ze ~actory . A brigade 
of TsiT workers helped to develoo progressive work organisation and methods 
at the factory in 1933 during the difficult period when it was ~ssimilating 
~ro uction • 7 
Betwe~"n 1Q)2 and 1037 TsiT rnade over e. thousand unit- construction raachlnes 
1:1 
on bot~-) a serial and one- off basis , with many special machines which were also 
developed by th.e experimental .factory No . 2 of the ' Ustatlovka ' trust . This factory 
undertook a range of special proouction activ1t~1ncludL1g the production of 
pistons undertaken on a series of special unit-c&nstruction machines 01 TsiT 
dP.sign , some of which were linked by automatic transfer mechan1sms.9 TsiT also 
created a very advanced flow line of unit-constr uction machines for making 
pistons at the Chelyab1nsk tractor factory.10 
In the course of the 1910s TsiT and its experimental factories a ppears to 
~~ve devoted increasing attention to the aircraft industry and the rationalisation 
of technolo ~ ical processes of machining and 'ls "'embly. hork was undertaken on 
the classification of components and the tyoification of processes, and also 
11 
on the introduction of flow organisation into serial , production. From 1937 
the No .2 factory was devoted to making means of mec~an1sat1on of l abour intensive 
processes at aircraft factories , but machine tool pro uction evi~ently continued, 
because in 1939 it was reported th~t this factory had mastered J6 types of 
12 
machine tool during the year with widescale use of standard assemblies . From the 
and o~ the Second Five-year Plan the Institute's work seems to have been channelled 
increasingly to serve the demands of the defence industries and both the Institute 
and ' Ustanovka • appear to have been transfered from NKTP to the defence i.adustry 
commissariat at ~bout this time . Part of its activity was concerned with the 
anmunition industry and later a special TsiT boeprioasov was formed ,which 
created flow lines , some of the semt-auto~tic type, for ~aking acnun1tion .Tb1s 
13 
experience is reporte' to have been widely used during the War . 
5.Alzenshtadt and Chlkhachev , on cit, p .26t .;Zaind . ,14 . 5.19J?· 
6.TsiT 1 e~o metody NOT ,op cit ,pp . 121-12J . r ~k~stroitel nyi zavod TsiT,oo cit, 
pp. 15- 20. 3 
? ,See Losev,A ,G .,O~.r:mizatsiya truda v period osvoeniva.,H. , 19J · , , 
B .Or~artlzatslya tr a,19'7 ,4io. 10,p. 19 . This total may exclude the S-03 lathe 
which was n~t a proper unit-construction machine,although the basic product 
of factory No .1. 
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On many occasions during the 'thirties Gastev propagated the benefits of 
the TsiT method of unit-constructi on . In 1935, when the 'official' machine tool 
industry began to take the it t un -cons ruction principle seriously he noted that 
d: 
the Institute had suddenly found thatLenJ·oyed id t \ol e supper • .aut at the same 
time he expressed concern that the machine tool industry would take the easy 
~~y out and , instead of developing unit-construction in the rigorous way charted 
by TsiT • sirnply copy existing :foreign models . This,he str~ssed , would not provide 
a basis for overtaking capt talist machine tool building ,1 Two years later 
Bakhrakh was compl ainhgthat this had happenerl. ; forei gn machin~s were being copied , 2 
In developing unit-construction machines the specialised. machine tool industry 
did in effect by- pass TsiT and its pioneering work, In 1938 Gastev was still 
appealing for proper large-scale production facilities so that the building 
of complex unit-construction machines and flow lines could be put on a viable 
footin~ The subsequent fate of TsiT's machine to~l building within the defence 
i n•lustry is not known , 
Although Gastev's original contribution of the 1930s had only limited impact 
at the time his ideas have not been :forgotten . From about the late 1950s the 
unit-construction principle as evolved by TsiT has been propagated in the Soviet 
Union , notably by V.V.Bo1tsov . 4 Furthermore, Gastev's works have been republished 
and a survey of the activities of the Institute has been produced~ which stresses 
t~ contemporary relevance of Gastev ' s work on machine tool design . Thus TsiT 
nade a lasting contribution. The work of ENll·IS alid the specialised industry was 
flruly anchored in the w~instream of world machine tool development; but Gastev , 
Bakhrakh and the other TsiT workers consciously strived to move forward and to 
raise machine tool building to a new higher level . 
9.!s!T 1 ego met ody NOT , op c it,pp.12.5-127. 
10.1 bid . ,pp.260-265. 
u .ibid. ,129- 131 · 
12.Minostroenie , )1 .12.1939 • 
l).TsiT i ef!O metody NOT , op c1t , pp . 12?-129. 
l.Organizatsiya truda, 193.5 ,No .6 , P .2. 
2.1b1d . ,1937 ,No . 10 , p.36 • 
).hknado rabotat ' , op cit , p .4.55 . 
,See Pravda,
7
•8 , 1958 .;Boitsov ,v .v. ,Mekhanizatsiya 1 avtomatizatsiya v melkoseriinom 
J seriinom proizvodstvakh , 2nd .edn • ,M · , 1971 . 
~.Tsn i ego metody NOT , op cit · 
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Appendlx Eight 
A Chronology of the ~lain Events in - ------:::;.:;._ __ ...:..:..:.:~=:..:....::.:.~~~~t:!:h~e~D~e~v~el?Pment of the folachine Tool Industry 
1926 l~ar.ch 4th 
'May 
1927 Harch 
1928 November 
1929 January 25th 
April 
April 29th 
t'tayt 1st weF>k) 
May 19th 
''ay 29th 
July 31st 
October 1st 
1930 January 11th 
Apri~ lnd 
June 
J une 
July 
Septel'ltber (11th?) 
September ( t6th?) 
1931 January t0-13th 
May Jrd 
J uly 16th 
November 
DPceomber 25th 
DecernbP.r 29t.h 
December 
Glavmetall decree on format.ion of a Section of 
Machine Tool Building a t.tached to the Conve:1ti.on 
of Syndicates of the He tal Indus try . 
Meeting of Glavmetall on l'ltachine tool building . 
f.le.,ting of Glavmetall on the developrr.ent of 
machine tool building tn the Five-year Plan period, 
Meeting of machine tool building workers to discuss 
the development of the branch. 
Presidium of VSNKh call for the organisation of a 
machine tool building trust . 
The development of the industry and the creation 
of a trust discussed by the Collegium of GlavQashstro1. 
Sixteenth Farty Conference approved the First rtve-year 
Plan . 
Glavmashstroi r.evised the Plan for the industt~. 
The findings of the NY RKI survey of machine tool 
building published . 
STO approved the formation of Stankotrest 
NK F.KI decree on the ra t.tonalisa tton of machine tool 
building 
Stankotrest began operation . 
VSNKh Presidium decree , 'On t.he state of machine tool 
building and measures for lts further 1evelop~ent! 
STO ap;;roved -forr ation of Soyuzstan'koinstTUI'!Cnt 
ob"edinenie. 
Construction of Gor'kii mil l ing machine factory began . 
Soyuzst~oinGtrument began operation. 
Construction of Noscow turret lathe factory began. 
Presidill!". of VSNKh discussed the state of the industry. 
VSNKh Presid 1 um decree on machine tool building . 
All- Union production rneet.ing on machine tool building, 
VSNKh Presidium approved organisation of JIISl'I . 
SlfK USSR decree on the creation of Stankoob''edlnenle. 
The Central Design Bureau created. 
Basic construction of turret lathe factory co~pleted. 
Basic construction of the Gor' kii factory coopleted . 
Stankoob"ed.l.nenle be,an operation . 
• j 
. 
1932 
:93'3 
1934 
1935 
Y.larch 
April 5th 
June 1st 
July 14-17th 
February 24th 
March 22- 23rrl 
Nay 19th 
June 16th 
June 20- 22nd 
AW<ust 31st 
J anuary 23rd 
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•court' on the 'DIP' lathe . 
f-leeting of Collegium of NKTF on the machine tool 
industry and the assimilation of new models . 
NKTP Order l'lo . 407 , ' Cn the further development of 
the machine tool industry ' . 
First Conference of ~1achtne Tool Desl!:.ners . 
N!('l'F Order hO , 173 forbi~the import o! certain 
types of mac~inery . 
Production- technical confere 1ce of machine tool 
ouildinr. 
NKTP Order on th~ orga.t".isation of t.1nJ1S. 
NKTP Order No .55? ;on the development of machine 
tool bu 1ld ing' • 
First All - Union Confere.-,ce on l-lachine Tool Suilding . 
SNK decree on the creation of GUSIP . 
NKTF Order f,o . 141 , ' On tl-te plM of develop~ent of 
H1achin e to --1 bull 1 ing and tne production of metal 
for m1n!- ef'luipment 1n thA Second Five-year Plan'. 
January/February First Machine Tool Exhibition . 
February toth Seventeenth Party Congress adopted resolution on 
the Second Five-year PlAn . 
ft~arch 25th KKTF Order ~io .430 calling for an improvement ln the 
work of the im .Ord:ubonikidze and Gor ' idl factories. 
November Leaders of the machine tool industry visited the 
London machine tool exhlbition at Olympia. 
December )Oth NKTP Order on equipping the auto-tractor factories 
w1 tb i3 oviet mach tne too] s . 
January 
January/February 
March 20-22nd. 
April 
July 11-13th 
t· . Kagttaovich report on the industry and technical 
progress at Seventh Congr~ss of 3ovlets . 
Second .rtchine Tool Exhibition . 
Third Conference of ~lachine rool Designers . 
All - Union co~ference of machine tool factory workers . 
Part y-technical conference of GUSIP . 
1936 February 1) - 17th Branch conference of enterprises of GUSIP • 
April 7- Bth Fourth Conference of 1achine Tool Designers. 
1937 March? First Con~ference of r:ach1ne Tool Building Productio:'l 
Sngineers . 
July3rd 
July/ August 1 
E .Lev1n removed as director of ~!MS and 'Stankokonst-
rukts1ya' . 
E .• ~i .Al ' perovich removed as leader of GUSIP. 
j 
j 
I 
\9J9 
1940 
t941 
Janu::lry 
February 
March 21st 
September 4th 
September 
April 
529 
Third Hachine Tool Exhlbltlon . 
Co:1ference of chtef engineers and technicians of 
~"lachine tool bu.tlding factories . 
Eighteenth Party Congress adopted resolution on 
the Third Five- year Plan. 
SNK decree , ' On t.he development of the machine 'tool 
bulldint7 industry in the US3R' . 
Creation of Glavtyazhstankoprom and Glavstankoprom. 
ENIMS transfered to NKTyazhllash. 
Fifth Conference of ~Jach1ne Tool Desl.gners . 
September/October All - Union meeting of machine tool builders. 
December 8th 
June 5th 
Decree of Central Committee VKP(b) and SNK USSR, 
'On t he develop~ent of machine tool building 1n 
the USSR '. 
Gove~~ment decree on the creation of the People's 
Commissariat of Machlne Tool Building . 
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STATISTICAL APPENDIX 
Tabl~ SA .I Output of Mach~ne Tools 1n Physical Ter•s· 
Table SA .II Output of Machine Tools in Value Teras. 
Table SA .III Planned and Actual Output of Major Factories. 
Table SA .IV The Geographical Distribution of Machioe Tool Production . 
Table SA • V The Growth of the fwlachine Tool Stock. 
Table SA .VI The Age of the Machine Tool Stock in 1940. 
Table SA .VII The Structure of Total Machine Tool Output by Type of Machine( units). 
Table SA .VIII The Structure of Total Machine Tool Output by Type (per cent) . 
l(lb}P SA .IX The Out put of the Specialised liachtne Tool Industry by type (units). 
T ble SA .X The Output of the Specialised Machine Tool Industry by Type(per cent). 
T ble SA.XI The Number of Types and S1~es of Machine Tools in Production. 
Table SA .XII The Number of New Types and Sizes Built, 
Table SA .XIII The Tr3.nsit1on f.rolll Old to New f•iodels , 1928/29 - 1933. 
1 ble SA.XIV The Year of First Soviet Production of the Main Types of ~lachineTool 
Tabl~ SA .XV Origin of the Main Types of Machine Tools built tn the USSR . 
Table SA .XVI Soviet Hetal-cuttlng Machine Tool I!!!ports, 1913- 1940. 
TAbl ~ SA .XVII Machine Tool Imports as a Proportion of all Machinery and Equipment 
Imports and Total !~ports. 
Table SA .XVIII The Level of Import Dependence. 
Table SA .XIX Import Dependence by Type of Machine Tool , 19)6-37. 
Table SA . XX The Structure of Machine Tool Imports by Country of Origin. 
Table SA .XXI The Structure of Machine Tool Imports by Type of Mach~e ,l929-19)8. 
Table SA .XXII The Structure of Imported lathes. 
Table SA .XXIII The Structure of Imported and Soviet-built Machine Tools Installed 
tn the Machine Build~g and Metal Working Industries, 1928-1933. 
Tabl e SA.XXIV Indicators of the Technical Level of !~ported and Soviet- built 
f1achine Tools Installed in the Machine Building Industry ,1923-1932 . 
Table SA .XXV Soviet Mach~e Tool Exports, 19}4-1940. 
Table SA.XXVI Imported Machine Tools,Installat1ons in the Engineering Industry 
during the First Five-year Plan , and the Degree of Specialisation 
-nd Automation of Installed Machtnes. 
Table SA .XXVII The Project Capacity of Machine Tool Enterprises . 
Table SA.XXVD:I The Construction of liew Hachine Tool Factories - Plans and 
Achievement, 1929- 1941 . 
T ble SA .XXIX The Prices and Costs of Some Baste Models , 19)2-1940. 
Tabl '! SA .XXX The Performance of Three Leading £nterprises- 'Krasny1 Proletar11' , 
Gor ' kH mtllL1g machine factory and lm .Ordzhonii<idze. 
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Table SA . I Olfl'Pl11' OF liACHINe! TOOLS 
First Five-year Plan ' 1928/29 - 1932 
(tmits) 
92'V29 1929/30 
Special 
Quarter ------
A.S:e!cialtsed 1111\chtne 
tool 1ndust.rx • 
Planned Output .. • . • • 
25603(a) Actual Output • • • ••• . 
Fulfi lment of Plan(~) 
~'Planned ' f'actorlea• 
Planned Output ••.• • 
4 
Actual Output • •••.• 1238 
Fulfilment of Plan(~) 
C.Total s2ec1a11sed 
and'elanned'out~uta 
Planned Output •.•. • • 
6 
Actua:l Out out. .. .... 1 3798 
Fulfilment of Plan(~) 
D.Outnut of aimpl~ 
II\8.Ch 1ne tools* 
Planned Output •.••.• 
Actual Output .•••••. 
E.Total Output..a 
Planned Output • ••• • • 
Actual Output •• ••• • • 
6 
459 
4843
3 
4 
2119 
-
6 
?o62 
6 
935 
•stmple poltah1ng and sharpening machines 
Sources and notes - see P ,535. 
t6os3 
892 
J 
- -
25003 
1931 
1 
10926 
8963
3 
82.0 
4 
11074 
4 
7695 
69.5 
... 
22000~ 
16658 
75.? 
1932 
2 
10333 
3 
7311 
6? • .5 
4 
11167 
4 
103.5.5 
92.? 
2 
220006 
17666 
80.3 
6 
2054 
6 
19'120 
531 
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Table SA.I cont. OUTPUT OF MACHINE TOOLS 
Second Five-Year Plan, 1933 - 193? 
(uni.ts) , 
h- - -~ 1 1933 193~- 1935 
A.Specialiaed Machine Tool I --
Industrya 
Planned Output. ......... 82821 88522 111273 
Actual Output........... ?8384 8)044 101006 
Fulfilment of Plan (,) 94.6 93.8 1 90 .8 
-- - -- - -----t 
B.Total NKTP Outputa _ 
7 
1 
Planned Out put. • . • • • • • • • 190006a 19800? 
Actual Output ••• . ••••••• , 154oo6a 159007 193?99 
Fulf1l ment_o_f_ Pl_an_ (,) ~ ~ J 9? .9 
C. 'Plannf>d' factor ies a . I 10 
11383 Pla~ned Output •••••••••• 
Actual Output •••• ,., •.• • 
Fulfilment of Plan (%) 
1066310 
93.? I 
lncludinga 
a)NKTP , other than the 
specialised industrys 
Planned Output •••. , ••• · j 
Actual Output • • ••• • .•• • 
Fulfilment of Plan (~ ) 
tncludings 
Defence Industrya 
Planned Output ••••.•••• 
b)Other 'Planned' Prodn' 
Planned Output ••••••• •. 
Actual Output •••••••••• 
Fulfilment of Plan (~) 
3101 14 
D.Total Specialised and 1 • Planned' Output a 
15 Planned Output •••.•• •• •• 19665 
18501
16 
Actual Output • •• •••••• •• 
Fulfilment of Fl~ (%) , 94.1_ 
E.Out~ut of Simple 
Machine Tools ;'f 
Planned Output •..••••••• 
tq Actual Output •.•• •• •.•• 249? 
F' .Total Output 
Planned Outnut .•.••.•••• 
0 t t 20998
19 Actual u pu ••••.•••••• 
• KKestProm1NK VD rNKProsRSFSR,etc. 
I 
I 
1014811 
11 
7596 
74. 9 
5231 14 
(b)' 
21131
16 
429618 
20 
25400 
I 
15000
10 
14?7210 
98. 5 
867311 
9278
11 
101 .o I 
76J413 
632714 
549414 
' 
86 .2 1 
2612?4 
243729 
95.2 
19J6 
140oo4 
13288
6 
94 .9 
19J? l 
199005 
15785
6 
79 . ) 
-f-----1 
23905
8 
2)6249 
98.8 
I 
1840510 j 
1912010 
103. 9 
990511 
10336
11 
104. 4 
8500t~) 
878414 
103.3 
324058 
324089 
100.0 
21116
10 
2033510 
96 . ) 
410169 
3612017 
33 .1 
~incl uding simple polishing and sharpening m~chines and the products of 
Proll!Cooperativee,NKZem. ,NKPS repair factories,Ptc . 
Sources a.t1d notes - see p. 535 . 
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Table SA.1 cont. Our.PUT OF 1-\ACHI •• E TCOLS 
Third Five-Year Plant 12J8 - 1241 
~938 1939 1940 1941 
A.SE!cialised Machin~ Tool Indust!I' 
Planned Output •• , ••••••••••••••••• 200001 2?7952 )20003 350004 
Actual Output •••••• ............... 198305 250305 6 24572$ 277.54 
Fulfilment of Plan,~) 99.2 90 .1 (a) 86.7 70 .2 
-~~ 
B.Defence Inriustrl a 
Planned Output •. .• , • • ••• • •••.••••• k 88653 108oo3 11900
4 
!nc 1 ud 1np; a 
m ....... ........................ 44263 52003 52004 
ill ............................... 221?3 29003 ) 2004 
~ .............................. 22223 27003 4 J 500 
C .Production of Other NKs: 
Planned Output ••••••••••••••••••.• 7?557 75007 t1100? 
1.ncl ud ing 1 
NKMestProm .•••• •••••••••••••.•••.• J1852 JJOOJ uoo4 
NKZe•, , •••..•••.•••••••••••••••••• 20102 17004 
~ .............................. 13302 
D.Total OutEut of S~c1alised Ind ~~ 1 
Defence !n~ustrr and Other NKs : 
Planned Output ••.••••••••••••.•••• I 444153 51)003 580004 
Actual Out put ••••••••.•••••••••••• 401?0
8 
l•09009 425009 
Fulfilment of PJ~n (~) 92 .1 82 .8 
... 
E.OutQut of SimQle Machine Tools+, 
Actu~l Output ••••••••••.•••••••••. 1413510 1597310 
F .Total Out out 
Planned Output •••.•••.•••• • • • • • • • • 
55500
11 
55035
12 31 12 4451012 Actual Output •••• . ••.••••••• • • • • • • 584e 
{ incfl&t 
~00)1) 
*1938 Glavstankotnstrument ;1939-41 NKTyazhMash. 
+1nclun1n~ a1mpJe o11sh1n~ and sharpen1n~ machines and the products or 
PromCooperstives ,repair factories of NKPS,etc. 
Sources and notes - see p .535 . 
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Table S.o\ .1 cont . 
RATE OF GRO .. TH OF MAC3ThE TOOL OTJrFU'l' 
Index:- Prev ious lear • 100a 
1929/JO 1932 19)4 
)s pee lal i sed ind • 190.7 91.6 107 .2 105.9 
b)S pl sd • plus 1 planned • • 185.9 106 .1 102 .1 114.4 
c)Total output 187 .9 229. 0 107 .7 106 . 5 121. 0 
+ 
19)6 1938 1939 1940 - 1 1937 
1 118.8 --a) 1)1 .6 125.6 126 .2 110.9 
:; I 130. ) I 111 .5\ 111 .2 101 .8 10). 9 1'31.0 - 109 . 2 111 .4 99 .2 
In~ices of Growth of Outnut during Five-year Plans: 
First Five- Year Plan 
• j t929/29 I tmn 
100 190.7 a)Speclallsed industry 
b)Splsd . plus 1 plaMed' 
c)Total Output 
~u ~~5 . 9 
100 187 .9 
~ ~econd Five-Year Plan 1933 1934 
)Specialised industry 100 105. 9 
114.2 
J50.1 
433.6 
430 .3 
19).5 
128.9 
1)4.4 
106 ,2 
1932 
285.6 
46.5 .1 
46) .2 
12J6 I 
l 
169.5 
175 .2 
l 121.0 161~11 .~ 
b)Spl sd . plus 1 planned' 100 
1
c)Total Output 100 
( 
)Specialised tndustry 
b)Splsd . plus 1 planned' 
c)Total Output 
Index of Urowth of Outout 
)S pee 1alised 1--.d us try 
b)Splsd . plus ' planned 1 
c)Total Outcut 
19)8 
100 
100 
100 
1939 
126.2 
101.8 
99.2 
140.0 
105.8 
105.4 
192~/29 - 1941 (1933•100) 
1928/2~1 1929/JO 19)1 
J2 .7 r 61.8 114.4 
20 • .5 l 39. 2 90 .0 
20 .J )8. 1 8? . 2 
1935 1936 
1941 
12) .9 
~0 . 2 
1935 
121 .6 
117.7 
13) . 5 
-
l t941 
33. 5 
76 .1 
1937 
201 ,4 
195.2 
230.8 
--~-t-
a) 128.9 169 . 5 )20.0 35) .0 
221 . 1 229.7 
262 . 1 273.5 
b) 1)4.4 175. 2 
c) t 61.4 211 . 4 
Source 1 eu1 t\ext ·page . .. 
534 
19)4 
105.9 
114.2 
121 .0 
1941 
)1) . 5 
212 .1 
SA.6 535 
Source Tabl e SA .1 1 
First Five- year Plan 
t.Ek .zhi zn ,suppleMent on ' annual b., lances • , 1931 ,1~o11 ,Aug . • 2.lli, 1932 ,No4 ,p2 . 
) .Prob.Ek . ,t9J5 ,No4 , p194 . 
4. by subtraction , C- A. 
,5 .~. ,14-4- 31. 
6,Sots1~11sticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR,N. ,1934,p48. 
Not es 
(a)Output of factories under Stankoob"ed1nen1e in 1930. 
Second Five- year Plan 
t.Prob.Ek., 1935,No4 , p199. 
2.~ , 1934,No4,p1 (includes 200 for tooling factories of CUSIP) 
J .Prob.Ek. , 1935,No4 ,p193 (inclurles 570 f~r toolin~ factories of GUSIP) 
4.Prob.Ek.,1935 ,No4 ,p200 
6.Calculated from the index of output of specialised industry (Zhed' ,oo c1t,p13J 
on the basis of the known output for 1933,)4 and 1940 .Aporoxlmate. 
5.!!!ru!. ,12-9- 37. J 6a .ProPkt vtoro~o pyatiletnlto plana • • , ~p cit ,Vo1.1 , p.450 . 
? .Narodnokhozyaistvennyi plan na 19j6g . ,p41? • 
• PlanKhoz,19J7 ,No3 , ~2JO. 
9.Narodno-khozyaistvenny1 plan Soyuza SSR na 1937g.,p?2. 
10 .By subtraction , D-A. 
'11 .By subtraction , B- A . 
12 .~ , 19J4 ,NoJ,p1 (as residual). 
t) .Zalnd . ,26- 10-J5. 
14 ,By subtraction , D-B . 
15.Zalnd. ,23- 6- 33 . 
16 ,80tSia11st1cheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR,M.,1936,pt56 (incorrect total for 1933 
a111ended) 
17 .Tret1i pyatiletnii plan razvitiya narodno~o khozy~tstva Soyuza SSR ,p20? . 
tS.By subtraction, F-D. 
19.Pen ' kov,P.M .,Razvttie t1pazha • • , p9 . 
20 .NarKhoz SSSR v t958g , p211. 
2t .Proroyshlennost' SSSR,1956,p20~ . 
~ 
(a)lncluding local industry (NKMP) 7000 (Za!nd,12-5-J7) 
(b)Plan 1~000 ' without sharpening machines' .Accord1n~ t o this definition output 
in 1932 was 15, 000 units and in 1933 15,400 units .This definition was adopted 
for the Second Five-Year Plan , 19J4. (Narkhoz.plqn na 19J5g,p 516 ;Proekt vtorogo 
~tiletnvo olan razviti a narodnoqo khoz aistva SS3R ,T.1,p430) 
(c)Includtn~ 2, 000 for NKZem. PlanKhoz,19J ,No2 ,p2 4) 
(d)Includ1ng local industry (NKMP) 6200 (Narkhoz.plan na 19J6.p4?8) 
fhlrd Five- year Plan 
! .Trudy LeniPfradskoi konferents ii po t1p1zats11 tekhnologicheskikh protsessov, 
t -M. , 1940, 9. 
2.Gosunarstvennyl clan r azvitiya narodnggo_~Q~vaistv~ SSSR v 1939g,p2J. 
).~Hrektivy KPSS ~ sovetskogo pravi tel' stva ~o kl'Ll<lZyaistve!'!&ey.n voorosam, Vo1.2 ,p.602 . 
• Gosudarstvenn 1 lAn razviti a nar~dn o knoz a1stva SSSR na 1941~ . ,pJ2 
S.A& Second Five-ye~ Plan , above . 
E.Oboznyi,A .G. ,Osnovnye fondy mashinostroeniya 1 outl uluchsheniya ikh isool ' zovanly~ . 
Klev ,1962, p15. 
7 .~ subtraction , D-(A+B). 
~ .As 2, p4 (provision~l output) 
SA.? 536 
Source Table SA .1 cont . s 
Third Five-year Plan,cont. 
9.Industrial1zatslya SSSR ,1938-t941gg ,M., t97J ,pp129-1JO . (1940- provisional) . 
lO.By subtraction, F-D. 
lt.NarKhoz .SSSR v 19~ , p23t. 
12 .Penkov, P .M • ,R.azv 1 t le t 1 pazha •. , p9 . 
1).Kravchenko ,C.,Ekonom1ka SSSR v otechestvennoi vo1ny,1941-1945gg,M.,1970,2nd edn ., 
ptf,8. 
Notes 
(a)Kas 'yanenko,V.I.,Zavoevanle ekonomlcheskoi nezavis1most1 SSSn ,M., 1972 , p198 
gives NKTyazhMash plan fulfilment as 84.7 per cent , t.e. an actual output of 
2) ,542 untts. 
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'!'able SA .II 
---- o s In Value Teras ' 1928/29 - 193Z Output of M::~chine l'o 1 
(million rubles' 1926/2? prices) 
L S_pecial1sed Industry M ' t d ' - 'Planned ' Factories 
'ie&r 
2,?34 G,?46 
arKe e 1 Per un1 t lA 0 t t narketed Fer unit 
u ou value(r, ) -r--~---=..:.::.=~!___j~~O ut put val ue(r , ) 
1928/29 
1
1929/JO 
1930 Sp .Q 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1Q14 . ; 
1935 
? .0 
14 . 0 
4. 5 
18.5 
32 . "3 
4? ,4 
66 .0 
(90 .0) 
(126 .0) 
2, S91 
2 ,?93 
2,0~4 
4,u:~ 
6 , 04? 
7 ,9?4 
(8, G10) 
(9,4g2) 
J , 4 
6 .0 
2 . 1 
15 .2 
46 ,q 
54 .8 
56.2 
2,832 
2,354 
t ,9? 5 
4,520 
5,139 
4,53? 
} not available 
1937 159 .4 10,093 
---=-- ----_;...~ 
Inde,. of Growth of Outnut of the Specialised Industry 
First Five-yearPlan 
1929129 ... 100 
Previous year • 100 
1929/30 
200 .0 
200 . 0 
~ 
264 .) 
1)2.1 
1932 
46~ .6 
1'77 .• ) 
t 
Total Output 
Markete T" fer uni't 
Output value(r) 
10.4 
20.0 
6.6 
J) .? 
79.6 
102.2 
124 .2 
2,7)8 
2,632 
2 ,640 
2,023 
4,506 
5.524 
.5 . ~8 
Second Flve-vear Plan 
l2J1. ~ 
100.0 1)9.2 
!22..2 
201.2 
L9J6 ill! 
2?4 .4 u86.o 
1933 - 100 
Previous year • 100 
Index of Per Unit Valu~ 
193J - 100 
Specialised industry 
Total output 
144.5 
45 
50 
1)9 .2 
48 
51 
1)6 .4 
J4 
J? 
?4 
82 
t.40 • 0 126 • 5 
tOO 1)1 148 157 167 
100 t06 
1 92~/ 29 - 19'34 
:Pro.bl elllv ekonomik1,19)5,tio ,4, pp . 194 and 200; except 192B/29' plan 'led 
output- Zainc.,2J.6 . J). (Prob .ek.,loc.c1~.,g1ves 7 .7 .r. which 
is consldere~ too high and inconsistent with other so~~es). 
aEstimates, on thl'! basts of interpolation between 19J4 a.nd 1937· 
aFrom 4~ per cent 1ncrease , 19~2-)7 - A1zenshtadt and Chikhachev ,p211 10J5 - 19)6 
1937 
SA.9 
Table SA .III 
Planned and Actual Outout of Major Factories 
1.1928-29 - 1932 
Factory 
'Krasnyi 
Proletar11' 
111\.Sverdlova 
1t~~.Len1na 
tn .Crdzhonikidze 
C"or'k11 
Khar ' kov 
'Samotochka ' 
i i!I .TsK Mash . 
'Komsomolets' 
I v.hevsk 
Tula 
Pa Annual Plan . 
A 1 Actual Output 
P . 
A. 
P . 
A. 
P. 
A. 
P . 
A. 
P . 
A. 
P . 
A . 
P. 
A. 
P . 
A • 
P. 
A. 
P . 
A. 
P . 
A. 
(units) 
. 
1923-29 1929-30 19J0Sp~ 
609 1,249 II 
-· 
4oo _l 1oo I 190 
299 524 I 292 
1,11 5-r--
goJ 1,48? 6)8 
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - I -
I - - -
- - -
I 
I 
155 t 343 155 
I I 
'j79 I . 904 I 375 - I 
10? I 262 84 
I I 
I I 
- factories not in operAtion 
1931 
1,810 
i 2,190 
I 
1,210 
605 
I 
),)20 
),459 
I 
-
-
I' 
-
-
-
-
?60 
?58 
1,600 
j 1,495 
350 
465 
1932 
2 ,857 
2,3?8 
535 
4?4 
2,217 
2, 203 
250 
36 
JOO 
I 28 
-
-
1,057 
743 
I 2,000 
540 
1,000 
1,130 
SA.10 
Table SA . III cont . 
Planned and Actual Outnut of Ma jor Factories 
Factory 1933 -
IJt.P . I P. 
A. 2 ,200 
hl .Sv , P . 
A. - ·-
i m,L. p , 
2 . 1933 - 1940 
(units) 
1934 193.5 1 1936 
2 ,390 2 ,716 
1937 ~ 1938 1939 
2 t 903 (3 ,400) 
2 ,640 ' 2 • 7 56~ ( 2 ' 900) ; 3,6251-_ --i-
310 )00 4.50 6.55 
.524 I 
1- . f~- -l 
1 ,69.5 1 ,800 1,920 
1940 
'(2 .400) I 
A. 1 ,666 I I I 3 ,064 I -
920 1 1,101 
- I 1a.Ord . P. ,506 1,554 
A ' i 466 608 i 1,)01 l -t ~4-
Cor 1 kii pJ 4?5 965 ~ 1,200 1,560 2 , 200 
A. 41 8 548 1 , 191 j 1,8B? i 2, .511 i 
Khar 1 kav P. J 114 350 500 'I 11 ,2so I A .l 31 , 192 509 I ?21 11,129 t ,338 1 ,?50 
I 
800 ~ 
r 
·s. I P. 891 790 (850) 
A.! 2,094 ?qS ! ' 
llri .TsK .M. P J 
I 
I 
537 1 692 811 
AJ I - ' -- - , __ -
'Korn . 1 P . 381 325 422 320 I 
A . 417 I ,.._ ' 'I -
t 
h hevsk P J 1 , 20; ( 1 . .5.50) 
A .1( 1 , 400) I ~ 2 ,212 
1,441 
~i 1,250 Tula 
I A~ 940 I ---~~ - -
( .. ) est1.mate 
.539 
Table SA . III 
Sources a 
SA .11 
'Krasnri Proletar11 ' 
1928-29! , 1929- )0A - Lebyachenko , p .8. 
19)1P - Metall, 19)1 ,l~o . 1 , p.88 . 
19)1A - Lebyachenko,p . 49 . 
1932P - Sokolov , 1932,p. t6. 
,540 
1933A - Industrial ' noe razvitie tsentral ' nogo promyshleonogo ralo~ , t969 ,p . 461. 
19J4P - Sii , 19)4, No . 3 , p . 1 :19j4A- Yestnik metalloproR.,1935 ,No . 9 , p .11). 
1935P - Problemy ekonomik1 , 1935 .~o .4 , p.193 . 
19J6A - Slavnye tradtts11,p . 126 . 
1937P - Zalnd • , 6 . 1. 37 • 
1937A - Estimated from Slavnye trad1ts11 , p.126. 
19)8P&A - EstimPted from Mash1noatroenie,2 . 10 .)9 . 
lm .Sverdlova 
1928- 29A,1929- JOA,19)0SQA,19)1A,1932A - Borisov & Vas1l'ev,p.1)2. 
1928-29P, 1929-30P -Zaiod . ,1.5.2 . )0 . 
1930SQP - Borisov & ''asil ' ev ,p .127. 
19J1P - Metall , 19)1 ,No.1,p.88. 
1932P - Sokolov , p . 16 • 
19)4P - S ii , 1934 ,No • ) , p .1. 
1935P - Wnd . ,14 .4 . 35 . 
19)6P -ibid .,28.5. )6. 
1937A,19)8P - Borisov & Vas1l ' ev,p.1?6 . 
1m.Len1na 
1928-29A, 1929- )0A,19)0SQA,1931A,1932A - Aizenshtdat & Chikhachev,p.181 . 
1931P - hetal1 , 1931.,No.1,p.88. 
1932P - Sokolov , p . 16. 
19)4P -S 1I , 1934 ,~ o • 3 , J? . 1 . 
1935P -Zaind . ,12 . 7 .3.5 . 
19)6P - Zaind. , 28 . ,5.)6 . 
1938P - Est i mated from Sii. ,19)8 ,No.9,p.42 . 
1940A - Obozny1,1962 , p . 17 . 
1929-)0P - l•'ashi Dostizheniya, 1931,No . 1 ,p . )O · 
lii .Ordzbonikidte 
1932P - Sokolov,p . 16 . 
19J2A ,1933A,19)4A - T*azhelaya promysblennost' 
193)P- Zaind .,15.3.) • 
1934P - Zaind . , 1,5.).)4. 
19)5P - Zaind . ,12 . 7 . ),5. 
1935A - Zaind . ,8 . 1.36. 
19)6P - Zalnd . , .28. 5 . 36. 
Gor'kU 
SSSR za 1931-}4gs.,p.88 . 
1932P - Sokolov , p . 16 • J4g 88 
1932A ,1931A,19)4A - Tyazh . prom. SSSR za 1931- - . ,p. • 
193JP,19)4P - PredDr1yatie,1934,No.19,p.?. 
19)5P - Zaind ., 12 . ? .)5 . h d kog:o-gor'kovskogo kr•wa,1968,p.)90. 
1935A - Istoriya 1ndustr1alizats11 niz egoro s 
1936P - Zai nd . , 28.5 . )6, 
19)7P, 1937A - Istori a . , p. 267 & )62. 
19)8A - XVIll s"ezd VKP b ,p.)91 · 
Source T.able III cont. 
SA .12 541 
ha.r'kov 
19)JA ,1935A,1936A,1937A,193BA,1939A 1940A 1934A 
P ·35. • , t - Khar ' kovsk11 stan~ostro1tel'ny1, 
1 p - ~' 1934 . t. 0 • 3 • p 1 ! 
19)5P - toainn . ,12.7 . )5 . 
19)6P - Zaind . ,28 .5.36. 
19)5P - Khar 'kovski t stankostroitel ' nyi,p .32. 
~ otochka 
1929-29A ,1929-30P,1930SQA,1931A - Lebyachenko,p .26 . 
19J1P - hetall,1931,No.t , p.88 . 
19)2P - Sokolov, p .16 . 
1932A - Moskovsk11 sovet raboch1~h,krest ' yansk1kh 1 trasnarme1sk1kh deputatov -
otchet o rabote, 1931-)4 ,N.,n.d . ,p. 29 lsource gives '1933 ' ,but this is 
clearly a misprint) 
l9)4P - Sil ,1934,No .3, p.t. 
1935P - Problemy ekonom1ki,19J5,No .4,p.193. 
19)6P - Zaind., 2.9 .36. 
1937P - estimated from ~aind .,2.9 . )6 . 
194QA- Gromov,V .I,,Rqzv1t1e spets1~lizats11 1 koooer1rovan1ya v promyshlenno~tl 
ekonom1cheskogo ra1ona,~ ., 196J , p .JO . 
1.n.TsK Mash1nostroen1ya 
l92B-29A,1929-30A,19JOSQA,1931A, 1932P- Lebyachenko,p .28 . 
1931P - ~~etalJ ,1931 , H o.1, o . 88 . 
1934P - S 1I , 1934 ,No • 3 , p • 1 
1935P - Problemy_ e ~onollli d ,1935 , .. o .4, P .193 • 
l9)6P - m .. za.s.;6 . 
'Kouomol ets • 
l928-29A ,1 929-JOA, 1930SQA , 1931A - lebyachen,ro , p .29 • 
19)1P- MetaJ1,1931 ,No . 1,p . 8~ . 
19J2P - Sokolov ,p.16. 
19)3A 19J3P - S1I , 1934,No.3,p.40. Pcalculated . 
1935P·- Proble~ekonomik1 , 19Jj ,~o.4 , p .193 · 
19J6P - Zaind . ,28. 5.36. 
I~hevsk 
19)2.P - Sokolov, p.16 • •. p evalov pp.l9&J4 (1933A estbated). 
1 M2A 19-:l3P ,1933A - Vol kova 1)<. er • 
, .; • J 6 3 5 t i... tPd ro""' ( 1CJ)5P -Zalnd., 2 . 10 . ,es :-.a t Ud~urtskoi ASSR ,Izhevsk,19.5? ,p.22 assumed to 
\~7 1&40A Narodnoe kho~vais vo ) 
7J A, , - t t ~the Izh~vsk factory only . . 
be the ou pu o.. · 
SA.13 
The Geographical Distribution of Machine Tool Production 
(units) 
Table SA.IV 
Republic and 1 <; 1 '31 192 -28 1932 
7fo % Region No. No. No. 
R.S.F .S.R. 1419 1 93.8 1187 60.0 1)974 
1.oclud1ng by 
I I ecOJlomic region a 
I 
ti orth-West 399 22.8 247 1 12.5 1492 
Centre 1042 68.7 5830 790 , 39.9 
{ i.nc .Moscow obl.) • I • • I • . 
Volga reg.lon 9 0.5 150 1 7.6 2556 
I 
Urals 29 1.8 - i - 2940 
{inc .Udmurt ASSR) • • • . . ,. 
Nor th Caucasus - - - I - 705 
( i.nc .Krasnodar kc • . • I • (330) 
Western Siberia - - - - 451 
East Siberia & F.E. - - - - -
Ukrainian SSR .. 65 4.3 791 40.0 5066 
Byelorussian SSR - - - - 680 
Georgian SSR - - - - -
Azerbaidzhan SSR 3~ 1.9 - - -
1C1rgizian SSR - - - - -
Uzbek SSR - - - - -
Other re:Qublics - - - - -
Total 1514 100.0 1978 100.0 19720 
1. 1n the boundaries of the USSR prior to 1940 · 
- no production or insignif icant. 
• no data 
Source a 
% 
70.8 
7.5 
29.6 
. 
13.0 
14.9 
• 
3.5 
(1.7) 
2.3 
-
25.7 
3·5 
-
-
-
-
-
100.0 
1937 1940 
No. ~ No. , 
33860 69.9 39476 67.5 
I 
8.4 I 2553 4056 4.4 
37.0 ! 27167 17902 46.5 
• I . ( 8943)1\ 15.3) 
4647 9.6 4404 7.5 
4190 8.6 2608 4.5 
I 
( 2212 )1 (4.6) (1441) (2.5) 
1187 2.4 1362 2.3 
(383); ( 0.8) (500) ( 0.9) 
1878 3-9 1 1382 1 2.3 
- I - - I -
9125 1 19.7 11704 20. 0 
4441 9.2 5985 10.3 
757 1.6 803 1.4 
290 0.6 330 0.6 
- - 110 0.2 
- - 29 -
- - - -
48473 100.0 58437 100.0 
Ai zenshtadt and Ch1khachev,op.clt.,p.521, except' 
·oscow oblast' - Moskovskaya oblast• za 50 let,M.,196? ,p.47. ~ 
~a t ASSR _ Narodnoe khozyalstvo Udmurt skoi ASSR ,Izhevsk,1957,p. 22 . 
Kr a:odar krai _ Narodnoe khozyaistvo Krasnodarskogo kraya,Krasaodar ,1965 ,p.23 • 
J 
SA.t4 
Table SA .V 
The Growth of the Machine Tool Stock 
(number of uni ts) 
Al l metal-cutting machine tools 1n 
Year Series I Series IT 
Aprll 1932 181 ,4031 
September 1934 242,2662 
January 1936 274, 7143 
January 1938 380, ooo4 
November 1940 710,00cY 
• all existing machines , not necessarily installed . 
the economy*" 
Series I - based on census of metal-working equipment of April 1932 • civilian 
branches only , excludes polishing and sharpening 11\aohinee and 
other small and simple types . 
Series II - result o£ census in November 1940; it is believed to include the 
defence ln~ustry stock , and also polishing 11\achines and other 
simple types excluded from Series I . 
Source.: 
1,3otsiall sticheskoe strottel'stvo ~SSR , 19J5,p.70 . 
2.1bid . ,1936 ,p . _54. 
j.Ca.lculated from SSSR strana, sotsial1ZII\a , ~1 ., 1936 , p.11 . 
4.Tret11 pyat1letni1 plan razvitlya narodnogo khozyaietva Soyuza SSR ,H.,19J9 , p.20. 
5.!ta.rodnoe khozyalst vo SSSR v 196? g. ,I1 . ,196J ,p . 55 · 
Table SA . VI Age of the Machine Tool Stock in 1940 
Nwnber of Units Under 10 y;s.old 10-20 ;yrs .old Over 20 yrs .old 
710 , 000 71% 1) , 16 ~ 
Sonrces Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 196? g . •"1• ' t96J,p . 55 
Th St::ructur c of Toca.l MAcbi.n Tool Output by !ypc of Mach:ine , 1927/28 - 194 1. l in t:crmo 0 1 uni.to) 
Type of Machine Tool 1927/28 1928/29 
Lathes •.•.. ... . . • .. .. 830 1495 
Turret Lathes .. ..••. • - -
Autos . & semi-autos .. - -
Vertical drilling mcs 546 963 
Radial drilling mcs .. - -
Milling mcs . .• .. . .. .. 53 205 
Grinding roes . . . .. . .•. 3 75 Tool & cutter grg.mcs 15 
Gear-cutting mcs .... . - -
Planing roes . ...... . . . 146 162 
Shaping mcs ..... ... . . 35 235 
Slotting mcs ... ..... . 35 5 
Broaching mcs ........ - -
Bor:ing mcs ....... . . . . 10 118 
Combined mcs . . ...•. . . - -
Threading mcs . . . .. . .. 110 540 
Special mos ...... . ... - -
Other mea ... .. ..•. .. . - -
Total ......•.. . . . .... 1783 3798 
- not built or :insignificant quantity. 
x no data. 
(l)included in 'lathes'. 
(2)included in 'other mcs.'. 
1929/0 1931 
3295 7057 
- 26 
- -
2167 6951 
- -
189 730 
155 530 
- -
256 145 
377 747 
35 11 
- -
30 7 
- 1 
521 464 
- -
37 4 
7062 16675 
1932 1933 1934 1935 1936+ 1937 
7115 7816 9076 X X 15202 
512 1049 1557 1919 1912 1806 
- - 120 283 725 894 
6838 5204 4950 X X 12235 
- - 21 X X 585 
1071 1581 1608 2076 2859 3243 
254 619 1111 1839 221 X X 2045 
- 16 171 222 408 397 
223 65 111 X X 303 
835 968 1037 X X 3172 
46 89 100 X X 250 
- - - . - 10 44 
67 95 155 123 173 131 
30 132 167 X X (1) 
861 807 851 X X (2) 
- X X X X 962 
41 iQ 96 X X 5365* 
18124 18501 21131 24872 32408 48473 
* inc luding a large proportion of polishing and sharpening machines not included in other years. 
+ provi sional output data. 
1940 1941P. 
11523 13650 
2088 3370 
2039 3136 
15251 X 
610 X 
3701 5147 
2094 3501 
4268 X 
543 686 
173 300 
2048 1300 
158 200 
68 350 
124 475 
(1) 120 
(2) X 
6688 8564 
7061* X 
58437 58000 
' 
. ..... 
\J\ 
. 
~ 
H 
SA .16 
"!'able SA .VII 
Source: 
1927/28-1934- Sotsialisticheskoe stroitel'stvo SSSR ,M. ,l936 ,pl56. 
Except: grinding mcs . and tool and cutter grinding mcs . 
in 1927/28 and 1932 - Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958qodu, 
M., l959,p232 . ; automatics and semi-autos . ,1934- Narodno-
khozyaistvennyi plan na 1936 god,M. , 2nd edn.,l936,p417.; 
radial drilling mcs. - TableSA .IX. 
1935 & 1936 - Narodno-khozyaistvennyi plan SSSR na 1937 god ,M., l937 ,pp72-73. 
1937 & 1940 Narodnoe khozyaistvo SSSR v 1958 godu ,M., l959 ,pp232-233. 
1941 Plan Gosudarstvennyi plan razvitiya narornogo khozya1stva ~SSR 
na 1941 p:o·~. ,M ., 1941 , p . )2 . 
The St.ructura of Total MAchine Tool Output by 'l'ype of t-IAchlne , 1927/28 - 1941. 
(as a percentage of total output) 
Type of Machine tool 1927/28 fl928/29 I 1929/30 1931 1932 1933 I 1934 
I 
1935 1936 1937 
Lathes • ••••••••••••••. 46.6 39 . 3 46 . 7 I 42 . 3 39 . 3 ! 42 . 2 43.0 X I X 31.4 
Turret lathes •••....•. - - - 0 . 2 2 . 8 5 . 7 7 . 4 7.7 5 . 9 3 . 7 
Autos. & semi -autos .•• - - - - - - 0 . 6 1.1 2.2 1.8 
Vertical drilling .mcs. 30 . 6 25.4 30 . 7 41.6 37.7 28 . 1 23 .4 X X 25.3 
Radial drilling mcs .•• - - - - I - - 0 . 1 X X 1.2 Milling tiCS ••••• ••• ••• 3 .0 5 . 4 2.7 4 . 4. 5 . 9 8. 5 7.6 8 . 3 8 . 8 6 .7 
I Grinding mcs .... • ....• 0 . 2 } 2 .0 2.2 I 3 , 2 1.4 } 3 . 4 5 . 3 3.8 Tool & cutter grdg .mcs 0.8 1.2 X X 4.2 
Gear-cutting mea ... ..• - - - - - 0 . 1 0 . 8 0 . 9 1 . 3 0 . 8 
P l&ning mcs •.... .. .•.. 8.2 4. 3 3.6 0.9 1.2 0.4 0 . 5 X X 0.6 
Shaping mcs •.• .•.. . .•. 1.9 6.2 5.3 4.4 4 . 6 5 . 2 4.9 X X 6 . 5 
Slottiny mcs ....... •. . 1.9 0.1 0.5 0.1 o. 3 0 . 5 0 . 4 X X 0.5 
Broaching mcs ...•.••.• - - - - - - - - 0.03 0.1 
Boring mea •••.•••.•• , • 0.6 3.1 0.4 0 .04 0.4 0.5 0 . 7 0.5 o.s 0 . 3 
' Cambinod mea . • •. .• •. • . - - - - 0.2 0 . 7 0 . 8 X X (1) 
Threading mcs • . .•. • ... 6 . 2 14.2 7.4 2.8 4 . 8 4.7 4 .0 X X (2) 
Special mes •••..•..•.• - - - - - X X X X 2.0 
other me& .. .... ... ..... - - o.s 0.02 0 . 2 0 . 3 o.s X :X 11.1 
To till . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100.0 100.0 I 100.0 100.0 1100.0 1100.0 1100 .0 I 1100.0 
1940 1941P . 
19.7 23.5 
3 . 6 5 . 8 
3.5 5 . 4 
26 . 1 X 
1.0 X 
o. J 8 . 9 
3 . 6 I 6 . 0 7 . 3 X 
0.9 1.2 
0.3 0 . 5 
3 . 5 7 . 5 
0.3 0 . 3 
0.1 0.6 
0.2 o.a 
(1) o.2 
(2) X 
u. 5 l4 .a 
12.1 X 
1100.0 75.5 
- not built or insi9nificant quantity. 
x no data. 
(1) illeluded in lathes. (2) included in ' other wcs. ' 
Sou.rc : calculated from ~ableS'A . Vll. 
VJ 
> 
Th oucput of tho SpeciAlise~ Machine Tool rndustry by Type of Machine . 1930 - 1940 (in terms of unica) 
Type of Machine Tool 1930 1931 1932 1 1933 19341 l935 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 
I I 
! 
Lathes . .... . .........•.. 2781 3760 4081 3760 3900 3470 4920 5245 5560 5532 6250 
Turret lathes •......•••• - - 46 510 624 1212 1501 1232 1710 1931 1720 
Automatics& semi-autos •• - - - - I 76 I 151 325 456 556 1258 1207 
I Vertical drilling mcs ..• 1522 2577 1308 12o6 964 817 1260 1880 2882 4034 3772 
Radial drilling mcs ...•. - - - - I 21 126 412 567 666 726 610 
Milling machines .. . •••.• - - 28 I 477 595 1261 1565 1922 2580 2634 2970 
I 
Grinding machines .. • ..•. - - - - 104 220 451 900 1093 1367 1290 
I I Gear-cutting machines .• . - - - 16 178 172 298 393 657 751 543 
Planing & Shaping roes •.. 684 809 873 822 I 872 788 850 1099 1055 677 1625 
Boring machines ..•• • .... - 7 67 95 104 121 173 131 129 138 124 
Special machines ........ - - - - 12 55 93 142 278 552 930 
Other machines .... . ••.• . 536 503 908 952 854 1707 1432 1.~18 2564 5430 6443 
Total . ..•. .. . 0 0 0 ...... 5523 8963 7311 7838 I 8304 10100 1.3280 15785 19830 25030 27754 '· 
Sourcel930-l932 , based on Tsaguriya,M. ,Osvoenie novykh predpriyatii i novoi tekhniki v tyazheloi 
promyshlennosti , M-L.,l934 ,pl0l.Total output for 1.931 and 1932 from Problemy ekonomiki, 
193S ,No4,pl94. 
~933-1940 , calculated from data on the structure of output presented in TableSn~ and from ~tal 
output data of TableSR. l.Some items adjusted to conform \>lith data of Table Sli.VII. 
Note:Output data presented above are approximate. 
. 
t:: 
en 
> 
The Structure o~ Output of the Specia11sed Machine Tool Industxy , 1930 - 1941 . 
(by type of machine , as a percentage of total output) 
Type of Machine Tool 1 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 
I 
La'thes . .. . •....... ...... I 50.3 56 . 5 56.4 48 .0 47 .0 34.4 37 .0 33.2 28.5 22.1 23.5 28.0 
Turret lathes .• .••.•... • j - - 0 . 5 6.4 7.5 12.0 11.3 I 7.8 8 . 6 7 . 7 6 . 2 7.0 
Automatics & semi-autos . - - - - 0.9 
I 
1.5 2.45 2.9 
I 
2.8 5 .1 4 . 35 5 . 2 
Milling machines •..••.•. - - 0.4 6.07 7 . 15 12 . 5 11.8 12 . 2 13.0 10.5 10.7 12 . 0 
Gear-cutting machines .•. - - - I · 0 . 22 2.15 1.7 I t . 25 2 . 5 3 . 2 3 .o I 1.95 2 .15 
Boring machines ..• . .•••• - 0.07 0 . 9 1.21 1.25 1.2 1.3 0.85 0.65 0.55 0.45 0.85 
Planing and shaping mcs . 12.4 9 .1 12.1 10.5 10.5 7 . 8 6.4 6.95 1 5.3 2. 7 5.85 4 . 4 
Grinding machines ......• - - - - 1.25 2.0 I 3.4 5.7 5.5 5 . 45 4.65 6 . 8 
I I Vertical drilling mcs ..• 27 . 6 28 . 8 17 . 8 15.4 11.6 8 . 1 9 . 5 11.9 14. 5 16.1 13.6 6 .1 
Radial drilling mcs ..... - - -·· - 0.25 1 1.25 3.1 I 3 . 6 3 . 35 2.9 2 . 2 2 .5 
Special machines ... .... . - - - - 0.15 1 0. 55 1 0 . 7 0.9 1.4 I 2 . 2 
I 
3.35 4 . 5 
Other machines ...•. .. ... 
I 
9.7 5.5 12 . 2 I 21.1 11.9 10.3 15 . 0 10.8 I 11.5 13.2 23 . 2 20.5 
Total . .... . ....... . .. .. . 100.0 1oo. o l 1oo.o 100.0 100.0 100.0 100 .0 1100.0 100.0 100 . 0 100.0 lloo .o 
Source: 1930-1931 , c~culated f rom Table SA ;x . 
1932-.~.941 , Zhed ',M.S. , Voprosy ekonom.iki stankoinstrumental 'noi promyshlennosti,M.,l946 ,pl4. 
SA,20 
c ne Tools i n Production,1932-194o 
( end of year totals) 
_ !!umber of types and sizes produced!---
Enterprises of: TotalsAll S pee i al i sed 'Planned~ndustry l Year Industry Total mc .tool Defence Other S,+'P' produced 
( 1) (2) (3) (4) ( 5) 
! 1932 --26 14 I 
-
13 53 
1933 38 14 25 ?? $30 
I 19J4 70 25 35 130 151 
1935 90 32 43 165(1)5) 201 
1936 112 25 48 1S35 220 
1937 150 25 35 210(190) 250 
1938 175 30 35 240 300 
1))9 230 35 40 305 380 
1q4o 320 30 30 3~0(360) 500 
l .Zxcludes ~11 unit-construction m~chine tools built by 'Stankokonstruktsiya' 
and TsrT , and other special machines built on a one- of f basis .These are 
included in (5). 
{,. )alternative total. 
Source 1 
( 1) , (2),(3) and (4) - es timates based on data of catalogues, price lists and 
other sources. Basic sourcesJ 
1932- Stanki,M.,t932; 1933,34,35 - MetAllorezhus~chie stanki proizvodstva 
zavodov SSSR ,M-L.,1935 ;19)6- 40- Preiskuranty f or 1936 ,37 ,38 ,40-41 . 
Ad1ition~l evidence: 
(1) 1932 - 26 , Stennogrammy •. ,op ci t , p .182; 1937 - 150-160 , mid-1937, 511,1937 
No .12 ,p.3 ; 1940 - 32n , Penkov , P,,~tt1e tipazha vyousk "'etallor ezhusnchikh 
stankov •. ,195~ . p .16 . 
(4) 1935- 155, Zain~ ., 6 ,4. 36r 1937 - 190 , Flanovoe kbozya1stvo, 1939,No. 9 , p.42; 
1940 - )60 ,Mekhanizatsiya 1 avtomatizatsiya pro1zvodstva , 1 96~ ,No.8,pp.21-22 . 
~~o te - this SO'li'rce~ives a total of 141 un1 t -constr.uct lon ana special types 
and sizes 1n 1940 . 
{5) 1933 ,34- Prob ,ek.,1 9'35 ,No .4, p. 203 ; 1935- ~,tQ)6 ,No . l , p . 54; 1936- est.; 
1937- est.,supported by tar~et of 250 , as se~n mid-19)7,Sii ,19J7,no .12 , p . Ji 
193~ - Plan .khoz ,, 193q ,N o , 9 , p . 38 : 1939 - est. - 400 1n Feb .1940 , !-1ashlnostrom1.~ 
15.2 .40; 1940 - Pl an . khoz.,1944,No .2 , p .30 . 
550 
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T~ Growth of the 'T1.oazh' - the ~.umber of New Ty es and Stzes Buil ~, 
1 Q32 - 1Q40* 
li ll:! · ,. · o"" .., ew t - ~ ·· ypes and sizes bull t 1.n each year 
'Planned' Total - all Specialised t1ach1ne Tool Industry 
Excluding unit-1 Including unit- Enterprises new types-
constrn . mc . ts . ccnstrn . mc.ts . l Year sizes 
Plan ActU?.l Plan Actual Plan Actual Plan Actual 
I 
19.32 15 8 15 8 • . . I . 
l93'3 22 20 22 20 . r 
. 
I l 19)4 49 42 49 42 . . 
1935 50-53 ;6 . . 47-50 83 100 .35.32 
1936 . • 66 58 73 l 139 l 
t9J7 125 78 164 114 . • 
19.36 205 . 277 . . • . . 
19.39 155 78 207 1.30 
, . . . 
1 0 148 94 . 147 . • . . 
• ote - dala should be treated witb caution because during the period the building 
of a new type frequently 1neant just ·the making of a prototype , not. the 
assimilation of serial production • 
• not available . 
t. or 19.3~-40 types and sizes built by ' Stanltokonstruktol.yn' (matnly unit. 
constr11ctton) were accounted separately . 
2. Including ?.22 at NKTF enterprises, 19.3.3- 19)6 . (~!!!_1 ,,26 . 2 .1937) 
4)2- 15 , §J:!,19JZ,No . 2 , p . 2 ; S, §.!!,1935, .o . 10, p . l. 
11- 22,St! , 19)4,1 o .4, p .1 ; 20 , Aizenshtadt & Chikhachev , p.226 . 
- 49 ,Sti ,19J4,No .4 , p .J ; 42,Aizenshtadt & Ch1khachev , p.226 . 
9)5- 50 ,SU,1935 ,No . t , p .6; 5J ,Si.I ,19)5,No .10, p.1 1 J6 , A1zens~tadt & Chikhachev, 
p.226i 4?-50.(Total less 50- 53) ;100 ,zalnd .,26 .; .;6. 
11)6 - 66 .~, 19J6 ,.l o .1 , p . 54• 56 , Atzenshtad t & Chl<hnchev , p .22' ; 7.l , Total less 66) 
139 . Zalnn .,6 .4 . 36 . I )7 - 125 , \ !64 1 ess 39 11-c)Plan .Kboz .,19)7 ,No.1 , p .27; ?8, { 114 less Jb 11-c), . 
Granovskii,E .,AvtoMaticheskaya s1stPma mash1n v promvshlennost1 sssn , ,1939. 
p . ?.56 ; !64, P19n .khoz.,19J7 .~o . 1 , p . 2J; 114 , Air.enshtadt & Chikhachev,p .226. 
)-37 - 83 , Aizcnshtadt & Ch!.khachev , p .219 ; 3.5.3 , (270 plus 83). 
t~1 -205, (277 less 72 u-c),Plan.khoz .,193B,No.5,p.22; 2?? .~· 
19- 155 , Mash1nostroenle , t~:t:40; 207 , 155 plus 52 to be built ny ' StSt .' , 
Maehtnostrottel' , 19J9,No . l ,p .4 J 78 , Mnsh1nostroen\e , j .4 .40; t)O,Pravda, 
F.z-:41. - 148, Kas ' yanenko ,V .1 .,Zavowanie .. , oo cit ,p .198; 94 .~ .; 147 ,Pravdo.,21 .2 .41 . 
j 
I 
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Table SA .XIII 
THE THANSITION FROM OLD TO NE~ MODELS , 1928/29 - 1933 
Main factories of Stankoob"edinenie 
1 . 'Krasny1 Proletar11' 
I Model 1928/29 ' 1929/30 1931 1932 1 1933 I 
Shaping me. X I X 
Threading me • X I 
1 Planing me. X I I i I Slotting me. X I Drilling me.(SV-40) X X 
Lathe (TV-2) X I X I 
Lathe (TN -15) X X x(1239) X(12.>Y) x( (350) 
. Lathe (TN -20) x(127) x( 951) x( 1094)1 x(1302) 
Lathe (DIP-200) • l25) •(49.5+) 
I 
•(30+) 
•(2) 
11(12) 
-
3 6 
1 4 
Lathe (DIP-300) 
Gear-cutt ing me. 
Multi-tool lathe(MT-~0) J 
Total number of models 7 5 2 
1 J 
inc • new models 
2.1m.Sverdlova 
[ Model 11928/29 1929/30 1931 I 1932 1933 
Shaping me. I x{29) x(20) 
Drilling me .(rad1al) x(1) x(t6) 
Tool grinding me. 
I 
x(32) x(30) 
Slotting me. x(20) 
Grinding me. ('Fortuna') 11(43) 
Lathe (TV-25) I x(237) x(394) x(593) x(399) X 
Horiz. boring me . (R80) 11(7) • (67) a(87) 
Plan 1ng me • ( 3PS ) • (1) ·~28) 
I 
I 
Planing mc.(2PS) I G24l_ Threading me for pipe couplings (911) 
- - ,_ -r--
I Total number of models 4 6 2 3 
5 
1 1 2 4 inc. new models -- - --
Total annual output (299) (524) (605) 
(474) 
~------L--------
J 
:J,1a.Lenina 
Model 
Lathe (TV- 220) 
Plan tng ( PS) 
Threading mc.(old) 
Threading mc .(507) 
1928/29 
x(135) 
x(26) 
x(427) 
P1pe threading mc.(912) 
Drilling mc.(l)nm) 
Dr1111ng mc . (65m•) 
Drlll1n~ mc . 2spd.(18mm) 
Drilling mc. 4spd.(18mm) 
Drilling mc.1spd . (30mm) 
Drilling mc . (50mm) L -
Total nW1\ber of models 5 
inc .new models J 
Total annual output (803) 
4. 1 Suotochka 1 
SA.23 
1929/30 
x( 325) 
x(75) 
x(266) 
•(10) 
1~11) 
X 
6 
1 
( 1437) 
~-
Model ----~1-19_2~/ 29 11929/30 
Lathe (T- tqo) x(11) x(90) 
Shapin~ (Sh-3) x(144) x(253) 
Shaping (Sh- JModzn . ) 
Shaping (Sh- 5) J 
Slotting (D-1) ,- 1_
2 Total number of morlels 2 ll 
S52 
Table SA .XIII cont. 
1931 -+-:?32 - --i,i--1-9_33_----4 
x(2S8) I x(4) 
x(131) x(129) x(27) 
x(405) x(484) 
•(59) •(379} 
8 
J 
(3459) 
1931 
x(80) 
x(6?6) 
: r (1241) 
•(6) 
•(60) 
•(945) 
•(2) 
•(144) 
•{1) 
e 7 
4 6 
-~-t-._...,.------
(2203) (1666) 
1932 
x(192) 
•( 535) 
•( 16) 
•(71~) 
a(t) 
•(67) 
( 155) Total annual output 
inc . new models 
j 
2 ; ~ 
(343)---l __ <_?ss_ > ____ <7_33_> D 7s-s+Tl 
I,_ Model; 1928/29 Sharpening me . - l x(~) I Drilling mc.(40mm) x(1~8) 
Lathe(20~m h.of c . ) x(14) 
Lathe(TV - 155) x(Z89) 
Lathe(TB- 200) 
Thread- milling me.( .563) 
'1929/30 
x(215) 
x( 39) 
x(730) 
I Metal saw ( ~40) 
.. t---
Total number of models ~ 3 
inc. new models 
--~ 
~Total annual output - (579) 
f 19.3t 
x(14.SJ) 
r 1 
19)2 I 1933 
X X 
•(48) •(225) 
•(8) 
•(1) 
2 4 
1 3 
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6, 1 Koasoaol ets 1 Table SA .~III c ont. 
Model 
Shaping mc . (Sh-40) 
lathe(TV- 20) 
Co~bined mc . (190) 
Gear-cutting rnc.(5J2) 
r 
Total nuaber of models 
inc. new models 
1929/JO 
x( 159) 
x(103) 
2 
x(462) 
x(2) 
•(1 ) 
J 
1 
1932 
x(2) 
X 
•(JO) 
J 
1 t----------l.- __ I 
Total annual output (107) - (262) --t---:-(46_5_)-l--~~ 
19JJ 
X 
•(132) 
• (14) 
3 
2 
(417) 
- ·- ------J 
Hew Factories 
7 .la .Ordzhon lkidze 
Model j 192~/29 I 1929/JO 19.31 
r-------------4-~~--~ 
Turret lathe ( 1J6) I 
------~------~----Total nw:tber of models 
Semt-auto. ( 114) t 
Total annual -o~u~t~p~u_t-_-:'L-1-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-_-:_:-_-_-_~-------L...~---.L 
B.Gor 1 kU mllllnll machine 
Model 
Un1vl .m111ln~(692) 
Hor1z .milling( 6G82) 
1 brt.x~~ 
Total number of models 
~-
~ 1929/30 1931 
l 
Total annual output -~ 
~--------------~--------~--------~------~ 
9 .Khar 1 kov ia.Molotova 
Model 
Rad 1al-dr111lnp; me. (?56) 
Crlndln! mc .(3A12) 
Total number of models 
Total annual output 
1929/JO 1931 
l 
19.32 
•(J6) 
1 
(28) 
19JJ 
1933 .. 
• h 4t8) 
1932 --r 19JJ 
•(1) 
• (1) 
2 
{h) 
x production of an old model, defined aa a pre-1926 des~ and/or a des~£n 
fn111nQ' well below the prevailinY. technical level of machine tool building 
of the period • 
• production of a new model corresponding to the prevailing ~orld technical 
level of machine tool building . 
( ••. ) annu~l output of a given model. 
'• in some cases total output includes a small number of miscellaneous and 
epecial aach1nes not covered by the models liat.ed. 
+ 
J 
Suae.ary 
a.Old Factories 
Nu'lber of Models 
Inc . ·ew Modele 
Propn .New Models(") 
Output 
Old Models (units) 
~ew Models (units) 
- -
Total Output (") 
Propn .Hew Models(~) 
b.Hew Factories 
Nu..ber of New Hodels 
24 
0 
0 
2552 
0 
2.552 
0 
-+--
Output of Hew ~lodels( units) 
SA,25 
24 
4796 
53 
4849 
1.1 
2 
c .All Factories of Stankoob"edinenle 
Nuaber of Models 
Inc.New Models 
Propn.New Models(~) 
Cutout (units) 
Old Models 
New Modele 
-~---
Total.Outp,ut 
Propn .New Models(~) 
24 
0 
0 
2552 
0 
25.52 
0 
Output per Model (units) 
Old Models 
New Models 
Annual Chanp:e a 
Old Models W 1 thdrawn 
t~ew Models Introduced j 
to6 
0 
24 
2 
8 .3 
4796 
53 
4'349 
1.1 
218 
27 
2 
2 
18 
5 
27 .8 
8890 
72 
8962 
o.a 
0 
0 
18 
5 
27 .8 
8890 
72 
8962 
0.8 
684 
t4 
9 
3 
Table SA .XIII corrt. 
1932 
22 
11 
50 .0 
6147 
1099 
7246 
1.).2 
2 
24 
1J 
54.2 
6147 
1164 
7311 
15. 9 
5.59 
90 
2 
8 
1933 
28 
22 
78.6 
2727 
3480 
6207 
:56.1 
6 
888 
J4 
28 
82 .4 
2727 
4)68 
7095 
61.6 
.5 
1.5 I 
+ 
19)4• 
47 
4) 
91.5 
2000 
4410 
6410 
68.8 
13 
1190 
60 
56 
9J .J 
2000 
.5600 
7600 
7J.? 
500 
100 
2 
28 
*The detailed dat~ on models and output presented for 1928/29 - 1933 are not 
available for 19J4.Thls column presents eGt1mates based on the limited 
information av~ilable . 
Source 1 
Compiled from a wide r~n«e o~ diverse sources , but pr1mar1ly:Lebyachenko,19)2; 
Tsa!urlya , ~l . ,Osvoenle no;ykh prednr1yat11. .,1934; Tyazhelaya pro::~yshlennost' 
SSSR v.a 1931-J4,::,q1935sStank1,kataloR,19J2;A1v.enshtadt and Chikhachev; Slavnye 
traditsH. 
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Table SA .XIV 
YEAR OF F"I.ttST SOVIET PrlODUCTION OF THE ?1AIN TYPES OF l'lAGHIN~ TOOL 
Type 
Lathes 
Centre- toolroom* 
Multi- tool 
Relieving 
Precision ( ' Sip' ) 
Crankshaft 
Combined mc . tool 
Vertical Turnin~ & 
Boring Mill 
Turret Lathe* 
Automatics & Semi-
Automatics 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1934 
1936 
1932 
1936 
1932 
Single-spindle auto 1934 
Four- spindle auto 1936 
Six- spindle auto 1939 
Single-spindle s-a 1934 
Four- spindle s-a 1937 
Six-soindle s-a (19J8) 
Vertical Six- spdl. s - a 1937 
Drilling HachL'1es 
'/ertical* 
Radial* 
Boring i achi!1es 
Horizontal* 
Diamond- boring 
1931 
1934 
1931 
1938 
t-1odel 
1D62 
173 
181 
t612P 
187 
190 
152 
136 
1110 
123 
126 
114 
123A 
127 
1283 
221 
262 
Factory 
' Krasnyi Proletarii' 
II 
" 
im.Voskova 
tKrasnyi Proletarii' 
' .Komsomolets ' 
' Stankokonstruktsiya' 
im .Ordzhonikidze 
1m .Frunze (P~nza) ,1: o. 50 
im .Ordzhonikldze 
im.Gor ' kogo 
im.Ordzhonikidze 
II 
im.Gor' kogo 
'Krasnyi Proletarii ' 
im,Lenina 
im.t1olotova 
im .Sverdlova 
im .Lenina 
I 2 
Szd/Mty . 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd+ 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Mty 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
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Table SA .XIV cont. 
Type I Year T Model 1 Factory ' Szd/H-tY. 1 
Disc Saws 1933 860 1m.TsK Mash .• 
C en lr tr-.v. Machines 19]4 2~31 'K.ramy1 Proletari:i. I 
f 
Unit- construction 
~;achines 1934 24 spdl. I Stankokonetruktsiya ~1 
Notes 
l .Year first example built . 
2 .Szd . - factory of the specialised machine tool industry . 
~ty . - military factory . 
Szd 
Szd 
Szd 
* first modern model . Previous Soviet products of thls type of pre-.ar 
(1914) desiun or prioitive , sio~le models . 
+ tooling factory of the speci .J.ized machine tool-tooling industry . 
( ... )a proximRte . 
Source a 
Compiled fr.om a wide range of diverse sources , pr\marlly catalogues , 
pr1oe 11.sts, newspapPrsand journals. Main 'book eoutces Lebyachenko , 
A17.enshtadt and Chi khachev , ann ~actory hietoriee. 
J 
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Table SA . XV 
ORIGIN OF THE HAIN TYPES OF MACHINE 'l'OOLS BUILT IN THE U.S.S.n . 
Factory 
A.Lathes 
Year 
Introduced 
t. 1m.TsK Mash . 1927 
2, in .sverdlova 1928 
3. Izhevsk 1928 
4, 'Kommtmar' 
5, 'K.P . ' 
6. Izhevsk 
7. 'K .P. I 
8. im .Dzerzh , 
9. 'K.P . ' 
10.!K.J?·. I • • 
11.1m. Voskova 
1929 
1929/30 
1931 
1932 
1932/33 
1933 
193, 
1934 
12 . im .TsK I>Iash. 1934 
1) . 'Kommunar ' 1934 
t4.Izhevsk 
15.'K .P.' 
16.'K .P. ' 
i7. 'K .P' ' 
. 
18. 'Kommunar' 
19 . 'K .P ~ 
1934/35 
1934/35 
1934/35 
1937 
1938 
1940 
Soviet hodel 
TV- 155 centre lathe 
TV - 25 centre lathe 
RUZh centre lathe 
K- 29 centre lathe 
TN -15JTN-20 c . -1 . 
161 ('Udrnurt ' ) c .-1 . 
1D62 ( ' DIP ' ) c .-1 . 
Foreign Model 
'Braun ' 
'Loewe' 
'American Tool ' 
'V .D .F .' 
Country 
of Origin 
Germany 
Germany 
Germany 
Soviet 
USA? 
USA 
Germany 
1P613{TV-13) precision 'Boley u .Leinen ' Germany 
172; 173 ( MT- 20&: 30) stub 1. ' Sundstrand ' USA 
1D63 ( ' DIP ' ) c .-1. ' V .D.F . ' Germany 
503 (PVT-3) precision 'Sip' Switzerland 
162SP c .-1.( modsd .TV155, 
1K61? c . -l . (modsd.K- 29) 
161A & rante(mod . 161) 
181 relieving lathe ' Reinecker' 
1D64 & 1D65 c . -1. ' V .D .F .' 
162K (t1o .26) c .-1.) ' honarch' 
1618 & range 
No28 c . -1 . 
G./Soviet 
Soviet 
USA/Soviet 
Germany 
Germany 
USA 
Soviet 
Soviet? 
SA.30 
f Year 
1 Introduced Factory Soviet l'!odel 
C.Seai-automatics and Automatics 
1. 1a Fnmze 19)4 1110;1118 lspdl . uto. 
2 . iJD .Ordzh . 1934 114 semi-auto. 1spdl. 
) . 1JI .Ordzh. 1935 116 semi-auto . lspdl . 
4. ill .Ordzh. 1936 118 se:li- ut.o. lspdl. . 
.5· tm.Ordzh • 1936/37 123a126 4spdJ. • auto . 
6. ' K.P.' 1938 1283 vert1 .6 spdl .s . -a. 
7. Kiev 1939/40 1124a1136 lspdl . uto . 
8. L.turrets 
& autos . 1940 lll alltP 1spdl .auto . 
D .Dr1111nJl: Machi nes 
1.1a.Sverdlova 1929 riadial dr1ll1n c. 
2 .1m.~1na 1932 221 vertical 18nm . 
.3 . Kbar ' kov 1933/34 256 rad.lal 
4 ,1m .Len1na 193a 213 vcrt.icnl 30 
S.im.Lenina 1934 215 ve tical 50m 
6 . 1m .Len ina 1935/36 2125 J2135a2150 a2175 v. 
? .Kha.r'kov 1935/36 2AS6 & ran~r.e radial 
S.Khar ' kov 1940 A-) ult1-spdl.un1t en . 
9 .m. VoroshU-
ova ,tUnsk 1941 2535 ra 1&1 
E .Boring I achines 
1 . il!l .Sverdlova 1932 262 (R-80) 80Ul hor1z . 
2 .1m.Sverd1ova 1934 261 (R-60) COm: hor • 
J . ia .Sverdl.ova 1935 263 (R-1 10) 110nm hor1 • 
4 . im .Sve.nU.ova 1939/40 262A;26)A 80 & 110ln h . 
lac nines 
1.Tul.a 19J1 681 ,6S1G ( 'Ih-.cnhln t ') 
2 .Gor ' k11 1932 6o82 a682;612 
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Table SA .IV cont. 
Foreign odel 
• Index • ( Hah:l • Kolb) 
'Scheu' 
'Fay ' (Jones 
'Fay' (Jones Laason) 
'Cone' 
I BullArd. 
'Tor.nos' 
'C1.nc1nn t1- 1ckford' 
' Av y' 
• 1nc1nn t1-B1ck ord' 
'01nc1n at1-B1ckford' 
' l~d SchUtt " 
' in; sbury' 
'Union' 
'C1nc1Lnat1' 
'C1ncltm U' 
Country 
o! Origin 
Ger=any 
Cercacy 
USA 
CSA 
USA 
Sv1t. erlan 
Sov1.8t 
u 
u .• 
1 
t~ 
r I Factory 
J ,Gor ' kii 
4. Gor ' kii 
5, Gor ' kii 
1 Year 
lrn troduced 
1934 
1934/35 
1934/35 
6. im ,TsK.Mash 1936 
I 7. Tula. 1936 
SA .31 
Soviet I odel 
680t•1 ;61 0 ;680 
6G83;683 
655;665 plano- ~il1er 
561 thread miller 
651 plano-~l, er 
6441 copy miller 
560 
Table SA . XV cont. 
Foreign Model 
' C lncinnati ' 
'Cincinnati'? 
'Cincinnati ' ? 
' Wanderer ' 
6ountry 
of Origin 
-·-
USA 
USA? 
USA? 
Germany 
Soviet 
Soviet , 8.im.Sve:r<Uova[ 1940 
j-------~----~------------------~--------4------
G .Grinding ~. achines 
1. im .Sverdlova 1929 
2.Tula 1934/35 
).Lugansk,No60 1934 
4.Lugansk No60 1934/35 
5 .Khar ' kov & 
Zlatoust 1935 
6.Khar ' kov 1936 
? .Khar ' kov 1936 
8 . im . Il ' icha 1936 
9 . 1m Kalin ina 1936/37 
& Samatochka 
10.lha.r ' kov 1936/37 
11 . 1m.Karl a 
Liebknekht 1937/38 
12 .Khar ' kov 1939 
Lniversal grinder 
3181 centreles . grdr . 
JV12 universal grdr . 
3G12 universal grdr. 
~A12 universal grdr . 
342 crankshaft grdr. 
352 aplined shaft grdr . 
3A64 tool and cutter grdr . 
372 surface grdr . 
316 &· range , universal grdr . 
585 thread grinder 
3A15 & range ,universal grdr. 
13.LuP"ansk No6C 1935/39 324A ;325 internal grdr . 
& Stankonom ' 
J.I,Gear Cutting l'!achines 
1~Komsomolets ' 1933 532 gear milling me. 
2 .' K. P . '& 1935 512 gear slotting me . 
im .Kalin ina 
3 . ' Komsomol ets' 1936 534gear millin~ me. 
' Fortuna ' Ger!ilally 
'Cincinnati' USA 
'Churchill' U.K. 
' Fritz erner' Germany 
'Fortuna' Germany 
' Landis' USA 
'Fritz Ylerner' Germany 
'Cincinnati ' USA 
' Nor ton ' USA 
Soviet 
' Lindner ' ? Geraany? 
Soviet 
'Aeald ' USA 
' Pfauter' Germnay 
'Fellows ' USA 
'B~ ber-Col ~an ' • USA 
SA. )2 
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Tabl e SA .XV coot. 
Year Cou."ltry 
5'actor y Introduced Sov iet Model Foreign l·~odel of Crigin 
I 
I ,Pl an inS!' ~!achines 
L i m .Sver dlova 1932 713 (3-PS) ' B~Hr.lnger ' GerL!'.any 
2.:\.m .Sverdlova 1933 712 (2-PS) ' B~hringer ' GerLll!Uly 
) , im .Sverdlova 1940 ~·~1 ; 7A1)2 ; 7A142 Soviet 
i 
I J .ShaEing ~achines 
1. ' Samotoc hka ' 11933 736 (Sh- 5) . Soviet 
K.Sl otting t·.achlnes 
1. ' Samotoc hka. ' 1932 741 (D-1) ' Rav~nburg ' Germany 
2. 'Samotochka ' 1934 742 (D-2) ' Butler ' U.K. 
L.Other Nachines 
1.im.Len1na 1931 507 threading me . ' Landis' USA 
2. ' h.omsomolets ' 1932 190 combined me . ' !l'.rause ' Gerl!Wly 
3. im .TsK .r•1ash . 1933 P60 disc saw ' Heller' Car many 
4 . im.Sedina 1937 152 vertical boring miU Soviet 
5. im .Lenina 1938/39 915 pipe threading Soviet 
6. im .Sedina. 1940 155; 156 vert . borlng m1ll ' Schiess-Defries ' Germany 
--
Source 1 See next oag e. 
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Table SA .XV 
Sources, 
The following sources refer only to the 1ndentif1cat1on of the foreign 
models concerned . 
A.Lathes 
1.Lebyachenko,p2?. 
2.15 let bor'by za sovetskoe masunostroeni&,p46. 
).Izvest1ya , 21-?- 30. 
4.Kostsov, V .P. ;Vantsak,B.S . ,Puty~:~m1 otsov ,Khar' kov, 1965,p23. 
5.From tllustrat1ons . 
6 .Izvest1ya , 21-?- 30. 
7 .Zaind. ,1-5- 31. 
B.SU , 1933,No1 ,p? . 
9.S1l,1934,No4 , p1 . 
10.Same range as 1~62. 
11.Za!nd .,19- 10-34. 
12.Bespalov,V .,Bol ' shaya zhizn' ,!u1byshev ,1949,p21. 
13.Kost sov,V .P . , Vantsak ,B.S. , op cit , pJO. 
14.Zaind.,24-9-34aOrgan1zats~a upravlen1ya ,19J4 ,No1 , p95 · 
15.Problemy ekonomlk1,1934,N ,p139JMachinist,16-2-J5,p40E. 
t6.as 10. 
17.Plan.Kboz.,193?,No?,p42. 
18.Kostsov & Vantsak,pp c1t,p)3 . 
19 •ill, 1940,No10 ,pt8 . 
B. Turret La thea 
1.KhotHmk11., I. ,Spets1al1zats1ya 1 kooperirovanie mashinostroeniya v pervoi 
pya e,M.-L.,193J, p291. 
2.Za!nd.,29-10-J2. 
3 .su ,1933,No1 ,p7. 
4.Sii, 1933 ,Not , p6. 
C.Semi-autos and automatics 
1.Zalnd.,22-?-34. 
2 .Za!nd., 9-5- 35. 
) .Machinist,4-J-34. 
4.Masb1nostroen1e , 28-1 t - J9 . 
6.Zaind,9- 5-35;Mash1nostroen1e, 28-11 - 39. 
6. Ident1f1ed from contempor ary photographs . 
? .Economic ~urvey of t he USSR ,1936 ,May,pp36-3? . 
8 .Sil,1939,No10- 11 , Pp9- 10. 
D.Drllling Machines 
t .A izenshtadt & Ch1khachev ,p175· 
2 .Zaind. ,1- .5- 31. 
3 .Zalnd . , 24-5-34 . 
4.Zaind.,1- 5- 31 . 
5 .Za!nd.,6-t-34. 
6 .M~shinostroen1e , 18-3-40. 
1~Khar'kovsk11 atankostro1tel'ny1., op cit ,pt? . 
8.1b1d ,pp4J -44 . ~ ?5 
9 .Bogushev1ch ,Yu.K. aGrebenntkov ,D.G. ,Im. 11el1kogo Oktyabrya,M1.nsk , bv7 ,p · 
E.Boring Machines 
1.15let bor'by za sovetskoe~hinostrie,op cit,p50 . 
2.Bor1s~v & Vas1l'ev ,op cit,p153 . 
) .Za!nd.,15-2- )5 . 
4.Borisov & Vae1l ' ev , on cit , p176 . 
F .Milling !liachines 
1 .Pravda , 3-4-J 1 • 
2.Front Nauka 1 Tekhnika,19J2 ,No2 , p22 . 
SA.)4 
Source Table SA . XV cont .: 
) . Identified from contemporary photographs. 
4. Identiflerl frcm conte~po=ary photographs . 
5.Ident1f1ed fro:a contrmporary photogr!'\phs . 
6 ,S1I ,1934,Not ,p4 . 
? .Zaind .,24-2- 36 . 
8 .Borisov & Vas1l ' ev, p177 . 
Gr1nd1n.r Machines 
t ,Aizenshtadt & Chikhachev ,p1?5 . 
2 .Zaind . ,24-2-36 . 
3 .Zalnd.,12- 4-J4 . 
4. i b1d: 
5 .Zaind. ,22- 6- J4. 
6 .1bid . 
?.1b1d . 
8.Zaind .,2?- 2-36 
9 .S1I ,19)6.No8 . p5. 
10~har ' kovsk11 stankostroitel'ny1 ,p1? . 
11.Iaplied by Aviapromyshlenaost• ,19JS ,No6 ,p29. 
12.Khar ' kovski1 st~kostroitel ' ny1 , p)5 . 
1J .Za!nd .,12- 4-J4 . 
H .Gear-cutt ing Machires 
1.SU , 19JJ ,Not , p6 . 
2 .S1I , 1934,No4, p1 a¥oprosv 1stor11 ,19?0,No10,p120. 
) .PrOblemy ekonom1k1 , 1936,no4,p58 . 
! .Planing Machines 
t.Zaind. , 1- 5- 31. 
2 .C1osely related to 71) . 
J .ShaPin~ Machines 
1.Zalnd .,15-9- JJ . 
K.Sl ott1ng Machines 
1.Zaind . , 1- 5-31 
2 .zalnd • , 14- 9- 34 
L .Other Machines 
1.Lebyachenko ,p2J 
2 .Pravda ,7- 11- 31 
3 .S1I , 19J4,No4,pl 
4 .za-Ind .,1?- 5- 36 
5 .SU ,194? ,No11 , p11 nr.. 
6 .SOlet Krasnodarsk11 stankostro1 tel ' ny 1. ,Krasnodar , 17U1 ,p55 • 
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Table SA .XVI 
Soviet Metal-cuttin~ Lachine tool Imnorts 1913 - 1940 
l-iac'"line tool imports in terms of 1 I Value Weight N um be-:- of 
Year ( ' 000 rubles) ( tonnes) Value I Units per Unit(r . ) 
1913 12 ,788 18,689 
1921 9 16 
1921/22 19 33 
1922/23 26) 39J I 
192)/24 798 1 ,193 I 
I 1924/25 4 ,)12 2 ,826 
192$/26 6, )29 4,863 
1926/27 19,429 16,471 
1927/28 20 , 046 16 ,)58 
1928(4thQ) 3 ,119 1,787 
1929 16, 275 9,602 .5,000 ) , 2.55 
1930 41 , 466 2) ,165 9,000 4,607 
1931 85 , 225 52 ,)74 14, 000 6 ,088 
1932 82,256 60 ,947 12,000 6,8.5.5 
1933 38 ,6)4 39 ,500 7,746 4 ,988 
1934 14, 184 11 ,455 4, 398 ;,22.5 
1935 1),667 lJ ' ,560 ) ,)74 4,051 
1936 40 , ))6 '"~5 , 321 8,157 4,945 
1937 2) ,561 25 ,375 ) ,916 6 ,017 
1938 43 ,770 JJ,8JO 6 ,0?8 7,201 
1939 39 ,195 40,197 3,458 11,335 
1940 .J3 , 166 22,201 4, 589 (9 ,274~ ?.221 
J 
Source :a . 1913-1927/23:Vneshnyaya t oraovlya SdSH za 1918-1949§ ,M.,1960,pp204,2J7, 
8c 269 .Note: "t.h.ls s~ri.es includes sooe l:t.e~s '$,fh1ch ra-e not str1ct.ly 
metal-cutting m~chine tools . 
b.1928( 4th;() -1932, Voznes~nskii ,A .N. ;Voloshinsk11. , A .~ . ( eds . ) , Ynes!tnyara 
tor"ovlya SSSR za pervuvu pvatiletku,M .• 19JJ,ppJ08-J.Q9.l•oi.e:cetal-
cut-ing machines only, t herefore not d11·ectly co~parable ~lth previous 
years .Dat a on these years given in source a . are inflate:! by the 
inclusion of non- netal-cutt1ng machine tool 1ten. Un1tst~ . ,2) .6 . JJ. 
c .1933- 1940: as a , , pp3)4 , ;.68 , & 402. ~: ca iegor1es were revised 1n 19Jb; 
data for 1934-1940 believed to be conparaole with 1929(4t ) -t9J2 . 
d .1940( 9,274): al ternat!ve given by l\.as' yanenKo, V.I. ,'Ze.vcev tnie cko:ta:Uch-
eskol nezavisi-osti SSSR,M .,1972 , p299· 
Value per un i t calculated from nuaber of unlts and value. 
' 
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Machine tool Inmorts as a !ro-oor tion of all Nachlnery and Equipment 
Im-oorts and Total Imports(per cent) 
Machine tool im-oorts as a orouortion ·of& I t-tachinery and Flq ' ment 
1 r~acniriary and .t!.q • oe~t Total Imports as a propn. 
Year Imports Imports of Total Imports 
1913 5 . 59 0.9J 16.6 
1922/23 0 .83 0,18 21.0 
1923/24 2 . 57 0 .)4 1) .3 
1924/25 4 .37 0.60 13.7 
1925/26 4 .07 0.84 20 .6 
1926/2? 12. 37 2 .72 22 . 0 
1927/28 8 .87 2 .12 2).9 
192~(4thQ) 6 .32 1.53 24.2 
1929 6 .14 1.85 )0 .1 
1930 8 • .3? 3.92 46 .8 
1931 14.)1 7.?1 53 .9 
1932 21 . 00 11 .68 55 .7 
1933 25 .80 11 .09 4) .0 
1934 24.)6 6 ,10 2., .0 
1935 24 .05 5.66 2) .5 
1936 )) . 52 1) .o6 
)9 .0 
1937 29 .49 8.08 
27 .4 
1938 40 . 52 1).99 
)4.5 
1939 47 . )8 18.35 
38.? 
1940 32 .)5 10.48 
32.4 
Source ' ~tachine tool 1. .oorts - :roill Table . s - Vneshnvc.ya 
f.lachinery and equip·1ent i:roorts . t:u1d total import ~ .r: &. 
Torr!l·ovlya. SSSR za 1918-1940.;z:~ , pp 204 ,237 .269 , 301.).,~4, )o8 & 02, 
Percentages calculated. 
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Table SA .X7Ill 
The Level of Iapert Dependence 1929 - 1940 
Year 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
FYP(l) 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
' Me .t .IIlports ' Domestic Prodn. 'l Iaports as Propo . 
of total supply(~) (units) {unite) 
5,000 (5,000) 1 (50.0) 
9,000 
14,000 
12,000 
40,000 
7,?46 
4,398 
3,3?4 
8,15? 
3,916 
l 
(9,250) 
18,317 
19,720 
52,28? 
20,998 
25,400 
(49.)) 
43.3 
37.8 
43.3 
---....;---
26.9 
14.8 
I 33.900 9.1 
I 
44,400 15.6 
48,473 ?.5 
f---
I 
----~---------4-------~ 
FYP(2) 27,591 173,171 13.7 
i-- - --
Source a 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1938-40 
6,078 
3,458 
4,589 
14,125 
Imports - from Table SA.XVI. 
55,500 
55,035 
.5g,4?3 
169,008 
9.9 
5.9 
7.3 
·~~·----
?.? 
Domesttc Production- from Table SA .I. 
liote - 1929 and 19)0 Output estlaated from 
known economic year totals. 
SA.38 
Import Dependence by Type of Machine Tool 1936-37~ Table SA.XIX 
Imports 1936 Domestic Prodn. Ra tie a Imperts 
Type of Machine (units) 1937 (units) te Domestic Prdn. 
Shaping me. 24 3172 o.oo8 
Vertical drilling me. 679 12235 0.055 
Lathes 1767 15202 0.116 
Tool & cutter grg.mc. 288 2045 0.141 
Slotting me. 50 250 0.200 
Turret lathes 3BZ 1806 0.212 
Milling me. 699 3243 0.216 
Planing me. 80 303 0.264 
Horiz.boring me. 57 131 0.435 
Autes.& semiautos. 407 894 0.455 
Broaching me • 28 44 0.636 
Grinding ac. 1307 1839 0.711 
Radial drill.ing me. 462 585 0.790 
Gear-cutting me. 599 397 1.509 
Sourceaimports 1936 ~ Statistika vneshnei torgevlya, 1936,Ne.12,pp99-101. 
Prodn. 1937 -Table SA.VII. 
1. Fully cemparable data only available for impor t s in 1936 and S wiet 
demestic output in 1937. Actual dependence for all types aust have 
been higher than indicated in 1936, butlewer in 1937. 
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Table SA .XX 
The Structure of Machine Tool Imports by Country of Origin 
(as a percentage of total imports) 
Germany U.S.A. Britain Other 
Year Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value Weight Value 
1913 80 . 3 83.3 3.3 3.0 11.5 9.4 4 . 9 4.3 
1924/25 31.2 27.1 16.1 18 . 4 36 . 1 36 .0 16.6 18.5 
1925/26 55.7 52 . 8 9 . 9 12 . 0 17.7 17 . 2 16.7 18 .0 
1926/27 69.8 64.3 2.9 5 .0 1.9 2 . 5 25.4 28 . 2 
1927/28 70.1 62.9 4.1 6 . 8 0.9 I 0 . 6 24 . 9 29 . 7 
1935 25.5 30. 3 25 . 9 23.1 34 .0 25.6 14.6 21.0 
I 
1936 58.4 56 . 2 28. 1 33 .0 5.1 3 . 7 8.4 7.1 
1937 74.6 71.5 10.2 16.2 3 . 5 4.7 11.7 7 . 6 
1938 9.2 7 . 9 57.7 62 . 9 26.7 22.9 6.4 6.3 
1939 17.7 16. 3 45.":4 50 .5 27.4 23.5 9.5 9 . 7 
1940 42 . 5 38.0 42 . 7 46 . 9 0.6 0.3 14.2 14.8 
Source:Ca1culated from , Vneshnyaya torgov1ya SSSR za 1918-194agg,M., l960. 
Note:Proportion of O.S.A. imports for 1913-1927/28 estimated by taking 80 
per cent of the given total for all metal-working equipment; for 
1935-1940 , as a residual. 
Ths American and British proportions for 1926/27-1927/28 are believed 
to be understatement$ ; the ' other' category probably includes imports 
from these countries. 
Equivalent information for 1929-1934 not available . 
Thw Structure of all Machinery and Equipment Imports , 1929-1934 
( as a percentage of total imports by value) 
Year Germany U.S .A. Britain Other 
1929 49.7 35 . 6 8.9 5.8 
1930 39.5 49 . 6 6.9 4. 0 
1931 47.1 43.1 1.6 2.2 
1932 70.0 8.7 19 . 0 2.3 
1933 78.2 5.9 11.9 4.0 
1934 43.5 27.1 20 . 3 9.1 
Source:as above. 
I 
I 
I 
SA.40 Table SA.XXI 
The Structure of Machine Tool Imports ~l Type of Mach~~~9 - 1938 
( in value term~) 
Structure of imports - per cent of total by value 
Type of Machine 1929 1930 1931 
Lathes •. , ••••••••••••• 23.3 23.9 21.5 
Turret Lathes, ••.••••• 10.8 10.5 11.6 
Autos .& Semiauto~ • • ••• 0.8 4.7 5.0 
Drilling & Boring mcs. 17 .o 16.8 18.0 
Milling machines •••••• ~ 25. t 21.0 16.9 
Grinding macl1ines •.••. 14.9 
I 
13.5 14.7 
Tool & Cutter grdg.mcs 4.0 2,? 3.0 
Planing & Shaping mcs. 5.1 6.9 9.3 
Total . •••• 100 .o 100.0 100.0 
1934 1935 1936 
Lathes • e • e • e e e • • • • e I 32.8 35.6 33.72 
Turret Lathes ••••••••• 7.6 3.2 5.5 
Autos & Semiautos •••• 9.8 8.7 9.4 
Drilling & Boring mcs 13.6 17.4 12.6 
Milling machines ••••• , 9.7 9.6 8.8 
Grinding machines ••.• 
t23.9 20.5 
22 .2 
Tool & Cutter grdg .mce 1.7 
Planing & Shaping mce . 2.6 5.0 6.1 
Total •••••• 100 .0 100.0 100.0 
t.January to September on1y , 
2.Including special lathe~- 17.7 per cent. 
3.Including special lat~es- 31.B per cent. 
Source a 
(\ 
1932 1933 
28 .4 10.6 
7 . 9 3 .2 
6.9 1.5.6 
18.3 16 .3 
15.7 31.1 
13.3 
} 16.3 2 .0 
7.5 6 .9 
100.0 100.0 
1937 19381 
45.13 11.7 
} 8 .1 17.6 
13.1 17.9 
11.8 15.1 
15.6 29 .8 
1.0 1.0 
5.3 6 .9 
100.0 100.0 
. 
1929- 1932a Calculated f rom • Vo~senskii.A.N. & Voloshinskii,A.A., 
y_neehn:yaya torgovlya SSffi za pervuyu P.'{atlletku,M.,1933,pp.30S-309 · 
1933- 193.5• Calculated from , Miehusttn,D.D., Vneshyaya torgovlya i 
industrializatsiya SSSR.M.,19)8.p.!48. 
1936 1 Salculated from ,Statistika vneshne1 t orgovl1 SSSR,1936,Ro . 12,pf . 99-101, 
1937c ibid.,1937,No.12, p.40 . 
1938: ~.,1933,No.12,p.40. 
r 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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Table SA.XXIl 
The Structure of Imported Lat ~es , 1929 - 1932, aftd 1936 
(Proportion of total lathe import~ by value) 
Type of Lathe 1929 1930 1931 1932 l 
~tan1ard single-tool 9.7 46.5 39.9 37.2 
Standard multi-tool 6.7 0.9 3.5 0 .4 
Turret 30.1 26.9 30.5 18.3 
Auto.& Semiautomatic 2.2 12.0 13.2 15.9 
Wheel and roll turning - - 0 .7 5.9 
Crankshaft 0.1 1.3 n.a 0 .8 
Vertical turning & boring 5.6 6.5 ?.4 8.5 
Other types 45.6 5. 9 4.0 12.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 1 
100.0 I 100.0 
Source a 
1936 
8.0 
0.7 
11.2 
17.3 
t6.9 
).7 
6 .8 
35.4 
100 .0 
1929- 1932s C~lculated from Voznesensk\i,N.A ., & Voloehinsk11,A.A . ,op cit, 
pp.J08-J09. 
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1936: Calculated from Statistika vneshne1 torgovlya,1936 ,No.12,pp .99-100 . 
The Structure of ImpoEted and Soviet-built Machine tools installed in the Machine building and Metal 
Working Industries , 1928 - 1933. 
Type of Machine Tool 
Lathes •...• .. .....• 
Turret Lathes ,Autos 
and Semi-autos •..• 
Drilling machines .. 
Milling machines .•. 
Grinding machines .. 
Planing,Shaping and 
Slotting machines •. 
Threading machines . 
Total .....•... . .•.. 
Source: 1928 - 193l(Ql) 
Calculated from 
refer to 75 per 
Structure of types of machine tool installed, as a proportion of notal installations in: 
The Machine Building Industry (%) The Mc.Bdg. & M. Wkg . Industries (%) 
1928 1929 & 1930 1931 &'3l(Ql) 1932(02-04) 1933 
Soviet Imprtd . Soviet Imprtd. Soviet Imprtd. Soviet Imprtd. Soviet Imprtd . 
30 . 4 36.1 41.5 31 . 2 50.2 23 . 4 43.3 30.9 42.4 21 .0 
6 .1 12.9 2.4 16.6 1.1 16.8 4.0 12.6 6.9 17.5 
30 . 2 20.9 30.7 20 . 9 29 . 2 22 .7 24.4 12.9 20 . 3 14.0 
2. 7 11.7 2 . 4 12 . 3 3.1 14.8 4 . 3 15.6 7.6 15.0 
16.1 8.9 9.8 12.5 5 . 5 15.0 8.8 29 . 9 10.1 26 . 3 
9.4 5.8 9.8 4.2 8.4 5.6 7.2 5 . 4 6 . 8 4 . 3 
5 . 1 3 . 7 3.4 I 2 . 3 2 . 5 1.7 4 . 0 1.7 5 . 9 1.9 
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
I Oborudovanie metalloobratyvayushchei erom~shlennosti ,M.,1935 ,vyp.l ,pp60-62. (data 
cent of total installations in the civilian machine building industry) 
1932(Q2-Q4) - 1933 
Calculated from, ibid ,vyp.l , pp58-59 . (all installations in civilian machine building and metal working) 
en 
> . 
~ 
N 
~ 
P> g; 
(1) 
§e . 
~ 
H VI 
H.....:l 
H t-" 
Indicators of the Technical Level of Imported and Soviet-built Machine tools installed in the Machine-
Building Industry , 1928 - 1932 
Type of Feed and Speed change Mechanism* (per cent of total) 
r With Power Feed 
With Stepped-pulley D_r_i_v_e _____ ' With Drive 
Without Feed- --rwith Feed- throuqh a 
change mechsm. change mechsm. 
Year of Installation Average Power(h.p.) l Without Power 
Gearbox . and Typ f M hi eo ac ne s i t I ed Feed ov e Import Soviet Imprtd. soviet Imprtd. Soviet Impr.td. Soviet Imprtd. 
1 
Lathes 1928 ,I 1. 8 4.5 8.2 
1929 & 1930 2.3 4.3 3.3 
1931 & 193Q(lQ) 2.6 5 . 5 4.1 
Turret + lathes 1928 2.3 3.8 97.1 
192~ & 1930 2 . 7 3 . 5 75.4 
1931 & 1932(1Q) 2 . 7 5.6 75 . 5 
Dri1linS~: mcs. 1928 I 2. 1 3 . 3 88.8 
1929 & 1930 2.3 3 . 2 I 78.8 
1931 & 1932(1Q) I 2.1 4 .0 I 77 .1 
Milling mcs. 1928 2 . 5 4 . 5 
I 
25 . 0 
1929 & 1930 2.5 4 . 2 27.3 
1931 & 1932(1Q) 2.1 5 . 2 50 .0 
I 
** P laninSl mcs . 1928 4.0 7.3 3.8 
1929 & 1930 3.5 6.2 3.6 
1931 & 1932(1Q} 3.3 8.4 3.5 
:Excluding automatic and semi-automatic machines. 
Including automatics and semi-autos. 
••tncluding shaping and slotting machines . 
27.3 69.2 I 31.2 I 17.4 I 14.9 
20.0 59.8 29.2 29.3 11.8 
10.8 46.2 22.5 I 38.1 1 11.8 
58.8 2.9 28.4 
31.4 
I 
19.3 23 . 1 
18.4 18.4 12.9 
53 . 6 1.8 2 .2 I 6 . 5 
I 
14. 0 
54 . 1 
I 
3 . 5 2.0 14.3 17 . 5 
38.0 1.6 2.8 16.0 16.4 
i 
5.1 25 . 0 
I 
31.6 31.3 23.3 
16.2 24.7 17.1 38 . 9 16.7 
6.7 17.9 I 13.2 l 19.9 15.1 
..___ --.:r- -· 8.9 67 . 3 49.<!> 
5 .1 49.5 40 .1 
3 . 0 38.0 25.6 
Source:Oborudovanie metalloobratyvayushchei promyshlennosti,M.,l935 , vyp . l,pp6Q-62;67-69. 
5.2 26 . 6 l 
7.6 39.0 
11.6 54 . 9 
- I 18.8 
5 . 3 45.5 
6.1 68.7 
I 
2 . 9 30.2 
3.4 I 26.4 I 5 . 3 42.8 
18.7 I 40. 0 
9 .1 50.0 
12.2 65.0 
28.9 42.1 
I 46 . 9 54 . 8 
58.5 71.4 
~ 
~ 
~ 
(I) 
Ul 
> . 
~ 
H 
...~ 
Ul 
> 
5 
\J\ 
-...J 
N 
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Soviet Machine Tool Exuorts 1934 - 1940 Table SA .nv 
--
I 'l'otal Exports Destination of Exports (~ total value) -
Value I 
Year Units '000 r~ Mon!ol1a Turkey Ch1na Holland Other 
1934 393 134 • . . • • 
1935 640 34 20.3 18.6 2.7 2.5 55 .9 
1936 1,087 
. 
28.4 105 11.2 32 .0 13.1 1) .3 
1917 4,931 290 5.8 9.2 8 .0 36.3 40 .7 
1938 1, ?S~ 177 15.2 1.1 11.8 2.6 69.3 
1939 792 29 62 .0 2.0 1.0 22.0 1) .0 
1940 766 83 54.7 3.4 40 .5 1.2 0.2 
1.In prices of corresponding year 
• no data 
Source :~eshnyaya tor~ovlya S3SR za 1918-1940g~ , pp.155 ,189J571- 576;889-89J; 
912-919;946-952 19~5-989 . 
SA.45 
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Table SA .XXVI 
lm'Oorted ~.achlne Tool s , Installations in the Engineerinll Industry durin:t 
the First Five-year Plan , and the Degree of Snecialisation and Automation 
of Installed ~lacnines 
h'f-rooortion of Imt~orted 1'lachines6and a Hio:h Rate 
1 . 
of 
Automobile building 92 . 8 49.9 tc .s )6 .5 22 . 5 79 ,8 I 4tV6 584.9 
rr act or buil di ng 90 .0 52.7 18.9 )9 .8 25 .1 72 .6 )409 880.9 
Optical-measuring eq. 
for personal use .* % .1 66 .7 24.5 43 .1 30 .3 1? . 1 1658 325 .7 
~lectric power eq . 84.5 35.2 7.2 31.1 36 .J 19 . 1 2143 77 .7 
Control-measuring eq. 7?.4 51 .0 5.J 33 .7 41.7 ; .6 116) 93 .8 
Office machine bdg . 74.8 48 . 2 lo J ..... 50 . 0 22 .6 0 .0 J34 2)0 .3 
Machine tool bldg . 68 .6 34.0 7.3 J4 .2 41.2 15.8 3103 416 . 0 
Auto- tractor spares 67 .8 39 .e 11.2 )2 .9 44 .6 10 .2 1247 265.3 
Welf"hted Av f>-rage (or ~2 . 0 45 .2 13 .0 35.8 :n.2 35 .7 (17233) 244. 5 
totRl) • ~J-.._ 
B.Branches with a Low FroEortion of Imnorted Machines and a Hich rlate of urowth 
durin,.. FYP(1)-! 
Food industry eq . 58 .7 120 ,) 2 .4 17 .0 55.2 ; .6 1010 94 .8 
+ 
I 26 .1 ;6 .4 16 .2 721 136.0 . Hsc • trans port eq • 58 . 5 )2 . 0 7 .7 
Agricultural me . ·oog . I 55 .1 24.0 J .O 1 • )9 . 1 26 . 2 3767 12) .7 
Lifting and industrl . 
_54 .6 12 . ) 55-9 11.2 831 ?6 .7 transport eq . bdg . 19 . 0 2 .1 
~oaa -constrn . eq .bdg . 54 .1 18. 7 1 .9 11.1 5'1 .? 3.0 790 
78.8 
Forestry eq .bdg . 5J .J 12 .9 0.6 16 . 2 62.0 
1.1 196 74.8 
Wei hted Average \or 55·7 22 . 5 ) .0 17 .J 46 .2 
16 .4 (7315) 104 .7 
total) 
---" 
~ includinv clocks ,watches and pnotoDraphic equipment . 
~ includtnp bicyles . 
SA.46 Tablf" SA . ~J:VI .:ont . 575 
Proportion (~) of stock on 10/4/32: Jcrortnof stock 
SplzdlAuto · ITurret, ILathes .Lnst:t . ! 1/29 to 10/4/32 
& & MJ lg .& 1n _, ... I~o . r.!:cer cent 
Branch of Engineering .rmptd . spcl . s- auto. grdg . plnng . floy In std. . ~~ollth 
C.Branches ~1th a H1lh Proportion of Inoorted t 1ach1nes and to t f 
Growth rlurin~ Fyp( )_, !:!l 11 w rta e o 
Co- unications eq . 8) .7 44 .? 
Ketallur~ical eq . ~0 .3 21 . 0 
Printing & paper eq . ?5 .0 19. 5 
Text i l e machinery 73 . 2 36.9 
Boller makin~ 70 .1 16 .1 
Fuel & ore eq . 68 . 1 21.8 
7 . 5 30. 5 33 .5 4 . 5 1322 4? .5 
4 .? 12 .4 6? .0 ) .9 389 55 .0 
4.? 15. 0 55. 2 22 . 9 84 49.4 
4.6 29.7 52 .4 3.5 671 3).4 
1.0 10 .8 57 ·5 6 .4 200 62 .9 
J .8 1? .6 56 .5 5. 9 996 66 .6 
'eight ed Average (or 
total) 76 . 5 )4 .J 1 5.3 24 .4 48.1 4 .? (.3662) 48 .9 __.._ _ .....__  ___._ 
D.'6ranches with a Low Prop_ortion of Imoortod Machines and a Low Jiate of Growth 
duri.n~ FYP( 1) . 
PUI!lps & cocpressors 
Misc .heavy lnd . eq . 
~lise .l ight 1.nd • eq . 
62 .6 
44 .8 
22 .9 
12 .9 
44 .4 14 .8 
Mlsc .cultrlrwlfr. eq . 35 .7 30.1 
I ) . 1 
1. 8 
24 . 0 
14. 5 
53 -7 
60.6 
4 .5 1 11 . 0 64 . 9 
4.5 
3.6 
4 .3 
1.0 16 .0 51 .2 12 .5 
44 .4 
61.0 
145 51 .6 
151 62 .4 
1-----------1---·---1---- -- ~ 
netghted Aver~e(or 
·total) 49 .4 18.4 5.0 (1156) j4 .J 
E.Branches with a Hiv.h Fronortlon of Im~rted Machines , a Very Low Rnte of 
Growth during FYP{i) ' and a Hi£h Prooortion ·of pre-1217 Installations , 
Loco~"~otive & wagon tg. 130 .6 30.4 
Frtme- movers bdg . 
Ship building 
t:.isc .railway eq . 
?8.8 24. 5 
?? .4 20 .6 
73 .1 J8. 1 
) .7 20 .1 52 . ) 
2.5 22 .5 53 .9 
2 .0 18.5 5t .5 
) .7 2) . 5 53 ·3 
? .• 1 1248 19 .2 
s . ; 1249 2:1 .5 
J.J B19 25 .5 
6 .2 281 27 -9 
ieight ed Aver age (or J I 
total) 7~ .9 27 . 0 J .O 21 . 5 52 .7 5.7 (3597) 23 . 5 _ 
~--------------~--~----~--~----~--~----Summary 
i 
A.Hi gh 71 ./Hi gh Gr owth 82 .0 45. 2 1J .O 35 .8 JJ.,2 35.71 52.-J 244 .5 
B.Low H./IHgh Growt h 55.7 22 . 5 J . O 17 . ) 46. 2 16 .4 22 .2 104.7 
C.High M./Low Growth ?6 . 5 J4.J 5 .3 24 .4 48. 1 4 .? 11 .1 4~.9 
D.Low n./Low Gro~sth 49 .4 18 .4 2 .5 17. 3 5? .8 ,5 .0 I J .S ,54 . ) 
E .Hi.Bb 11 ./V .Low Crth . ?8.9 27 .0 3.0 21.5 52.7 .5. 7 10.9 23 .5 
Av .for all branches 74 .0 JJ .J 6 .8 26 . 0 44 .4 1~ . 1 [ 
SA .4? 
Table SA ,XXVI notes and source 
~ 1 Two branches of enginePring have be-n excluded because of tho speci:fic 
nature of thetr ~quipment - the making of medical instruments and the 
building of sewin~ machines . 
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Source aCompiled from material of the 1932 Census : Oborudovanie meta11oohraty-
vayushcht=-i 'PrO:"yst'l..lennosti , J., 193 5, vyp .2 ,Table 28( pp112- 117) and Table )0 
( ppt)0- 1 T3) 
.otes t 1.0f 3rd ,4th and 5th de~ree of soecialisation , according to the definition 
employed or the Census tsee p-474 ) . 
2 .Auto1Lat1c ant'! sem1- autoN.at.:.c .,achines of all t.ypes. 
3 .Turret l athes (1noludin~ automatics and semi-automatlcs~illing machines 
of all types , a_r1c ~Trinding machines. including toi:il and cutter grinders • 
i . e . the b~sic typ~~ oc progressive proouctlon equipment . 
4 .Lathes ; planinq , slotting and shaping machine~;1 . e. types predominantly 
o~ a general-purpcso nature . 
S.Machine tools arranged on a flo~-line basls , according to the sequence 
of processes per:ormed (see r .520) . 
6. c· or th • nurnoses of this table a ' htg h' proportion of imported machines 
in the stock of t0/4/32 is defined as 65 per cent or more ; and a ' 1o~· 
pro-portion as less than 65 per cent . 
7 .Br~ches with a ' high ' rate of growth during FYP(1) ar~ defined as those 
for which the stock increased by 70 per cent or more ; with a 'low ' rate 
of growt h - les than 70 per cent . In the case of Category E ., over 
50 per cent ofthe stock on 10/4/32 was installed before 1917. 
8 .Percentage of total installations durlng FYP(l) . 
SA .48 
Table SA .XXVII 
The Project Capac! ty of ~-lachine Tool Enterprises 
(Full project capacity as seen 1n various years) 
(number of units) 
Enterprise 1929 
' Krasny! P:roletar11 ' 2 , 3251 
1m.Ordzhon1k1dze 1 ,2002 
Gor ' k11 ZFS 1,30rl 
Khar ' kov drilling mea .f. 1,8oo2 
" grinding mcs .f . 
im .Sverdlova 2 , ooo3 
1m.Len1na 
'Samotochka' 
' Komsomolets ' 
1m.TsK Mash~nostroen1ya 
Kiev 1m .Cor ' kor,o 
Saratov g- c mc .f . 
' Stankokonstr~ktsiya ' 
Sverdlovsk un1t-c . mc . f • 
.. heavy mc . t . f . 
Source a 
1 .Tore . -proa.gaz ., t . ~ .29 . 
2 .Ek .zhizn ' , 22 .12.29 . 
) , 1b1.d . ,2? .? .29 . 
1930 
3 ,6oo4 
2 ,4oo5 
J ,4oo5 
1,9505 
2 ,700
4 
4 ,?00
4 
2 ,1?04 
?50
4 
I 1931 I 19)2 
6,ooo6 6, 00010 
2,44b/6 ,8oo8 6, 14011 
7 -y· 
J ,435/B , ooo 
l2 11-
12,500/9.300 
14 T) 
1 ,960/1 ,?00 
1 , 50015 
1 ,;oo10 
? , ooo10 
J ,b.5Ql0 
10 
1,200 
l , 6.5010 
2?f6 
I~ 
Conti ued next p 
4 ,For 1932 - S1I , 19JO ,No .J -4 ,p .) . 
5 . Izvest1ya , 19 • .5· 1930 . Note - this was the capacity at time of projection, 
see Vestnik metallopromyshlennost1 ,19Jl ,to .8 , pp .65-66. 
6 .Ptavda,1? . 12 .)1 . 
7 . ibid . ,2 . 1 .)1 . 
8 .Ek . zh1zn ' .,29 .12.31 . 
9.zal0d .,29 .12 .)1 . 
lO .Lebyachenko , oo cit ,p . SO . 
1t .Pravda ,24 , t2 .)2 . 
12 .0rdzhon1k1dze ,G.K.,Stat11 t rech1 ,Vol .2 , p .)j0 . {Jan . t9)2) 
1J .Bol ' shev1k ,1932,No.5 ,p.50 . 
14.!2_Jet bor'by za sovetskoe mash1nostroen1e ,op c1t , p.40 . (early 1932) 
15 .Khar ' kovsk11 stankostro1tPl ' ny1 , op c1t , p.9 . (second half 1932) 
16 .Zalnd .,24 . 1 . )2 . 
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Table SA .XXVII cont . 
'I'he Project Cauacity of l·1achine Tool Enterorises - continued . 
1933 1Q34 1935 1936 ' I Ent . 1939 . 
6,ooo1 2 ,7004 3 , 5009 2, 70011 ' KF ' 
6,6oo2 3 ,7004 3 ,4oo9 - 2,4oo
11 2,40o12 im.O. 
6 ,7002 5,1004 5,ooo9 3,40011 3,85012 CZFS I -
1 ,7003 1,7505 1 , 750!2 , 40010 } 11 1 ,8oo
12 Kh .d • 
3 , ooa-5 . 1 ,220 
7006 
9 - 1 
Kh.g . 
S300/700 .u 6oo1.1 1m .sv. 
4, 000° 3 , oo6Y 2, 5201 .\ J ,300J.' 1m .L. 
3,ooo·t 1 ,700J.U J , 0001 l 90012 ·s ·. 
-
1,2oo6 1,2009 1,25011 1,16012 • K ' • • 
1,2006 90010 1,20011 2,10012 1m .TsK 
2, 000.5 -2 , oolJ; 6 50ro 50011 6oo1" Kiev 
1,5008 1,5009 75011 '-'80013 S .g- c 
2004 25010 27511 ' StSt~ 
-
~, 3005 1, 8oo10 1 ,8oo11 Sv .u-c 
300/1505 "6oo
14 
Sv .h. 
Sources 
l .Industrial ' noe razv1tie shlennogo raiona,1926-J2 , op cit, 
p. 1 Feb.1933 • 
2 .Planovoe khozyaistvo , 193J ,.No .1- 2, p . J8. 
J .Izvestila , 1~ . 1 . 33 . 
4.Zaind. ,26 .1 .J4 . 
5.Proekt vtorogo pyatiletno~o plana .• , op cit , Drilozhenie,pp48-49 . 
6 .Sli,19J4 ,No . J,p .1. 
7 .Zaind ., t6 .1 .J4 . 
8.1bid.,2? . 8 .J4 . 
9 .Naredno- khozya1stvenny1 olan n?. 1935g.,op c1t,p .810. 
10 .Problemy ekonomi ki , 19'3 5 ,j~ o .4 , p . 193 • 
t1 .Uarodno~khozyaistvenny1 plan na 1936g . ,op clt,pp.296 , J28 , J50 , J70,J76 ,42M490 . 
12.Gosu!Larstvennyi plan razvit lya narodno~o khozyaistva Soyuza SSR v 1932g . , 
op cit , pp .2~2-26J . 
13 .Nashinostroenie ,8 . ) .40 . 
14.ibid . ,16 . 3 .41 AQutput in 1942) 
SA. 5G 
The Constructio.'l of New Machine Tool Factories .. Pl&!'l& and Ach1ev ent 
1929 - t94t - -
Table . ID'UI 
ractqry 
1a.Ordzbon1k1dze 0 0 
Cor' k11 !Ulng . c .f. c 0 
Khar' kov drlllg . mc.f. FPl PC X c c Or -
Kbar' kov grndp; ,me .:f . p p FP2.F: 
'Stankokonstrukts~a' p p PC c 0 
Chelyablnok hvy .a . f ·I p p c c c 0 
Cor' k11 gear-ctg. a.f. p p p p FP2P 
Sverdlovsk hvy. l!l . f . p p FP2L~ 
,. 
Sverdlovsk un1t .. o. :f' . 0 
lev automa lee f. f'P2 J:c 0 
Saratov gear-c .a.:f' . FP2 ro O• 
Voronezh grd~ .M . f . Pf-?.P 
rama torsk h vy. A f • 
Alapaevsk autos . f . 
l~ovos1b1rsk bortng 
mc .f . 
Pen1-a prec ! e 1 on na f • 
Planing mc .~,S1bar~a 
Cor' k11 vertl . tf!: .&~. p 
Sarapul ~rd~ .m .f . 
Un1vrsl.n.Far East 
Kazan broaching a~. 
Vladl.t!lir un 1 t-c .e .~ 
Ryaun lathes r . 
Ulyanovsk larf!:e 
lathe f . 
li!!l 
p _ construe ton propo e but not. l.n anoual or fiv -year pl 
FPt 2 ') - ln.Five-year .Plan (1s"t ,2n~,Jm). 
P -' c~~t.ruct1on proj~t ln annual plan. 
X c c c 
-· -· -· -· 
m re 
c c 0 
FFJ ro 
P) ro 
FPJ? ro 
P) 
F) 
fP3 
m 
r. 
~ 
ro 
•• 
0 l 
~ 
... 
"'' 
Fe 
R:l 
fC l 
F 
F 
p 
p 
f\1 f 
C - under construcUon . •otea 1n all caaes conatrue C-0 ,t ln :1 !t r f .. !'!rl 
started pro1uet1on. 
0 - start of nro"' uct1on • 
- - re~ular production • 
x - work ewspe.'l-.:1 " 
• _ ex~r1 ental shop crnl1· 
1 
Table SA .XXVIII 
:a1n sources a 
SA .51 
Five-year Plans - 1s ,2nd and )rd . 
Annual plans - 1935,36,37,39. 
S1I , 19)4,ho. 4 , p .40 (19)U) 
K~h1nostroenie , 8 . ~ . 1940 (1939 ,40) 
Industr1al1zatslya SSSB ,1938-41 , p.6? (1 0) 
Planovoe khozva1s~vo , 1941, o .) , p .44 (1941) 
51I ,1932 ,No .? ,p.2 (1932) 
Khar'kovskil stankostroltel ' ny1 ,op c1t,p c-J). 
Sogrln .G ,V ., Per.el~styvaya stran1tsy ,Chcly bin k,l9 S,p .21.8-229.(Ch ly b1nsk). 
Prices and Costs of Some Basic Models 1932 - 1940 Table S\ .AXIX 
- (rubles) 
Model .1.932 _1933 _1934 J935 
TN-20 Lathe c1 4582 4517 
( 'KP') p2 8000 
DIP-200 Lathe c 15035 9071 7206 
(I KP') X p 9100 9830 
DIP-300 Lathe c 15000 
('KP') X p 20000 18150 
MT-30 Multi-tool c 12952 
lathe ( 'KP') X p 20000 20000 18000 
'136' Turret c 27202 17189 15474 13986 
lathe ( im .Ord.) X p 15000 15670 
'114' Semi-auto c 131748 25021 
(1m .Ord .) X 
20000 p 25000 
'123' 4-spdl.bar c 
auto ( 1m .Ord. ) X p 60000 
'2135'vert.dr111 c 24620 
( 1m.Len1na) X p 13000 
' 682'Un1versal c 40207 17206 13500 
milling (GZFS) X 21000 16460 p 15000 
'681G'Horizontal c 15500 11000 8860 8500 
milling (Tula.) p 7500 13000 12000 
' 262'(R-80) BoringC 73000° 28000 
(1m.Sverdlova) p 45000 31000 
'532' gear- c 12240 
X cutting me. p 10000 19000 15500 (~omsomolets) 
'3A12'Cyl1ndrical C 
X grinding me. p 10000 20000 
( K 'Jar ' kov) 
1 713 1 (3-PS) c 69205 56063 
Planing me. X 43200 p 18000 40000 (1m.Sverdlova) 
x year introduced; before 1932 if not i ndicated • 
• not produced 
* Jan .-Feb. ** Harch 0 1931 
_1936 1937 1940 - -
6670 6670 • 
9930 7700 7700 
13040 
17680 15000 15000 
10000 10000 10000 
13574* 
14140 12500 15500 
20000 20000 • 
40000 40000 40000 
15530** 
13130 11000 11000 
15150 12500 12500 
9600 9600 9000 
30300 25000 25000 
15660 15660 • 
18000 16000 . 
44440 41000 • 
1• Cost _ annual average factory cost of production (fabrichno-zavodskaya 
sebestoinost') 
2. Price - Industry wholesale price (etpusknava tsena) 
Sourcet see next page 
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~ources -Table SA.XXIX 
Costs 
TN -20: Vestnik metallopromyshlennosti ,1935 ,No.9 ,p .126. 
DIP-200t1932- Zaind.,6.4.33; 1933-34- as TN-20. 
DIP- 300s 1934- Zalnd .,29 .3 .35: 1936- ibid ., 5. 2.37. 
MT- 30 a Zaind.,29 .3.35. 
5S2 
1)6a 1932- Zalnd.,6 .4. 33~ 1933-34- Vestnik metalloproroyshlennosti,1935,No.9,p.t16 
1935-36 - Plan,1936,No .9,p.8. 
114t Vestnik metallonromyshlen~osti,1935,No.9,p.tt6. 
6821 1932-33- Plan.Khoz.,1934,No.5-6,p.38;1934- laind.,29.3.35 . 
2135• Za!nd. , 21.5 .36. 
681G a 1932& 35- Zaind.,29.2.36; 1933-34- ibid.,24.2.36. 
262 a Borisov & ~asil'ev,op c1t ,p.157. 
532a Zalnd.,29 .3.35. 
713 a Vestn1k metallopromyshlennost1 ,1935,No.9,p.116. 
Prices 
1932- Zalnd.,2) .7 .)1. 
1933- 1b1d.,3.8.)2. 
1934-~ •• 29 . ) .35. 
1935- ~etallorezhushchie stanki proizvodstva zavodov SSS~M .-L.,1935; 
Nashe stroitel'stvo,1935,No.8,p.36. 
1936 stanki roizvodstva 
1937 - Preiskurant otpusknykh tsen na metallorezhushchie stank1 groizvodstva 
zavodov SSSR 1937g.,M.,1937· 
1940- Metallorezhushchie stanki- pr eiskurant, 1940-41gg~,M .-L.,1941. 
'-
• 
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The Perfor mance of Three Leading Enterprises 
l. 'Krasnyi Proletarii ' 
Indicator 192!/0 19)1 1932 
a .Gross ·output 
('000r,1926/7 p . ) 
4700 111556 f9926 
b .tfo .of workersl 967 1538 
c ,Output/worker(r) 4860 7513 
d .Output - units 1249 2190 
e .Un1t.s/worker 1.29 1.42 
f .No.of types/ 
sizes b ull t* 6 5 
!•Av,no.units per 
type/si ze 208 438 
2.Cor' Jdi Hilling L'lachine Factory 
Indicator 1932 
a .Gross Output 
( '000r ,1926/27 p.) 1598 
b.No.of warkers1 776 
o.Output/worker(r. ) 3148 
d .Output - units 28 
e .Units/worker 0.04 
f .No.of types/sizes 
t>u1lt* 1 
g .Av ,no.units per 
type/si.ze 28 
) . imeni Ordzhon1kidze,Moscow -
Indicator 
a ,Gross Output 
( 'OOOr,1926/27 p.) 
b .No ,of tJorkers 1 
c .Output/worker (r . ) 
d.Output - units 
e ,Units/worker 
f .No .of types/sizes 
built* 
g .iv .no .un1ts per 
type/si ze 
( • . ) estimate 
• approximate 
1 ,vorkers (rabochie) only 
19)2 
2600 
826 
2059 
36 
0.04 
1 
36 
2395 
8320 
2378 
0. 99 
6 
396 
1933 
6646 
1292 
6697 
418 
0.32 
2 
209 
19)) 
9865 
1473 
5144 
466 
0.32 
2 
2)3 
1933 1934 1935 
29256 i 
2710 
7987 110566 11565 
2200 2640 ( 2700) 
I 0.95 
12 15 17 
I 18) l 176 159 
1934 1935 
19990 
1695 
8670 
548 1181 
0.32 
8 11 
69 I 107 
1934 1935 
120621 29900 
21'31 2)40 
9678 12775 
60B 1)01 
0.29 0 • .56 
7 8 
87 163 
Table SA .AU 
1936 1 1937 193~ 1939 1940 ! 
49815 73328 
3481 3125 
12563 114310 17139r384 123462 
2756 2900 3625 4000) (44ro) 
1 o.8) 1.~ 1 
20 23 24 25 28 
1)81 126 1 151 160 1571 
1936 1937 
32000 
1800 (2000) 
16000 
(1500) t887 
0. 83 0 .94 
1J 15 
115 126 
1936 1937 
53900 
2850 
18912 
(2200) 
0 .77 
10 12 
183 
'!'able SA.XXX 
Source a 
1!~snyi Proletarii' 
SA.55 
a.1929-30- ~etall,1931,No.1,p.88. 
1931 - ~ebyachenko,op cit,p.8. 
1932- I~d.~trial'noe razvitie tsentral'nogo promyshlennogo raiona,1926-32, 
M. ,1969,p.458. 
1934- Tyazhelaya promyshlennost' SS3R za 1931-34gg.,M.,1935,p.1'73· 
193'7 -Output inc. 1932-37 by 250 per cent - Slavnye trad1tsi1,1'1.,1957,p.18?. 
1940 - Output inc. 1932-40 by 368 per cent - Omarovskii,op cit,p.153 . 
b,1929-30 & 32 - Frob.Ek.,1934,No.6,p.132. 
1931,34,37,40 - Calculated from a. and c.Notet1940 - 3104- Plan.Khoz,1940,No6,p33 
c.1929-30 - calculated from a. and b. 
1931 - 40 - Calculated using index - Omarovskii,op cit,p.1'70, on basis of 
1932 output/worker calculated from a. and b. 
d.From Table 
e.Calculated from d. and b. 
! .Estimated on the basis of data of price handbooks and other sources. 
!•Calculated from d. and f. 
2.Gor 'kii milling machine factory 
a.1932 ,33,34- Tyazhelaya promyshlennost' SSSR za 1931-34gg.,op cit,p.88. 
193'7 - ~izenshta~~ & Qhikhachev,op cit,p.218. 
b.1932,33,34 - as a. 
1q36 - Sii,1936,No.8,p.1. 
c.Calculated from a. and b. 
~ .From Table 
e.Calculated from d and b. 
!.Estimated on the basis of price handbooks and other sources. 
!•~alculated from d. and f. 
).im.Ordzhonikidze 
a.1932 , 33 - Tyazhelaya promyshlennost' •• ,op c1t,p.88; 
1934 _Calculated from 1935 output and Gudov,I,Sud ba r abochego,M.,1970,p.9'7· 
1935- Za!nd.,8.t.J6. 
1937 - Aizenshtadt & Chikhachev,op c1t, p.218 . 
b. 1932, J3 - as a .. 
1934,35 - calculated from a. and c. 
1937 - Zaind. ,9.1.37 • 
c !932 33 3~ - calculated from a. and b. 
"1934'- ~alculated from 1935 output/worker and Gudov,loc. 
1935 - Zaind. ,8.1.36 • 
cit. 
d .From Table 
f.Estimated on the basis of price handbooks andother sources. 
e .Calculated from d. and b. 
g.Calculated from d. and f. 
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